(Main Committee II) Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Very good morning to everyone.
Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, the meeting is called to order.
I declare open the seventh and final meeting of main Committee two of the 2026 Review conference of the parties to the treaty on the non proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Excellencs, distinguished delegates.
As this is the last meeting of main Committee two, the committee will also need to adopt its draft procedural report.
To enable the most efficient use of our time, I suggest that we first proceed to adopt the draft procedural report before moving to delegations views on the revised draft outcome document.
This morning, the Secretariat circulated the draft report of main Committee two bearing the symbol NPT slash dot 2026 slash c dot slash CRP dot, which contains the procedural elements of the committee's work.
As delegations are aware, the Secretariat continues to receive working papers and national reports from delegations.
The list of documents contained in paragraph four are as of 8:00 A.M.
This morning and will be factually updated at a later stage by the Secretariat to reflect all documents that were submitted prior to the end of the review conference.
If there are no objections, the draft report of main Committee two outlining the procedural work of the committee will be circulated as an official document of the review conference.
I see no objections.
It is so decided.
Thank you.
Excellencies, distinguished delegates, I will now invite oh, I'm sorry.
Uh I think.
Sorry, Excellence delegates.
I will now invite state parties to provide their comments and proposals on the paragraphs of the president's revised draft final outcome relevant for the main committee too.
As a reminder, please send any written statements and comments on the draft to the email address pt at un.org, clearly identifying the subject.
In case we run out of time today, it will be even more important that you send these written comments.
As you know very well by now, the time limit for group statements remain 8 minutes and 5 minutes for national statements with automatic microphone cut off.
I kindly ask delegations to inform the Secretariat in advance if they're speaking on behalf of group so that we can be sure to allocate the sufficient time.
Delegations are encouraged to provide statements in case they have them available for the interpretation services by sending them to the email address, estates at.org.
Please inform the Secretariat as soon as possible if your delegation wishes to exercise its right of reply.
Rights of reply will be heard at the end of this meeting, time permitting.
Those delegations that wish to take the floor are requested to press the button at this time.
We will proceed in the order in which requests for the floor are received with priority given to the groups.
The first speaker I have on my list is the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the non aligned movement to be followed by United Kingdom.
Indonesia, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I have the honor to speak on behalf of the group of the non aligned states parties to the NPT.
We congratulate you, your team, and the Secretariat for the efficient and provisional manner in which you have steered work during the 11th NPT review Conference.
The group attaches great importance to the successful outcome of this review conference.
To this end, the group welcomes the president's effort in preparing the revised draft outcome documents at an early stage for considerations by state parties.
Group is pleased to see that a number of met rays in our working paper and statements were considered and reflected in the document.
The group expresses its strong support to the zero draft affirmations of existing commitment pursuant to the 1995, 2000 and 2010 outcome documents of the review conference.
Notwithstanding these, we have identified some areas which need to be addressed to further strengthen the draft outcome documents and ensure effective implementations of the treaty.
In this regard, the group would like to share our general reflections on matter under the purview of main Committee two and subsidiary revit two as follows.
We believe that there should be a clear reference in the outcome, underscoring that effort aimed at nuclear nonproliferation should be pursued in parallel to simultaneous effort aimed at nuclear disarmament.
We must also emphasize that in the area of safeguards and non proliferation, it is fundamental to maintain a clear distinctions between legal safeguards obligations and other voluntary confidence building measures.
That such voluntary undertaking shall not be turned into legal safeguards obligations.
In this regard, we underline the importance of strict observance by IAA of its statute and the relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements in conducting verifications activities and the necessity of IAA reporting on the implementation of safeguards being factual, professional, technically based, and reflecting appropriate reference to the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements while ensuring the protections of confidential information.
Group notes the changes in paragraph 11 and reasserts positions that the CSA are the universal standard of verifications and the legal prerequisite under the treaty.
The additional protocol is a voluntary instrument to which sanctions remain a sovereign decisions of its state.
These distinctions needs to be clearly captured in the document.
The group also underlined that Article 3 of the treaty on verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programs provides the necessary credible assurances for states parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material, and technology for peaceful purposes, and therefore, states parties to the treaty shall refrain from imposing or maintaining any restrictions or limitations on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material, and technology to states parties with comprehensive set GAP agreements.
We note the reference on the challenges facing the implementation of safeguards in the context of nuclear propulsion activities.
At the same time, we believe that this reference could be further strengthened to reflect the concerns raised by delegations.
The group takes note of the reference recalling the baseline provisions of Article 3 regarding export control and safeguards and reiterate the need to explicitly establish that adherence to the NPT and to IAA's comprehensive safeguards must be an absolute conditions for any nuclear operations with states not parties to the treaty.
In line with paragraph 12 of the decisions two of the 1995 review and extensions conference about the inadmissibility of nuclear cooperations that extend to exchange of source or fissionable materials and related equipment with states that are non parties to the NPT and not subject to the IAA full scope safeguards.
The group supports further efforts aimed at establishing nuclear weapon free zones in the regions where they do not exist, in particular in the Middle East and in this context, reaffirm the importance and validity of the 1995 resolutions on the Middle East until all its objectives are achieved.
The group reiterates that the reference to establish nuclear weapon free zones in the Middle East as a reasonable basis to build on and call for strengthened provisions regarding this matter.
We expect the documents to reaffirm commitments under previous real conferences, including by nuclear weapon states in 2010, reaffirm the determinations to achieve the universality of the NPT, including in the Middle East, signal commitments toward undertaking concrete and specific steps in support of implementations and to dismiss any language which established conditionality on implementations.
The group also support welcoming the convening of the previous conferences sessions and adding forward looking elements which will help the accelerations of the implementations of the 1995 resolutions on the Middle East, especially urging all states parties of the Middle East, as well as the nuclear weapon states, especially the three co sponsor of the 1995 resolutions on the Middle East to participate in this conference and to extend the necessary support for its work and objective, and to call upon Israel to participate in the conference and engage with its constructively and in good faith.
Lastly, NAM demands that Israel, the only one in the region that has not joined the NPT, nor declared its intentions to do so, renounce any possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the NPT as a non nuclear weapon states without preconditions and for delay, and place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAA full scope safeguards.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Indonesia for the statement on behalf of non aligned movement.
Next on my list is the representative of the United Kingdom.
United Kingdom, you have the floor.
Thank you.
Good morning, Chair and to colleagues in the room.
Firstly, I want to express our thanks to you, chair, and your team, for all of your efforts here in Main Committee two over the last few weeks to seek to accommodate the views of states parties throughout this process.
We are very grateful for all of your work.
We provided detailed comments to the committee yesterday and stand by them.
So in the interests of efficient working, I will not repeat them in length today.
This includes our views on the additional protocol and on several key areas of the text, including strong language on non compliance related to Iran and the DPRK issue.
But I would like to briefly refer to a couple of points.
In relation to the balance of the draft outcome text on export controls, we reiterate that effective export controls reinforce the effective implementation of the treaty by providing transparency, predictability, and confidence that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes can proceed without increasing proliferation risk.
As stated previously, we also don't accept that export controls impose undue restraints or hamper the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
We prefer this reference is removed, but could potentially accept a change to the language in the interests and consensus in paragraph 21 to more accurately reflect that export controls do not impose such restraints.
I would also like to briefly note that we welcome the language as it is in paragraph 19 of Revision one and the new additions made to strengthen the language in paragraph five.
Chair, we also welcome the new revision reflects widespread support for the principle and practice of nuclear weapons free zones and note the importance of those arrangements being freely arrived at among the member states of the regions concerned.
The UK recognizes the legitimate interests of non nuclear weapon states to receive negative security assurances.
The UK provides clear and credible assurances and has given legally binding negative security assurances to more than 100 countries not in material breach of the NPT under nuclear weapons free zone treaties.
We would like to see paragraph 76 focus on the value of dialogue between nuclear weapon states and members of zones.
Finally, Chair, I just want to briefly note that our paper on enhancing transparency and accountability in the NPT review process, Paper WP 40 has been mentioned in the reports of other committees, but also comes under the purview of this committee.
I would be grateful if the change could be reflected in the committee report.
I will send details to the team as instructed.
We look forward to continuing our discussions on the next revision of the text and the outcome document and look forward to working with colleagues in the week to come.
Thank you.
I thank the distinct representative of the United Kingdom for the statement and kind words addressed to the chair.
We're waiting for other delegations to request the floor.
Next speak on my list is Singapore, followed by Kazakhstan.
Singapore, you have the floor.
Chair, my delegation thanks the president for the revised draft outcome document and for his continued efforts towards balanced text that can be broadly acceptable to all delegations.
Our view is that Rev one represents a commendable effort to bridge the different and in some cases, opposing views expressed over the past week.
Allow me to make some brief comments on the revised draft.
On paragraph four, my delegation welcomes the inclusion of a reference to the indispensable role of IAEA safeguards in relation to nuclear nonproliferation and the implementation of the treaty.
Singapore supports the addition of the sentence at the end of paragraph five, that no action should be taken to undermine the authority of the IAEA.
We add our voice in support of the proposal made by South Africa yesterday to add a further phrase at the end of this line, nor its ability to execute its safeguards mandate.
We note that adjustments have been made to paragraphs 9 and 10 to include a strengthened reference to the legal nature of comprehensive safeguards agreements and the value of its universalization in relation to the implementation of the treaty.
We support this.
We welcome the inclusion of Paragraph 21, encouraging all states parties to facilitate transfer of nuclear technology and materials and international cooperation among states parties in conformities with Articles one, two, three, and four of the treaty and to eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the treaty.
On paragraph 76, my delegation echoes the call of those other delegations who have proposed the addition of the phrase without reservations, following the call for the ratification and accession of nuclear weapon states of the relevant protocols to nuclear weapon free zones treaties.
On paragraph 78, my delegation's preference is to retain the formulation in the draft.
We note that nuclear stockpiles in any region that is not part of a nuclear weapon free zone poses challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
In the alternative, we would support the proposal by South Africa yesterday on this paragraph, namely to replace South Asia with areas where nuclear weapon free zones do not exist, which we believe is a good formulation.
On paragraph 79 on the DPRK, my delegation's strong preference is to retain the original formulation of this paragraph in the draft.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Singapore for the statement and the kind words addressed to the presidency.
Next speaker is Kazakhstan, followed by Japan.
Kazakhstan, you have the floor.
Mr.
Chair, we appreciate your continued efforts to refine the document, and we also thank the Secretariat team for their dedicated support in working to reflect the many important comments, concerns, and proposals put forward by delegations.
As an active participant and the current chair of the Central Asian nuclear weapon free zone, Kazakhstan welcomes the paragraphs in ref one, recognizing the importance of nuclear weapon free zones in strengthening the NPT regime.
In this context, we would like to draw attention to a practical dimension that could be further reflected in the document, namely the ongoing cooperation and coordination among the existing nuclear weapon free zones, including initiatives undertaken in recent years.
Such interzonal engagement has provided useful opportunities to maintain dialogue, share experiences, and promote greater coherence in implementation, particularly in the absence of formal conferences of nuclear weapon free zones since 2015.
Acknowledging these efforts would, in our view, complement the existing language and reflect current practice.
We will share our proposed language with the Secretariat in writing.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the Distinguished Representative of Kazakhstan for the statement and the kind words addressed to the presidency and Secretariat.
Next speaker is representative of Japan, followed by Lithuania.
Japan, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
We very much appreciate your great effort to lead the discussion of this main committee.
As I had a chance to comment on B one in a comprehensive manner yesterday, today, I wish to concentrate on three issues we attach importance today.
First, let me take up AP.
The NPD has a history spanning more than half a century.
In the early 1990s, we have faced with two issues of prof concern, one in East Asia and the other in Middle East.
Both of them involved undeclared nuclear material and activities.
Exposing the need to strengthen the non profession regime.
Following intensive multilateral deliberation, the model AP was developed and adopted to address this proliferation concern.
Today, 140 member states with CSA, including Japan, have concluded the AP.
Such current status of AP should be appropriately deflected as the UK and others are also calling for.
Let me further emphasize the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities cannot be fully assured without the AAP.
We must not underestimate the essential role of the AP as a verification tool to ensure non proliferation.
The core objective of the NDPD to enhance the regional security of each state party and to strengthen our collective security.
Over emphasizing the branary nature of concluding the AP does not reflect the past lesson I mentioned, which should never be forgotten.
Thus, we must not weaken the agreed language of 2010 final document.
Japan as a state that has been receiving the largest number of complimentary access, robust verification measure under the AP insist on its paramount importance.
Now, let me turn to export control.
Export controls were also introduced and have been continuously updated based on lessons from an even earlier period as necessary measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
The claim that export control unduly constrains the peaceful uses of nuclear technology does not take those lessons into account.
The state parties should establish sound national registration grounded in guidelines developed through CRS multi territorial libération and implement responsible export control measures.
This should also be reflected in the outcome document.
With appropriate export controls, trust among states will be fostered and nuclear technology, important but risk bearing, can be responsibly harnessed for the benefit of humankind.
Finally, with respect to North Korea, which has violated the treaty, acquired nuclear weapon, and continue its nuclear development, this is a matter striking as the credibility and integrity of the NBPT.
The Arab Conference should adopt a firm stance on violation.
Our delegation is of the viewer.
If the outcome document of this conference does not send a clear message on this point, its value would be seriously questioned.
Mr.
Chair, in closing, I wish to express my sincere appreciation for your leadership in guiding us toward consensus.
We stand ready to continue to engage with delegations with a view to achieving a consensual document.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Japan for the statement and kind words addressed to the chair and your willingness to cooperate further.
Next speaker is Lithuania to be followed by Republic of Korea.
Lithuania, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
We would like to thank you for the revised draft and to make the following remarks under this committee.
Also, we will provide written comments in due time.
Mr.
Chair, we welcome the emphasis placed on the safeguards and the central role of EIA, including in OP five, which clearly states that no action should be taken to undermine the authority of the agency in this regard.
In this context, we align ourselves with those delegations calling for the text to further reflect the AAA's mandate and its impartial, independent, and objective work.
We associate ourselves with the statements made by Ukraine, Denmark, Norway, and many others regarding the need to reflect the severe implications for safeguards implementation in Ukraine as a result of Russia illegal use of force, including the seizure and militarization of the Zaporyza nuclear power plant.
Such actions directly challenge the national implementation of EIA safeguards and undermine the integrity of the nonproliferation regime.
Mr.
Chair, Lithuania is of the view that non compliance as well as actions that may undermine the compliance obligations of the other states should be clearly reflected in the outcome document.
We already commented on it under MC three as well.
In this regard, we regret the removal of references to Iran's noncompliance in OP seven, as well as the weakening of the language in OP 79 and OP 80 concerning the DPRK.
And we call as a minimum for the reinstatement of previous language, but also Lithuania would support stronger language on both Iran and DPRK cases.
Mr.
Chairman, with regard to export controls, in particular OP 19 to 2021, we welcome the affirmation and the recognition of the positive contribution of the export controls to non proliferation.
At the same time, it is important that the text clearly reflects this such measures are in no way undue constraints inconsistent with the treaty.
I would also like to mention that we support the view that EIA comprehensive safeguards complemented by the additional protocol represents the current verification standard.
Mr.
Chair, Lithuania remains committed to engage constructively towards a balanced outcome document.
I thank you.
I thank the S representative of Lithuania for the statement and willingness to cooperate with us.
Thank you.
Next speaker is the Republic of Korea, followed by Egypt on behalf of Arab states.
Republic of Korea, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Further to my delegation statement yesterday, I would like to offer some additional comments.
First, with regard to the IAN safeguards, we emphasize the authority and the role of the IAEA.
In this regard, together with others, we welcome the reference in paragraph five, stating that no action should be taken to undermine the authority of the IAEA.
In addition, while we recognize the voluntary nature of the AP, we note that AP, together with the CSA CSA constitutes the modern verification standard.
Given that a significant majority of states have already concluded an AP, we believe it is natural for the conference to encourage all state parties to conclude additional protocols.
This is also consistent with the 2010 River Conference final documents.
In this regard, we hope to retain paragraph 12.
At the same time, we hope to reinstate paragraph 16 of the draft, which reaffirms the safeguards should be regularly assessed and evaluated in light of the technological development.
This was also agreed in the 2010 review Conference, and considering the unprecedented pace of technological development in recent years, we believe it is important to reaffirm this once again.
Second, Regarding export controls, we welcome the recognition that export controls can facilitate nuclear trade for peaceful purposes.
However, we hope this point can be reflected more accurately and precisely in factual terms.
In the meantime, the reference to undue constraint is subjective and could be interpreted as undermining export controls.
Therefore, we hope to delete this reference in paragraph 21 and other relevant paragraphs.
Lastly, before concluding, I'd like to recall that yesterday there was broad support to reinstate the deleted sentences from the zero draft, as well as to further strengthen the language regarding the DPRK.
We hope these views will be duly reflected in the next revised draft outcome document.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Republic of Korea for his statement.
The next speaker is Egypt on behalf of the Arab Group, to be followed by Iraq, Egypt, you have the floor.
Thank you so much, Mr.
Chair and thank you for giving me the floor.
I'll take this opportunity to give some more explanation about the amendments and the statement that we delivered yesterday.
Let me start by reiterating our appreciation for all of your efforts and the presidents in providing for Rev one.
We believe that Rev one introduced a couple of amendments that took a step in the right direction.
However, the statement and the amendments that we relayed in the previous sessions as well as yesterday remain relevant.
Mr.
Chair, I would like to provide explanation into a couple of points, and all of them are related to the balance of the text between comprehensive safeguard agreements, additional protocol, and the broader application of safeguards on nuclear weapon states and non nuclear weapon states.
To start in the preambler paragraph 17, there is a new language that has not been introduced in an agreed text before that reads that safeguards are essential for peaceful nuclear commerce and cooperation.
We believe that the language in paragraph four is sufficient to address the interlink between safeguards and nuclear cooperation, and that's why we call for and suggest that we remove the preamblar paragraph 17.
Or we can at least substitute it with a language that would link safeguards that it should be designed in compliance also or inconsistency with Article 4 of the treaty.
The same applies to paragraph four as well.
The concept of the balance between Article 3 and four of the treaty is crucial and important for us to add in paragraph four, this balance.
This is the first point, the balance between Article 3 and four of the treaty.
The second point that I want to highlight is the language on comprehensive safeguards agreement versus additional protocol.
We notice that the current draft only mentions comprehensive safeguard agreements in relation to the additional protocol.
There is only one factual paragraph, paragraph ten that mentions a number of states that joined the CSA since the last review conference.
In our view, Mr.
Chair, that the current text does not give due consideration of the comprehensive safeguard agreements and with a simple comparison between paragraph nine and paragraph 11, Paragraph nine mentions a limited level of assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities vis-à-vis CSA and paragraph 11 celebrates additional protocol as enhanced verification regime.
We see that the text might benefit of an additional effort to balance, first of all, to consider data language on CSA and I here recall language maybe in the general conference resolutions of the IEA, particularly paragraph J and K to recall the central importance of the CSA for the implementation of the NPT.
As well as paragraph K in the preamblar that say, noting the implementation of the CSA should be designed to provide the agency for the correctness and completeness of state declarations.
The concept here is that we need to add language that consolidates and supports comprehensive safeguards agreements to balance the text.
Mr.
Chair, on paragraph ten, also, we see that the language regarding the universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreement can benefit from strengthening this language, and we suggested particular text in this regard.
On paragraph 11, back to the point that I was just mentioning about how we balance the introduction and the projection of comprehensive safeguard agreements versus additional protocol, we know that the language introduced here also is a new language that has not been introduced before and we can engage constructively to try to address the strategic objective three of the additional protocols related to, um, absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the state as a whole.
However, we see that this particular paragraph 11 is somehow mixing the findings of CSA only states and CSA and AP states in a way that can blur the lines between these two findings.
We understand that this paragraph speaks of strategic objective three of the IEA safeguards and that's why we highly suggest that we use an agreed language to be very much focused on strategic objective three and does not give any indication that this is something related to CSA only states.
Mr.
Chair, also, we've heard a couple of delegations saying that we can reflect on the number of countries joining the addition protocol.
If there is a paragraph that would allude to numbers, we will highly suggest that we also reflect numbers related to CSA countries, SQP countries, and countries who are not party to the NPT as well to give due balance to the reflection that we need to address here.
On the paragraph that has been omitted in rev one related to the review of safeguards in light of technological developments, because we've heard that reference to 2010, 2010 and action 32 did not mention technological developments and in the zero draft, this particular paragraph did not give the context on how or the legal context of reviewing safeguards.
That's why we welcomed its removal and we highly suggest that even if we would bring something in this direction, it could benefit from action 32 of the 2010 action plan.
We suggested language on safeguards on nuclear weapon states, and this is very important to reflect that safeguards is not only applied to non nuclear weapon states.
The Arab Group adjusted two paragraphs in this regard.
Finally, Mr.
Chair, on export control arrangements, in our understanding and belief that control has two elements that needs to be reflected.
And any attempt to water down the precondition to apply comprehensive safeguards or to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons will be undermining the commitments that we had before.
Equally important is that we need also to reflect on the undue constraints and the inalienable rights of member states.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
We are looking forward to engage constructively going forward to reach a consensual outcome.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Egypt for the statement on behalf of the group of Arab states and the kind words addressed to the presidency and your willingness to work constructively further.
So the next speaker on my list is Iraq, followed by Turkey, Iraq, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
At the outset, we would like to thank you for your efforts in guiding our discussions and we also thank the president through you for circulating the revised draft outcome document.
We align ourselves with the statement delivered by the Arab Group and non alignment movement, and we would like to add the following remarks in our national capacity.
My delegation reaffirms that the nonproliferation pillar as reflected in Articles one and two of the treaty constitutes a fundamental component of the MPT regime.
However, it cannot be implemented in isolation from the other two pillars, nor should it use as a basis for maintaining permanent distinctions among state parties.
We believe that the sustained dialogue and diplomacy remain the most effective means of bridging differences and restoring confidence in the treaty.
In this regard, we call for open, inclusive, and transparent multilateral discussions aimed at addressing all implementation challenges and ensuring a genuine balance among the three pillars of the treaty.
Mr.
Chair, Iraq stressed that the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction remain essential to strengthening the credibility of the treaty.
In this context, we remain concerned that the one does not adequately reflect the positions and repeated calls of the majority of state parties regarding this issue.
Regarding paragraph 77, we support retaining the original language as contained in the zero draft.
The reference to arrangement really arrived at among the states of the region and the relevant principles is already adequately reflected in paragraph 74.
Therefore do not support the proposed amendment to this paragraph.
Regarding paragraphs 84 to 86, we note that the current formulation fails to reaffirm the commitments and understandings agreed up at previous review conferences.
The text contains no reference to concrete and practical steps in support of implementation.
In this regard, we consider it important to include separate paragraph reaffirming the significance of achieving the universality of the treaty, including in the Middle East.
We reaffirm the relevant conclusions and recommendations of the 2000 2010 NPT Review Conferences on the Middle East, which provide essential guidance and practical steps toward the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.
We prefer to delete the first part of Paragraph 86 and to start, we further welcome the important work and progress achieved within the conference on the establishment of the Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
Convened pursuant to the General Assembly Decision 73 slash 546, and we recall that the conference extend an open ended invitation to all to participate in its work and support this important process.
We look forward to engaging constructively with all delegations with a view to reaching a balanced and consensus based outcome document.
Thank you.
I thank the distinct representative of Iraq for the statement and the kind words.
Next on my speaker is the representative of Turkey, followed by Ireland.
Turkey, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Turkey appreciates the president's continued efforts to guide the conference towards a consensus outcome.
Although certain progress has been reflected in Rev one, there remains rooms for further improvement in order to achieve a balanced text with a greater clarity and broader convergence with the view of reaching consensus.
In this regard, we would like to share our views on certain paragraphs of Rev one draft as follows.
Mr.
Chair.
Concerning operative paragraph two, our concerns remain.
We believe that the current reference to extend deterrence is not conducive to achieving a balanced and consensus based outcome as it introduced language that many states parties, including Turkey have identified as a source of concern.
Not only is the substance of this paragraph of concern, but it's permanent placement at the outset of the document also creates an inaccurate impression regarding the priorities of the conference, diverting attention from the substantive issues under constration.
We therefore support its complete deletion.
In this regard, we reiterate that NATO extended deterrence and nuclear sharing arrangements have always been and continue to be fully consistent with the NPT.
These arrangements predate the NPT, were well known at the time of the treaty negotiation and notification.
And remained recognized at the time of its indefinite extension in 1995.
Furthermore, we have noted previously, NATO's nuclear arrangements have contributed and continue to contribute to preventing proliferation risks in a manner consistent with the objectives of treaty.
We are concerned that statements by states parties underscoring the compatibility of deterrence arrangements with the NPT and broader non proliferation objectives have not been reflected in the text.
Given immense challenges facing nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, we consider paragraph two to be a distraction from the core issues before the conference and reiterate our expectation that it be deleted in its entity.
We trust that this concern will be duly considered in the next version with a view to achieving a more balanced and broadly acceptable outcome.
Mr.
Chair, with regard to transparency and accountability concerning paragraph 64, we consider it essential that reference to nuclear weapon states be retained as it underscores the need for enhanced and equitable transparency by those states in line with action five of 2010 action plan.
The priority should remain the reporting obligations of nuclear weapon states, particularly in the context of Article 6 commitments.
We appreciate the strong language on CTBT as well as the inclusion of a paragraph recommending the work of international monitoring system and recognizing the importance of nuclear testing moratorium.
Finally, Turkey believes that the importance of achieving the universality of the treaty should also be reflected in the preamble paragraphs of the outcome document.
Turkey remains committed to engaging constructively throughout the negotiations with the aim of adopting a meaningful consensus based outcome document.
I thank you.
I thank the disted representative of Turkey for the statement.
Next on my list is the representative of Ireland, followed by Cameron Ireland, you have the floor.
Chair, good morning and thank you, Chair, through at the outset, I would like, like others to repeat our gratitude, our thanks to you and to the president and to his team for the work that has gone into the first revision of the draft outcome document.
Chair, we've submitted our comments on the issues covered by this committee, as well as across the draft document more generally separately to the secretary.
But allow me, if I may, to highlight some of the contributions that we have made.
First, we welcome that the role of the IAEA is highlighted in preamble of paragraph 18 and in OP four.
We think that the language on the IA's independence, its impartiality, and indeed its objectivity should be strengthened further.
Secondly, we welcome the moves towards balancing language on the crucial role played by export controls.
However, in line with comments by several other delegations in this committee, we feel that further improvements should be made, namely by removing references to undue constraints in one or both of paragraphs 21 and 23.
Chair, during this review cycle, we have seen multiple instances where nuclear facilities have been put at risk with the potential for severe and widespread consequences beyond state boundaries.
In paragraph 41, we feel it is important that the conference set out accurately and comprehensively the framework of international law, including international humanitarian law and IEA regulations to reinforce the norm that nuclear facilities should not be the subject of attack.
In the draft, we welcomed the approach in its factual recognition of the IAEA Board of Governors finding concerning Iran's noncompliance with its safeguards agreement.
The language in paragraph seven should not be so general as to omit the facts of that conclusion.
We need to reflect the decisions of the IAA as an integral part of the treaty functioning.
The text should emphasize the necessity for Iran and of all states to implement their respective agreements and engage fully with the IAEA.
The conference must deal with sensitive matters to uphold the treaty's credibility across all pillars.
We have also submitted written comments on the situation at the illegally seized Zaïre nuclear power plant where attacks represent a direct threat to safety and security and the need for compliance with all relevant UN General Assembly and IAEA resolutions, which again are integral to the treaty functioning.
Chair, we echoed the calls of many in this committee that the conference should reiterate its concern over the DPRKs illegal nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
The DPRK should immediately undertake steps towards the complete and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and can never have the status of a nuclear weapon state.
Chair, we have listened carefully to the discussion on nuclear weapon free zones on paragraph 74 to 77 and the specific treatment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in paragraphs 84 to 86.
Ireland has been a longstanding supporter of the establishment of a Middle East zone, which is an integral part of the 1995 indefinite extension of the NPT, and we call for its full implementation.
Thank you, Chair.
We look forward to further engagement with you on these important issues and working with you constructively now and towards the end of the conference.
Thank you very much.
I thank the distinct representative of Ireland for the statement and the kind words.
Next speaker is the Representative of Cameeron, followed by United Arab Emirates.
Cameroon, you have the floor.
Monsieur President.
Chair, it's always a pleasure to see you preside over our deliberations with the same finesse and dexterity you've been doing that.
First of all, we would like to invite the weapon states to speak up, whatever the format configuration or the format for discussion so as to dispel mistrust and restore the trust, which is absolutely necessary for the effective and efficient implementation of obligations under NPT.
This is of cardinal importance.
If people continue being staying silent, we are wasting our time.
In my village through which a great river is running, fishermen are saying that when two boats are hitting each other, it's not the wind that's at fault, but rather the fact that people then stop talking to each other.
Having said that, I would like to present detailed observations on the paragraphs for MC two preambular paragraphs.
We support these three paragraphs as they stand.
They usefully recall compliance with the nonproliferation obligations, the fundamental role played by IA safeguards and the negative impact of treaty violations.
Now, moving on to operative paragraphs 1 to 21.
My delegation supports a number of these paragraphs which are generally well balanced technical and procedural provisions.
It is true that some could indeed be improved in the spirit of flexibility.
Nonetheless, my delegation would not lose sleep if they were retained as they are.
However, my delegation pays special attention to paragraph 20 and 21.
We note that there's a certain tension between paragraph 20, which emphasizes the need of having export controls and paragraph 21, which calls for the elimination of undue constraints.
In practice, some supplier states consider their restrictions are justified on nonproliferation grounds, whereas non Nuclear weapon states perceive them as undue in order to remove this ambiguity, my delegation proposes adding clarifying sentence at the end of paragraph 20.
This regard and sharing the views of Canada and Norway, my delegation considers that paragraph 20 should clarify the legitimate objectives of transfer controls, namely exclusively the prevention of proliferation and in full respect of Article 4.
Thus, when such controls depart from these objectives, they become undue constraints, as is recalled in paragraph 21.
Or even illegal, illegitimate, politically motivated, or discriminatory.
Controls that go beyond the NPT requirements cannot be justified.
We therefore call for paragraph 20 to be read as follows, so that the objectives of export controls are strictly aligned with the provisions of the treaty and do not evolve into discriminatory or arbitrary restrictions.
We suggest the following.
Highlights that the legitimate objectives of export controls are strictly to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in full conformity with the provision of the treaty, including Article 4.
These controls shall not be used for purposes other than non proliferation, nor in a manner that will impede the inalienable right of state parties to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
All that will create unnecessary obstacle to international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Contrast this clarification which my delegation considers necessary gives substance to paragraph 21 and respond to delegations which are questioning the relevance of the notion of undue constraint.
My delegation would like to I would like to stop here and we'll reserve the right to ask for the floor later.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Cameron for the statement and kind words.
Next speaker is the United Arab Emirates, followed by Argentina.
United Arab Emirates, you have the floor.
Mr.
Chair, at the outset, please allow me to extend our thanks to you for steering our discussions.
We commend the efforts in preparing the first revised version of the draft outcome document.
We align ourselves with the statement delivered by the Arab Group.
We would like to note the following in our national capacity.
Our capital continues to look into this revised draft.
At the same time, at this stage, we would like to share our preliminary comments.
We welcome the improvements to some paragraphs.
Mainly the paragraph that reaffirms that the IAA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring safeguards compliance.
We also welcome the wording that expressly states that no action should be taken to undermine the authority of the IAA in this regard.
Mr.
Chair, we regret the dilution of wording about Iran's noncompliance with the obligations.
We prefer the first version.
Safeguards issues are of critical importance and in light of the Board of Governors conclusion that Iran does not comply with the safeguards obligations, We believe that the outcome document must include a clear and firm formulation in this respect and it must avoid a general formulation.
In this context, we reiterate that the conference must express a deep concern over Iran's failure to comply with its safeguards obligations.
The text must call on Iran to fully uphold its obligations and to address all outstanding issues with respect to safeguards without delay.
The conference must call on Iran to cooperate fully and unconditionally with the IAEA.
This will serve as a first step towards restoring trust and the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program.
The United Arab Emirates believes that this is not the moment to merely discuss a paragraph in the document.
We are not here discussing whether a paragraph is strong or weak, and in fact, this is a critical moment for the integrity of the nonproliferation regime.
If we do not cooperate, we will lead to a precedent that non compliance can be diluted and detect.
Outstanding issues must be resolved.
This is not a technical precedent.
If we do not address this, this will undermine the trust in the nonproliferation regime.
To preserve the NPT, we should adopt a firm position and we must uphold the authority of the IAA as the competent authority as an indispensable verification and confidence building pillar.
International review Conference must dot the eyes.
Noncompliance must be referred as non compliance and the outstanding issues must not be deferred but must be addressed.
We must send a strong and simple message.
There can be no trust without transparency and there can be no transparency without full cooperation and the nonproliferation regime will lose its credibility if we do not take a clear and decisive stance.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the Distinct representative of the United Arab Emirates for the statement and kind words.
Next speaker is the representative for Argentina, followed by Brazil Argentina, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Please convey to the president our gratitude for his efforts in presenting the revised draft document, and also the Argentinian delegation would like to express its gratitude to you and to the Secretary for the efforts in this process.
At this stage, my delegation would like to make comments on two points.
Um, One, in particular is regarding the export controls.
We are of the view that the current language of paragraph 21 does not reflect what at least many delegations in this room has expressed, including my own, that have taken the floor on these issues twice.
But also in particular because Argentinians views is that the export controls per se, are enablers, not a barrier of legitimate trade.
We see them as a mechanism that permits countries to engage in the maximum amount of legitimate nuclear commerce without undermining nonproliferation.
But also importantly, is that ensures those state that needs access to these nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes to get them through channels that the international community trusts, and that is why Argentina is part of those regime controls.
Therefore, we would like to join our request to you as expressed by our delegations to revise the current language of paragraph 21 But in particular because we see a contradiction in the sense that the first part says that the conference encourages state parties to facilitate transfer of nuclear technology materials and international cooperation among state parties in conformity with Articles one, two, three, and four of the treaty.
If it's in conformity, then is no need to say at the end and to eliminate in this regard any undue constraint inconsistent with the treaty.
So if we said that in the first part of the paragraph that should be in conformity with the treaty, then it's a contradiction to say that to avoid constraint in constituent treaty because if they're constituent treaty, they are consistent with the treaty.
We ask Mr.
Chair, to a look at this just to revisit the language.
Um, our second point is going to be related to the relevance, at least my delegations and others sees to bilateral and regional safeguards.
We see that they help to promote the trust and confidence on the international safeguards regime and also helps to implement the goals of the NPT.
I have in mind in particular here, the ABAC, the Argentin Brazilian Accountant Agency of Nuclear materials.
And that we want to point that language, a general language refers to these bilateral and regional safeguard systems have been included in the final document of the 2010, I believe in paragraph 20 times, similar to 21 at times, and also the the president's final documents of 2022 reflects exactly that in paragraph 28.
My delegations and I believe others have requested and have proposed language in that pertains, but it was removed in the latest iteration.
We would like to request you chair to include it again.
Thank you.
I thank Ambassador Svanan for your statement and the kind words addressed to the president and chair.
Next speaker is the representative of Brazil to be followed by Iran.
Brazil, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
In addition to my preliminary comments yesterday, I would like to make the following additional remarks.
My delegation has taken note on comments on preamble 17 and would like to propose minor adjustments.
My delegation has taken note on comments on preamblear 17 and like to propose minor adjustments so that there is no conditionality on nuclear commerce and cooperation, and that would be adding in the context of after are essential.
That would read are essential in the context of peaceful nuclear commerce.
We regret the deletion chair of previous OP eight armed attacks against nuclear facilities under IAA safeguards are prohibited under international law, the UN Charter, and relevant IAA provisions including its statutes.
On paragraph 12 on the additional protocol and the reiterated urge by my delegation and others to delete it, this paragraph does not adequately reflect the balance underpinning the treaty.
While the strengthening of safeguards may contribute to the nonproliferation pillar, it remains essential to recall that the additional protocol is not a legal obligation under Article 3, but a voluntary instrument.
Elevating its universalization through encouragement language risks creating expectations that go beyond the treaties agreed framework, particularly in the absence of corresponding progress under Article 6.
In this regard, my delegation considers that further advancements in nonproliferation commitments should not be pursued in isolation from tangible and balanced progress across all three pillars.
Furthermore, the paragraph does not sufficiently acknowledge the diversity of existing safeguards agreements, including the important role played by regional and bilateral mechanisms such as EVOC.
The absence of any reference to such mechanisms risks narrowing the understanding of safeguards implementation and overlooking approaches that are particularly relevant to certain regions.
In this context, the deletion of the paragraph would help preserve the agreed legal framework, avoid unintended normative shifts, and maintain the necessary balance between non proliferation and disarmment obligations.
Likewise, we insist on having reference in the text on regional and bilateral safeguard systems and support Argentina once again in this regard.
I would like to thank you and the president for maintaining paragraph 17 in its current form as it preserves an important balance by recognizing that there is no one size fits all approach and by taking due account of the respective safeguards obligations already established and approved by the board.
Chairman delegation supports language that helps preserve balance on ensuring nonproliferation and facilitating peaceful nuclear exchange and commerce.
On paragraph 78, my delegation has a similar position in Singapore.
We would like to see no mention of regions or alternatively, the suggestion made by South Africa yesterday to focus on regions where states are not yet party to the treaty.
My delegation also supports suggestions to strengthen language on the zones, including on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.
We are finalizing our edits to the text and we'll send it as soon as possible to the Secretariat.
I thank you Chair.
I thank the representative of Brazil for the statement.
Next speaker is representative of Iran to be followed by Costa Rica.
Iran, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair, and good morning to you and distinguished colleagues.
Mr.
Chair, while we are approaching the end of consideration of this revision, and we are expecting to receive the new revision hopefully in the early next week.
I think that we heard a lot of divergent proposals, but from our perspective, we can categorize those proposals to almost two types of proposals.
The ones that their main departure is absolutely politicized approach and the ones that are consistent with the provisions of the treaty and the decisions of the previous review conferences.
We call those first type of proposals as politicized because, for example, we hear them crying on Iran, North Korea, and developments in Ukraine.
But really, they turned a blind eye to actual cases of proliferation.
For example, in the Middle East region, the actual owner of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, is the Israeli regime and let alone the irregular and illegal activities of their allies.
For example, As is the real case of concern, and if they have genuine concern, they should have reflected on these issues as well.
They should have supported a blanket approach toward provision of proliferation.
Therefore, Mr.
Chairman, I think that to have a successful conference and to try to garner consensus, we should pay real attention and focus on those proposals that are genuinely consistent with the provisions of the treaties.
And among many others, we can refer to some of them as following.
We believe that that a nuclear disarmament obligations should be implemented in parallel with the commitments on nuclear proliferation.
In this case, the qualitative and vertical proliferation by the nuclear weapon states must not be underestimated.
We should specifically bring strong language on nuclear deterrence and extended deterrence as well as nuclear sharing.
We should mention the concerns on ACS.
We cannot agree more with the regional countries supporting to have a strong language on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
On implementation of safeguard systems, we believe that we should avoid any language that can restrict in any way their right to peaceful users and their right to participate fully in the international cooperation.
As Cameroon mentioned, we cannot justify any export control, and we believe that based on the foundational principle of international law over domestic law, we must ask the parties to make compatible their domestic laws with their international obligations.
We cannot accept any reference to Iran's nuclear peaceful program.
A Brazil mentioned, we should have a strong language on prohibition of the attacks against nuclear facilities.
We think that applying this approach will help a lot to the integrity and credibility of the treaty in future and we are fully supporting your endeavors to find consensual language on these genuine concerns, and then Again, we would like to emphasize that the attention to politicized approach will be poisonous to our multilateral endeavor to have a consensus at the end.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished Repent of Iran for the statement.
The next speaker is representative of Costa Rica to be followed by China.
Costa Rica, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Costa Rico is grateful for the efforts made by the chair to reflect in this new version of the document the elements that were proposed by delegations during this conference.
Equally, we'd like to congratulate you chair on your effective management of main Committee too.
With regard to this first rev of the draft, we welcome the changes made to the document, but we think that some provisions need to be strengthened in order to preserve the authority of the treaty to ensure continuity with previous commitments and better respond to current challenges.
Firstly, in operative paragraph seven, we support maintaining the reference to the IAEA governor's conclusions with regard to Iran as well as a diplomatic solution and full cooperation with the body.
The integrity of the verification system means that outstanding issues need to be addressed technically, transparently by all parties under the obligations that apply to them.
We also agree with several delegations suggested to reincorporate paragraph 16, according to which the IAEA safeguards should be evaluated and examined on a regular basis in the light of technological developments.
Thirdly, in OP 18, as we have previously pointed out, we feel that the current wording could be developed to be more accurate In the 2022 final document, we addressed more comprehensive concerns including cybersecurity, protection against non authorized access and sabotage, illicit trafficking in nuclear material and other radioactive materials, the protection of sensitive information, nuclear terrorism, and the risk of acquisition by non state actors.
In that context, Costa Rica feels it's important to recognize the ongoing relevance of resolution 15 40, clearly setting out the framework to prevent non state actors acquiring nuclear weapons.
With regard to OP 75, we agree with many delegations, namely that we need to strengthen the reference to the contribution made by nuclear weapons free zones to peace, international peace and security.
These areas have been established are an important part of nonproliferation.
Finally, we feel that the wording in OP 79 regarding DPRK should not be weakened.
We need to preserve the coherence of our messages with regard to nonproliferation.
Chair, we recommend these adjustments in order to ensure the legal precision and the credibility of the treaty and the institutions of the treaty to which Costa Rica is committed.
Thank you.
I thank the distinced representative of Costa Rica for the statement and kind words.
Next speaker is representative of China to be followed by Australia, China, you have the floor.
S.
Thank you, Chairman.
China supports the chair in its efforts to bridge the differences among the parties.
Yesterday, China put forward some suggestions on improving the text on regional issues, nuclear submarine cooperation related safeguards, transfer weapons grade nuclear materials, and certain country statement on nuclear capabilities.
On the basis of yesterday's discussion, we would like to further present our views and suggestions on a new version of the text.
First, with regard to nuclear sharing arrangement, China believes that this issue bears on both nuclear disarmament and more importantly, nuclear weapons proliferation prevention.
Therefore, China, like many countries, supports paragraph two and believes that this paragraph should be further strengthened.
In addition to expressing serious concern about the existing arrangement for nuclear sharing and extended deterrence, the paragraph should also express serious concern about any further expansion of this arrangement as this is related to the effectiveness and credibility of the treaty.
China also suggests proposes to add some new text after para two.
That is, to further call on relevant nuclear weapon states to withdraw its nuclear weapons deployed overseas back to its own territories and refrain from new deployment in foreign territories.
Secondly, some countries Some countries serious imbalance between supply and demand of sensitive nuclear material deserves great attention, particularly in the context of senior government officials of a certain country having expressed their support for nuclear capabilities.
It is necessary for the IAEA to take seriously this issue and to make great efforts to study the imbalance between supply and demand, including timely and flexible adjustment of safeguard arrangements for countries concerned and establish an early warning mechanism for risks so as to prevent the occurrence of behavior that do not conform to the provisions of the treaty.
We therefore propose to add new paragraph after paragraph 16 and we will provide specific wording to the Secretariat.
Third, The establishment of Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMDs is a cause that should have made, but unfortunately has not made progress for a long time.
It is also an important issue pertinent to the credibility of the treaty.
China has always supported efforts towards establishing such a zone in the Middle East, noting the serious concerns of countries in the region.
We further wording of the paragraph 60 86, including urging relevant nuclear weapon state and regional countries to actively participate in the process of international conference on the establishment of Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMD.
Thank.
With regard to Paragraph 20 and Para 21, China has taken note of the views and suggestions of the Arab Group and other countries.
Our principled position, which we would like to further emphasize here is that any nonproliferation measure should not harm the peaceful use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which are in line with Article 1 and two of the treaty.
China will submit written amendments to the chairman.
Thank you very much.
I thank the distinguished representative of China for the statement.
The next speaker I have on my list is the representative for Australia, who seems to be the last speaker for today.
You have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
We made an intervention yesterday outlining our position on a range of matters including Iran, the DPRK, export controls, naval nuclear propulsion, and the IAEA.
I would like to use this opportunity to make a few minor additional comments that are relevant to main Committee two.
Regarding paragraphs 11 and 12, as many others have mentioned, the combination of a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol equip the IAEA with the tools to develop a complete picture of a state's nuclear activities.
It is an important tool for meeting the objectives of the NPT and is an essential part of the modern standard for verification.
Australia welcomes the matters addressed in paragraphs 11 and 12.
They are a complementary package.
However, we prefer the language as proposed in the zero draft for paragraph 11.
The inclusion of voluntary in the paragraph is redundant.
As is the practice for international agreements, the additional protocol is a sovereign decision of each state.
Finally, I'd like to request a few minor changes to paragraph 13 of the Chapot and paragraph three of the operative text.
For legal accuracy, we request that references to the UN Charter be changed to international law including the UN Charter as opposed to international law and the UN Charter or treaty and the Charter of the United Nations.
This minor amendment would clarify that the UN Charter is part of international law and not separate to it.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Australia for the statement.
I have a number of other speakers who requested the floor.
Next speaker is the representative of South Africa, followed by Cameroon, South Africa.
You have the floor.
Good morning, Chair and thank you for giving me the floor again.
In addition to the comments made yesterday, we wish to reiterate the following points.
Chair, as previously stated, South Africa attaches particular importance to the balanced promotion and implementation of all three pillars of the treaty, which are interrelated and mutually reinforcing.
In this regard, we call for an outcomes document that reflects this.
We are not in favor of the approach that singles out Articles one and two without reference to nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses.
Stated yesterday, we regret the deletion of paragraph eight in the draft text, which we considered to reflect a balanced and measured approach to the issue and we believe that it's important that the conference unite behind a clear unambiguous norm prohibiting any attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities.
On nuclear weapon free zones, we reiterate that they play an important and meaningful role and represent a significant contribution to the objectives of the NPT.
In particular in advancing nuclear disarmament, preventing proliferation, and enhancing international peace and security, while also encouraging dialogue on establishing additional zones in line with regional circumstances.
South Africa is of the view that the text can benefit from language that strengthens these points.
Lastly, on naval nuclear propulsion, we note the concerns facing the implementation of safeguards in the context of nuclear naval propulsion activities and we believe that this reference could be further strengthened to reflect the concerns raised by some delegations.
We will submit our written proposals, and I just wish to reassure you again, chair of South Africa's continued support and constructive engagement during this process.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of South Africa for the statement and kind words.
The next speaker I have on my list is Representative Cameroon, followed by Algeia Cameron, you have the floor.
Min.
Thank you Chair for allowing my delegation to conclude our statement.
We support paragraph 74, particularly the idea of establishing nuclear weapon free zones where they do not yet exist on a voluntary basis of the states of the region concerned.
This is a treaty regime whose mechanisms for adoption are contained in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
From the view of my delegation, this reference should be reflected in the paragraph as well, and so we suggest that after the words consistent with the principles and guidelines of the United Nations Disarment Commission, we add the sentence with the fundamental principle of free consent codified in the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties.
Sit down.
This addition is consistent with respect for sovereignty, which is intrinsic to international law.
My delegation supports paragraph 75 and welcomes its importance and central role in consolidating regional peace and international security.
My delegation believes that it could be usefully strengthened through a call for respect for the status of these zones, for the ratification of the protocols without reservations by nuclear weapon states, and for enhanced cooperation among them.
We therefore propose the following addition after the enumeration of these zones.
Reaffirms that these zones constitute an effective instrument for promoting nuclear non proliferation and disarmament at the regional and global level.
Calls upon all state parties to respect fully the status of this zone and to refrain from any or use of force against them.
The conference further encourages the nuclear weapon state to ratify the relevant protocol to these treaties without reservation that are incompatible with their object and purpose and advise the state parties to this zone to enhance cooperation and experience sharing amongst themselves.
Where to In order to remain consistent with the strengthening that we have just proposed for paragraph 75, my delegation proposes also strengthening paragraph 76 by replacing the expression, the conference welcomes with the conference commends the vigorous efforts.
So as to give concrete expression to the negative security assurances provided for by the protocols to nuclear weapon free zone treaties and to strengthen confidence among states parties.
My delegation notes that nowhere in paragraphs 4 to 21 is there any mention of Article 3, paragraph three of the NPT, which provides that safeguards are be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economics or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the sphere of peaceful nuclear activities.
S, this omission is regrettable as it creates an imbalance in the interpretation of Article 3.
Accordingly, my delegation proposes adding a sentence to paragraph four or paragraph five, for example.
The conference recalls that in accordance with Article 3, paragraph three of the treaty, the implementation of safeguards shall not be used to impede the economic and technological development of nuclear weapon state.
So President.
Chair, my delegation hopes that these observations and proposals, formulated in a constructive spirit will contribute to the adoption of a balanced final document that respects the rights and obligations of all parties.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Cameron for the statement.
The next speaker is the representative from Algeria, who apparently is the last speaker for today.
Yesterday, you were filling the gap.
Now you are probably finalizing the list of speakers in today's meeting.
The floor is yours.
Thank you, Chair.
After filling the gap, maybe it's the full stop today.
Good morning to you and to everyone in the room.
My delegation made a number of comments yesterday and we won't repeat them today.
We would like to make some additional comments today.
We, of course, fully aligned with the Nam and Arab group positions.
We echo the statement made by Brazil on the imperative of a balanced implementation through the various pillars.
Ajeaaffirms that safeguards are accepted for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of obligations assumed under the NPT, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Accordingly, the safeguards shall be implemented without affecting the inalienable rights under Article 4 of the treaty.
And to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities.
We reiterate our unwavering support for nuclear weapon free zones, in particular on Pars 84 to 2086 relating to the Middle East and the implementation of the resolution of 1995.
We recall that the statement made yesterday on behalf of the African group, or we simply recalled it.
It is a source of deep regret that the proposals of the Arab group on the Zero draft, which were overwhelmingly supported were not incorporated.
We hope that the Ref two will take into account the views of the Arab group on this issue as supported by an overwhelming majority of state parties.
Before concluding, my delegation would like to, uh underline that the 1995 resolution remains the core of the treaties and definite extension.
Chair, we remain constructively engaged in reaching a balanced and consensual result under your leadership of this main committee.
Thank you.
I think the Distinguished Representative for Valgia.
I was wrong.
You are not the last speaker.
I have Dominican Republic who requested the floor.
Dominican Republic, you have the floor.
Chair, my delegation thanks you for preparing revoir and we would like to put forward our comments.
We agree with the inclusion of a preambular paragraph recognizing the meaningful, significant participation of women in disarmment and non proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy because we are convinced that a more inclusive participation will help to increase the effectiveness, legitimacy, and sustainability of the international regime.
I following the principles of sustainability and equality of the United Nations.
In this regard, we propose recognizing the contributions that women make and support their full equal and meaningful participation in disarmament, non proliferation and the peaceful uses and take note of the disproportionate impact of nuclear weapons on women and girls.
Chair.
With regard to preambula paragraph 17, we propose a change to make the paragraph clearer without changing its meaning.
Replacing environment by appropriate environment that would still maintain the centrality of the IAEA with regard to peaceful uses.
Likewise, we support the text of paragraph four because it affirms the safeguards of the IAEA, which are a fundamental component of the nonproliferation regime and an indispensable element for the implementation of the treaty, and also helps to create an environment that is helpful for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
And we support paragraph 12 because it encourages states parties to, uh, bring into force additional protocols and to implement them provisionally where appropriate, thus strengthening the ability of the IAEA to carry out more robust verification and thereby strengthening trust and the efficiency of the nonproliferation regime.
Thank you very much.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Dominican Republic for the statement.
I don't have any other requests for the floor.
So Dominican Republic, was he was the last speaker for today.
Excellencies, distinguished delegates.
That was the final meeting of the main committee too.
It was really a great pleasure and honor to serve you as the chair of the main committee too.
I express my appreciation for the constructive engagement, discipline of the delegations in the meetings.
And thank you very much for leaving us a bit more time to work on ref two.
I wish to express my deep gratitude to my team, to the secretary of the committee, Christian, the Francia.
A Tuo Luzu, both from the IAEA, to Janossv and others from Innoda for their tireless work.
I also wish to thank Thor Anderson for his skillful vice chairmanship of subsidiary Body two.
Finally, I wish also to express my sincere appreciation to conference services, to the interpreters, and to the technicians for their excellent work during these proceedings.
Secretariat wants to make an announcement.
Thank you, Chair for the kind words.
Distinguished delegates, I have two announcements.
First, please be kindly advised that the next open ended consultations on the strengthened review process will be from 1:15 P.M.
To 2:30 P.M.
Today in the EcoSox chamber.
Additionally, the Joint Nuclear Suppliers Group Zanger Committee side event entitled Promoting Responsible Nuclear Supplier Group will take place in conference room E, also beginning at 1:15 P.M.
Where Ambassador Gustavo Savinin will be speaking in his capacity as the chair of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
Thank you, Chair.
Thanks Secretariat for this announcement.
The meeting is adjourned.