(Main Committee I) Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Excellencies, distinguished delegates, kindly take your seats.
Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, the seed meeting of main Committee one of the 2026 Review conference of the parties to the Trey on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is called to order.
Excellency, distinguished delegates.
Yesterday evening, at the request of the president of the conference, the Secretariat circulated the revised draft outcome document of this review conference bearing the symbol PT slash coNFtn 26 slash CRP slash rev.
As the president stated in the plenary yesterday, this revision represents the best attempt to try and find a basis for consensus.
Whilst it cannot represent every individual preference of each state party, it attempts to show up common ground and seek to close the gaps where there is divergence.
In accordance with the guidance from the president of the review conference, main Committee one will discuss and negotiate the following elements of the revised draft outcome document.
Preamblar paragraphs Roman numeral one to 12, paragraphs 1 and 2, paragraphs 45 to 73, and paragraph 81.
Our focus on these elements of the revised draft outcome document is in accordance with the respective allocations of items to each main committee as decided by the preparatory committee and the decision by the review conference to proceed in accordance with that decision.
I'm mindful that many delegations, if not most, will not yet have received guidance from their capitals.
This will, to some extent, limit the depth of our discussion this afternoon.
However, I'm also cognizant of the limitations of time and will therefore propose that we adhere to the guidelines given yesterday by the president, namely, that delegations do their best to focus on those areas to which there have been amendments or when new elements have been added.
Distinguished delegates, before we move to the list of speakers, please allow me again to remind you of some guidelines for the conduct of our deliberations.
The conduct of business in this main committee meeting will be without a list of speakers.
Statement is 8 minutes for group statements and 5 minutes for national statements.
Delegations who speak on behalf of a group of states or state parties should clearly indicate that they are doing so when they take the floor.
Finally, delegations are requested to please inform the Secretariat as soon as possible if they wish to exercise their right of reply.
Right of reply will be heard at the end of this meeting.
Those delegations that wish to take the floor are requested to press the button in front of them at this time.
The first three speakers I have on my list are Argentina, Mexico, and China.
It's now my pleasure to invite the distinguished representative of Argentina to take the floor.
Thank you very much, Chair.
At the outset, we wish to thank the chair, you, Ambassador, the presidency, and the Secretariat for presenting the revised version of the outcome document contained in documents CRP two rev one.
We're grateful to you for your sustained efforts to steer this process in a transparent, inclusive, and balanced way.
In this regard, we wish to air the following comments on the issues that are incumbent upon Committee one to review.
We believe that this new version is a serious effort to preserve an adequate balance across the three pillars of the treaty and to reflect the various positions expressed during our work.
My second point, we particularly value the fact that the text retains substantive references to previous commitments entered into within the treaty review process.
This appears in preambular paragraph eight.
We also welcome the fact there is reference to the full and effective implementation of Article 6.
That is in paragraphs 45 to 49 and in the preambular section.
Here, we believe it positive that the draft preserves fundamental issues linked to nuclear disarmament, including references to the irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency.
That's Paragraph 47 and we welcome the fact it refers to the importance of making gradual and sustained progress towards tangible nuclear disarmament and arsenal reduction measures in line with commitments entered into within the framework of the treaty, that's paragraph 48 to 49.
My third point, it is important in our view that the text attaches particular importance to referring to nuclear risk reduction measures, and we're grateful that that's been included.
Paragraph 56 to 58.
As we've stated, these measures stand as an important contribution to reducing the risks of accidental, unauthorized or unintentional use of nuclear weapons.
More specifically, in our view, it's positive that reference is made to strengthening strategic dialogue between nuclear weapon states, that's paragraph 56, specifically in the current international context, and we value the very positive dialogue that's taking place between the states referred to.
Moreover, we value references made to confidence building measures, communication in crisis situations, reduction of levels of alert and strategic dialogue, Paragraph 58.
In our view, these measures in general are complementary and they pave the way towards our primary goal, that is complete, verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament.
More four, we underscore the fact that the text preserves robust references to the CTBT and to the importance of maintaining existing moratoriums on nuclear tests, that is paragraph 50 to 54.
The preservation and strengthening of the norm against nuclear tests continues to stand as a pivotal component of the international disarmament and nonproliferation architecture.
My fifth point, we welcome the fact that the text maintains references to negative security assurances and to the legitimate interests of non nuclear weapon states in receiving universal, unconditional and legally binding guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, paragraph 61 to 62.
My sixth point, we also welcome the fact that the text maintains references linked to transparency, accountability, and verification mechanisms.
That is paragraph 63 65 and 71 to 72.
All of these are essential components to build trust and to move towards our primary goal of nuclear disarmment.
Chair, We welcome the efforts made, and it is important, in our view that we continue to work with flexibility and with a constructive spirit to keep alive the possibility of achieving a consensus based and balanced result which bolsters the credibility and central role of the treaty.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Argentina for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished Representative of Mexico to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair of main Committee one.
We too wish to thank the president of the conference and the bureau and the whole team for having given us the opportunity to have early discussions on a Rev one of the document.
In general terms, We have a great deal of trust in the fact that this text will take us in the right direction because it has a number of references that it needs to have it maintains references to very important issues.
I'll simply touch on a number of phrases and a number of issues that, in our view, still require work so that they can properly reflect what was said in the room and reflect the interests of delegations, particularly those of non nuclear weapon states.
Firstly, I am compelled to refer to preambula paragraph four and reiterate that in 2010, the conference expressed its concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons.
This concern We don't think it's vanished.
It's increased.
The level of alarm has been increased where this issue is concerned.
We see no reason why we should remove the word concern, and we don't see why the conference shouldn't once again express concern at these consequences.
Once again, we appeal to you to return to the language agreed upon in 2010, at least because that language really reflects the agreements of the, the previous agreements and the reality and that language would really truly reflect what working documents have said, what people in the room have said.
That is, we've continued to voice those concerns.
We are satisfied with the number of paragraphs that have been devoted to the review in this document to Article 6 and the review of it, there are a number of issues that deserve our attention here.
We're particularly satisfied because we have retained references to recent developments in technology, including artificial intelligence.
We've included new language on the norm against tests and nuclear explosions.
There's a very welcome reference to the work of the international monitoring system, and also there are appeals for the nonuse of nuclear weapons and those calls should be increased.
This is a f, a basic threshold, not a limit in terms of how far the document should go.
We're grateful that we've retained a reference to the CTBT.
Finally, I do wish to refer here to all those paragraphs where appeals are made to the Conference on disarmament.
And that it should broach certain issues.
It will come as no surprise to anyone that Mexico's position on that conference is one of grave concern.
This year, this forum marks 30 years without negotiating, without fully discharging its mandate.
In our view, this review conference shouldn't simply make appeals without recognizing that fact, but we do understand that this can't necessarily be reflected in that way in this text.
We invite the chair to consider making some adjustments to paragraphs where appeals are made to the CD first so that we establish the fact that the conference mandate is to negotiate not to undertake other types of deliberations and it should focus on facts and not on the activities of the conference, which unfortunately, and this is an issue that Mexico notes with regret, has not been able to discharge its mandate in 30 years.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Mexico for intervention.
I now invite the distinguished representative of China to take the floor.
Thank you Chair.
The Chinese delegation, which is through you to express its appreciation to the president and his team for the timely circulation of the revised text, we have forwarded the revised text to our capital for review and stands ready to share its preliminary reviews and suggestions regarding the paragraphs within the purview of this committee.
China is concerned that the revised text fails to adequately reflect the written input previously submitted by this delegation.
We believe that certain textual revisions are divergent further from a potential consensus.
China looks forward to future revisions that to the greatest extent possible, respect prior consensus, seek the greatest common denominator, and strike a balance among the concerns of all sides on this basis in order to facilitate the achievement of an outcome that is acceptable to all.
To begin with, the preamble must fully reflect the international consensus on nuclear disarmament.
As essential guiding principles for advancing the nuclear disarmment process, the consensus outcomes reached at previous review conferences must be effectively upheld.
The fourth paragraph of the section on principles and objectives within the conclusions and recommendations for follow up actions, which is a component of the 2010 final outcome, states that significant steps toward nuclear disarmament should promote international stability, peace, and security and be based on the principle of increased and undiminished security for all.
This final principle must not be selectively omitted.
China requests that the inclusion of a corresponding paragraph in the preamble citing the consensus language contained in the 2010 final document.
Second, it is essential to advance the nuclear disarmament process in a rational and pragmatic manner.
In Section B entitled Disarmment of nuclear weapons of the conclusions and recommendations for following actions within the 2010 final document.
The document encourages those states with the largest nuclear arsenals to lead efforts in this regard.
Nuclear weapon states possessing the largest arsenals must earnestly fulfill their special and priority responsibilities regarding nuclear disarmament.
Paragraph 48 of the current text presents an entirely erroneous explanation for the current lack of progress in nuclear disarmament.
The current stall of this process is by no means attributable to a lack of progress on good faith negotiations.
On the contrary, it stems precisely from the fact that arms control treaties previously reached through good faith negotiations have been unilaterally abrogated or allowed to expire without renewal situation that has resulted in the largest nuclear arsenals comprising thousands of warheads being stripped of any binding constraints.
Furthermore, paragraph 55, which addresses follow up arrangements to the new start contains a proposal calling upon all nuclear weapon states to multilateralize future arms control frameworks at an early date.
This proposition is flawed in terms of both logic and reality.
China requests the deletion of the relevant language.
We third, we must also remain highly vigilant against policies and actions that are incompatible with the purpose and objectives of the treaty.
0.1 of the 64 point action plan adopted in 2010 explicitly states that all states parties commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the NPT.
Both the new text and the preamble of the draft underscore the importance of this principle.
All parties must maintain a high degree of vigilance regarding policy statements and actions such as nuclear sharing arrangements and pro nuclear rhetoric that run counter to the purpose and objective of the treaty.
China supports the proposals put forward by a large number of states, including Iran to strengthen action two.
We express grave concern regarding existing nuclear sharing arrangements as well as the potential establishment of new ones, and we further advocate for the expression of of grave concern regarding any statements or actions that are incompatible with Article 1 and two of the NPT.
Due to time constraints, this delegation will take the floor again at a later stage to elaborate on our revisions and tax proposals on the sections.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of China for his intervention.
I now invite the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation to take the floor, followed by the distinguished representative of Egypt on behalf of the Arab Group.
The Russian Federation, you have the floor.
Mr.
Chairman, we will be very frank here.
The updated draft document is something which we cannot support.
This document continues to diverge with a number of premises set out by the Russian Federation.
These are fundamental importance to us, and the overriding imperative is the holistic interpretation of Articles six of paragraph 11 of the NPT.
The arbitrary interpretation of the content of these obligations is not acceptable.
In our written amendments, once again, we will propose a preamble with this reflection, with the elimination of excessive and superfluous elements in the text.
We will also propose the necessary amendments for paragraphs of 48, 71, and 72.
We already explained our reasons for which we cannot accept a document that contains in paragraph four of the pre the premise about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons.
We have questions about the selective approach in paragraph five of the preamble, according to the article referring to the charter of the United Nations which to be applied and implemented in full.
Equally selective and arbitrary are the references in the text with various references to various provisions of the treaty scattered about and compliance with the various obligations.
Once again, we call for there to be one time balanced setting out in paragraph seven of that preamble about the importance of all components of the treaty and the full implementation thereof.
And no longer to revisit that or reiterate that in the document to state it just once in light of the absence of consensus on the question of the unconditional reaffirmation by parties in paragraph eight of the preamble of their commitment to all prior obligations, we wish to recall our proposal to use the word recalling here.
We cannot agree with paragraph 12 of the preamble in support of certain abstract norms against nuclear testing.
And there's a need for there to be a clear reference.
We are talking here about the CTBT and it must enter into force.
We firmly believe that the principle of irrevocability, irreversibility and transparency need to be applied by all parties to the NPT in accordance with compliance with their obligations.
So we propose that paragraph 47 reflect this and for it to be moved from the operative part to the preambular part.
And the evolution of OP two is moving in the right direction, but it is not sufficient.
Once again, we will propose our relevant revision and submit it and we do not see a need at the end of the paragraph.
It turns out that the conference allows for and calls for dialogue to be engaged in only on issues relevant to the implementation of Articles one and two of the NTT.
Once again, the question of selectivity and a lack of balance that problem once again arises.
Once again, we wish to recall our approach and principle, according to which there's a need for the text to clearly, explicitly recognize a core fundamental, the inextricable link between the situation in the area of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament and the situation in the area of international security.
Our amendment for OP 49 56 and part of 58 is our submissions are designed to reflect that.
And when it comes to paragraph 61 and 62 and negative security assurances, we continue to believe that it is not possible to have a non nuclear states under the nuclear umbrella to be placed on the same footing as other non nuclear weapon states.
The argument about the absence of a third category in the treaty of states parties under no circumstances changes the objective reality which we must take into account.
In paragraph 71, there is a need to clarify the description of the role of verification as a tool for verification of the implementation of obligations under the international agreements arrived at under Article 6.
Mention of the group of scientific and technological experts is something which we did not support, and we will submit the relevant revisions.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of Egypt on behalf of the Arab group to take the floor.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chaperson and as you have indicated, we will be speaking on behalf of the Arab Group.
First thanks to you for convening us today and due regards and appreciation to the president of the conference for the second time having a timely circulation of the Rev one.
I think pretty much like what Mexico mentioned that the president continues to provide us with a text that can keep us on the right pathway towards finding a desirable outcome document.
Yet our general impression about Rev one when it comes to the issues under the consideration of main Committee one, that it is a one step forward, one step backward at the same time.
And what we would try to focus on during this stage is to make sure that the Rev two will be a few steps forward without any steps backwards.
On the preamble section, In PP one, we note a positive change that was made to bring disarmament ahead of nuclear proliferation as part of the same regime.
Maybe we just need to insert the word nuclear ahead of disarmament for precision.
We still also see that there is a need for using a more appropriate language when it comes to the element on peaceful uses.
And the best language that we can use is from Article 4 itself, which is promoting the inalienable right of all states parties to develop, research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful uses without discrimination.
This is certainly much more accurate than what is in this version about fostering We take positive note of the new PP two about the recognition of the value of the treaty.
On PP four, like several others in the last round and also now, that the language on humanitarian consequences indeed needs strengthening.
In 2010, we were expressing concern and now we are only recognizing even without indicating any value judgment about what we have noticed and been supported by scientific evidence and research for years.
It's not only the humanitarian, but also the environmental consequences of any use of nuclear weapons.
We believe that PP five and after deleting the word applicable, that we don't see that there is a necessity for having it in the text should be merged with PP four on humanitarian consequences, we see a lot of interconnections and mutual reinforcement between these two paragraphs.
Now moving to PP six and we welcome the addition at the end of the paragraph to which all states parties are committed under Article 6.
Yet in the fourth line before the last we need to reaffirm not only recall unequivocal undertaking by nuclear weapon states.
PP seven a number of positive additions also that we welcome, including the word urgent at the first line.
The only change that we would appeal for your consideration to that at the second half of the paragraph, it is a little bit beyond noting the importance.
What we need to say is to reaffirm that all states parties shall pursue policies that are fully compatible with the treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.
We consider this as a very solid expectation from the states parties to the treaties that needs to be reflected as such in the text.
We strongly welcome how PPA was revised.
On PP ten, we also support the inclusion of urgent.
We also want to see the insertion of effective.
It'd be urgent and effective implementation.
Also like last time, we think that this is a place where the unequivocal undertakings by nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons need to appear side by side with the obligations under Article 6.
We also very much support the PP 12 on underscoring and upholding the Nora McInnis nuclear testing.
This was supported by the Arab group and several other delegations in the last round.
Now, on OP one and OP two, We welcome the addition of non discriminatory and balanced.
But since this paragraph is in its place and as part of the paragraphs considered admin Committee one, we believe that the reference would need to be to the treaty as a whole and not only Article 1 and two of the treaty.
Here we should either be speaking about Article 6 since this is a very nuclear disarmament centric discussion at this section or to speak about the implementation of the treaty as a whole.
In paragraph two, here there are three remarks.
I think that the conference, what it should expect to note is not the discussions because the discussions are not yet happening.
I think that what the conference needs to note is a growing interest in having a discussion.
And this is what many delegations have been indicating in their interventions that they either have views or they have concerns and they are willing to have a dialogue about it.
So the discussion have not started yet and we should not give false indication that it did.
We are concerned with the word longstanding.
What we have asked for in last rounds was the word existing, side by side with the evolving or potential or future nuclear sharing arrangements.
Because if we speak about longstanding, so what about more recent nuclear sharing arrangements? This is not part of the discussion.
Is this not something that we are concerned with? We're concerned with all types of sharing, whether they have been existing for many years or recently or the ones that might take place in the future.
For the same reason, we are also not comfortable with the deletion of the element of expressing concern regarding this arrangements that was part of the draft.
Now, on the rest of the paragraphs, there are welcome provisions in paragraph 45, also the insertion in paragraph 48, yet we will continue to advance the need for having a reference here to including incidents of nuclear rhetoric and threat of use of nuclear weapons.
We haven't seen that element touched upon in any part of the document.
Yes, you are speaking here about expressing concern at statements and actions and we think that this is one of the main actions and statements that we need to highlight our concern about.
In the same paragraph, these commitments were not provided, they were agreed in the previous conference and the language would need to be revised as such.
We will come back for a second statement regarding the other paragraphs.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt on behalf of the Arab Group for their intervention.
I'll now invite the following speakers in the order in which they are mentioned to take the floor.
First, El Salvador, Germany, Austria, and Iraq.
El Salvador, you have the floor.
Thank you very much Chair for circulating this document in such a timely fashion.
I echo previous speakers in hammering home that point.
Our delegation continues to peruse the text, but we do want to share a number of preliminary comments with you at this stage of discussions.
In the preamble section, we welcome the reference to disarmament contained in para one here, that serves to create a greater better balance in the text.
Moreover, we welcome the reference contained in PP ten on the urgent need to implement Article 6 of the treaty, bearing in mind that compliance with nuclear disarmament obligations is essential to preserve the credibility and legitimacy of the NPT.
Moreover, we welcome the language contained in PP 11 and 12.
On the operative section now, my delegation preferred the previous wording of paragraph 47.
While we do note that part of this language has been moved to the preambleus section, we believe it is important to retain a substantive reference to the same thing in the operative section of the text.
We welcome additional language on the purpose and importance of the treaty on the CTBT in paragraphs 50, 52, and 54.
We are of the view that it is important to preserve this wording in future versions of the text.
Moreover, we note that the language used in paragraph 60 reflects progress.
However, we are of the view that the text could more precisely reflect a number of the concerns expressed by myriad delegations during discussions, including risks related to automation, miscalculation, loss of meaningful human control and inadvertent escalation, particularly in the context of the integration of emerging technologies into nuclear strategic systems.
Without prejudice to the above, we welcome the efforts made by the chair to move forward in striking a delicate balance between these positions.
On paragraph 66, we welcome the references made to Resolution 78 slash 240 of the General Assembly.
Moreover, We welcome new paragraph 67.
It reflects the importance of education for nuclear disarmment and nonproliferation, particularly in terms of young people and future generations.
Finally, my delegation notes with concern that one of the components that doesn't appear to be adequately reflected in the text and that we do not believe is properly representative of the discussions held within this committee and the general debate are references to the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons that was referred by countless delegations.
In El Salvador's view, the language on the Human humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons should be more robust.
They should more precisely reflect the concerns expressed by many member states.
Moreover, we deem it important that the document better reflect the complementarity between the NPT and the TPNW, particularly in relation to the common goal of nuclear disarmament.
We hope that these elements will be strengthened in future versions of the text.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished Representative of El Salvador for her intervention, and I now invite the distinguished Representative of Germany to make the intervention.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I would like to thank and commend the President, you and your team, and the Secretariat for the thoughtful revision of the draft.
We believe that we are moving in the right direction.
Ref one maintains and strengthens many elements which we welcome and support.
Among them, the importance of the implementation of Article 6, the CTBT testing moratorium, the importance of verification, the call for moratorium on fissile material production, effective maintenance of human control and risk reduction.
Having said this, I would like to share some remarks on specific powers under consideration in MC one.
As requested by the president, we will also submit language proposals where applicable in writing.
In the preamble, we appreciate the addition of positive language on the amptee in Roman two and language on testing in Roman 12.
On Roman seven, we'd like to ask you to delete the term non discriminatory.
It is unclear to us where this language comes from and what it refers to, we'd prefer to stick to the 2022 language full and effective implementation of the treaty.
Briefly on Roman ten, we fully support the power on the importance of implementation of Article 6, but would also like to point out that the implementation of all three pillars is essential.
In para one, again, we'd like to ask you for the deletion of non discriminatory.
It is unclear to us how this qualification could apply to Article 1 and two.
In para two, generally, we appreciate the improvement of language in a paragraph.
However, we still strongly prefer deletion as the para highlights only one single discussion, while many other discussions we have had over the last weeks are not being reflected in the text at all, leading to an imbalance we have to avoid.
In Power 48, please delete the language of unfulfilled.
From our perspective.
The amendments in this power go into the wrong direction.
We appreciate the strong language on the CTBT and nuclear testing moratorium.
It has improved in many aspects, including in Power 50, the new Power 52 on IMS and adding measures to confidence building on the nuclear testing moratorium in Power 54.
In Power 55, we'd like to ask you to adjust the third sentence in the power by referring to strategic stability talks among the nuclear weapon states on one hand and arms control negotiations among the states with the largest arsenals on the other hand.
Furthermore, please also delete this last sentence of Power 55.
Mr.
Chair, it might not come as a surprise to you that we appreciate the good language on risk reduction.
We would like, however, to ask for an addition of general remarks underlining the importance and contributions of risk reduction in Power 58, and we'll submit language proposals.
Power 59 in its current form is not acceptable to us and should be deleted.
The outcome document should not highlight the doctrine of one nuclear weapon state.
We will submit to you alternative language if deletion is not feasible.
On Power 60, we strongly suggest to make a full stop after, in particular, artificial intelligence.
We reject the reference to entanglement of conventional and strategic forces.
Instead, we'd like to equally see positive language on emerging technologies, and we'll submit a language proposal.
On Power 63, please enter sentence after nonproliferation obligations.
There are no reporting requirements for non nuclear weapon states on disarmament commitments.
Reporting by non nuclear weapon states is voluntary and covers all three pillars.
On Power 64, we cannot accept the deletion of nuclear weapon states, which would not be in line with the 2010 action plan.
Ultimately, we highly appreciate the language on education on Power 67, on FMCT on Power 70, and on verification in Power 71, where we'd like to maintain welcomes and don't support changing it to notes.
Mr.
Chair, I assure you of Germany's ongoing support towards a consensus outcome document.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Germany for his intervention, and I invite the distinguished representative of Austria to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair and also please do extend also my thanks to the chair and also to you and your team for the amended text.
We've seen some progress in important areas, but also unfortunately some areas where further improvements are needed, or the text, unfortunately has also had some backtracking.
In the interest of time, I'll limit myself to six points, but we will be submitting more detailed comments in writing.
The first and very importantly is the element of the humanitarian environmental consequences of nuclear weapons.
This has been a long running issue and a deep concern already firmly in the NPT context since 2010, but the text has evolved quite dramatically.
We of course, have seen the joint statement by 148 states at the 2022 review conference, and this issue has been raised throughout this review cycle by a large number, including the largest groupings, including the NAM, the Arab group, the African group, Carcom, Asean, the list goes on.
Clearly, this is an absolute priority for the overwhelming majority of states in the NPT.
And therefore, we believe this should be reflected accordingly.
We would, of course, like to see a very extensive language, but we think in the spirit of finding a possible consensus language, we should fall back on a text that combines 2022 elements into a single paragraph that could read the conference reiterates its deep concern that the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons.
Including any intentional unintentional or accidental nuclear explosion.
The conference reaffirms the need for states at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law and the Charter of the United Nations and states parties affirm that awareness of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons ought to underpin our approaches and efforts towards nuclear disarmament.
We would also be We see it is quite important that we have a clear reflection of the challenges that the amputee faces.
We notice that in the preambular paragraphs, there is a stronger recognition of the achievements of the APT with which we agree, but there also needs to be a concordant recognition that there are challenges and a lack of implementation of obligations and commitments that affects the amputee because otherwise, we have the impression the text might be falling short in reflecting reality outside a conference room.
Coming to paragraph 58 and risk reduction, we think it's important that we not just agree but also take measures and risk reduction and also not add undue qualifications.
We think that the end of the sentence should speak of the security of non nuclear weapon states and nuclear weapon states alike.
On paragraph 60 on artificial intelligence, we want to clarify that the steps that have been taken so far are positive, but are only first steps in this regard and don't actually solve the matter as the current text seems to imply.
Let me turn third to the nuclear testing norm, the CTBT where we welcome some progress throughout the text that has been made.
We think it's, for example, very important that the urgency of entry into force remains.
We also very much like the additions on the 30th anniversary, et cetera, but we are somewhat cautious on the new addition of develop and implement new measures to restore confidence in explosive nuclear testing moratorium.
Linking this new idea to the CTBT is urgent, so we should add at the end, in particular to further strengthen the CTBO IMS and the provisional application of on site inspections and the clarification procedure.
Also very much agree with points raised previously to strengthen the TP&W reference, both by reverting to the acknowledges formulation of 2022 and also by adding a reference to complementarity that can be done in a non controversial way.
That is by adding that for its states parties, the TP&W is a complimentary measure that they have adopted to implement their Article 6 obligations and commitments.
On risk reduction, we call for broader understanding risk reduction, that is nuclear risk reduction or strategic risk reduction, and we would like to see more granular detail in paragraphs 56, 57, and 58.
We would also call for having a better formulation in line with the preamble of the NPT instead of increase in unession security.
In transparency and accountability, we want to make sure that there is a clear understanding that we need a more concrete requirement of reporting rather than just having it completely open ended.
We also want this to be an obligation and responsibility differentiating nuclear weapon states and non nuclear weapon states and the focus being clearly on Article 6.
Thank you very much.
I thank the distinguished representative of Austria for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of Iraq to take the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
At the outset, my delegation joined the statement delivered by the Arab Group.
We also commend the efforts made in issuing the first revised document, which reflects some of the comments and discussions that took place over the past few days.
Nevertheless, my delegation would like to note that paragraphs 45 through 73 still require further work, consultations and amendments.
We consider that many of the substantive observations presented by delegations during the discussion of the zero draft of the report have not been sufficiently taken into account in the production of the current text.
In this regard, we underscore the importance of continuing to work in a manner that adequately ensures the achievement of the required balance, particularly with respect to the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations under Article 6.
Mr.
Chair, with regard to paragraph 45, while we welcome the reaffirmation of the legal obligations contained in Article 6, we believe that the paragraph should reflect a greater degree of accountability in the implementation of these obligations.
In this context, we propose adding the phrase within a specified time frame after the phrase effective measures to emphasize the necessity of achieving tangible and time bound progress toward nuclear disarmament.
As for paragraph 48, we support expressing regret over the continued lack of progress in implementing Article 6.
However, we consider it necessary that the paragraph more clearly reflects the risks arising from the continuation of nuclear arsenal modernization programs and their quantitative and qualitative development.
Accordingly, we propose adding language expressing concern over the continued modernization and expansion of nuclear weapons programs as this contradicts the objectives and the spirit of the treaty.
With respect to paragraph 49, we support the call addressed to nuclear weapon states to fully implement their obligations under Article 6 and related previous commitments.
However, we believe that the paragraph would be stronger if it included an affirmation that reductions in nuclear weapons and their ultimate elimination should be carried out in a transparent, irreversible, and verifiable manner.
The inclusion of these principles would enhance confidence and credibility in the disarmament process.
Iraq reaffirms once more the great importance of negative security assurances and we take note of the references contained in paragraph 61 and 62.
We call for the addition of reference to the importance of commencing negotiations within the Conference on disarmament on a legally binding and non discriminatory instrument on the non use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non nuclear weapon states.
Regarding paragraph 68, we reiterate the importance of the immediate commencement of negotiations on a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for the use in nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, including existing stockpiles of such materials.
In conclusion, we look forward to constructive cooperation for a balanced final document.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Iraq for his intervention.
I will now invite the following set of speakers to take the floor in the order in which they are mentioned, South Africa, Malaysia, Iran, Brazil, and Denmark.
The distinguished representative of South Africa, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
We welcome the revised draft, which includes careful consideration of issues raised over the previous few days.
In spite of this, we have some comments to further strengthen the text in a constructive effort and to correct some inconsistencies.
On PP one, we see the need to be clear that the NPT is the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime rather than the broader disarmament and non proliferation regime, which is made up of many more treaties, norms and institutions to prevent the spread of WMDs.
PP two should focus on seeking security for all and a world without nuclear weapons.
We request the deletion of safer world and this to be replaced with security for all and moving a world free of nuclear weapons before achieving peace and security.
With regards to PP six, we need to correct that Article 6 is an obligation and not a commitment.
And in this regard, we recommend deletion of committed and replace that with obligated under Article 6.
South Africa welcomes the changes to the preambula paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 14.
With regards to paragraph two, South Africa regrets the deletion of language reflecting concern on important current and potential developments related to nuclear sharing.
Our preference would have been to retain that sentence.
We also have concern with the use of the phrase longstanding, which conveys an aspect of acceptance of nuclear sharing and extended deterrence, which is not the case and which has been expressly mentioned by many states and groups over a number of years.
On 55, we propose the deletion of reference to in accordance with Article 6 in this paragraph to avoid the perception that multilateralizing arms control is the objective of Article 6 or replacement for nuclear disarmament.
On Paris 53, 56, and 58, South Africa proposes deletion of reference to strategic risks as we need to avoid the situation of such measures being used basically to make nuclear deterrence doctrines and postures less precarious and more predictable for those relying on these weapons and making nuclear weapons more palatable, nor should it be a distraction from nuclear disarmament.
On Paris 68, we suggest that in addition to the Conference on Disarmament negotiating of File material treaty, we need to also include the possibility of the use of other relevant fora for such negotiations.
We propose that the conference calls on the Conference on disarmament and other relevant fora in this regard to undertake such negotiations.
We repeat our proposal on paragraph 70 to revert to the 2010 language related to nuclear materials designated by each of the nuclear weapon states as no longer required for military purposes, remaining permanently outside military programs.
The permanence of this designation is essential.
On the reflection of the TPNW in 73, we reiterate the need to replace notes with technlgs which factually frames the TPNW within the United Nations context and broader nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation architecture and which is supported by a majority of UN states.
The sovereign decision of some states not to join the TPNW cannot be used to distance the TPNW from this fact.
On 71, South Africa would like to retain reference to the verification, which is essential to achieving full compliance with the object and purpose of the treaty as was included in the zero draft.
Overall, chair, we wish to express our support for the amendments to paragraph 45, 48, 52, and we welcome the addition of the last sentence on paragraph 50.
We also welcome paragraph 81 as drafted.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of South Africa for his intervention, and I now give the floor to Malaysia to make their intervention.
Malaysia, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Malaysia thanks the presidency for the circulation of the revised text and welcome the continued effort to steer the outcome document toward a balanced, credible and implementable result.
We offer the following broad comments on the revised draft.
On PP 1212, Malaysia supports the overall framing that reaffirms the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime and underscores the continued relevance of the treaty three mutually reinforcing pillars.
We welcome the strong emphasis on restraint, risk reduction, and the urgent need to avert any use of nuclear weapons, particularly in the current geopolitical climate.
NASA welcomes the new inclusion in PP 11 and 12.
We would encourage keeping the to implementation focus so that the preamble sets expectations for measurable progress rather than simply restating longstanding principles.
On paragraphs 1 and 2, Mass supports the clear reaffirmation that the full and effective implementation of Articles one and two remains essential to the treaty's effectiveness and to international peace and security.
We also welcome the recognition that ongoing discussions on nuclear weapon sharing and a standard deterrence arrangements raise questions relevant to the treaty's long term credibility.
NASA considers it important that the text continues to discourage the establishment of any new nuclear sharing arrangement as this could weaken confidence in the integrity of Articles one and two.
On paragraphs 45 to 73, NASA welcomes the direction of travel towards strengthening implementation of Article 6 and sustaining a global normative framework against nuclear weapons.
NASA supports language that reinforces tangible, verifiable, and time bound progress, including true transparency, accountability, and structured follow up across the review cycle.
We also encourage maintaining strong action oriented references to practical near term measures to reduce the risk of miscalculation and escalation, while making clear that these measures complement and do not replace disarmament obligations.
MESA further supports a renewed push on widely supported deliverables that can command broad confidence, including upholding the nuclear testing taboo and advancing CTBT entry into force, as well as advancing effective measures related to fise material and verification oriented approaches.
We also see merit in ensuring the text addresses emerging technology and domain risks in a practical way by encouraging guardrails, meaningful human control and confidence building practices that are realistic and implementable.
Mr.
Chair, MESA offers these broad comments in an affirmative and bridging spirit We recognize that some issues remain sensitive and positions diverge, but we believe there is sufficient common ground to close gaps in the coming days.
NASA stands ready to engage constructively with all six parties to achieve a balanced and forward looking outcome that strengthens the NPT.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Malaysia for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of Iran to take the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
My delegation would like to express its gratitude to the distinguished president, his team and the Secretariat for Sculation of Reg one and will remain constructively engaged to work on a consensual outcome document.
Regarding our comments and remarks, proposals with regard to the paragraphs under purview of this main Committee one.
First, with regard to PP two, we believe that we should have a factual approach in in describing the achievements of the treaty.
We believe that in fact the achievements were just in some areas while we know for the fact that there was lack of progress in implementation of Article 6 obligations.
Therefore, we need to highlight that the achievements were in some areas and we need to specify lack of progress on achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament.
We have a new paragraph to be added here referring to ICJ 1996 advisory opinion and especially highlighting its opinion about the contradiction of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons with international law and international humanitarian law.
We believe that PP three should be moved to the end of PP five.
It refers to the nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
We believe that on PP six, we need to highlight and emphasize on the importance of implementation of the treaty in all its aspects, in particular with regard to nuclear disarmament.
On PP seven, we believe that nondiscriminatory and balanced implementation of all provisions of treaty, including nuclear disarmament obligations must be highlighted.
On paragraph PP eight, we believe that the implementation of obligations should be urgent and with regard to all provisions of the treaty.
PP ten, we need to express utmost concern about lack of progress achieving of implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations.
We see a good paragraph here as PP 11.
However, we believe that the notion has been transferred from operative parts to preamble, but we think that it has a merit to be moved again to operative parts to express that indefinite Positions of indefinite extension of the treaty does not substitute indefinite position of nuclear weapons.
Similarly, we believe that on the importance of upholding and strengthening the norm against nuclear testing by nuclear weapon states, this is a good paragraph that should be moved to operative parts.
With regard to paragraph one, we believe that implementation of Article 21 and two of the treaty should be conducted in a non discriminatory and balanced manner with regard to nuclear sharing and extended deterrence.
First, we need to refer to the exact cases conducted and in this regard, NATO and the OCHA partnership should be mentioned.
And as I've explained earlier, we need to highlight its contradiction with the purpose and objective of the treaty and to specify that these kind of activities are in violation of Article 1 and two.
Therefore, there should be a request and the urge to put an immediate and effective ending to these activities.
And this subject needs to be discussed in the next review conference.
On paragraph 44, as we have expressed, we believe that in order to contextualize the notion of nuclear disarmament, it's better to have only reference to nuclear disarmament rather than general and complete disarmament.
And on paragraph the rest, Mr.
Chair, I thank the distinguished representative of Iran for his intervention, and I invite the distinguished representative of Brazil to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
I'd like to thank the presidency for circulating this draft.
I believe that there are several elements that are a progress regarding the zero draft, but there is still a lot of work to do.
First of all, I'll make some preliminary remarks because my capital is still assessing the document.
But on the preliminary part, I would like to express my delegations support to the suggestion made by the delegation of South Africa on preamble of paragraph two to change the order in a way to highlight that a world without nuclear weapons is a crucial step to achieve peace and security.
This is the idea that the paragraph should convey and not that we should seek a safer world to achieve a world without nuclear weapons.
I believe that this would be a good change in this paragraph.
I also would like to support my delegations welcome that preamble to paragraph eight and also 12 as they are.
I think that we should indeed affirm the validity of the commitments and also the need to uphold and strengthen the norm against nuclear testing.
On the operative part, I would like to start my statement on paragraph two.
We thank the president for keeping this paragraph.
I think that it is important to keep this discussion going, but we have some issues with the wording.
For example, like other delegations pointed out, we would rather have existing instead of long standing when we are referring to the arrangements.
Um, we also in the third line, we believe that we should insert for the treaty long term effectiveness, put a four before the treaty and right after it as my colleague from Egypt mentioned, there is no dialogue already about this, but we would like to change the word for examination on issues relevant to the implementation of Articles one and two.
Finally, since our reading of this paragraph is not only related to Article 1 and two, but in connection to Article 6, So in the end, we would like to suggest adding including the ultimate goal of complete and irreversible nuclear disarment under Article 6.
So it would be an interesting complement for this paragraph.
And now I jump to paragraph 46, and I Here, we think that we should rephrase the last part of the paragraph with a reaffirmation of the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination on their arsenals, including through unilateral, bilateral regional and multilateral measures.
With this change, the paragraph 46 would be in line with the current language of paragraph 49 that also mentions these measures in the last part.
We will send this in routine, but we'd like to flag that on 46.
Now on paragraph 48, the last part that reads commitments provided at previous review conference, we I've been suggesting to change for commitments undertaking within the treaty.
I believe it's a rather accurate language here.
On 54, my time is almost is running up, so I will continue right after.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil for her intervention.
I now invite the distinguished representative of Denmark to take the floor.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chair.
Again, I want to thank the president and all involved for the work on Rev one.
I'll offer some preliminary observations on key issues from the perspective of Denmark.
Our overall impression of the new text is that we see the work being done to bring us closer to consensus on a document.
In some aspects, the text has been substantially improved, but in all aspects, it has unfortunately gone too far in terms of weakening the text for the sake of seeking consensus, which we regret.
Allow me to explain some of Denmark's considerations on the paragraphs allocated to MC one.
First, we still find that the growing concerns of reckless and dangerous nuclear rhetoric, signaling and threats should be reflected in the preamble or in the operational paragraph.
We heard many states from different regions express this concern.
The term humanitarian consequences in PP four is not well established and is obvious to us that there's not agreement on it.
We propose to use text on the visiting devastation upon all mankind from the NPT preamble PP two or from the relevant paragraph in the Pact for the future.
With regard to OP two, we recognize the president's work on this paragraph.
We welcome the deletion of one completely unacceptable sentence.
The paragraph, however, still contains ambiguous and unclear language.
It is not clear, as Germany pointed out, it is not clear why the discussion on extended deterrence is the only among many discussions is singled out.
It is also incorrect to speak about nuclear weapons sharing.
No sharing is taking place.
All nuclear weapons remain under national command control and ownership of the nuclear weapon states in question.
We continue to request the deletion of this paragraph.
In OP 55, we still find that negotiations on a follow on to the new start should include the states with the three largest nuclear arsenals.
I'll also recall our stance on the so called no first use policy in OP 59.
It is purely declaratory and without any credibility, without a verification mechanism, which would be de facto impossible to establish.
Further, first use policy is even further concerning in the absence of transparency.
So there's a need to delete or reformulate.
We continue to have a basic concern about the lack of inclusivity in the conference on disarmament, to negotiate universal and multilateral arms agreement in the CT of all interested states at the table without all interested states at the table is problematic and also the CT has not been shown any effectiveness.
Such negotiations should be open to all states.
There are two references to the CT in the current text.
We prefer the deletion of paragraph 72 on the TP&W.
If retained, it must be strictly factual.
Let me end by mentioning the problematic ambiguity on OP 63.
As we mentioned, and I think all the delegations have mentioned as well.
But as we have mentioned before, the requirement for non nuclear weapon states for reporting and verification is in relation to the IAEA safeguards, but they have no reporting requirements on nuclear disarmament as they possess no nuclear weapons.
It needs to be specified in the paragraph and as the current ambiguity is problematic as mentioned.
We will hand in these and some additional remarks in writing.
Denmark, of course, stands ready to continue to work with all states to find text that can gather consensus.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Denmark for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished Representative of Cuba to take the floor to be followed by Egypt, China, and the Russian Federation.
You have the floor.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
At the outset, we wish to thank the presidency for circulating this new version of the checks text to save time.
To save time rather, I won't repeat what other delegations have said about things that we welcome where this rev version is concerned and I'll go to our proposals for change.
In preamblea paragraph two, we agree with the proposals that have been made by South Africa and Brazil on the changes, particularly because it could be contradictory specifically to recognize the historic achievements of the treaty over the last five decades when what we're attempting to emphasize is the lack of progress under Article 6.
We also agree with the proposal made on preambula paragraph six on the importance in order to with obligated in terms of obligations under Article 6 as cited in the end of preambula paragraph six, regarding preambula paragraph 12 on the need to strengthen the norm against nuclear tests, we could add at the end of the phrase as a practical measures on the path towards nuclear disarmament.
We believe that that could focus us all on the path that we're all on, which is compliance with Article 6 on operative paragraphs now one and two.
Firstly, one, We suggest including not only reference to Articles one and two, but also a reference to Article 6, as Egypt suggested on behalf of the Arab group.
Regarding on extended nuclear deterrence, we agree that it is important to return to language that was lost through the previous version in terms of voicing concern regarding existing arrangements.
More specifically, we also suggest in the last phrase, referring to the implementation of Articles one and two that could contribute to strengthening the treaty.
That phrase already appears, and we would replace that with language that referred to the effective compliance with the treaty.
A later paragraph refers to credibility at the end of this paragraph refers to credibility enhancing confidence and advancing objectives.
It refers here to Article 6, but echoing what Brazil said, Well, we would agree with what Brazil said here, where the rest of the paragraphs are concerned, that is those under the committee's consideration.
More specifically paragraph 48, we suggest adding at the end of the paragraph where reference is made to non compliance with Article 6 and the causes for it.
We suggest including a reference to the sustained presence of nuclear weapons in security doctrines of nuclear weapon states, that would be in accordance with the factors that have determined the lack of progress in this matter.
Paragraph number 49, we emphasize the importance of taking up or moving forward with steps not only to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in these doctrines, but also to eliminate them.
We would replace decrease with directly eliminate.
Regarding paragraph 54, that pertains to moratorium on nuclear tests.
We suggest deleting the last phrase here.
It focuses on new measures to restore confidence in explosive nuclear testing moratoriums.
We think we should appeal for an unconditional and immediate cessation of all forms of nuclear tests.
That language would be more comprehensive than the proposal as it stands.
Paragraph 63 now, we have a proposal here too.
That is that the conference in the conference, first of all, recognizes the imperative.
That's one thing, but here we'd switch arguments around so that we can better appreciate the intention here and the idea that there is requirements for the implementation of disarmament commitments or obligations on behalf of nuclear weapon states, bearing in mind the current imbalance in between the existence of requirements that are placed on non nuclear weapon states and the obligations they have in terms of verification rather than proliferation.
Paragraph 64, we suggest deleting the reference to without prejudice to national security.
Finally, in paragraph 73, we suggest including recognition of the complementarity of the CTBT with a change to the text which allows us to retain coherence with views previously outlined.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Cuba for her intervention, and I now invite the distinguished Representative of Egypt to take the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chaperson for giving me the second opportunity to resume the comments of the Arab group on the operative section and we will resume from paragraph 49.
We are honestly still very surprised that we don't see a reference to 1995 among the outcome documents when it comes to commitments under implementation of Article 6, specifically the decisions that were part of the indefinite extension basis of the treaty.
In line number four, we're going to see diminish being replaced with excluded to exclude nuclear weapons from the role and significance of nuclear weapons to be excluded from military security concepts.
And we will repeat our proposal from last time to see the chapot of action five from the 2010 action plan that treats accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, and that would be before introduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons.
In paragraph 50, Mr.
Chairperson, you recall that tracking the exact language of action ten from the 2010 action plan about the special responsibility of nuclear weapon states towards the entry into force of the CTBT towards the annex two states and particularly those states that are not party to the NPT.
This was part of the call of the Arab group.
It was also part of the intervention of the non aligned movement and the African group and we haven't here the single intervention opposing that the text remains committed to action ten of the 2010 action plan.
So we will strongly appeal for reconsideration of the last part of the paragraph to have the adequate text from action ten.
Paragraph 51, the only missing piece is the characterization of the CDBT as an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation both together.
Paragraph 54, the Arab Group supports the retention of this paragraph about the continuation of the moratorium or upholding of the moratorium on nuclear testing.
Probably the only edit that we would have in the third line, I don't think that we need to use the word restore here that this means that the entire confidence and faith into the verification regime on nuclear testing is lost.
Or we can speak about enhance or alleviate confidence in explosive nuclear testing moratoriums.
We also would suggest to add at the end of the paragraph that the conference calls upon nuclear weapon states to refrain from any action contrary to the object and purpose of the CTBT and the commitments undertaken at the review conference.
In paragraph 55, we welcome at the third line from the end the addition of non strategic as part of the nuclear weapons as part of these arrangements.
And we also welcome the last addition on the call for the voluntary maintenance of the limitations on the new start.
Paragraph 57, while of course we agree that non nuclear weapon states can play a role in the prevention of any use of nuclear weapons.
However, for the sake of clarity and the precision and respective responsibilities, the second half of the paragraph needs to commence with that while recognizing the primary responsibility of nuclear weapon states in this regard, and then the rest of the sentence about contribution by non nuclear weapon states.
In paragraph 58 on nuclear risk reduction, we don't have major substantive comments on this, but we still want to see the disclaimer of and pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
That would be in the third line in the context of the implementation of Article 6 and pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons and then the call upon nuclear weapon states to engage with nuclear risk reduction measures.
The Arab Group strongly supports the retention of paragraph 59 on no first use policy.
In paragraph 60, we remain with a number of outstanding concerns here about the relationship between emerging technology and nuclear weapons.
We want to see full and effective human control, not just over the decisions to employ nuclear weapons, but over nuclear weapons at large.
We're concerned with the reference of trying to build confidence on this issue.
There's a lot of clarity about what is the issue that we are trying to build confidence about.
And also, I think like one of the previous colleagues that spoke before me, is that we want to speak about mitigation of the risks related to the integration of emerging technologies, in particular, artificial intelligence into the command and control and communication systems of nuclear weapons.
We welcome the addition here of artificial intelligence in this reiteration.
We're deeply disappointed in paragraph 61 that rights was replaced by interests, and we call for restoration of this word from the zero draft and like last time, we will continue to call for an action oriented dimension in on the matter of negative security assurances.
So we want to extend this sentence this paragraph to read and calls upon nuclear weapon states to provide these negative security assurances as a matter of urgency and engage without any further delay in negotiations leading to the elaboration of a legally binding instrument.
Paragraph 63, I think like the majority of previous speakers, I think that there were good intentions behind the way this paragraph was drafted, how we read it initially at the drafts, that it highlights the asymmetry in the reporting obligations between non nuclear weapon states and nuclear weapon states and that the conference wants to address this asymmetry.
But I think that as the text evolved, it went in a completely different direction that now it's even actually calling upon non nuclear weapon states to also report on disarmament obligation.
It is completely recusing the nuclear weapon states from their responsibilities and the expectations from them under the 2010 action plan and making the paragraph focused on non nuclear weapon states and their reporting obligation.
I'm very glad that this is one of the very few instances that we agree with Denmark and Germany at this section.
This gives you an indication chair that there is a sense of unanimity around the need to revisit this paragraph.
Paragraph 65 needs a reference to particularly under Article 6 in the last line, 68 on FMCT is missing the within an agreed and comprehensive program of work and also the part about addressing past existing and future production.
Paragraph 17 needs to track action 17 of the 2010 action plan and we have only one pending remark that we will come on.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Egypt on behalf of the Arab group for their statement.
I now invite the distinguished representative of China to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair for giving me the floor again.
If I may, I wish to continue sharing China's position on other matters in the revised draft.
First, NFU is fully compatible with the purpose and objective of the treaty.
It is vital to reducing the role of nuclear weapons in national security doctrines, reducing nuclear risks, and avoiding nuclear war.
UN Secretary-General Guterres has publicly called on all nuclear armed states to commit to NFU of nuclear weapons.
Although right now there's probably only one nuclear weapon state that adheres to this policy, most countries, including non countries, Support the NFU policy.
The demand by certain countries to delete the relevant paragraph amounts to a disguised encouragement of or even connivance at the first use doctrine, sending a terribly misleading signal to the international community, given the doubts about the credibility of certain countries commitment to NFU, China strongly urges the inclusion in the text of a call for nuclear weapon states to negotiate a treaty on mutual no first use of nuclear weapons at the earliest opportunity.
Second, it is imperative to preserve the international consensus on the nuclear test plan.
CTBT contains clear provisions prohibiting nuclear testing.
Action 11 of the 2010 action plan explicitly states, and I quote, all states commit to refraining from conducting nuclear weapon test explosions, any other nuclear explosions, the use of new nuclear weapon technologies and from taking any action that would undermine the objectives of the treaty or existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions shall be maintained.
China supports effectively safeguarding the international consensus on nuclear test ban and urges against using non agreed language.
And we propose that the conference focus on certain countries actions undermine the purpose and objective of the treaty, such as advancing preparations for nuclear weapon states to demonstrate flexibility, China supports amending Power 54 based on action 11 of the action plan.
Third, nuclear transparency and risk reduction.
That is to demonstrate our flexibility, we support amending Power 54 based on the wording of action 11 of the 2010 action plan.
Third, nuclear transparency and risk reduction measures should be advanced rationally.
Nuclear armed states differ in their nuclear policies, nuclear force sizes, and strategic security environments.
Therefore, there is no one size fits all approach to nuclear transparency or risk reduction.
China therefore requests the deletion of the specific risk mitigation measures listed in Power 58, encourages all parties to prioritize crisis prevention and address the root causes of crisis, and requests the deletion of the phrase equal transparency in P 64.
Fourth, In China's previous statements, we have repeatedly clarified our position on the issue of a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
China argues that such moratorium lacks clear definition and scope is impossible to verify.
Some nuclear armed states may transfer fissile material for nuclear weapons to each other without restrictions.
Two nuclear armed states that have announced their commitment to the moratorium are engaged in nuclear submarine cooperation with the new With a non nuclear weapon state involving the transfer of tons of weapons grade fissile material.
This makes the moratorium proposition particularly hypocritical.
China therefore requests the deletion of the relevant wording in paragraph 70.
Those are China's preliminary comments on some selected paragraphs of the revised draft outcome document.
China will continue to participate constructively in subsequent consultations and will provide specific language proposals in writing.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of China for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation to take the floor.
La.
Mr.
Chairman, we are not in a position to support paragraph 66 and 73, which reflect the agenda for the nuclear weapons treaty.
Paragraph 67 needs to be amended, and we propose that it be more focused on the call itself for greater awareness on matters of nonproliferation and disarmament without excessive clarification.
Turning to paragraph 58 on strategic risk reduction.
This is imbalanced, the paragraph.
If such a measure as eradication of the root causes for international conflict is not brought back into the text, at the very listing itself of such measures loses any sense in our view.
Turning to paragraph 60 on artificial intelligence and other new technologies.
This is completely superfluous, unnecessary.
We do not see any need whatsoever to introduce this theme which has not been sufficiently fleshed out within an international format.
Bringing this to the platform of the NPT.
We insist on the deletion of paragraph 52.
The verification mechanism of the CTBT is comprised of three components, not just the international monitoring system, and this mechanism will begin to operate fully only after the entry into force of the treaty.
Turning to paragraph 54, there's a need to maintain mention of the fact that the national moratoriums on nuclear tests will operate until the entry into force of the CTBT.
We cannot agree with the mention of certain measures for confidence building.
The only such measure needs to be the entry into force of the CTBT.
Turning to paragraph 68, there's still no reference to the fact that negotiations on the FMCT can be carried out solely within a comprehensive balanced program of work for the conference on disarmament.
The demand for the immediate conduct of negotiations and especially reaching agreement on the relevant treaty is not acceptable.
There's an important need to bring this paragraph into accordance with the language of the Shannon mandate.
We do not believe it is feasible in paragraph 70 to call upon nuclear states to replace nuclear material under the IAEA, which no longer required for military purposes.
The reason for this approach has already been explained by us.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation for his statement.
I would now invite the following sets of speakers to take the floor in the order in which they are mentioned.
Sweden, Republic of Korea, United States, and the Netherlands.
I I invite the distinguished representative of Sweden to make his intervention.
Thank you, Chair.
We join others in commending the precedent, you and your teams for your efforts to shape an outcome document that strives to strike a balance acceptable to all state parties.
Allow me to provide you with some first preliminary remarks and reserve the right to revert with further comments, including in writing.
We believe the preamble has been improved and strengthened in several important parts, including with stronger language regarding the treaty and its historic achievements on nuclear testing as well as language on the obligation of all states to comply with international law, including regarding nuclear rhetoric and threats.
We welcome these changes.
On paragraph two, we appreciate the effort to find common ground.
However, we do not believe its inclusion in the text is conducive to the overall objective of consensus on the text.
It is well known that NATO's policy is longstanding and predates the APT.
It respects Article 1 and two of the treaty and actively contributes to its nonproliferation objectives.
Sweden's own recent security policy development is a case in point.
After more than 200 years of military non alignment, Russia's aggression against Ukraine dramatically worsened the security situation in Europe.
Applying for membership in NATO was and remains the most effective and treaty compatible security arrangement for Sweden.
We can think of a number of actions and policies that do put the empathy at risk.
However, extended deterrence is not one of them.
Therefore, we would suggest P two to be deleted.
In paragraph 50, we welcome the strengthened language on CTBT and that it calls on all states to refrain from any actions contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty.
In paragraph 52, new language on verification and CTBTO is also welcome.
In paragraph 55, we welcome the attempt to find a compromise language and underlined the importance of calling for urgent work towards a broader new agreement on legally binding framework limiting the three largest nuclear arsenals.
On paragraph 59, our position remains unchanged.
The new first use policy is unverifiable and not credible.
We propose to delete this paragraph.
Chair, you can count on our continued support in your efforts to bridge different views with the aim to reach a consensus outcome document.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Sweden for her intervention, and I invite the distinguished representative of Republic of Korea to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
We join others in thanking not only the president of the conference, but also you, Chair of the main Committee one, and other chairs and the Secretariat for guiding our work and preparing the revised tax in an effort to achieve consensus despite diverging views.
The revised tax is under careful review in capital, but we would like to offer preliminary views.
At this stage, my delegation would like to make three points.
First, regarding operative paragraph two, we disagree with the view that no discussion has taken place on this issue.
State parties have made numerous statements reflecting a diverse range of perspectives on this issue and we consider that to constitute a discussion.
The point is not whether we have discussion or not, but rather why the mere fact of such a discussion should be noted in the outcome document.
During its deliberations, the conference discussed many other issues and we do not believe it would be appropriate to list all the issues in the outcome document, particularly where no convergence of views have emerged.
Furthermore, the current language is one sided and does not accurately reflect the debate as many delegations, including my delegation highlighted the ways in which such arrangement have contributed to the global nonproliferation regime.
We therefore remain convinced that the OP two should be deleted in its entirety.
If you would like to keep the paragraph, it should be reformulated so that the paragraph should be strictly factual, neutral, and balanced.
Second, we also remain of the view that paragraph 59 should be deleted as it does not reflect the balanced view expressed in this room as several delegations have noted today.
Lastly, on the negative security assurances, we find it difficult to understand why some delegations would disagree with our principled position that such assurances should be provided only to states that are in compliance with their obligations under the MPT.
We recall that all three parties committed themselves to pursuing policies fully compatible with the treaty as reflected in action one of the 2010 action plan, a point and pursued by many delegations today in previous discussions.
In this regard, it is only logical that negative security assurance should be extended so that states that remain faithful compliance with the treaties.
So we suggest, again, including they are in compliance with their unpate obligations after non nuclear weapon state parties in paragraph 61 and deleting all circumstances in the same paragraph.
You may come back with more detailed comments at a later stage.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea for this statement, and I now invite the distinguished representative of the United States to make their intervention.
Thank you, Chair.
Like others, I'd like to recognize the president and his team for their diligence and their intensity of work.
Before commenting on the revision, I think it is important to take a moment to step back and recognize our goals at this review conference.
For three weeks, we have heard repeated interventions that this RevC cannot end without an outcome, and many delegations have tied an outcome to success.
The United States also wants an outcome, but any outcome, and by this, I mean a weak outcome would not equate to success.
For the outcome to be successful, it must be credible.
To be credible, it must grapple directly with the most proximate and urgent threats to this treaty effectiveness and the consequences of those threats to global security and stability.
This text does not yet achieve that.
Chief among those threats is Iran's violation of the treaty, as expressed by the IEA Board of Governors and its finding of Iran's noncompliance with its safeguards agreement, which is legally required by Article 3 of the treaty and through Iran's failure to credibly explain its activities in the presence of undeclared nuclear material at multiple undeclared locations.
The RevC outcome cannot gloss over a non nuclear weapon states treaty noncompliance without clear condemnation.
Iran must never be permitted to have a nuclear weapon.
Relevant to this committee chair, and I note that my capital is still reviewing the text, We can see that the president is listening carefully to our debates and reflecting some of that in this text.
We appreciate the clear focus and the revision on Article 6 as an obligation and not a need.
We welcome the inclusion of multilateral strategic stability talks reflected in the draft, and we also hope to add it to the preamble.
On arms control, any meaningful progress must reflect the current realities of today.
The strategic landscape has fundamentally changed and arms control commitments can no longer be limited to a bilateral framework between Russia and the United States.
For three weeks and even this afternoon, we have heard this committee call for concrete progress toward risk reduction, arms control, and nuclear disarmament.
An outcome that fails to demand China's participation would send a signal that this conference is ambivalent about China's breathtaking arsenal buildup.
Must remind the conference that at its current nuclear arsenal expansion rate, China would come to the next Rev Co with an excess of 1,000 nuclear weapons.
That estimate does not even account for Beijing's cooperation with Russia to intensify and speed its fissil material production for use in nuclear weapons.
I ask all colleagues in this room, is that acceptable? China must hear this from the conference that the whole international community is demanding that it seriously engage.
A multilateral framework to do so is on offer.
Chair, on testing, we commend the president and his team for adding the concept of creating confidence in nuclear explosive test moratorium in this text, both in the preamble and in the body of Revision one.
There's still more work to do, and we will have some suggestions for precision.
We cannot urge the upholding of a norm that we know already to be broken or demand entry into force of a treaty that, with its current verification tools, would be insufficient to detect low yield producing nuclear explosive tests.
We also continue to seek confirmation from China and from Russia that their testing moratoria are indeed held to zero yield standards.
The United States encourages this conference to call for an improved detection threshold and enhanced and increased verification measures.
We stand ready to work with the chair to ensure the conference's calls are effective as possible.
Chair, these issues that I've outlined are the most critical threats to the treaty's authority and effectiveness.
Our outcome document must reflect these realities.
I will not repeat the remarks we delivered in the past week about extended deterrence in NATO's nuclear arrangements, but I believe much of that discussion demonstrates a misunderstanding of what the arrangements entail.
Where the real threats lie and which threats are actually evolving and destabilizing global security since the last Rev con.
It's important to reiterate that these arrangements have never impeded progress on Article 6.
The largest reduction of nuclear arsenals in history for the United States, an 88% reduction occurred with NATO's nuclear arrangements in place.
Extended deterrence and NATO's nuclear arrangements have never precluded or diminished the ability, the willingness, or the good faith of the United States to engage meaningfully, seriously, and verifiably in arms control.
I'll come back in with a few further comments later.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of the United States for her intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of the Netherlands to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Let me begin by joining other delegations in thanking the president and his team for preparing the ref one of a possible outcome document and for guiding us in this process towards consensus.
We welcome this first revision and understand how complicated your task is.
I will underline our key points here while Capitol is finalizing a more detailed written input.
Chair, my delegation welcomes the addition in the preamble, underscoring the need to uphold the norm against nuclear testing and the reference to the CTBTO and the IMS Empower 52.
Chair.
Power two continues to contain several omissions and is based on misconceptions regarding NATO's extended deterrence arrangements.
Let me explain.
First of all, it has been pointed out several times and by multiple delegations that NATO's extended deterrence arrangements do not entail any sharing of nuclear weapons.
The United States maintains full custody and control of its nuclear weapons forward deployed in Europe.
Second, NATO's extended deterrence arrangements are and have always been in full compliance with the treaty.
Third, the current text fails to reflect the fact that these arrangements have been a key tool in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, therefore actively contributing to the NPT's nonproliferation objectives.
Moving forward, my delegation is aware of the widely diverging views concerning the matter of NATO's extended deterrence arrangements, which makes it all the more important that the outcome document remains factual.
Our proposals to balance the text, however, have not been taken on board, and they have now to request to delete the power in its entirety.
On paragraph 59, my delegation would like to delete its language on the first use.
This is the claim of just one nuclear weapon state that did not present the national report for discussion, while it should be discussed alongside the doctrines of the other nuclear weapon states as already proposed in paragraph 58.
On P 62, we noted the inclusion to establish a subsidy body in the conference on disarmament to formulate recommendations in relation to negative security assurances.
While we are in favor of engaging in substantive discussions on this matter, we do not believe that the establishment of a subsidy body in the CD to achieve this goal.
We therefore would like to request to return to the text in the zero draft.
Lastly, the current phrasing of Power 63 raises questions regarding non nuclear weapon states reporting obligations.
We propose this text should be clarified by stressing that the implementation of disarmament obligations remains an obligation of nuclear weapon states only.
Chair, you can count on my delegation's continued support in working towards the consensus outcome document, and I thank you for giving me the floor.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Netherlands for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of Peru to take the floor.
Peru, will be followed by Senegal, the United Kingdom, and Nigeria.
Peru, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I would like to start by expressing Peru's gratitude to your leadership, as well as that of the president of the conference and also for your efforts to achieve a balanced text.
Although my capitalist is still examining the text, we will formulate some preliminary comments right now.
In the preamble section of the text, we wish to make a number of comments here.
Firstly, welcoming the two additions that are interesting.
One is the reference to the treaty achievements, and the other is the reference to the norm against nuclear testing.
As regards the first comment, we think this was an entirely justified inclusion, the reference to the achievements of the treaty and also the reference to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.
However, we have taken note of and we indeed endorse the spirit of the interventions by some delegations who have suggested the wording of the text in this paragraph.
Turning now to the inclusion of the norm against testing, new PP 12 As I said, we welcome the inclusion of the need to uphold and strengthen the norm against nuclear testing.
This is complemented by what's in the operative section of the text.
Paragraph 50, more specifically, we believe that that paragraph two is a positive addition to the text.
The reference made to the 30 years of the CTBT's existence is something that was rightly included.
I have one more thing to say on the preambular section.
We welcome the inclusion in PP five of the reference to the Charter of the United Nations and to Article 24 and the content thereof.
Paragraph two, Article 4.
In the operative section, nuclear disarmament, we wish to indicate here two key comments for this first statement.
One pertains to nuclear disarmament and the other relates to the future of nuclear arms control agreements.
On the first point where of the view that in paragraph 46, it's positive to note the inclusion of the urgent implementation of Article 6, And we also welcome the relocation of the former paragraph 48.
It's been moved and is now in PP 11.
It's been relocated.
Turning now to the future of nuclear arms control agreements.
This is contained in paragraph 55.
We welcome the idea behind multilaterlization.
At the same time, the paragraph that you propose, Chair, has a final phrase that calls upon the states concerned to voluntarily maintain the limitations and reductions agreed upon in the New Start treaty.
Taking into account the time limits, I will bring things to an end there, but I have other comments that will be voiced at a later stage.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Beirut for his intervention, and I invite the distinguished representative of Senegal to take the floor.
Thank you very much, Chair.
Like previous delegations, we wish to congratulate the chair and the entire team for having proposed a rev of the text.
It's a timely revision and allows us to take resolute strike strides forward towards an outcome document.
We see a great deal of merit in this new text.
We welcome a number of changes that have been made, namely on the preular P one, which recalls the architecture in the way we would see it to be recalled with a focus on nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
There's a lot of positive substance in this section.
My colleagues have referred to that fact and I won't go back to what they've said.
However, It's a mixed bag, nevertheless.
Some things have been improved, matters have been resolved, but We haven't really talked about environmental consequences in PP four.
That's a shortcoming that is of grave concern to us.
I think Australia also raised that same concern, if I'm not mistaken.
When we've taken the floor previously, we've also appealed for the incorporation of the ICJ's opinion on the illegal nature of nuclear weapons that has not yet been incorporated into this document.
On paragraph four still in the preambula section, we echo what Australia said.
We need to evoke the environmental consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.
I briefly wish to go back to two here.
We've seen a lot of improvements here, but we haven't yet achieved our ultimate goal.
We're not talking about discussions here and what we've discussed, we voiced concerns and we need to reflect that fact in the document.
If discussions are underway, they are discussions on how far these nuclear arrangements are compatible with the provisions of the treaty.
That could be a positive addition.
Paragraph 48, we welcome the amendments that have been made, namely the introduction of the term action.
And we've added reference to declarations and statements on nuclear threat.
In our view, we can go further here.
We can go further.
This is not a red line, but we would like these statements to be clearly referred to in terms of their scope and their focus.
Paragraph 60 now, as other previous delegations have done, we welcome the addition to artificial intelligence.
We're of the view that we ought to add full human control of nuclear weapons.
As Egypt and the Arab Group have said, we need to define the framework within which full human control is relevant.
So in the context of nuclear weapons, that is P 61 now Chair, we refer to assurances.
For us, negative security assurances, that's a right for non nuclear weapon states and an obligation of nuclear weapon states.
But whatever wording we use, that should be made clear.
We echo what the Arab group said about interests that's replaced rights here.
We don't have interests, we have a right in terms of those negative security assurances.
On the same paragraph here we had referred to the limitations placed on the five nuclear weapon states.
We understand that nuclear weapons that category as meaning these obligations should be extended beyond these five nuclear weapon states.
We should here be referring to those that live under the threat of the use of nuclear weapons.
62 refers to the Conference on Disarmament.
We know what's going on in the Conference on Disarmament.
The Conference on Disarmament has its mandate and it's empty of meaning here.
We need to say that it hasn't reed its mandate for years, for 30 years now.
There's a reporting mandate referred to in 63.
This is an appeal.
The obligation is one that falls on nuclear weapon states and not non nuclear weapon states.
Like Denmark said, this last bit of the paragraph needs to be reworked.
I'll stop there.
Thank you.
Er I wish to thank the distinguished representative of Senegal for that statement.
Dish representative of the United Kingdom to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair and good afternoon, colleagues.
The UK welcomes this opportunity to comment on the latest version of the text.
We welcome the amendments to paragraph 45, which now accurately reflects relevant language from the NPT.
Our written comments will highlight other examples of language that we believe should, with a view to achieving convergence, reflect language within the treaty.
This includes PP four on humanitarian consequences.
The UK cannot accept this language.
We agree with Denmark that we should revert to the language in the preambular paragraphs of the NPT.
In the same vein, we would also wish to see a faithful quotation of the language from Reagan Gorbachev in PP three.
This is a quote and should be reflected as such.
We welcome the intent, chair behind the addition on PP 12 on nuclear testing.
However, there are legal issues with the current formulation.
The current drafting is untethered to any of the relevant treaties or obligations.
We would suggest reframing PP 12 to underscore the need to uphold existing prohibitions and moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions, and we'll suggest language in writing to that effect.
We also welcome the additional language referencing the IMS in paragraph 52.
The UK welcomes the change in paragraph 61, which now recognizes the legitimate interest of non nuclear weapon states to receive negative security assurances.
However, we continue to have fundamental problems with elements of this paragraph and paragraph 62.
The UK provides clear credible assurances and has given legally binding negative security assurances to more than 100 countries, not in material breach of the NPT under nuclear weapon free zone treaties.
But like the Republic of Korea, we cannot accept assertions that security assurances should be unconditional.
The UK is concerned that the text still calls for the adoption of a no first use policy.
As the Chinese delegation noted this afternoon, there is no one size fits all approach to nuclear policies and doctrines amongst nuclear weapon states.
The UK does not maintain a no first use policy.
We have no intention of adopting one.
We cannot accept this language.
The UK does not believe NFU is a credible doctrine nor a credible risk reduction measure, doubly so when there is a contradiction between a state's rhetoric on the one hand and the extraordinarily rapid and opaque development of its capabilities on the other.
On emerging technologies chair, the UK welcomes efforts in paragraph 60 to align the language with that of the P three statement on human control over decisions to employ nuclear weapons.
However, we wish to see further changes to this paragraph.
These include removing the first sentence in the spirit of brevity and clarity as it is ambiguous and redundant.
We also wish to see the final sentence removed.
We cannot accept that nuclear weapon states should be required to discuss issues relating to their nuclear command control with non nuclear weapon states.
This risks proliferation and would have consequences for UK national security.
We also repeat our request for the deletion of language entangling conventional and nuclear.
This blurs concepts that are rightly being addressed through more appropriate fora and mechanisms.
The UK remains concerned by the thread that runs throughout this text that suggests a hierarchy of obligations.
In particular, we are troubled by references to strengthening the treaty in PP ten and Para two.
Treaties can be strengthened through amendments or by adding additional compliance and enforcement mechanisms.
Similarly, we share Germany's concerns regarding the new references in paragraph one to non discriminatory and balanced implementation.
All compliance must be full and effective.
Introducing language that implies there may be scope for selective or lesser forms of compliance is unhelpful.
The UK believes that paragraph 55, as drafted, confuses two issues.
The references to New Start as a bilateral treaty between the US and the Russian Federation should be a standalone paragraph.
On multilateralizing, we have provided language as part of the P three statement, which we believe is the most appropriate formulation.
Mr.
Chair, I also want to echo those who have called for the deletion of Article 2 Um, notably the arguments that the fact that we have discussed it is simply not credible as an argument for including it.
We have discussed other issues.
Like my Dutch colleague, we had sought to balance this language.
It has not been sufficiently balanced in our view, and therefore we are now calling for its deletion.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom for his intervention, and I invite the distinguished representative of Nigeria to take the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Nigeria appreciate the efforts undertaken in producing this reverse test and note several positive elements, particularly the reaffirmation that the total elimination of nuclear weapon remain the only absolute guarantee against their use or threat of use, as well as the recognition of the urgent implementation of Article 6 of obligation.
However, Mara believes certain areas require strengthening.
One, implementation of Article 6 must be more concrete, measurable, transparent, irreversible, and time bound.
Continuous monedization, expansion, and reliance on nuclear weapon doctrine fundamentally undermine the credibility of the treaty.
Two, while interim nuclear risk reduction measure may contribute to lowering immediate dangers, they must now become substitute for the full elimination of nuclear weapon.
Three, in general, I believe stronger language is required on legally binding unconditional negative security assurances for non nuclear weapon states.
Four, references to nuclear sharing and extended deterrence arrangement should be treated with greater scrutiny in light of the obligation under Article 1 and two.
Lastly, as a state party to TPNWU, Nigera believes its complementary contribution to the global disarmment architecture should be appropriately recognized.
Nigera remains committed to engaging constructively towards a balanced and credible outcome.
Furthermore, on nuclear sharing slash extended deterrence, that's paragraph two.
We have a bit of concern on the current world.
The conference notes ongoing discussion regarding longstanding and evolving nuclear weapon sharing extended deterrence arrangement, blah, blah, blah, blah.
We are not comfortable with that.
I think We wish to propose that it should be replaced.
The conference expresses concern that arrangements involving the deployment, transfer, stationing, or reliance on nuclear weapon by or a non nuclear weapon states may be inconsistent with the objectives and proposed of the treaty and warrant urgent scrutiny under Article 1 and two.
We welcome Parel 55 on the call for new start, and we support the language, and we call for the retention of it.
We also support the language and call for the retention of PP 12 and OP 50 to 54 on CTBT.
On artificial intelligence, we echo Senegal and Egypt on behalf of our Group for inclusion of full human control.
Similarly, on risk reduction, that's paragraph 57 to 60.
Although we so much welcome this development and we say risk reduction is not a substitute, the overall section overemphasizing risk reduction over actual elimination.
To this effect, we would like to suggest that we should have a stronger language in that paragraph.
On no first use, that's paragraph 59.
While we welcome this and we support the call for it, that we states that the present wording should be replaced, the conference call upon all nuclear weapon states to adopt legally binding no first use commitment, accompanied by doct reform that diminish the role of nuclear weapon in security policy.
Like stated in my first statement, we call for much stronger language on TPNW not.
We felt that the conference recognizes the contribution of the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon to advancing global nuclear disarmament objective and acknowledges its complementarity with the NPT.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
We will send our remaining observation to you later.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria for his intervention, and I would now invite the distinguished representatives of the following state parties to take the floor.
Indonesia, Dominican Republic, Brazil, Japan, and Thailand in that order.
The distinguished representative of Indonesia, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Thank you for your leadership on this committee and assuring of Indonesia full cooperation and support.
We appreciate the effort of the president and you chair for preparing the revised draft outcome documents.
In this context, as we continue to assess the revised text, we would like to offer our preliminary observations on the current revised draft.
On preamble paragraph four, we reiterate that references should also include environmental consequences in additions to the humanitarian consequences.
On operative paragraph one, while we welcome the inclusions of non discriminatory and balanced implementations, we share the view that this principle should apply to the treaty as a whole and not only to Article 1 and Article 2.
This is also already reflected in the preamble paragraph five.
Regarding paragraph two, in our view, the paragraph will benefit from a clearer reflections of the concerns that such arrangements may affect the credibility and effectiveness of the treaty and raise questions regarding consistency with obligations under Article 1, two, and six of the NPT.
On paragraph 49, my delegations believes that the implementations of obligations under Article 6 must be pursued through measurable benchmark, timelines, and detailed reporting.
Furthermore, effort to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons should be reinforced through the urgent commencement of negotiations on effective nuclear disarmament measures, including a comprehensive convens on nuclear weapons.
On paragraph 58, we propose strengthening the text to stress that nuclear risk reductions must address the full breadth of risks associated with nuclear weapons, including by explicitly diminishing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines, and policies.
Furthermore, we request the deletion of the press without prejudice to national security at the end of the paragraph as this caveat creates loopholes that undermines the very purpose of this vital risk reductions and transparency commitments.
On paragraph 60, sorry, my delegations proposes replacing welcomes with notes in reference to statement by nuclear weapon states on human control and also proposing inserting the word full before human control.
We also believe that the risks identified in the paragraph should be articulated more precisely and comprehensively, including risk arising from cyber threats to NC three system and broader system vulnerabilities.
On paragraph 61, we support the call to retain the term right as in previous draft rather than replacing it with interests.
On 62, Mr.
Chair, we welcome the call for the conference on this armament to establish a subsidiary body on negative security assurances.
We propose to strengthen this by explicitly mandating the CD to commence negotiations on universal unconditional, non discriminatory and legally binding instrument on negative security assurances.
And in paragraph 50, if I make back to paragraph 50, we welcome the call for the city to enter into force without precondition or delay.
And concerning the FMCT issues in paragraph 68, we also proposed that calling for the commencement of negotiations on FMCT that explicitly address both future production and existing stockpiles.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Indonesia for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of Dominican Republic to take the floor.
President.
Thank you, Chair.
The Dominican Republic is grateful for the presentation of Rev one of the outcome document.
We recognize the efforts made by the chair to reflect the many perspectives of states parties.
My delegation wishes to make the following comments and recommendations.
In a constructive spirit and pursuing the ultimate goal of strengthening the full balanced and non discriminatory implementation of the treaty.
Firstly, as regards the preamba Pars one, two, and seven, my delegation reaffirms that the treaty is the cornerstone of the international disarmament and nonproliferation regime, as well as of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
However, it is important for us that this centrality be reflected in a balanced role at its three pillars.
We should avoid disproportionate emphasis that could undermine its integrity.
That is the treaty's integrity.
Regarding preambula paragraphs 3 and 4, my delegation values the recognition of the fact that a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought, as well as the reference to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.
We're of the view that these elements should remain a moral and political foundation to move forward in nuclear disarmment.
Chair, we propose adding a preliminary a preliminary paragraph on the CTBT.
We should underscore here the importance of its universalization and timely entry into force.
We're of the view that its contribution is an essential component of the international nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament regime because it effectively limits the qualitative development of nuclear weapons.
Regarding the operative paragraphs 46 and 45 and 46, we reaffirmed that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against their use or threat of use.
With that in mind, we underscore that the implementation of Article 6 is not only a legal obligation, rather, it's a moral imperative also.
We believe the document should strengthen language pertaining to specific deadlines and verifiable measures towards disarmament.
Regarding paragraph 50 to 54 on nuclear tests, the DR reaffirms its stang support for the timely entry into force of the comprehensive test ban treaty.
In paragraph 52, we're of the view that it is positive and we support the fact that the paragraph has recognized the IMS and the International Data Center, both are essential components of the verification regime.
On this paragraph, we wish to make one comment, and that is that in the Spanish translation of Rev one, the term international monitoring system was used and the Spanish monitor was used, but vigilantia should be used.
The Spanish translation needs to be corrected.
Paragraph 55 and onwards, regarding nuclear risk reduction, this is important because nuclear risk reduction are complementary measures, but they should not remove, replace, or dilute the need to pursue complete nuclear disarmament under Article 6.
61 62 now negative security assurances, we reaffirm that these assurances should be effective, universal, unconditional and legally binding.
We support as such, the establishment of an international instrument which codifies these guarantees.
As regards paragraph 63 and 65 on transparency and accountability, my delegation underscores the need for greater equity in reporting specifically in relation to the obligations of nuclear weapon states in terms of disarmment Paragraph 66 and 67 we recognize the humanitarian environmental obligations of new nuclear weapons use and testing, and we support the reference to victims and environmental remediation.
68 to 70, we support the immediate initiation of negotiations on an FMCT for nuclear weapons, as well as the adoption of moratorium until these negotiations reach their end.
Finally, in paragraph 71 and those that follow on verification verifiability, and irreversibility.
There does need to be robust technical verification measures that are non discriminatory that build confidence between states.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Dominican Republic for this intervention.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Brazil.
Thank you, Chair for giving me the floor again.
I will continue to go through my delegations suggestions for rev one.
Now I will go straight to paragraph 54.
We understand that we could not do away with the dimension to entry into force of the CTBT as it is stated in the zero draft.
So we would like to request the return to the language of the zero draft in this paragraph.
I will address two paragraphs at the same time because it's the same suggestion 58 and 64.
Both paragraphs, they use the expressions without prejudice to national security, and in both paragraphs, we have this caveat.
Um, and like other delegations, we would rather to have this expression deleted from the text.
We understand that one of the core tenets of the NPT is the principle of invisible security, and we recognize that conditionalities based on national security goes against the spirit of the treaty.
For us, it would be important to revise the inclusion of this kind of caveat.
Now I'll go to paragraph 60, For us, it's a very important paragraph, but the first sentence, we believe that as it is, it has no clear function in the paragraph, so we would agree with suggestions to delete it.
But we also we definitely support some mention to a full effective human control over NC three systems.
We believe that it's more accurate to put in this way in this paragraph and to replace the verb employ on the fourth line by the expression divide on decisions on nuclear weapons.
Going on here, I would like to address the concerns on paragraph 63.
I believe that at this point of the discussion, we all agree that this paragraph went to the wrong direction, reinforcing inequalities rather than bringing some balance.
For us, it would be important to change the language, especially in the third line, we would suggest to the language like need for nuclear weapon states providing commensurate reporting on the implementation of their disarmment commitments, it would be more balanced this way with this language.
Finally, on paragraph 71, we would rather have the language that was used in the zero draft.
We believe that it would be more adequate to this paragraph.
Finally, I would like to echo my delegations support to those that stressed the need for a stronger language on humanitarian consequences.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil for her intervention.
I now invite the distinguished representative of Japan to take the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Like previous speakers, Japan welcomes the efforts by the president and the chairs to capture very diverse elements from states parties discussions in Rev.
Japan has already submitted its written comments, so I will focus on a few points in my remarks here.
Regarding the preambular paragraphs, in particular, PP two on contribution of the NPT, PP three on prevention of the nuclear war, and PP four on humanitarian consequences, Japan welcomes these paragraphs and hope they will be maintained.
Regarding operative paragraphs 50 to 54 on the CTBT, I'd like to reiterate that the universalization and entry into force of the CTBT is key to limiting qualitative development of nuclear weapons, and we welcome the related paragraphs.
Regarding OP 57, preventing the use of nuclear weapons, we welcome the retention of this paragraph calling on nuclear weapons states to make every effort to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again.
However, As stated in the previous meeting, we request to delete the second sentence in this paragraph because the forecast here should be on nuclear weon states.
On OP 61 to 62 negative security assurance, like the Republic of Korea and the United Kingdom, we'd like to reiterate that the security assurance should be given to non nuclear state parties to the NPT that are in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.
The current wording in this paragraph still differs from the languages in both the 2022 final draft and the 2010 consensus document.
As stated in the previous meetings, Japan believes that the language of 2010 final document would be helpful in reaching a consensus on this matter.
Regarding OP 63 and 64, we have had a lot of delegations already speaking on this matter, and I think there is clear convergence on these two paragraphs.
Regarding these two paragraphs, our understanding is that they address the imbalance of reporting obligations between nuclear weapon states and non nuclear weapon states.
However, by deleting reference to nuclear weapon states in OP 64, this important element has been lost.
And OP 63 should not go beyond the existing obligations of non nuclear weapon states regarding reporting, and OP 64 should refer to the necessity of enhanced and equal transparency by all nuclear weapon states in line with action five of the 2010 action plan.
We strongly welcome a new standalone paragraph on the disarmament and non proliferation education in OP 67.
FMCT for OP 68 to 70, we welcome the retention of OP 68 to OP 70 and especially call for the immediate commencement of negotiation of an FMCT in the city and call on the nuclear weapon states to maintain or declare moratoriums on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Japan for her intervention, and I invite the distinguished representative of Thailand to take the floor.
Mr.
Chair, my delegation joins other in expressing its appreciation to you and to the president for the Rev Bond document.
We recognize the link that reconciliation the diverse views of state bodies is not an easy task.
We welcome the inclusion of the new polygraphs and languages aimed to enhancing the effectiveness of the implementation of Article 6.
This includes inter effort to streamline the texts on risk reduction, reference to the voluntary maintenance of limitations of the New Star Treaty and the T stimulator.
While MI Capital is considering this document, I would like to offer the following preliminary observations.
In PPP four, we reiterate our preference for the formulation iterating concerns about as the term decognition doesn't adequately reflect the gravity of this impact of any nuclear weapons use.
Furthermore, we would like to add environmental consequences to this paragraph.
In paragraph 49, we are concerned by the weakening of the language related to the obligation of nuclear weapon states to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons.
We believe that the formulation undertake further efforts as reflected in the CELA draft would better support progress towards a nuclear disarmament and the cessation of nuclear arms bs in accordance to Article 6.
In paragraph 60, we welcome the new formulation.
However, we wish to underscore that meaningful or full and effective human control must be ensured in order to mitigate risks arising from nuclear weapons and emerging technologies.
Furthermore, we suggest to use the formulation, welcome the commitments of the nuclear weapon states rather than welcome that statements made in this effect.
With respect to negative security assurance in paragraph 61, Thailand maintains a strong preference for the language contained in the zero draft, which recognize the legitimate right of all non nuclear weapon states to receive legally binding security assurance from nuclear weapon states.
Regarding paragraph 64, we propose adding at the end of the paragraph the phrase, through standardized comparable and measurable reporting formats.
This reflects the call by a number of delegations during the discussion on enhancing the effectiveness of the strengthened legal process this afternoon.
In paragraph 671, we underline that verification serve not married to to monitor implementation, but to confirm compliance by state parties with their obligation under the treaty.
We therefore support retaining the term compliance.
Lastly, we reiterate our call to strengthen the language on the contribution of the TP in to the implementation of Article 6.
In this regard, we consider that the term recognized would be more appropriate.
We also wish to reiterate our call to add language on the recognition of the complementality of TP interview and other instrument.
We hope that these elements will be duly reflected in the text.
And we stand ready to work constructively with all delegations.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Thailand for her remarks.
I now invite the distinguished representative of the Philippines to take the floor.
Thank you very much.
Mr.
Chair and to the president and to your teams and to the Secretariat for all the hard work that we've put into this current document that we have now.
On the preamblear paragraphs, our delegation is pleased with the retention of the reference to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons in preambular paragraph four.
While some types of nuclear weapons use are not devastatingly explosive, any use of nuclear weapons can result in humanitarian consequences from one generation to another.
We hope those who have reservations on this paragraph will be willing to meet with those of us who believe in its attention and have a conversation on this.
We agree with China and others that were extremely relevant.
Pre consensus language should be reflected, not all of it, but those that are truly relevant to the times.
Action two from 2010 comes to mind, and we support, of course, now and China on this.
We welcome preamblear paragraphs 11 and 12 and would like to underscore that the NPT and its recognition of nuclear weapons states do not necessarily validate or legitimize their possession of nuclear weapons.
On the operative paragraphs pertaining to nuclear disarmament, our delegation supports the reference to an early cessation of a nuclear arms race and is pleased with a continued reference to the general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
While we joined Japan and others on the CTBT and its entry into force, although we do prefer the original 51 in the zero draft, We are flexible on 52 on the zero draft.
This affirms longstanding commitments agreed by states and reflect the continued importance of the CTBT within the international nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation architecture.
Our delegation supports the reference to strengthening international peace and security through the multilateralization of future arms control framework by the nuclear weapon states in accordance with Article 6, and we support the inclusion of nuclear weapons in such frameworks.
We view this as an effective measure to reduce risks of nuclear weapons use and support the establishment of such to complement nuclear disarmament by the nuclear weapon states.
On artificial intelligence, Mr.
Chair, we believe we'd like to retain the original formulation in the previous part in zero draft where the comment is that the human control and element should be there at all times.
In the revision, it keeps the language at all times but qualifies it.
We believe that it should not be qualified and we join others like Senegal, I think Nigeria, Egypt, and on behalf of the Arab States in strengthening the language in terms of the totality of human control.
We believe this is particularly important because without the normative framework on AI in relation to nuclear weapons, the only thing that would apply is international humanitarian law, and we believe that it should guide us in this way.
However, it's a bit of concern when in 1996, despite our best efforts, the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on the legality of threat or use of nuclear weapons, did not create a robust enough legal link between international humanitarian law.
And the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.
Mr.
Chair, our delegation strongly supports the finalization of a consensus outcome document.
We will continue to work constructively with the president and yourself and your teams as well as other delegations to achieve this highly important objective.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Philippines for this intervention, and I invite the distinguished representative of Australia to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
At the outset, Australia expresses our appreciation to the conference president for the revision released yesterday, which continues to form a solid basis for discussions.
Australia welcomes the text on nuclear testing and the CTBT.
In addition to the preambular paragraph, we welcome the updates made to paragraph 50, calling on states to refrain from actions contrary to the objective and purpose of the CTBT in line with action 11 of the 2010 action plan.
We support the additional language in paragraph 52, which recognizes the unique role and contribution of the CTBT's international monitoring system.
Australia continues to urge all relevant states to abide by their respective moratorium and refrain from nuclear explosive tests of any yield.
As such, we particularly welcome the new language in paragraph 54 calling upon nuclear weapon states to maintain moratorium on nuclear test explosions of any yield and to implement measures to restore confidence in these moratorium.
Chair, Australia, alongside many others, has consistently highlighted the nonproliferation and other benefits of extended nuclear deterrence.
We echo the views of the Republic of Korea, the Netherlands and others on paragraph two.
Australia would welcome the replacement of the current text with language recognizing the benefits of extended nuclear deterrence.
We would also support deletion of the text.
Australia considers the text in paragraph 55 is heading in the right direction.
The obligation is on and commitments have been made by all nuclear weapon states to undertake further efforts to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons.
Australia has repeatedly joined calls for greater N five dialogue and strategic stability talks and would welcome these calls being more clearly reflected in the text.
Australia continues to support the draft language on reducing the nuclear risks in paragraph 58.
This is a solid list of actionable items.
Chair, alongside Germany, Egypt, and others, Australia is concerned with the edits made to paragraph 63 and 64.
With the deletion of any reference to nuclear weapon states, the object of these paragraphs is confusing and unclear.
The paragraph should address the need for nuclear weapon states to report on the implementation of their commitments under Article 6 as no such reporting otherwise exists.
This is what non nuclear weapon states are calling for.
Non nuclear weapon states are already subject to rigorous reporting requirements, including through our safeguards agreements with the IAEA.
The imbalance must be addressed.
Turning now to paragraph 70, Australia reiterates that the scope of a fissile material cutoff treaty is fisile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, consistent with the Shannon mandate.
Finally, Australia echoes suggestions and actually, it was Canada's suggestion earlier in the week, but I do think it's important to echo and we've heard it in many other rooms.
The suggestions to include a paragraph calling for the full equal and meaningful participation of women in the NPT review process.
Gender equality is a necessary foundation for peace, prosperity and stability.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Australia for her intervention.
I now invite the distinguished representative of Iran to take the floor.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chair.
In follow up to our previous intervention, I'm happy to share the following remarks and proposals.
First, we heard some references to Iran under this main committee, one, and from our perspective, those remarks are very unprofessional unless they want to give Iran a nuclear status.
Having said that, I'll focus on the paragraphs.
With regard to paragraph 46, we believe that we need to have a clear request to commence the negotiations on a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons covering all life cycle of those weapons and requiring their disruption and also to urge the nuclear weapon states to cease immediately and completely all modernization plan and refurbishing or production of new types of nuclear weapons, and also day to adopt no first use policy in all and any circumstances.
With regard to we have a new paragraph for mobilization of international efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, and therefore we mentioned that any meeting, including the General Assembly annual meeting on total elimination of nuclear weapons should be seized as a great opportunity and we need to require the nuclear weapon states to participate constructively in those meetings.
In paragraph 47, we need to highlight that the nuclear weapons are not legally owned or legitimately held weapons.
We believe that paragraph 48 should be deleted because the reference to the talks and dialogue between nuclear weapon states while some of them are exactly involved in strengthening their nuclear arsenal, lowering the threshold of use and preparing for resumption of nuclear tests is totally distracting.
Therefore, we believe that this paragraph should be deleted.
We believe that it should be mentioned in paragraph 49 that the nuclear disarmament obligations have not been honored and met after 56 years of entry into force of the NPT and the nuclear weapon states should be in compliance with their obligations while they are not.
We believe that in paragraph 50, the reference to action five of 2010 review conference should be retained.
With regard to CTPD, as we have previously expressed, we believe that even with implementation of the treaty, if the goal of nuclear disarmament is not acquired, then the effectiveness of the treaty will be undermined.
Also, we believe that the reference to IMS and IDC should be deleted because they are not the only components of verification system of the treaty.
We believe that all caveats to implying conditionality to implement nuclear disarmament obligations, and there are different ones like strategic stability, strategic environmental risk reduction, and so on.
We believe that all those references should be deleted.
We believe that the danger of resumption of nuclear weapons should be extended to qualitative and quantitative strengthening of the nuclear arsenals.
We believe that with regard to 54, the previous language should be retained and that there is no need for further additions.
Arms control in the beginning of paragraph 55 should be deleted because it is not the aim of the nuclear disarmament.
It cannot achieve nuclear disarmament goal.
The risk reduction at the end of the paragraph also should be deleted.
With your indulgence, we will share the rest of our proposals later on, Mr.
Chair.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Iran for his intervention.
Distinguished delegates, we have barely 2 minutes to end proceedings, particularly so when we are approaching the end of the period for which interpretation services are available.
I still have CS delegations who are waiting to take the floor.
May I therefore propose that we allow them to speak at the start of our final main Committee one meeting tomorrow.
I see no objection.
Thank you very much.
Distinguished delegates, let me again express my appreciation for the constructive manner in which delegations have engaged with the revised draft outcome documents, notwithstanding the fact that it was circulated only yesterday evening.
The final meeting of main Committee one will take place tomorrow, Friday, the 15th of May at 3:00 P.M.
In the EcoSox chamber, and I look forward to meeting you all again.
Secretariat.
All right.
Thank you very much.
The meeting is adjourned.
Thank you.