(Main Committee I) Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Good morning, Excellencies, distinguished delegates.
Kindly take your seats.
Thank you.
Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, the fifth meeting of main Committee one of the 2026 Review conference of the parties to the Trey on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is called to order.
Excellence distinguished delegates.
On Friday, we discussed the zero draft outcome document of this review conference as circulated by the Secretariat on Wednesday six May and bearing the symbol ampT slash UNF 2026 slash CRP dot two.
As a reminder and in accordance with the guidance from the president of the review conference, main Committee one will discuss and negotiate the following elements of the zero draft outcome document.
Preambola paragraphs Roman numerals I to X, paragraphs 1 and 2, paragraphs 46 to 73, and paragraph 80.
This is in accordance with the respective allocations of items to each main committee as decided by the preparatory committee and the decision by the review conference to proceed in accordance with that decision.
In that regard, allow me to kindly remind allegations of the president's request for this committee to focus specifically on those sections of the draft outcome document that I have just cited.
Let me again express my appreciation for the constructive manner in which delegations have engaged with the draft outcome document.
Let me also thank delegations for the written inputs they have submitted thus far.
Distinguished delegates.
Let me also remind you that the conduct of business in the main committees will now be without a formal list of speakers.
States states may request the floor by pushing the button to register their requests to speak.
There will be a strict time limit for delegations intervention.
A timer will be shown on the screen and your microphones will start blinking on 1 minute remains for intervention, followed by a strict microphone cutoff once the time limit has been reached.
Delegations will recall that the time limit for statements is 8 minutes for group statements and 5 minutes for national statements.
Delegations who speak on behalf of group of states or state parties should clearly indicate such when they take the floor.
Finally, delegations are requested to please inform the Secretariat as soon as possible if they wish to exercise their right of reply.
Right of reply will be heard at the end of this meeting.
Distinguished delegates, you will recall that at the end of Friday's main Committee one meeting, there were four states parties who had requested the floor but were unable to speak due to time limitations.
I had proposed that those states be given the floor first at today's meeting to which I had no objection.
Those four states parties are Iran, the Netherlands, Austria, and Japan.
After those states parties speak, and state parties agree, I propose we continue our discussion of paragraphs 46 through 73 and paragraph 80 of the zero draft document.
Should we exhaust that discussion, I intend to open the floor again for comments on all our allocated sections of the zero draft.
Those delegations that wish to take the floor on paragraphs 46 to 73 and paragraph 80 are therefore requested to press the button in front of them at this time.
I'll turn to that list following the interventions of the final four speakers on my list from Friday.
The first speaker I have on my list is the distinguished representative of Iran.
You have the floor.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chair.
Good morning to you and distinguished colleagues.
In fact, due to bulk of paragraphs to be discussed in this section, I may need some further interventions, but I'll continue and see to the extent that I'll be able to cover the remarks from my delegation.
Starting with paragraph 46, I think that in order to follow the verbatim of the treaty on Article 6, we need to add at an early date in the middle of the paragraph, because it is missing in this paragraph quoting Article 6.
Also, in order to contextualize our main goal, which is nuclear disarmament, I think that if we change the phrase general and complete and put nuclear, it'll be much meaningful.
The afterwards, we need two new paragraphs, first on expressing our concerns about decades long lack of progress in implementation of Article 6, and therefore to request the commencement of negotiations for early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons covering all lifecycle of nuclear weapons and requiring their destruction on internationally verifiable and irreversible manner.
And also we need, due to the plan of modernizations by different nuclear weapon states, we need to urge them all to cease completely and immediately all their nuclear modernization plan including upgrading and refurbishing their existing nuclear weapons, as well as developing new types of nuclear weapons and also to adopt the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons under any and all circumstances.
Also, in another paragraph, we should stress on the importance of further mobilization of international efforts towards weapons, nuclear disarmament.
And in this context, we see very good opportunities like General Assembly's high level annual meetings on International Day for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
And we see there is a merit to support this meeting and require all nuclear weapon states to participate constructively in that annual meeting.
We believe that paragraph 49 should be deleted because the first part of the paragraph on implementation of Article 6 is essential to maintenance, strengthening the treaty.
It is actually repeated in other places and the second part is, in fact, not factual because we have not seen numerous multilateral, regional, bilateral, and unilateral measures undertaken in fulfillment of Article 6.
This is not a fact.
We believe that in paragraph 50, we need to stress that nuclear weapons are not legally owned or legitimately held weapons, and this is something that we need to highlight in the paragraph.
We believe that paragraph 48 needs to be deleted because it is against the backdrop of some nuclear weapons, certain nuclear weapon states engaged in new nuclear arms race and new nuclear arms modernization.
This is not factual and we definitely need to have it deleted and it is misleading in the current formulation.
We need to highlight the lack of progress as we have mentioned in our statements.
56 years following the entry into force of the treaty, still the Article 6 obligations have not been implemented and there is no prospect for honoring those obligations by their nuclear weapon states.
Mr.
Chair, I'll take another floor I thank the distinguished representative of Iran for his statement.
The next speaker I have on my list is the distinguished representative of the Netherlands.
You have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Since this is the first time we take the floor in this committee on the zero draft, let me begin by joining other delegations in thanking the presidency for preparing the zero draft outcome documents and for guiding us in the process towards a consensus outcome document.
In general, my delegation welcomes this first draft, which we consider to be a solid basis for further deliberations.
In this regard and with a view to support the presidency in the next stage of the drafting process, we have submitted written inputs, and I would like to highlight three key elements during today's debate.
First of all, the Netherlands strongly supports the elements on the CTBT, including a call on the nuclear weapon states to maintain the existing moratorium on nuclear weapon tests pending the entry into force of the CTBT.
In line with the suggestion of many other delegations, we would like to include the need to uphold and strengthen the norm against nuclear testing, as well as a reference to the CTBTO and international monitoring system.
We also support the suggestion of other delegations to include a factual reference to the decision of the Russian Federation to revoke its ratification of the CTBT, which the conference should consider as a concerning development.
Second, my delegation welcomes the text in paragraph 68 to immediately commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and the call nuclear weapons states to maintain or declare moratorium on its production in paragraph 70.
Additionally, and with a view on the current and decade long deadlock in the conference on disarmament regarding the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT, the Netherlands would suggest to include language in the final document which calls for innovative contributions in all appropriate formal and informal forums to facilitate the launch and early conclusion of such negotiations.
We have submitted a suggestion in that regard.
Third and lastly, regarding paragraph 56 concerning new starts, my delegation would like to note that the current text does not reflect the call of several states parties on the holders of the three largest nuclear arsenals, namely Russia, the United States, and China to negotiate a follow up agreement.
We would welcome this to be reflected in the next draft.
Chair, you can count on my delegation's support in concluding this phase successfully and to work towards a consensus outcome document.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Netherlands for testate me.
I invite the distinguished representative of Austria to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
As we are continuing our discussions from last Friday afternoon on sections relating to nuclear disarmament, I would nonetheless like to thank again the president and his team for the draft presented to us and would like to speak now in addition to our preliminary remarks on this section and we'll focus on some important elements, particularly in paragraphs 46 to 73.
On paragraph 50, like other delegations, we deem it important to add an explicit reference on the threat of use and that the conference expresses deep concern about nuclear threats and increasingly stringent nuclear rhetoric.
As previously alluded to, previous commitments have a place in this document, notably the 1995 Review conference outcome, and it should be added in this section in AA in paragraph 51.
We further want to see paragraph 51 strengthened as a central Article 6 measure, and we have provided some comments in writing to the president and his team in this regard.
Further, presenting nuclear weapons as a security guarantee risks incentivizing proliferation and runs counter to the global disarmament and non proliferation regime.
We have commented on that before and have also made some suggestions here.
On nuclear testing in paragraph 55, particularly, we should underline the commitment by all states, not only nuclear weapon states, to refrain from any test explosion.
In this regard, we agree with what the US colleagues referred to on Friday that when we talk about the testing moratorium, we talk about a moratorium on any yield, and the CTBT is a zero yield treaty.
All nuclear weapon states said as much on record before.
The best way to reflect this in our view is to underline this by referencing under any circumstances and at any yield.
Further, acknowledging the impact on people and communities of past testing should be added, for example, in paragraph 54.
Echoing other comments in the room, Austria supports having a specific reference to the CTBTO and the international monitoring system, as well as a specific call on annex two states to sign and ratify without precondition or delay.
With regard to paragraph 61, it is a welcome new element which however, will require further scrutiny.
The paragraph should focus on maintaining human control and involvement over all actions critical to informing and executing decisions related to the possible use of nuclear weapons and encourage nuclear weapon states to deepen understanding of how artificial intelligence may shape decision making processes.
Paragraph 67, we have heard several delegations ask for the paragraph to be separated and have the elements contained in this paragraph in standalone Paris.
We do support this suggestion.
In this regard, we would change the message on education on calling more specifically to educate and empower individuals of all generations regarding the dangers of nuclear weapons and the imperatives to reach a world without nuclear weapons, including the risks and humanitarian consequences associated with these weapons.
In addition, a new paragraph referencing new scientific evidence and research reflecting new data on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, as amongst others established by the G seven Academies of Sciences, should be included.
This would include also a reference to the independent panel on the effects of nuclear war as mandated by Resolution 79 238, with the goal to present to the General Assembly in 2027 the first comprehensive science packed update on global nuclear dangers in nearly 40 years.
We further support suggestions by those allegations that ask for inclusion of references to the disproportionate impact on women and girls in this regard.
As a last comment on this section, para 73, with regard to the TPNW, it should acknowledge the TPNW.
Note that states parties highlight the TPNW's complementarity with the MPT and its implementation of Article 6 and add a factual reference to victim assistance and environmental remediation provisions of the TPNW.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Austria for her intervention and I now invite the distinguished representative of Japan to take a intervention.
Japan, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I'd like to express my delegation's appreciation to the president, his team, and the Secretariat for the early circulation of the draft.
Since I already made general remarks in subsidiary B one last Thursday and that Japan submitted its comments in writing, we did not request the floor before.
I will focus on a few points in my current remarks.
So let me start with the preambula paragraphs.
As already submitted in our written comments, Japan welcomes the preambula paragraphs 2 and 3.
And hope that paragraph these paragraphs will be maintained.
Regarding paragraph 49, we welcome this paragraph which reaffirms the commitment to and the importance of application of the principles of irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency in the implementation of the Article 6 obligations.
Regarding paragraph 52 to 55, Japan believes that the universalization and the entry into force of the CTBT is key to limiting qualitative development of nuclear weapons.
We welcome paragraph 58, which calls on nuclear weapon states to make every effort to ensure that the nuclear weapons are never used again.
As already stated by other delegations, this paragraph should focus on nuclear weapon states.
We join some previous speakers that requested to delete the second sentence in this paragraph.
Paragraph 65 to 66, Japan also welcomes paragraph 65, which stresses the necessity of enhanced transparency by nuclear weapon states and paragraph 66 on the reporting.
We believe these paragraphs are important to introduction to transparency and accountability in paragraphs 90 to 91.
Regarding paragraph 67, following previous practices, we'd like to have languages on disarmament and non proliferation education as an independent paragraph.
The importance of this issue is widely shared as demonstrated by the joint statement supported by 116 states parties.
We also had many delegations, including my previous speaker, requesting a separate paragraphs.
So we think there is a wide support for separating this paragraph, and we propose to use the language in related paragraphs in the draft 2022 final document.
Finally, on paragraphs 70 to 71, FMCT, we welcome the reference to the code for the immediate commencement of negotiation of an FMCT in the CD and to maintain and declare moratoriums on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Japan for her intervention.
I think that at this stage, we have exhausted the list of states parties who had requested the floor on Friday, so we will now continue our discussions of paragraphs 46 through 73 and paragraph 80 of the draft document.
Have a number of delegations that have requested the floor.
Indonesia, on behalf of the non Allied movement, Egypt, Denmark, Mexico, Fiji, Iran, Canada, China, the Russian Federation, and Poland.
Follow that in this order.
I invite the distinguished representative of Indonesia on behalf of the non Allied movement to take the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
As I will be speaking on behalf of the non allied states parties to the NPT, I would kindly ask for your indulgence in allowing me to deliver this statement in full covering all matters under this committee.
Mr.
Chair, I have the honor to speak on behalf of the group of the non allied states parties to the NPT.
We congratulate you, your team, and the Secretariat for the efficient and prosicsional manner in which you have steered our work during the 11 NPT review Conference.
The group attaches great importance to successful outcome of this review conference.
To this end, the group welcomes the president's effort in preparing the draft outcome documents at an early stage for considerations by states parties.
Group is pleased to see that the number of matters raised in our working papers and statements were considered and reflected in the document, and we believe that this document provides a good basis to start our deliberations.
The group expresses its strong support to the zero drafts re aation of existing commitments pursuant to the 1995, 2000 2010 outcome documents of the review conferences.
Notwithstanding this, we have identified some areas which need to be addressed to further strengthen the draft outcome documents and ensure effective implementations of the treaty.
In this regard, the group would like to share our general reflections on matters under the purview of Main Committee one and subsidiary B one.
We welcome the reference that indefinite extension of the NPT does not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapon states.
We further welcome the strong calls for adherence by all the nuclear weapon states to the policy of no force use pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
At the same time, NA commends call for a legally binding agreements on negative security assurances by the nuclear weapon states and encourages considerations of practical measures such as commencement of trilevant negotiations within the conference upon disarmament that could facilitate gradual progress toward this goal.
We are of the view that document needs to be strengthened in some areas, in particular on extended nuclear deterrence and nuclear selling arrangement.
We appreciate the acknowledgment of these pertinent issues.
The group looks forward to strengthen formulations in the next iterations, including by covering both existing and potential arrangements.
The reaffirmation of the application of irreforceibility, verifiability, and transparency in a cohent and mutually reinforcing manner.
Relation to the obligations of nuclear weapon states under NPT should be followed with underscoring the importance of the implementation of action 16 17, 18 and 2010 action plan.
We appreciate the reference on the special responsibility of the nuclear weapon states with regard to the entry into force of the CTBT.
However, we call on closely tracking the language of action ten of the 2010 action plan, as well as the insertions of the reference to the special responsibility of nuclear weapon states in the broader implementations of Article 6.
Now support the continued observations of a moratorium on all nuclear testing pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the entry into force of the CTT.
On qualitative improvement, the group is of the view that the draft could be strengthened to include reference for the immediate halt to modernizations, refurbishment and life extensions program, as well as productions of new types of nuclear weapons and reducing the threshold for their use.
The text also should signal the expectations of the state parties that all nuclear weapons to take concrete and time bound steps to reduce their nuclear arsenals through deeper and further cuts in a transparent, irreversible, and verifiable manner.
We appreciate the inclusion of important priorities such as the negotiations of treaty banning the productions of offs material for use in nuclear weapons.
On this, we underscore the need to also address the past productions and existing stockpiles of vice materials.
We also wish to see the recognitions of the TPNW which contributes to the implementations of Article 6 of the NPT that would further contribute to advancing the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
NAM wishes also to see stronger language on humanitarian consequences, compliance with international humanitarian law, and the prevension of nuclear war or any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
In addition to registering and addressing the concern about increasing incidence of nuclear rhetoric and threats.
In our assessment, reference on concrete measures for achieving the treaty's objective on nuclear disarmament are not commensurate with the decades long lack of progress in this regard, as well as the heightened threat of the existence of nuclear weapons.
Accordingly, non states parties urge the inclusions in the outcome document of a strong call for the immediate establishment at the highest priority in the conference on disarmament, a subsidiary body to negotiate and conclude a comprehensive conventions on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possessions, development, productions, acquisitions, testing, stockpiling, transfer use or threat of use, and to provide for their instructions.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Indonesia on behalf of the non Allied movement for his intervention, and I invite the distinguished representative of Egypt on behalf of the Arab group to take the floor.
Thank you very much, Excellency chairperson, taking the floor on behalf of the Arab group and first to align with the intervention by the non aligned movement.
Last week, the Arab group has delivered the statement sharing with the room the general reflections on the paragraphs under consideration at Main Committee one.
Today we will and thanks to you have the opportunity to share textual remarks and suggestions on the text that we have already submitted in writing to the Secretariat.
We will restrict ourselves now to the block of paragraphs that the chair has advised the room to follow.
And then if there's an opportunity, we'll come back to the prebliatory paragraphs as well as paragraph one and two.
On paragraph 46, like several other delegations, we believe that this paragraph needs to closely track the language from Article 6 under the treaty.
There are some changes in the text here that we are a little bit confused about and we do not understand what would be the reasons to deviate from the exact language of Article 6.
We are also keen to see a specific emphasis on the role of nuclear weapon states in the implementation of Article 6.
Under paragraph 47, and here we believe that there are a couple of elements that would be useful to add.
In addition to the implementation of Article 7, but also the commitment to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the treaty and objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons being the ultimate objective of the entire exercise.
We also want to see a connection to the full and effective implementation of the treaty side by side with the maintenance and strengthening of the treaty and its credibility.
Much of this language has been taken from action one of the 2010 action plan.
Now, moving forward to paragraph 50, and here we would be very keen to see the language featuring the issue of increasing instances of rhetoric and threats of use of nuclear weapons.
The paragraph is already touching on a very important and consequential issue, which is the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and quantitative growth.
Also another very alarming signal in our view are the instances of nuclear rhetoric and the uses of nuclear threats.
This is something we want to see in paragraph 50, and then towards the end of the paragraph, we need to replace provided with agreed, the commitments agreed at previous review conferences.
On paragraph 51, like Austria, we have noticed that 1995 outcome is missing from the paragraph.
It needs to be inserted.
We would be keen to see diminish be substituted with exclude so as to exclude the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines, and policies.
We want to see an additional element on the acceleration of concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament and to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons.
This is taken from the Chapot of action five of the 2010 action plan.
Also the fulfillment of the 13 practical steps and the unequivocal undertaking.
A, only one operational element that we would suggest to add towards the very end of the paragraph is to call upon nuclear weapon states to immediately cease plans to further invest in modernizing and upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives of nuclear weapons and related facilities.
On paragraph 52, while we appreciate that the draft has captured the responsibility of nuclear weapon states vis-à-vis the entry into force of the CTBT.
However, we believe that it would be of paramount importance to closely track the language of action ten under the 2010 action plan of the responsibility of the nuclear weapon states to encourage annex two countries, in particular, those which have not acceded to the treaty or the NPT and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to sign and ratify.
Paragraph 53, and here we believe that the CDBT is a very effective contribution not only to nuclear nonproliferation, but also to nuclear disarmament.
We need to add at the end, which constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation, both the horizontal and vertical aspects.
In paragraph 54 and we are flexible about the placement, but maybe 54 should be the adequate place is to have an addition towards the end of the paragraph condemning all threats of use of nuclear weapons, whether implicit or explicit irrespective of circumstances and to deem them unacceptable, illegitimate, and dangerous.
Paragraph 55, like also several other delegations, we believe that this should be the place where we reaffirm the need to uphold and strengthen the norm against nuclear testing.
Moving forward to paragraph 59, where the important disclaimer of pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons and not as a substitute to nuclear disarmament is missing.
This paragraph in its entirety is about nuclear risk reduction measures.
This disclaimer is central to understanding the conversation around nuclear risk reduction.
Also keen to have an addition of the element of the removal of operational weapons from high alert status as among the suggested measures.
Paragraph 61, and as mentioned last week, we appreciate that the zero draft is capturing the dilemmas related to the integration of emerging technologies into the realm of nuclear weapons.
However, as we have indicated previously, we noticed that specific reference to artificial intelligence is missing.
This is something that would need to be rectified.
We'll also need to work on the language about the integration of emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence into the systems of communication, command and control of nuclear weapons.
We need also to assert the full and effective human control over nuclear weapons.
The part about building confidence, which is referenced here in this paragraph, is also not clear what is the exact purpose of this and what type of confidence are we building and about which parts of the conversation.
Paragraph 64, we previously expressed our appreciation to the straightforward and powerful language on negative security assurances.
However, the future outlook is still missing in terms of responsiveness by I thank the distinguished Representative of Egypt on behalf of the Arab Group for their statement.
I invite the distinguished representative of Denmark to take the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
And also in this MC, our thanks to the president and all involved for the Sal draft and its early release.
Let me use this opportunity to offer some dangerous considerations on MC one paragraphs in the Sal draft, which we have handed in in writing.
They go a bit beyond the paragraphs mentioned by the chair, so I do hope for your indulgence.
So in the preamble to Bro Grass, we support recognizing the growing concern over reckless and dangerous nuclear rhetoric, signaling and threats as mentioned by others.
We propose to replace humanitarian consequences with a of language about recognizing that a nuclear war would truly visit devastation appal all humankind, and our proposal goes also for OP 67.
Mr.
Chairman, the main birdie on OP two, we disagree with the argument that extended deterrence is a violation of the NPT.
On the contrary, the arrangement has contributed to nonproliferation, as mentioned by many delegations in our deliberations.
But even as extended deterrence has contributed to nonproliferation, the issue is in itself not a question of nonproliferation.
It is a question of nuclear disarmament.
The key tenant as mentioned before, of nuclear deterrence, is that the three ATO nuclear weapon states retain full control and custody over their nuclear weapons and there is no transfer.
So there's no nuclear sharing as other states have underlined.
On the content of OP two, we have fundamental concerns about the power in its entirety, but especially on the second sentence, and we see no consensus on retaining the paragraph as it is now.
Moving on, we to better reflect the CTBT the moratorium, and the norm against testing.
We also support text on that negotiations on a successor to the new start should involve the state with the three largest nuclear arsenals and that all nuclear weapon states should engage in the strategic stability talks.
We do not find it relevant to add text on exclusive discussion on root causes, and we continue to believe that a no first use policy lacks credibility and has no value in itself.
I also wish to add that we have concerns over the lack of universality in the CD.
Negotiations on multilateral agreements should be inclusive and open to all states.
Further, the RevC should express concern over the rapid and opaque modernitization of nuclear weapon arsenals, especially in a situation where there is no transparency.
Mr.
Chair, finally, let me turn to paragraph 64.
The current wording lacks the necessary granularity and we propose to delete it.
The first part concerns nuclear weapon states requirements in the EEA safeguards, it should say, while the second part does not concern non nuclear weapon states as they do not have nuclear weapons and have no nuclear disarmament commitments.
So we propose to delete it in its entirety.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Denmark for his intervention.
I now invite the distinguished representative of Mexico to take the floor.
Thank you, Chairman.
My delegation already made some comments.
To the test that we are dealing with.
I just wanted to follow up on that with some important emphasis from my delegation following some of the important comments we've had in the debate.
To start, I'd just like to emphasize the fact that from our point of view, The concern that the conference expressed in 2010 about the catastrophic consequences that would result from the use of nuclear weapons has not gone away.
Rather, on the contrary, it has increased and it remains.
That's why from our point of view, recognizing the consequences is not enough.
We must reiterate concern over these consequences.
In this regard, we have put forward proposed language for preambula paragraph three.
Another issue that I'd like to touch on is that we have before us a paragraph on technological developments.
Like some delegations that spoke before me have already said, Mexico is concerned for two reasons.
First of all, because we need to specify that we're referring to technological developments that include artificial intelligence, as well as the fact that we need to launch an appeal to nuclear weapon states to retain meaningful and effective control over the command control, and communications functions of nuclear weapon systems.
In this regard, we would request that we amend that paragraph.
Furthermore, we support what Austria and Japan requested, that is to separate the ideas in the paragraph on education.
It's very important to retain the paragraph on disarmament education and keep it as clear as possible, but also to link it to the need to retain awareness over the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.
We also support what Austria said on the need to increase awareness, but also their comments on compatibility between the NPT and the nuclear bans treaty and the paragraph that mentions this treaty.
We'd also like to mention that the treaty has 774 state parties and 95 signatories.
This constitutes the vast majority of the states parties to the NPT.
I'd also like to comment on the fact that a lot of the eminent issues in this review cycle have led to debates between nuclear weapon states and non nuclear weapon states, and that is the need to emphasize the principle of irresversibility as a fundamental principle that must guide our measures and our actions on prior commitments and obligations.
In this regard, paragraph 71 where the conference calls for more work on irreversibility must be complemented by emphasizing the fact that this principle hasn't been met with the same type of attention for other issues like transparency and accountability and verification linked to transparency.
We'd like to ramp up this emphasis with practical measures to ensure that when we reach nuclear disarmament, this is irreversible and that we can ensure that we maintain a world free of nuclear weapons.
Mexico has already submitted its written comments on these paragraphs and other comments on this section also.
Thank you very much.
I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for her intervention, and I invite the distinguished representative of Fiji to take the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair, Mr.
Chair.
I have the honor to deliver this statement on behalf of the 12 member states of the Pacific, S Island and developing states.
Most of our members are also party to the NPT and parties as well to the Ratatona Treaty.
We first and foremost, thank you, Mr.
Chair for the manner in which you're conducting this committee meeting.
And we'd also like to thank the president and his team Secretariat likewise for the draft.
At the outset, Mr.
Chair, the PC aligns itself with a joint statement on the legacy of nuclear weapons as delivered by the CD of Kirbas on behalf of Kirbas and Kazakhstan, and we thank both delegations for their leadership on this important matter.
We also align our statement with the Pacific Islands Forum statement delivered in the plenary by the Solomon Islands.
As it's a group statement, we wish to touch upon a few other paragraphs that may slightly beyond some of the sections you have indicated to us this morning.
Mr.
Chair, the Pacific has borne and continues to bear a disproportionate burden from the development and testing of nuclear weapons.
The consequences of nuclear weapons extend far beyond immediate devastation.
They encompass profound and lasting harm of human health, socioeconomic development, climate stability, food security, and the ecosystems.
The intergeneration harm inflicted upon affected communities falling most heavily upon women and children demands urgent and sustained international attention.
PC calls for explicit recognition in the preamble of any outcome document of both the direct and transboundary humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapon use and testing.
Turning to paragraph 46 to 73, as we've outlined from Friday on paragraph 52, PC underscores the urgent imperative for all annex two states to ratify the CTBT without further delay and without preconditions.
The entry into force of the CTBT is long overdue.
Every year of delay perpetuates the unacceptable risk of resumed nuclear testing with potentially catastrophic consequences for the most vulnerable regions of the world, including our own Pacific.
On paragraph 52, P calls upon conference to give full and ambiguous recognition to the impact of past nuclear tests have had on people and communities.
This is a continuing reality for affected populations across the Pacific and beyond.
Acknowledgment of this harm is a prerequisite for meaningful progress towards victims assistance environment remediation.
With respect to Paragraph 55, PCH supports language calling upon all states parties to maintain the moratoriums on nuclear weapons test explosions under all circumstances and at any yield.
We emphasize that the integrity of moratoriums must be unconditional.
Turning to the legacy of nuclear weapons, PCH urges any reference to education be decoupled from the treatment of legacy issues.
Education is available, conflating it with the victim assistance and environmental remediation risk diluting the distinct obligation owed to affected communities.
The remediation of harm and the provision of assistance to victim must tend on their own terms.
PCs reaffirms the centrality of victim systems, environmental remediation as pillars of any credible response to the legacy of new nuclear weapon testing.
And we strongly support the inclusion of new paragraph based on the joint working paper on the legacy of nuclear weapons, recognizing that more than 2000 nuclear explosive tests have been conducted worldwide, including in non self governing territories.
We equally support language reflecting the growing international calls for assistance to affected communities and peoples, including through engagement with affected communities, visits to former test sites and the sharing where appropriate of technical and scientific information regarding humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons use and testing.
This further supports the inclusion of new paragraph that explicitly recognizes the Human Rights Council resolution by the Marshall Islands, which was adopted by consensus, as well as the General Assembly Resolution 70 8240 entitled, Adré the Legacy of nuclear weapons, providing victim assistance, environmental remediation to member states affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons, and all subsequent resolution calling for the first ever meeting of victim assistance, environmental remediation to be held in 2026.
We call upon all state parties in a position to do so.
Provide scientific, technical, and financial assistance in support of these objectives.
Mr.
Chair, the Pacific has waited long enough.
Communities most affected by the legacy of nuclear weapons testing are communities whose voices have historically been marginalized in international deliberations and we wouldn't want a repeat of that in this outcome.
BC calls on this conference to deliver outcomes that honor the obligations owed to these communities through concrete, time bound commitments on victim assistance, environmental remediation, and the universal adherence to the CTBT.
We remain committed to constructive engagement in these negotiations and stand ready to work with our delegations to those outcomes that reflects the urgency and the human dimension of the issues before this committee.
Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
I thank the distinguished representative of Fiji on behalf of Pacific's small Island developing states for their statement.
I now invite the distinguished representative of Iran to take the floor.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chair.
First and foremost, given the frequent rhetoric of use of nuclear weapons against non nuclear weapon states, we believe that there is a merit to add one other new paragraph to the text expressing that the conference condemns the increasing rhetoric of nuclear threats against non nuclear weapon states, which risks normalizing threats of nuclear attacks and consequently the normalization of the use of nuclear weapons, full stop.
With regard to CTBT, we believe that even after entry into force of the treaty, it's important to achieve nuclear disarmament and otherwise the effectiveness of the treaty will be undermined.
We have a sentence to add at the end of the paragraph on CTBT.
On danger of resumption of nuclear testing, we think that it's not enough just to limit ourselves to recognize the danger of testing.
Rather, we should recognize the danger of quantitative or qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons.
Therefore, we should underline the importance of addressing all of those dangers.
We see on paragraph 57, 58, and 60 references to conditionality, and we reject any conditionality with regard to achieving the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.
Therefore, we must strike them out all of them.
In fact, we have highlighted those parts of the paragraphs that should be deleted in our written input.
This is the same with regard to paragraph 61, which refers to without prejudice to national security.
It is a pretext to prolong accession and possession of nuclear weapons, and we categorically reject them.
On paragraph 67 about the verification, we believe that it should be extended to nuclear disarmament obligations implementation as well, and Finally, on paragraph 80, subparagraph A, we see a reference to an entity that we have not recognized it as a state and we will not do so.
We believe that the proper title for addressing that entity is to call it Israeli regime, and we believe that it should be added after that word and in the end of the first line of the sub paragraph where we need to remove the word states and put parties, so it will be non nuclear weapon party and it will be consistent with our policies.
Our policy will never allow to recognize such an entity as a state.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Iran for his statement and I invite the distinguished representative of Canada to make the intervention.
Thank you very much, Chair.
We appreciate your continuing guidance of our deliberations.
Our delegation would like to flag two other delegations that we submitted some gender language for inclusion in the preamble, specifically calling for the full equal and meaningful participation of women in the NPT review process.
We also want to reinforce calls barder delegations for maintaining and strengthening the language, reinforcing the norm against nuclear testing, including through universalization and entry into force of the CTBT.
We agree with proposals demanding greater transparency, accountability, and stronger tools for verification of the moratorium on nuclear testing.
Pending entry into force of the CTBT, we believe that it is critical to strengthen the CTBTO, including the international monitoring system, which should be improved in terms of quantity of the monitoring stations that participate and also as much as possible, the quality and technology involved in increasing international monitoring systems capacity to detect nuclear testing.
We also believe that other allegations are correct in calling for zero yield nuclear testing moratoria.
Zero needs to mean zero, and we believe the reference to subcritical testing should presumably refer to supercritical testing because we don't believe that subcritical testing has been captured by the prohibition.
We support the Netherlands in respect of the comment they made on FMCT and the language they proposed for including in terms of calling on states to make innovative contributions informal and in informal forums towards the negotiation of a treaty on fiscal materials for use in nuclear weapons.
Canada welcomes calls on the CD to fulfill its negotiating mandate, including in respect of negotiation of a treaty on FS materials for use of nuclear weapons, but we don't believe that the CD is necessarily the only forum that can do that.
In that respect, we believe other forums may also have a role to play and we see a necessity for states to approach these negotiations without preconditions, which in our view includes also the issue of existing stocks.
All these matters should be discussed at the negotiating table.
And there should not be a creation of lists of preconditions which will prevent us from actually getting down to the task and fulfilling the mandate on negotiating this treaty.
We also agree with Denmark about including language on condemning the reckless and dangerous nuclear rhetoric that we have witnessed over the past years.
We also call for having a separate paragraph on disarmament education.
Finally, we agree with other delegations that have encouraged carefully tracking NPT language and not to amend the treaty without going through appropriate treaty amendment procedures.
The same goes for respect for international law, including international humanitarian law.
Thank you very much, Chair.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Canada for his intervention.
I now invite the distinguished representative of China to take the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
The Chinese delegation would further share some premier ideas and proposals on the basis of the earlier statements, including paragraph one to ten OP.
Paragraph one to two, one to ten, and one to two OP paragraphs.
First of all, China hopes that the draft outcome document would include language reaffirming the maintenance of international consensus on nuclear disarmament.
Given the huge differences among countries in the size of nuclear forces and nuclear policy strategic secure environment, nuclear disarments adhere to principles of maintaining global strategic stability and undiminished security for all.
An important practical measure to reduce risk of nuclear war now is to reduce the role of nucle weapons in national security policies.
China notes the text on nuclear disarmament and averting nuclear war in PP two and five of the draft we suggest citing the consensus language in 2010 outcome document and put them in new separate paragraphs of relevant paragraphs so as to reflect this consensus.
Second, China hopes that the draft outcome document will reflect concerns about statements of some non nuclear weapon states on acquiring nuclear weapons.
Officials from some non nuclear weapon states have public called for the acquisition of nuclear weapons openly challenging the international nonproliferation regime and seriously undermine authority and effectiveness of the treaty.
The review conference should remain highly vigilant against this dangerous trend, we propose adding the language of expressing grave concerns over relevant statements in OP two of the draft.
Third, China supports pragmatic advanced nuclear disarmment based on previous consensus on 16.
To avoid different interpretation of Article 6, we suggest citing the written text of Article 6.
On 48.
To strengthen action part of this paragraph, we suggest adding the following to its end calls on nuclear states to renounce the permanent possession of nuclear weapons.
China supports the call of the majority of countries to strengthen paragraph 56 regarding the successor arrangement to new start and suggests adding the following to the end of the power calls on the US to respond positively to Russia's proposal and continue to observe voluntarily the central quantitative limit of the new start.
Fourth, China supports concrete measures to prevent nuclear war.
Given the differences in nuclear policies, the size of nuclear arsens which secure environment among nuclear weapons, there is no universal applicable transparency or risk reduction measures.
States as part of nuclear sharing arrangements, participate in the plan of the use of nuclear weapons and related exercises and must play a special role in preventing the use of nuclear weapons.
China proposes in the second sentence paragraph 58 after non nuclear states, we add in particular those participating in nuclear sharing arrangements.
In paragraph 59, at the end of the first sentence, we suggest adding on a voluntary basis and without prejudice to national security and we delete the list of the specific risk reduction measures.
In paragraph 65, we suggest deleting the reference to equal transparency.
In the previous statements, China has already shared its views and suggestions regarding nuclear sharing, the prohibition of nuclear testing, no first use of nuclear weons and moratorium on the production of its materials for nuclear weons and will not repeat them here.
China has submitted specific language proposals to the Secretariat.
We hope that these relevant inputs will be fully incorporated into the new version or the revised version of the draft outcome document.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of China for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation to take the floor.
Distinguished Chair.
I'd like to explain the conceptual approach and the principled position upon which the motion proposal is based for the draft outcome document.
I would like to return to the preamble with reference to the operative part.
First of all, we believe it's important in one sentence of the preamble to reaffirm concisely the relevance and importance of all of the articles of the agreement with a focus on those provisions.
With a balance of the three pillars.
This we take other provisions of the preamble that we proposed based on experience of the review process.
This would allow us to significantly shorten the text and avoid attempts to prioritize certain articles or obligations.
Selectively giving them asymmetrical focuses and evaluations of their value as took place in PP ten and 11, as well as the P one, two, three, 46, 47, and part of 65.
We believe that each article is important and the treaty ought to be taken in its entirety in strict compliance with the balance that is enshrined in it.
We also believe it's important to take away from the text as much as possible duplications over redundancy, and that is the main goal of our proposed language combining various paragraphs and shortening certain paragraphs.
In particular, it's enough to say one time in the preamble that the full effective, non discriminatory and balanced implementation of the NPT in all of its aspects and all of its by all of its parties is important for the integrity of the treaty.
The policy of states parties should be compatible with its provisions, and any concerns on implementation of the NPT should be resolved solely through diplomacy and based on international law.
The relevant pages in PP six and 11 allow us not to return to this topic in PP eight, nine, 15, as well as OP 13, 46 47, 51 and 64.
We believe it's important to avoid in the text any attempts to distort the goal of nuclear disarmament from the overall context of Article 6 or interpreting its content and relevant obligations arbitrarily, as was done in PP five and OP 465-05-1702 and part of 56.
We cannot read any other approach.
In accordance with the preamble of the NPT and the previous review processes of this document and in accordance with the document of the first special session of the General Assembly on Disarmament, we believe that supporting the implementation of Article 6 requires collective efforts for de escalation of international tensions.
As we've already repeatedly announced, there's no alternative to us, the recognition of the mutual link between progress in the area of nuclear disarmament and the military and political strategic reality.
This is why we proposed our proposals for 48 and 51, as well as part of 58 59.
As for the question of reaffirming dedication to all of the commitments in the outcome document of the previous review cycles, then existing divergences in this room and effectively trying to combine all the older elements.
To do so, we should once and for all universally take the collectively used options, the text, recall them in paragraph seven of the preamble, microphone was cut off of the speaker.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation for his intervention, and now invite the distinguished representative of Poland to take the floor.
Thank you Chair for your and your team's strenuous efforts to create a document palatable to all many thanks.
In addition to my delegations suggestions provided before, I would like to comment further on a few issues within the scope of this main committee.
Firstly, paragraph 60, Poland cannot support the inclusion of the no first use language as it is not reflected in the treaty itself and would introduce policy prescriptions that go beyond the NPT framework, potentially affecting strategic stability in the current security environment.
Secondly, when it comes to the broader security context in general, we are of the view that the text is not sufficiently contextualized with regard to regional threats and actions that undermine the non proliferation architecture.
As a representative of the region, we deem Russia's irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, particularly in the context of its war of aggression against Ukraine the gravest and most persistent threat to nuclear safety and security.
The ongoing militarization of Belarus and Kaliningrad Oblast, attacks on nuclear infrastructure, interference with the activities of the IEA and the ongoing illegal occupation of that NPP, as well as other Ukrainian nuclear facilities are a case in point.
Therefore, Chair, we suggest including the language that would reflect the aforementioned regional circumstances in a factual and just manner.
Thirdly, in paragraph 73, my delegation is not in a position to support any reference to the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons.
Even descriptive references would go beyond the agreed NPT framework under Article 8 and could be interpreted as conferring political status on an instrument outside the treaty, thereby undermining consensus.
Sir, as the subject of nuclear sharing and extended deterrence has been raised several times, both today and on Friday, I feel compelled to state that my delegation has requested the deletion of paragraph two.
In our view, this paragraph does not reflect the circumstances in which NATO's sharing arrangements operate, not to mention the role they play in upholding regional and global nuclear nonproliferation architecture.
We believe the issue of nuclear sharing is simply not pertinent to the outcome document of the NPT review conference.
There is no internal debate whether to keep or abandon NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements, nor is there room for discussion on their legality.
As we have stated multiple times, the NPT was precisely worded to accommodate NATO nuclear policy, not the other way around.
It clearly proves that any statement questioning their legality of our arrangements is logically incorrect.
NATO's nuclear policy is fully legal, long standing, and predates the NPT.
It is fully consistent with Articles one and two of the treaty and actively contributes to its nonproliferation objectives.
Any comment to the contrary serves ill advised political motivations aimed at undermining NATO's legal security arrangements.
Chair, to conclude, Poland believes that the zero draft should remain firmly anchored in the NPT, including Articles one to six and preserve its clear distinction between nuclear weapon states and non nuclear weapon states, avoiding any language that could be seen as creating new obligations or altering the treaty's balance of rights and responsibilities.
Thank you, Chair and best of luck in drafting the other version.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Poland for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of South Africa to take the floor.
Thank you very much Chair for giving me the floor.
South Africa alliance with the NAM statement delivered earlier this morning.
South Africa previously made interventions in the discussions of MC one and would like to focus on only a few points.
On paragraph X, we welcome the reference to the importance of the implementation of Article 6 and wish to strengthen the text further to reflect the urgent and effective implementation of this important pillar.
We propose to add at the end of the sentence and determined to pursue the full effective and urgent implementation of Article 6.
On paragraph 46, we wish to reflect in the text language on negotiations on nuclear disarmament to add the sentence and to bring to a conclusion negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of nuclear arms race at an early date.
On paragraph 51, we would like the draft to reflect reference to the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines of non nuclear weapon states and the implications this has on international humanitarian law as follows.
The conference also calls upon all states parties that maintain a role for nuclear weapons in their military and security concepts, doctrines and policies to indicate how international humanitarian law would be followed for use of nuclear weapons on their behalf, to take immediate measures to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their military doctrines and calls upon such states to include in their regular reporting details on progress towards this end.
We would also like to propose 51 B as follows.
It calls on the nuclear weapon states to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons deployed and non deployed.
Regardless of the allocation, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional, and multilateral measures, consistent with section five of the conclusions and recommendations for follow on actions of the 2010 Review Conference.
I thank you Chair.
I thank the distinguished Representative of South Africa for her intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of Kribas to take the floor.
Thank you very much, Chair.
I thank my colleagues from the Pacific Sma Islands developing states for the joint statement delivered by Fiji and for expressing support for Kubest and Kazakhstan's remarks that were delivered earlier in this committee.
Chair, Kibest wishes to underscore the importance of recognizing the past used and harm of nuclear weapons.
This is why we delivered a joint statement and shared our comments in writing on the need to separate the issues of education and the legacy of nuclear weapons in paragraph 67.
Therefore, we also support the creation of a new paragraph that highlights both UNTA Resolution 78 slash 240 and subsequent resolutions concerning the first ever International meeting on Victim Assistance and environmental remediation, as well as the Human Rights Council resolution on the Marshall Highlands.
We also supports the references concerning the CTBT and nuclear testing as we highlighted earlier in this committee and in our written comments.
Finally, concerning paragraph 73, we wish to re emphasize the need for the state parties to recognize the complementarity of the TPNWU to the NPT, as well as its humanitarian provisions on victim assistance and environmental remediation.
We underscore the necessity for the states parties to agree to an outcome conference that contains meaningful progress for affected states parties and communities that have been impacted by the use and testing of nuclear weapons.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Cribat for her statement.
I invite the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
We have submitted our written comments on the President's zero draft.
Again, we would like to express our appreciation to the President and Secretariat for circulating the zero draft in a timely manner, thereby creating a constructive environment for substantive discussions and negotiation on the text.
With regard to main Committee one, as we indicated preliminarily in SB one last Thursday, our comments address issues in paragraph two, 60 and 62 mainly.
Regarding paragraph 60, we join others in noting that the paragraph does not present a balanced view on this issue.
We therefore suggest deleting the paragraph in its entirety.
With respect to negative security assurances as contained in paragraph 62, we reaffirm our position that such assurances are highly significant but should be provided to non nuclear weapon states that are in compliance with their obligations under the NPT.
In this regard, the current language in paragraph 62 goes beyond the existing understanding reflected in UN Security Council resolution 984 of 1995, and the draft final outcome document negotiated during the 2022 review conference.
Additionally, although this goes beyond the textual scope designated by the chair, I'd like to briefly address paragraph two as well by way of introducing the main points of our written comments.
On nuclear extended deterrence in Par two, we will not restate our well known and clear positions.
However, we wish to emphasize that Iraq US extended deterrence cooperation in the context of the Korean Peninsula is intended to protect the lives and security of our people against the ever growing nuclear threat.
Contrary to some misleading statements, such cooperation is fully consistent with the obligations and objectives of the NPT.
Lastly, we sincerely hope that this review conference will pave the way for nuclear weapon states under the framework of the NPT to initiate and engage in a meaningful strategic stability dialogue, including but not limited to the nuclear risk reduction, transparency and accountability, and we welcome the relevant paragraphs contained in the draft.
I thank you Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea for his intervention.
Javid Mia I now call upon the representative of Senegal to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Delegation of Senegal aligns itself, of course, with the statement made by Indonesia on behalf of the non aligned movement.
At the outset of my intervention, I would like to reaffirm Sengal's position on the preamble in particular.
For the first paragraph, is re establishing a hierarchy, focusing on disarmament first and foremost, then nonproliferation and lastly, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
In the preamble as well, we reaffirm that we are in favor of including references to environmental consequences in paragraph three and the call for a reference to the nonuse of nuclear weapons.
In paragraph two, we reiterate our position on nuclear weapons sharing, but we're not entitled to the wording because for us, it's an ongoing discussion, but also about grave concerns on nuclear sharing.
In the same paragraph, It's not just about potential nuclear sharing arrangements, but also existing nuclear sharing arrangements.
As for paragraph 50, Mr.
Cherry believe we ought to further clarify the references to nuclear rhetoric and the type of statements we're referring to here, not all statements are of the same value.
So we have to be clearer here to reflect what exactly is happening when it comes to nuclear rhetoric.
For paragraph 51, I support proposal made by South Africa On expanding the state's policies and doctrines of non nuclear weapon states.
For paragraph 55, we align ourselves with the position of Egypt and the Arab group on the reference to existing norms on nuclear testing, which we believe are relevant.
In paragraph 51, which was the bulk of our interventions, we believe that strengthening the reference to new technology, especially AI and determining in what circumstances it would be used or not is important.
Paragraph 52, as well as reference to the rights of non nuclear weapon states.
It's not an obligation.
We believe the obligation rests solely on nuclear weapon states.
Same paragraph.
The limitation, I mentioned this before, the reservation of Senegal on the limitation to the five non nuclear weapons states.
The only states that are not parties to the NPT, but also are responsible for that same rhetoric.
Paragraph 64, I'd also like to support the proposal made by Ireland.
I believe we got to remove the requirements on non nuclear weapon states, which are more pertinent for the nuclear weapon states.
I'd like to reiterate the proposal to move paragraph 66 before 64.
Because reporting is an obligation for nuclear weapon states and optional for non nuclear weapon states.
Paragraph 69, lastly, I am in support of the proposal made by states to add discussions of stockpiling, which is a missing element so far.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished Reecive of Senegal for those remarks.
I invite the distinguished representative of Egypt on behalf of the Arab group to take the floor.
Thank you.
Thank you once again, Mr.
Chairperson.
In this intervention, we will continue to explain to Your Excellency and the room the textual suggestions and remarks by the Arab group on this section of the text.
We have stopped in the last intervention at paragraph 64 where we acknowledged with great appreciation that the text has a straightforward and powerful messaging on negative security assurances and the characterization expected from us on the type of assurances to be provided.
Nevertheless, we believe that the only missing piece here is something of an operational outlook.
And this is why we are keen to call upon nuclear weapon states to provide these assurances as a matter of urgency.
Of course, we are conscious that this goes beyond Security Council resolution 984.
I think that some of the previous speakers alluded to that because in our view that the unilateral assurances given by nuclear weapon states have never been enough in terms of the type of conditionality that surrounds them, in terms of selectivity and the discriminatory nature, that characterizes some of them.
This is why non nuclear weapons will continue to advance the call for legally binding negative security assurances.
Paragraph 65, we will be keen to connect the conversation around transparency, enhanced and equal transparency to the outcomes and commitments under the previous review conferences agreed in 1995, 2000 and 2010 outcome documents of the NPT RevC.
Now moving to paragraph 67.
First, like I think that the majority of the previous speakers, we certainly believe that we need to separate the input on disarmament and nonproliferation education from the impact on victims survivors and affected communities in paragraph 67.
And this is for two reasons.
First, the fundamental importance of the issue of education that I think several delegations have already included in their statements, but also so as not to give the wrong impression that we are providing disarmament and nonproliferation education as the answer for the needs and the priorities for the victim survivors and affected communities.
On the other hand, we believe that paragraph 67 on assistance to people and communities need to include underlining the importance of achieving progress addressing recovery, rehabilitation, reconstruction, compensation, redress, and guarantees of non recurrence, and to further call on nuclear weapon states that have used or tested nuclear weapons to provide environmental remediation and assistance to affected countries.
This is underlining the centrality of the responsibility of nuclear weapon states that have either used or have tested the nuclear weapons to undertake the effective measures after undertaking this action.
On paragraph 68, we track this to action 15 from the 2010 action plan.
We have just noticed that the only missing element here is the reference to within an agreed and comprehensive program of work of the Conference on disarmament and similar to the nonaligned movement at the end of the paragraph, it is very important to address past production, existing stockpiles, and future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
In paragraph 70 and to make it more in line with action 17 of the 2010 action plan, the following is missing from the paragraph and to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements within the context of the IEA to ensure the irreversible removal of faci material designated by each nuclear weapon states as no longer required for military purposes.
Finally, in that section on paragraph 80 on universalization of the treaty, we would suggest to replace promptly with urgently and to add or further delay after without conditions.
So as you would read urgently and urgently and without conditions or further delay.
I would use the remaining time allocated for this intervention to comment on paragraphs 1 and 2.
In paragraph one, At the end, we suggest the following addition, bearing in mind that universal adherence to the treaty and full compliance of all parties with all its provisions are the best way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to promote and preserve international peace and security.
This is our contribution once again to enhance the balance in the text and the equilibrium between the three pillars under the treaty.
On paragraph two and the Arab group is following with great interest the conversation around this.
We have in numerous several occasions in the past expressed our concerns regarding nuclear sharing and extended deterrence arrangements.
We believe that the president in his zero draft is providing a reasonable pathway to continue the conversation on this.
However, like the non aligned movement and several other colleagues, we believe that the paragraph needs to capture the concern also towards existing nuclear arrangements, not only the potential or new ones.
The existing ones were originally the source or the trigger for the concerns by civil states parties and need to be part of the conversation.
In the remaining 90 seconds, maybe I can also touch on the preempory paragraphs that we haven't commented on.
Now, in PP one, it's not a declaration, it's a reaffirmation of a statement that we have agreed upon in the past.
Also, the order of the elements or the pillars under the treaty needs to be rectified to bring disarmament ahead of nonproliferation to ensure the consistent messaging that the NPT is catering for both nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation together and also to highlight the importance of its full and effective and balanced implementation.
In PP two, and also we have seen in many previous occasions, including at the 2022 P five joint statement, that there's a missing element here that existed in the past, which is recognizing that the only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons are never used again is their total elimination.
To go hand in hand with that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
And finally, also like several other delegations, we are keen to see much stronger language on the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences of any use of nuclear weapons like Mexico mentioned that in 2010 we have already expressed concern.
So it was very difficult for us 16 years after to see that we are lowering the bar of the language that low and also in terms of compliance with IHL.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Egypt on behalf of the Arab Group for his intervention.
I now invite the distinguished representative of Indonesia to take the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Thank you for your able leadership on this committee and assure you have Indonesia's full cooperation and support.
We would like to align our positions to the statement of the non aligned states parties to the NPT.
In addition to our initial remarks delivered last week, we would like to underline several key priorities under this committee.
In Per paragraph six and eight in paragraph one and two, we propose stronger langs on the balance, full and effective and non discriminatory implementations of all the three pillars of the treaty.
We also proposed the text more clearly reflected concerns regarding nuclear selling arrangement and extended postures, including their implications for the treaty long term credibility and effectiveness, as well as covering existing and potential arrangements.
I preambular paragraph five and paragraph 40 related to paragraph also 49 and 50, we proposed reaffirming that the transparent, irreversible, ifiable and time bound eliminations of nuclear weapons remains central to the implementation of Article 6.
We also proposed stronger language expressing grave concern over the continued maintenance, modernizations and expansions of nuclear arsenal, as well as policies and doctrine that elevated the role of nuclear weapons exist.
I preambular paragraph three and four, in line with also in paragraph 67, we propose strengthening references to the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences of any use of nuclear weapons as a basis for urgent disarmament actions.
We also propose reflecting the special responsibility of states that have conducted nuclear tests toward affected people, communities, and environments.
In paragraph 57 60 and 61, we propose clarifying that nuclear risk reductions measure and other interim steps cannot replace the obligations to achieve the total eliminations of nuclear weapons.
At the same time, risk reductions must be comprehensive.
It must address also risks arising from doctrines operational posture, high alert level modernizations, weakening arms control and the integrations of emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence to nuclear command control and communication systems.
In disregard Indonesia underline the need to maintain full effective and meaningful human control over nuclear weapons at all times.
In paragraph 65 and 66, we propose to strengthen transparency accountability and regular reporting obligations of nuclear weapon states on the implementation of the IRS armament commitments, including through substantive standardized and periodic reporting with the strengthened review process.
In paragraph 63, we proposed that the conference on disarmament to commence negotiations on universal unconditional and non discriminatory irrevocable and legally binding instrument on negative security assurances.
We further propose to reinforce support for nuclear weapon free zones, including by calling upon the nuclear weapon states to sign and ratify the protocol to the Southwest Treaty without delay and without reservations contrary to the treaty.
Finally, on paragraph 52 68, 73 and 80, We propose calling for the immediate entry into force of the CTBT particularly by remaining annexed to states, the commencements of negotiation of an FMCT that address both future productions and existing stockpiles, recognitions of the TPNW as complementary to the NPT and the transcl Article 6, and as well as reformations of the urgency of achieving the universality of the NPT.
Mr.
Chair, Indonesia calls on this R Conference to deliver concrete, time bound, and measurable steps that restore the credibility of Article 6 and preserve the treaty balance between rights and obligations.
We also will submit our input in this regard.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Indonesia for their statement.
I now invite the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
I would like to present another set of comments.
In this room, our strongly negative position is well known with regard to promoting at the NPT platform, the TPNW and relevant agenda.
We cannot support its mention in the outcome document.
For us, it's also unacceptable to try to include in this document a so called positive obligations on nuclear disarmament and its consequences, as well as the assertion about disastrous consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, given that after the conference of 2010, This narrative was unilaterally instrumentalized by a group of states when NTPW to place pressure on nuclear weapon states without taking into account the security interests.
Also well known is the longstanding Russian concern about the deeply destabilizing effects of the joint nuclear sharing missions for the countries of NATO.
Including Poland, which spoke earlier and other analogous state practices by the collective West.
We believe it's important to strengthen these elements in OP two.
In the same context with regard to 62 63, we do not think it's possible to continue to put on equal footing.
Non nuclear weapon states, the Western camp that rely on this nuclear umbrella scheme and countries that are responsible toward their non nuclear weapon status.
When viewing their interest in negative security assurances.
In particular, 56, we believe it's important to express regret not only about the lack of an agreement on replacing the start, but also the lack of a positive response to the Russian initiative in the post start sphere.
In addition, in accordance with our consistent and principled position, we do not accept calls for future steps in the field of nuclear disarmament that are selective in nature and run counter to Article 6, therefore, for countries in the Start treaty.
As for paragraph 61, we are not prepared to support in the document the inclusion of the topic of AI.
We believe it is unnecessary.
As for the issue of TBT in 2055, we believe it is not useful to put into the draft outcome document categories such as critical nuclear explosions and small nuclear explosions.
Given that there is a lack of universally acknowledged and established international legal document defining such terms.
In particular, in the negotiations in paragraph 50 68, we believe it's important that these negotiations should take place solely as part of a balanced agenda for the conference on disarmament.
In addition, we believe it's not helpful to call on nuclear weapon states to place under IEA safeguards nuclear material that has been declared to be a surplus for military purposes that is in paragraph 70.
We've repeatedly tried to develop modalities for IE control over such materials, but we have not yet found an acceptable option.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation for his statement, and I now invite the distinguished representative of Turk to take the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Turkey welcomes the president's efforts to reach a consensus document through an inclusive and transparent process.
While we consider that the current text provides a useful basis for further negotiations, we also believe that it would benefit from further improvements and refinements in order to achieve a more balanced and broadly acceptable outcome.
Our long term priority is uphold the NPT as a major instrument for reinforcing international peace, security and stability, and to promote its universalization.
We support efforts to strengthen the review cycle and enhance the effectiveness, continuity, and transparency of the review process.
Some of our views have already been conveyed by Australia on behalf of the nonproliferation and disarmament Initiative and PDI in writing.
Turkey also would like to set out the following elements that we consider crucial to be reflected in the outcome documents in order to advance our deliberations.
On paragraph two, as highlighted in our national statements during high level segment of the review conference, Turkey strongly emphasizes that NATO extended deterrence and nuclear sharing arrangements have always been and continues to be fully consistent with the NPT.
They predate the NPT, were well known when the treaty was negotiated and ratified and remains recognized as its indefinite extension in 1995.
Therefore, Turkey supports the deletion of paragraph two.
Several states parties, including Turkey have also expressed the view during our deliberations that extended deterrence has contributed and continues to contribute to nonproliferation and strategic stability.
On paragraph 56 regarding the call for future arrangements following the expiration of New Start, Turkey encourages dialogue among nuclear weapon states to reach subsequent arms control arrangements that would contribute to strategic stability.
In this context, Turkey welcomes the United States proposal to launch a multilateral strategic stability dialogue, which could serve as a meaningful framework for future arms control arrangements.
In this regard, we recall paragraph eight of the NPDS landing zone paper, which proposed language calling for the urgent development of new verifiable arms control arrangements by nuclear weapon states.
Chair, Turkey welcomes paragraph 68 and 70, which call for negotiations on a FMCT to begin without further delay and for the declaration of a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.
We will continue to engage constructively throughout the negotiations with a view to the adoption of a meaningful and consensus based outcome document.
I thank you chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Turkey for his intervention.
Javid M, the distinguished representative.
I now invite the distinguished representative of Cameroon.
To take the floor.
That's it.
Thank you, Chair.
My delegation aligns itself with the very relevant interventions by Senegal, South Africa, and Egypt and reaffirm its comments on the pre bul and paragraph 62 and 63.
We'd like to respond to the longstanding request on paragraph 62.
Which is intended to be clarifying.
That is the universal, irrevocable et cetera effect mentioned in this paragraph, taking up the terms of DJ resolution as well as repeated calls of the non aligned movement.
Paragraph 62 is not at all ambiguous on what non weapon states expect disarmament.
And a commitment to not use nuclear weapons with no ambiguity.
We note with satisfaction the call in 63 of resolution 924 and the Unilateral Declaration References made to the disarmament conference and its desire to engage in discussions on an internationally legally binding instrument is political progress.
However, we note with concern the gap between the request in paragraph 62 and the reality in paragraph 63.
62 explains an ideal position, that is a binding and unconditional assurance that 63 recalls existing reality.
And it refers to the Conference of disarmament in this regard.
Therefore, there is a gap between the ambitions that we've set and the concrete proposals made.
There are no transitional measures suggested to reconcile these positions.
My delegation also notes that the text does not indicate what would happen if a nuclear weapon state were to violate these assurances.
There is no complaint mechanism or verification procedure or legal consequence.
Non nuclear facilities therefore are simply forced to rely on the good faith of nuclear weapon states.
My delegation is wondering about the outcome of referring to the conse disarmament here because it functions on the basis of consensus and has not adopted a substantive program of work for years.
The call to engage in discussions is a diplomatic classic, but does not guarantee any progress.
In 63, we could have proposed a specific mechanism under the NPT working group, for example, or a meeting instead of referring to a paralyzed body.
We also note that security assurances are not demanded are only demanded for nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT.
What about other nuclear weapon states that are not party to the NPT? Because their configuration also are a threat is a threat to non nuclear weapon states.
We fully support 62 as an expression of legitimate aspirations of non nuclear weapon states.
We believe that security assurances are a necessary corollary to abandoning nuclear weapons.
No nuclear weapon states non nuclear weapon states should be afraid of being threatened or attacked using nuclear weapons.
That is the implicit promise of the NPT.
This being said, we are realistic a legally binding instrument will not arrive tomorrow to make progress.
My delegation believes we should consider interim measures.
We propose, therefore, adding a line of paragraph 263 to bridge that gap between the ideal and the real and would read as follows.
While awaiting the conclusion of a legally binding instrument, the conference invites nuclear weapon states to revise their unilateral declarations in order to eliminate any conditions that might weaken the unconditional implementation of the treaty and encourages them to engage in annual dialogue with non nuclear weapons states as part of the preparatory commission on the implementation of their assurances due to the potential concerns of the non nuclear weapon states and try to establish a point of contact within their disarmament offices to engage in communication on potential threats.
Microphone was cut off.
Is your Mercy Ding.
I thank the distinguished delegates of Cameroon for that statement.
The next speaker I have on my list is the distinguished representative of Iraq.
You have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
At the outset, we would like to thank the presidency and the Bureau for all their efforts, and we associate ourselves with the statements of NAM and the Arab Group.
Mr.
Chair, we submitted our national comments in advance and we would like to highlight the main comments, Mr.
Chair.
Iraq affirms that the only safeguard against the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons is their full elimination.
Therefore, all efforts must be part of this pillar in order to fully implement Article 6 and to have deadlines in order to fully eliminate nuclear weapons.
In this context, we see that the current document can be strengthened more in a number of aspects related to nuclear disarmament.
Regards to paragraph two, we find that expanding nuclear sharing arrangements or using nuclear deterrences can threaten the credibility of the treaty and with our efforts to reduce the use of these concepts in military and security doctrines.
More attention should be paid to deal with the continued modernization of arsenals and their qualitative modernization as this is in contradiction to the objectives of this armament.
And undermines international trust in the implementation of Article 6.
We also want to introduce some amendments on the following paragraphs.
Paragraph 50, which clearly expresses regret regarding the increase in nuclear arsenals and the qualitative improvements.
We feel that there should be concern expressed regarding the modernization and the production of new generations of weapons and the continued role of these weapons in their security doctrines.
As for 48, we welcome the direct reference that the indefinite extension of the treaty does not mean the indefinite possession of weapons.
We find that this is especially important and that this principle must remain clear and unequivocal because the continued possession of nuclear weapons is in contradiction to the objective of the NPT and with the objective of the full elimination of nuclear weapons.
In paragraph 51, adding a reference where there is more effort exerted to have nuclear disarmament.
As for 57, we reaffirm that nuclear risk reduction efforts must not be a replacement or a substitute or precondition for measures related to nuclear disarmament.
We have concern regarding any initiative that legitimizes the continued position of nuclear weapons under the title of nuclear risk reduction.
As for non use, the principle of no first use, we suggest adding at the end of the paragraph without delay.
We affirm the importance that the CTBT enter into effect and that we have immediate start of negotiations on a non discriminatory treaty on FCMT including its as part of a comprehensive conference.
We emphasize the importance of the NSAs, and we note references in 62 and 63 and we call to adding the importance of beginning to negotiate a legally binding text and non discriminatory text regarding this.
In conclusion, we affirm that establishment of nuclear weapon free zones, especially in the Middle East will work on enhancing regional and international peace and security and will lead to advancement in nuclear disarmament.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Iraq for her statement and I invite the distinguished representative of Singapore to take the floor.
Chair, Singapore recalls Article 6 of the NPT on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the commitment by the nuclear weapon states to nuclear disarmament.
We note that reference to this important bargain by the nuclear weapon states is reflected in the current zero draft of the outcome document, and we continue to support language that recognizes, emphasizes, and strengthens implementation of the NPT's three mutually reinforcing pillars.
I have three points to make on the relevant paragraphs of the draft outcome document, including a brief comment on the preambula paragraphs as this is the first time that my delegation is addressing the sections under consideration by this main committee.
First, Singapore supports the inclusion and retention of preambula paragraphs 1 to ten with particular emphasis on preambula paragraph ten and corresponding paragraph 47 on the implementation of Article 6 of the NPT.
Second, Singapore considers the current formulation of paragraphs 46 to 72 as a reasonable and balanced reflection of the range of views expressed during this conference, while also acknowledging the obligation of nuclear weapon states to make concrete progress towards nuclear disarmament.
Singapore also welcomes references in paragraph 68 to 70, which call for the immediate commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Third, Singapore welcomes the references in paragraphs 52 and 53 on the urgency of the entry into force of the CTBT and importance of the expediency of its ratification by the remaining annex two states.
While recognizing the call at paragraph 55 for nuclear weapon states, pending the entry into force of the CTBT to maintain their existing moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions, including low yield and subcritical tests, Singapore underscores that the CTBT is a zero yield treaty and that reference to this should be made in paragraph 52 or 53.
My delegation is also of the view that the current draft would be enhanced by the addition of a reference in this section, preferably after paragraph 53, to the CTBTO's international Monitoring System, the only global network of sensors and laboratories built to detect nuclear testing.
Singapore views the IMS as complementary to the object and purpose of the NPT and its goal of nuclear disarmament.
The IMS represents a substantial investment by CTBT state signatories and our view is that it would be important to include language on the importance of ensuring the sustainment of the IMS so that it remains fit for purpose at such time as the CTBT enters into force.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Singapore for her intervention and I now invite the distinguished representative of Namibia to take the floor.
Mr.
Chairman, we associate ourselves with a statement by Indonesia on behalf of the non aligned movement.
Namibia longstanding support for the treaty on the prohibition on the NPT is well known across all three pillars.
With regard to the main Committee one issues, we welcome the reference to the CTBT in paragraph 52, 53, and 55, and we would support retaining them.
We also like to see the inclusion of language recognizing the important contribution of the CTBT in the national monitoring system.
A verifiable ban on nuclear testing remains essential to achieving the international community shared objectives of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.
The entry into force of the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty is therefore a critical step and one we must remain firmly committed.
Now maybe also underscore that the disproportionate impact of nuclear testing on women and girls is well documented and should remain a priority consideration in our work.
The CTBT verification regime provides all states with a vital tool to monitor compliance and detect any violation of the treaty.
It continued strengthening is therefore indispensable to the credibility, effectiveness of the global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation architecture.
This year, Namibia will host the third on site inspection, integrated field exercise of the CTBT 10-20 October 2026.
This exercise will bring together hundreds of participants across the world who will apply their training in a scenario designed to be as close to a real on site inspection as possible.
The integrated field exercise is essential to review and demonstrate current OSI capabilities in a hostile manner, highlighting areas of improvement and further reinforce the robustness and readiness of the regime.
Namibia is proud to host this important exercise.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Namibia for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of Brazil to take the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
In addition to previous comments, Brazil is extremely concerned with the expanding nuclear sharing practice, and we welcome the proposal for OP two, but we would suggest a few modifications to read.
The conference recalls that the integrity and credibility of the treaty depend on the strict observance of the obligations set out in Articles one and two.
In this context, the conference expresses serious concern regarding nuclear weapons sharing and extended deterrence arrangements.
The conference emphasized that the establishment or continuation of such arrangements risks weakening confidence in the treaty and undermine its long term effectiveness.
We are sending this in written to the Secretariat.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil for his brief intervention.
I invite the distinguished representative of Nepal to take the floor, followed by the distinguished representative of the United States, Nepal, you have the floor.
Thank you Chair.
Nepal aligns itself with the statement of non states parties to the NP as delivered by Indonesia.
Please allow me to express some of our preliminary observations on my national capacity.
Nepal stands for balanced and forward looking recommendations on nuclear disarmament issues in the final outcome document.
Nepal welcomes the reaffirmation of Article 6 obligations in paragraph 46 of the draft and the clear recognition in paragraph 50 that these commitments remain unfulfilled.
We welcome the call for nuclear weapon states to fully implement their disarmament obligations, including taking steps to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines.
Nepal also values the emphasis on the entry into force of the CBT in paragraph 52, as well as on the strategic political, environmental, and humanitarian danger posed by the resumption of nuclear weapons testing.
We support the strengthening and retention of these paragraphs.
We further welcome the paragraphs reaffirming concrete progress on legally binding negative security assurances to non nuclear weapon states parties.
We also support language mentioning that nuclear risk reduction measures cannot substitute for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the calls for effective human control over nuclear weapons at all times, and the welcoming of the establishment of the group of scientific and technical experts on nuclear disarmament verification.
Language on the concern over growing risks of integration of emerging technologies, including AI into nuclear weapons C three systems, would have been more welcome for our delegation.
We further welcome the call for engagements in environmental remediation and disarmament and nonproliferation education, which are quite important matters in their own respect.
While appreciating the mention of TPNW in paragraph 73, Nepal stresses on recognizing TPNW's complementarity with NPT for the latter's effective implementation in the draft.
Nepal stands ready to engage constructively, Mr.
Chair, to support you to ensure a balanced and consensus final document.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Nepal for his intervention, and I I invite the distinguished representative of the United States to take the floor, followed by Saudi Arabia and Norway.
United States, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Colleagues, I offered some initial reactions in our first session after the draft was released, but as that was a closed session, I will reiterate some of the key priorities of the United States in this portion of the text.
We have provided written comments to the president of the conference.
Chair, in several places in the text, we align with the views raised today by many delegations that the emphasis on Article 6 as an obligation, not merely a need, can be strengthened.
In this regard, we propose some strengthening of paragraphs 47 51 and paragraphs 56 to 57 to encourage all nuclear weapon states to engage in multilateral strategic stability talks as a demonstration of the good faith pursuit of negotiations that is called for by the treaty.
Such engagement would promote mutual transparency and build confidence through the adoption of concrete risk reduction measures.
We have proposed several specific ideas in the text, taking account of some of the debate in this committee.
We believe these paragraphs should be more explicit about what is preventing the fulfillment of Article 6 obligations.
The breathtaking pace of buildup of one nuclear arsenal without transparency about its ongoing activities, intent, or end state, paired with a lack of serious engagement and strategic stability must be referenced as obstacles to progress.
The other hand, this conference calling on all nuclear weapons states to participate in such talks in line with our Article 6 obligations would be a clear and positive step many delegations have asked for and provide a forum for engagement with a view to addressing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines, and policies, as well as a way to address non strategic or theater range nuclear weapons.
On testing paragraphs, I've intervened at our last on record meeting on this topic and so I won't repeat that here.
We appreciate the emphasis on risk reduction in the text at paragraphs 47, 57, and 59.
Like several others said today, we do not think an unverifiable no first use policy would meaningfully contribute to reducing risks.
This language will not enable us to reach a consensus outcome.
I mentioned US views on AI's role in decision making on nuclear weapons employment in my earlier remarks, as did the P three statement.
We hope this contribution can help us find consensus in paragraph 61.
I also explained our thinking on humanitarian consequences when we discussed the preamble and we have proposed some related suggestions for paragraph 67.
Finally, Chair, we appreciated and will insist on the texts maintenance of a clear call for nuclear weapon states that have not yet done so to declare moratorium on new fissile material production for use in nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
The texts recognition that verification and enforcement of Articles two and three are also essential to achieve full compliance and build trust.
These inclusions in the text is welcome.
Thank you very much, Chair.
I thank the distinguished Representative of the United States for her intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of Saudi Arabia to take the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
At the outset, we would like to thank you for your efforts in steering the work of this committee, and we would like to provide the following comments with regards to the paragraphs under discussion today.
With regards to the paragraph 52, we suggest amending the text that urges the ratification of the City BT in a way to more accurately reflect the special responsibility of nuclear weapon states and annex two states.
Where their ratification is a precondition for the entry into effect of this treaty.
The universality of this treaty is an important objective, and therefore, the focus must mainly be on the nuclear weapon states and AACs and those in AneCS two whose ratification is indispensable for the CTBT entering into force.
We have sent a proposed text to the Secretariat.
As for paragraph 66, we suggest clarifying the text regarding the obligation on reporting in order to be consistent with approved commitments and with responsibilities under the treaty.
We feel that the main responsibility related to submitting reports on the implementation of Article 6 and paragraph four C of the principles and objectives of 1995 focus on nuclear weapon states.
Considering their special responsibility with regard to nuclear disarmament commitments as part of the treaty.
Therefore, we see that this paragraph would benefit from a clearer draft to avoid giving the impression that there are unified commitments for reporting, that we have the same commitments for reporting on all parties in areas where responsibilities are not the same pursuant to the treaty in terms of their nature or their scope.
We have provided a proposed draft to the Secretariat.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Saudi Arabia for his statement.
The next speaker I have on my list is Norway, followed by Lithuania, Thailand, and Cameroon.
I invite the distinguished representative of Norway to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
We register our thanks yet again for the work that has gone into this draft, which we believe is a good basis for our further work and we've sent our full comments in writing, so I'll highlight some issues here and now.
On OP two, we urge the deletion of the first two sentences.
The current formulation implies that nuclear sharing and extended deterrence arrangements are problematic for the treaty effectiveness and credibility and a nonproliferation concern.
Apart from the fact that nuclear sharing is an unclear term, there is no convergence on such an assessment and at the same time, the paragraph fails to take into account the fact that such arrangements which predate the treaty were instrumental to its very establishment and their enduring contribution to nonproliferation.
As regards transparency, verification and irreversibility, we believe that the emphasis that is put on these three interrelated and core principles of nuclear disarmament in OP 49 is important in its own right and that it serves as a good preface to the later paragraphs that elaborate on these three principles individually.
On that note, we welcome the language on nuclear disarmment verification in OP 71, including the important reference to the group of scientific and technical experts on verification, which the UN General Assembly established last year.
We also welcome the emphasis on irreversibility in OP 72.
There is, however, scope to strengthen that paragraph further by encouraging the states parties to exchange information on the application of the principle of irreversibility as was called for in the joint statement of 39 states two weeks ago.
On OP 50, we question the last sentence and in particular, that it is limited to statements that are counter to Article 6, as opposed to actions.
The focus on statements does not adequately capture, for instance, developments such as the rapid and opaque expansion of the nuclear arsenals of certain nuclear weapon state.
If it is to be retained, we suggest replacing statements with actions.
We support the strong language on the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty in OP 52 to 55, including the importance of upholding the moratorium.
Nevertheless, there is scope for improvement and we would welcome the strengthening of the language as proposed in some of the overlapping points made by, for instance, Singapore and Canada.
As regards OP 56, this fails to capture the widespread calls on the three states with the largest nuclear arsenals to engage in arms control dialogue and negotiations, but also rather implies that this is only for Russia and the US to do, and that needs to be rectified.
We propose that the final sentence call on China, Russia and the United States to lead meaningful initiatives to this end and welcome proposals for multilateral arms control dialogue.
As regards risk reduction, we support the strong language that is already in OP 57 to 59 and would advise against consolidating or streamlining those paragraphs further.
They merit this elaboration, we find.
Overall, we believe that transparency and accountability should be further elaborated in this document.
But that said, we welcome the good language on transparency in paragraph 65 to 66, including the important call for both enhanced and equal transparency, which serves as a preface to the latest sections on this issue.
Like others, we welcome the emphasis on FMCT negotiations in OP 68 and the important call for the establishment and maintenance of moratorium on new fossil material production for nuclear weapons pending the conclusion of such negotiations, which is in OP 70.
And we also agree that OP 67 should be split so that assistance to affected communities and education are treated separately.
And finally, as regards the issue of women's inclusion and representation and disarmament, we support Canada's proposal to include a preambula element on this.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Norway for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of Lithuania to take the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
My delegation has already submitted the written comments.
Now I would like to emphasize the most important general points relevant to the work of this committee.
As last week, my delegation has already stated our position on paragraphs 1 to two.
I will not repeat the argument, but Lithuania suggestion is completely deleting the paragraph two.
Mr.
Chairman, while it is important to have paragraph on future negotiations on a successor arrangements to the New Star treaty, paragraph 56 should not be limited to the United States and the Russian Federation.
Should also refer to all holders of the largest nuclear arsenals, including China and call for the urgent engagement towards a new legally binding framework in this respect.
In this context, we also support calls by the United States for multilateral strategic stability and nuclear arms control talks.
With regards to paragraph 50, we support calls heard in this room to refocus this paragraph attention on certain states undertaking rapid and opaque military buildup and on those using irresponsible nuclear rhetoric.
Lithuania welcomes the specific attention on the risk reduction measures.
While not a substitute for nuclear disarmament, risk reduction contributes to the prevention of nuclear war, can play a major role in creating trust, confidence, and predictability and complements disarmament and arms control efforts.
However, we see some adjustments needed in the paragraph 57 and 59, specifically on the language which might fall outside the risk reduction measures scope, such as addressing the root cause of international tensions.
Regarding no first use policy, we do not recall significant discussion in the room on this issue.
Moreover, such policies alone do not provide sufficient guarantees of restraint or strategic stability, nor can they replace meaningful measures on transparency, risk reduction, and verifiable arms control.
In this context, we are not in a position to support the current text and will propose its deletion.
On paragraph 64, we find the proposed language insufficient, clear and see limited added value as the focus should be on strengthening transparency and accountability by all nuclear weapon states across all three pillars, particularly with regard to Article 6 obligations, we are unable to support the paragraph in its current form.
Regarding TPNW, we remain committed to the shared goal of world without nuclear weapons pursued in a manner that reflects the current security environment.
We believe progress should be grounded in practical, verifiable steps that strengthen collective security and upholds the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime.
In this context, we would propose deleting reference to the TPNW.
Also, we would like to support countries that called on strengthening language and moratorium on nuclear testing.
And we would like to support the Netherlands on the point regarding the FMC.
Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
I thank the distinguished representative of Lithuania for her intervention, and I invite the distinguished representative of Thailand to take the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Cher.
Thailand allied itself with the statement delivered by Indonesia.
We have already submitted our written comments.
In addition to our preliminary statement last week, I wish to highlight our key observations as follows.
Paragraph T, we see that the term recognition cannot capture the urgency and level of harm of the catastrophic humanitarian.
We therefore support the proposal to strengthen the language in this paragraph.
Paragraph 51, we believe that the addition of the outcomes of 1995 Leal Conference will make the paragraph more comprehensive.
Paragraph 57, we welcome the language that nuclear risk reduction measures cannot substitute for the effort aimed at the total elimination of nuclear weapons and support a call for streamlining the language in Paragraph 57 and 59.
On paragraph 61, while welcoming the reference to integration of emerging technologies into the use of nuclear weapons.
Like other previous speakers, including Mexico and Indonesia, we support the effective maintenance of meaningful human control over such weapons at all times.
Paragraph 62, we welcome the reaffirmation of the legitimate rights of all non nuclear weapons to receive legally binding security assurance by all five nuclear weapon states and the emphasis on irreversibility.
However, the call for nuclear weapon state to respond as an act of agency is missing.
Paragraph 67, Thailand supports a proposal to separate the issue of on the assistant to affected communities from nuclear weapon use and tasting from disarmament and nonproliferation educations as the two issues are distinct in their nature and should be further elaborated and strengthened.
In addition, there should be a reference to the contribution of disarmament and nonproliferation education to leash a world without nuclear weapons, including to reduce and prevent the risk and humanitarian consequences associated with nuclear weapons.
Paragraph 73, Thailand suggests to use the term the conference acknowledge the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons.
We wish also to add acknowledgment of state bodies to the TP interview on complementality between the NPT and TP interview.
Furthermore, the complementality between the NPT and other disarmament and nonproliferation instruments and framework must be highlighted.
These include the nuclear weapon free zone treaties and the CTBT.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Thailand for her intervention.
I invite the distinguished representative of Cameroon to take the floor, followed by Sweden and Austria.
President.
Thank you, Chair.
My delegation lines off with the statement by Namibia and Brazil on paragraph two, a delegations, highlighting the importance of strengthening confidence as well as they risk reduction.
My delegation pay special attention to paragraph 50, which notes the failure of the implementation of Article 6.
We welcome this lucid observation and note that paragraph 50 notes with diplomatic language the problems with previous cycles or non nuclear weapon states.
The allegation does note several gaps and ambiguities.
However, first of all, lack of corrective measures, we note with concern that in paragraph 50, there is a regret mentioned but does not propose any measures to redress the situation.
It is an empty observation if nothing follows up with it.
This paragraph ought to recommend the establishment of measures.
The lack of a concrete link here weakens it.
We also note the lack of accountability.
The text simply mentions regret and concern.
The language says that this is deliberately vague.
We note that we ought to have an outcome document that could at least call on the nuclear weapon states to note what they have to do in their obligations.
We are also deeply concerned with the silence on transparency obligations.
Paragraph 50 does not draw any link between obligations under Article 6 that were provided for in the review conference of 2000 2010, but it's detailed report does demonstrate this.
We believe it's fairly useful to include in this paragraph a obligation or language to that end.
We also note the reference to irreversibility.
Paragraph 50 refers to the qualitative increase which runs counter to the principle of irreversibility of disarmament.
However, there are no consequences mentioned for this contradiction.
As for qualitative enhancement and quantitative growth, we believe modification of arsenals and quantitative increases violate the spirit of Article 6.
To extend its impact and credibility, my delegation proposed the following additions to be inserted in paragraph 50 or in a paragraph 50 B.
The conference calls Therefore, on nuclear weapons states, two, one, submit on an annual basis as part of an annual implementation statement, a detailed report on the state of their arsenals deployed and stockpiled, their modernization programs, as well as their reduction plans.
To, to refrain from making any statement that would threaten to use nuclear weapons or weaken their obligations to negotiate in good faith.
Three, adopt within two years an interpretative statement on the irreversibility that defines measures incompatible with the goal of disarmament, especially the modernization, a qualitative modernization that aims to provide new capacities.
Thank you.
Mercy, thank the distinguished representative of Cameroon for that intervention.
I invite the distinguished representative of Sweden to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
We welcome the early distribution of a first draft text and have provided written proposals.
However, allow me to make a few comments to highlight some of those relevant to the discussion this morning.
Let me first turn to the erosion of arms control arrangements.
We regret the expiry of the New Star treaty which for many years contributed to strategic stability, transparency, and predictability between the states possessing the world's largest nuclear arsenals.
The absence of an international arms control agreement in combination with rapid and opaque expansion of nuclear arsenals by China and irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and threats to use nuclear force by Russia are cause for concern.
We know that many speakers in this room would like to see the concerns of a dangerous nuclear rhetoric and opaque buildup better reflected.
We join in this call and suggest to include such references to these deeply worrying developments in paragraph 50.
We would like paragraph 56 to urge the three largest nuclear weapon states to engage meaningfully without preconditions in the interest of global security and predictability in strategic stability talks on a new treaty.
In reference to Article 54 and 55, we welcome the language on nuclear weapon testing and the CTBT.
The decrease of nuclear testing over the last decade is one of the unsung success stories of our common disarmament and nonproliferation efforts.
We commend the chair for putting forth a solid text in this regard and supporting retaining language that reflect the importance of states adhering to and upholding the moratorium on nuclear testing.
In addition, we would like paragraph 71 to reflect the value of multilateral cooperation in advancing nuclear disarmament verification in formats such as the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, IPNDB.
Finally, we would like others, welcome a reference in the preamble to equal inclusion of women and men in the work related to NPT.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Sweden for her intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of Austria to take the floor.
Thank you very much Chair.
To encourage a more interactive discussion, I wanted to pick up a point raised earlier.
The notion that security concerns has been monopolized by the non nuclear majority was put forward as an argument to reject the inclusion of references to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.
This is an interesting argument, given that concerns about the international security environment have been highlighted to explain why progress on nuclear disarmament is not possible and in fact being reversed.
We agree that legitimate security concerns need to be properly reflected in the NPT.
To do this, we need to look at the scientifically proven facts.
First is a clear recognition that any use of nuclear weapons would have catastrophic consequences, trans boundary, cascading, and uncontrollable.
That even a limited exchange would produce global effects with climate disruption, food insecurity, and impacts far beyond the states directly involved.
These facts are underpinned by an increasing body of scientific research.
This should be the starting point of our deliberations.
Second, we need to highlight the clearly documented risks and that they are growing.
Third and importantly, we need to reflect that nuclear deterrence theory is a human construct, a theory that rests on a chain of assumptions that decision makers will always behave rationally, that signals will always be read as intended, that command and control will always function, that information will always be accurate, and that restraint will prevail under maximum stress.
Each of these assumptions is put in question by the historical record of near misses, miscommunications, technical failures, and too many instances of sheer lack preventing a catastrophe.
We need to weigh these risks against the catastrophic consequences of even a single failure.
For states not relying on nuclear deterrence, this represents an even more acute asymmetry.
We are asked to accept little to no transparency, no accountability, and potentially catastrophic consequences as a byproduct of others security doctrines.
We have heard today that these scientific facts have been instrumentalized by non nuclear weapon states to put pressure on nuclear weapon states.
We would like to reject this.
On the contrary, these are very concrete, scientifically based security concerns.
They should be taken seriously by all, including those relying on nuclear deterrence.
We need to base our conversation and policies on a scientifically grounded factual basis.
The vast majority of states have highlighted these facts and concerns over and over and over again over the past several review cycles, and this should lead to concrete progress on transparency and accountability, risk reduction and actual progress on nuclear disarmament and moving away from reliance on nuclear weapons.
We look forward to jointly developing this as a central deliverable of the APT Review Conference.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Austria for her intervention.
I now invite the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom to take the floor.
That intervention will be followed by Cuba and Belgium.
United Kingdom, you have the floor.
Thank you very much Chair.
The United Kingdom has submitted written comments on the draft.
The UK's proposals have sought to ensure the treaty text is referred to faithfully in preambula paragraphs 2, three, and paragraph 46.
We particularly wish to emphasize this point in relation to the reference to catastrophic humanitarian consequences in PP three.
The UK proposes replacing this with the language from the NPT preamble on the devastation of nuclear war.
The UK had some concerns with the concept expressed in preambula paragraph ten and paragraph 47, that the treaty itself can be strengthened through implementation and the implication across preambul paragraphs 10 to 12 of a hierarchy of obligations.
Instead, the UK has proposed amendments that recognize that implementation of Article 6 is essential for the effective implementation of the treaty as a whole.
The UK echoes calls by many states for removal of paragraph two on extended deterrence, and we underline that the text should reflect the balance of debate in the room on this issue.
On paragraph 60, the UK also echoes the calls for the deletion of this paragraph.
As colleagues from Lithuania, the US, Denmark, and others have said, no first use doctrines lack credibility and do not reduce risk.
The UK notes the strong interest from many states and references to AI in the text, and we have proposed language on paragraph 61 consistent with the Pa three statement on human control in decisions on nuclear weapons employment.
On paragraph 62, the UK cannot accept the call for unconditional or irrevocable negative security assurances.
We have proposed amendments that recognize the interest of all non nuclear weapon states that are in compliance with their obligations under the NPT to receive unequivocal and legally binding negative security assurances.
Finally, the UK welcomes texts that recognizes the importance of transparency, irreversibility and verification in paragraph 65, 66, 71, and 72 and would support language that recognizes and reinforces the role of the CTBTO.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom for her intervention.
I now invite the distinguished representative of Cuba to take the floor.
Thank you very much Chair.
First of all, we align ourselves with the statement made by Indonesia on behalf of the non aligned movement.
Subsequently, I would like to emphasis on some specific issues.
On the reference to paragraph two, we reiterate our support to retaining it with the proposed amendments made by some countries on the reference to reflecting the deterrent doctrines in force.
What's more, when it comes to paragraphs 46 to 73, we agree with paragraph 46 reflecting the exact drafting of Article 6 of the treaty and focusing on the responsibility of nuclear weapon states.
On Article 47, we propose removing the reference to maintaining and strengthening of the treaty and referring to the implementation of Article 6, which is essential for its effective implementation, to include that.
What's more, on 50, that refers to the courses for which Article 6 remains unfulfilled to also include the Okay.
Maintenance of nuclear weapons for concepts of security and other military concepts of nuclear weapon states.
We agree with the proposal for Article 51 on removing the reference to removing nuclear weapons from deterrent doctrines, including the elimination and exclusion of these weapons in these contexts.
On paragraph 52, we also agree with reflecting the exact drafting of action ten of the 2010 action plan.
Un Article 53, we also agree with the proposal made by Egypt on behalf of the Arab Group on reflecting that the reference to compliance with the universalization of the CTBT is a mechanism of non proliferation that strengthens this objective.
On paragraph 55, specifically, we would propose adding not only subcritical tests, but other non explosive tests with non modern technological techniques within the scope of this drafting.
Furthermore, when it comes to 60 paragraph 60 on the call to all nuclear weapon states to adopt non first use policies, we also agree with retaining it and the importance of this for non nuclear weapon states.
On 65, we agree with the proposal to remove the conditionality of the implementation of Article 6, which is not subject to national without prejudice to national security and threats to national security for certain nuclear weapon states.
These are the specific elements that we wished to contribute and we support referring to the NPT.
Thank you.
Michel Gracias, I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba for her intervention.
I now invite the distinguished representative of Belgium to take the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I will now come back to the comments Belgium made last week on Among Us nuclear sharing arrangements.
These comments still stand and were adequately transmitted to the president.
In addition to these, we would also like to stress an important aspect that in Belgium view is not reflected in a sufficient manner in the draft.
Transparency.
A large number of delegations underline their concern regarding the lack of transparency on the rapid and opaque expansion of the arsenals of certain nuclear weapon states.
This question was also the subject of several working papers and should be adequately reflected in the text.
We would therefore propose the following.
First, in paragraph 50, we would suggest acknowledging the serious concerns regarding the quantitative growth of nuclear arsenals happening in an opaque manner and without transparency.
Second, we would also suggest the deletion of paragraph 64 and the modification of paragraph 65.
The objective is to shift the focus on how to enhance transparency and accountability, especially by all nuclear weapon states across all three pillars, in particular with regard to Article 6 obligations.
Finally, we would also support the deletion of paragraph 60 on no for use as proposed by the Danish delegation as this proposal lacks credibility and verifiability, given the absence of transparency of certain nuclear weapon states advocating for such policies.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Belgium for her intervention, and that was the last speaker on my list.
Distinguished delegates, I believe we've met two state parties have inscribed.
We have ten more minutes to go and taking into account the availability of interation services, I would urge the respective delegates to be brief.
I now invite the distinguished representative of Cambodia to take the floor.
Mr.
Chair, first, Cambodia aligned itself with the statement delivered by Indonesia on behalf of the non aligned movement.
We appreciate the efforts undertaken in preparing the current draft and wish to offer preliminary observation on selected paragraphs under main Committee one.
First, regarding paragraphs 54 on nuclear testing, Cambodia believes that this language could be further strengthened in light of the current deteriorating international security environment and the increasing erosion of trust among major powers.
The resumption of nuclear testing in any form, whether overt or indirect would not only undermine international peace and security, but also risk triggering a renewed armed race and weakening decades of progress achieved under the nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime.
In this regard, Cambodia underscores the urgent importance of preserving and reinforcing existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions aligned with the object and purpose of the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.
Furthermore, with regard to paragraph 61, Cambodia attaches particular importance to the principle of maintaining effective human control over nuclear weapons at all times.
As emerging technology, including artificial intelligence, a growing concern regarding the risk of miscalculation, unintended escalation, accidental launches, or loss of human judgment in nuclear decision making processes.
Cambodia believe that decisions relating to the use of nuclear weapon must never be delegated entirely to automated system or machine.
Human responsibility, accountability, and political judgment must remain central in all command and control structures involving nuclear weapons.
Cambodia stands ready to engage constructively with all delegation to further strengthen the draft outcome document in a balanced, inclusive, and forward looking manner.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Cambodia for his intervention, and I I invite the distinguished representative of Estonia to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Since this is the first time Estonia takes the floor following the circulation of the zero draft outcome document, then allow me to thank you and your efforts in guiding the work of the main committee on.
As a general comment regarding the section of the draft, Dystonia underlines the importance of clear language on the CTP team, nuclear risk reduction, transparency and strategic dialogue, including emerging technologies and artificial intelligence.
The document should also adequately reflect the current security environment, including irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and other factors that undermine strategic stability and increase nuclear risks.
Estonia has already submitted more detailed comments and drafting suggestions in writing.
In this regard, we would like to highlight several key priorities relevant for the current drafting discussions.
In Para 48, Estonia believes it should better reflect the relationship between progress of nuclear disarmament and the prevailing international security environment.
In Paragraph 52, Estonia supports references to the Russian Federation's revocation of its ratification of the CTPT We also support increased transparency regarding the activities related to low yield nuclear testing.
In Paragraph 55, Estonian supports maintaining moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions, including low yield and subcritical tests.
In Par 58, Estonian supports stronger language condemning threats to use nuclear weapons and irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, which undermine strategic stability, increase nuclear risks, and erode decades of efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons.
In paragraph 60, Estonia believes that the no first use declarations cannot substitute for measures related to transparency, verification, and risk reduction.
Finally, as several delegations have referred to paragraph two during today's discussions, Estonia underlines that NATO's nuclear deterrence posture, including extended deterrence arrangements, is defensive in nature and fully consistent with the NPT.
Nuclear weapons remain under the control of nuclear weapon states at all times.
These arrangements have contributed to nuclear nonproliferation for decades.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Estonia for his intervention, and that was the last speaker on my list.
I would like once again to express appreciation for the constructive manner in which delegations continue to engage the draft outcome document.
At our next meeting, I intend to open the floor again for comments on all our located sections of the draft.
On this note, I would like to see that the meeting is adjourned.