(Main Committee III) Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, the sixth meeting of the main Committee three of the 2026 Review conference of the parties to the Trey on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is called to order.
Excellencies, distinguished delegates.
The president circulated the revised draft outcome document yesterday with the symbol NPT slash 2026 slash CRP dot two slash rev one.
Main Committee three will discuss preambular paragraphs 14, 15, 16, and 19, paragraphs 22 to 44, paragraphs 82 and 83, and paragraphs 87 to 93 of this document.
As the president announced at the plenary, this draft represents our best attempt to try and find a basis for consensus.
In reviewing this revised draft, I would invite the delegations to focus on those areas where divergent views still remain.
I also encourage delegations to propose succinct and concrete solutions in a spirit of flexibility and compromise.
I'm counting on your cooperation and constructive engagement.
Before opening the floor, I would like to remind delegations that in addition to the discussions in the main committees, delegations are encouraged to send written comments on the draft to PT at un.org.
Emails sent to this address should clearly state in the subject line that the email contains written comments on the zero draft outcome document and identify which main committee subject matter it refers to.
Please also allow me to remind you of some guidelines for the conduct of our deliberations.
As usual, there will be a strict time limit of 8 minutes for group statements and 5 minutes for national statements.
There will be a timer shown on the screen.
Your microphone will start to blink when there is 1 minute remaining, and it will be cut off once the time limit has been reached.
Finally, delegations are requested to kindly inform the Secretariat as soon as possible if they wish to exercise their right of reply.
Rights of reply will be heard at the end of the meeting today.
Those delegations that wish to take the floor are requested to press button in front of you.
The first speaker I have on my list is the distinguished representative of Norway.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you Chair.
We welcome the revised draft presented yesterday and believe it reflects careful and thoughtful drafting with clear efforts to strike balanced compromises.
We particularly appreciate the concise structure.
Overall, we consider that the draft appropriately underscores the importance of addressing Pillar three on peaceful uses.
Given the important role of the IAEA, including under this pillar and the role of export control regimes in enabling access to peaceful nuclear technology, I would like to start there at the intersection between this committee and committee two.
We appreciate that the draft reflects the IAEA essential role in the MPT and we underscore that the IAE budget should reflect its increasing responsibilities and workload as recognized in OP 16 and 33.
However, we would support stronger language on the IAEA, including in the preamble emphasizing the agency's independence.
It's important that we recognize that export control regimes enable access to peaceful nuclear technology and do not represent a hindrance.
It's very important that we avoid formulation that suggests otherwise.
OP 25, we support retaining reference to sustainable development and the needs of developing countries.
OP 26 and 27, we support the reference to facilitating the transition to low emission economy, as well as the emphasis on the involvement of NGOs, research, and academic communities, which we consider important.
OP 31 and OP 90, Women and Gender, we note the inclusion of a dedicated paragraph on women.
While positive, the language remains far from sufficient.
Stronger and more explicit references to gender perspectives should be included.
Then pardon me, on minimization on highly enriched uranium is a longstanding objective in the NPT context.
During the 11th review cycle, significant international progress has been made on HIU minimization, including through an international symposium in Oslo.
In the outcomes of which are reflected in working paper 36.
NOR believes that the conference should recognize these efforts and encourage states on a voluntary basis and where feasible to further minimize civilian HEU stocks and use, including through experienced sharing, transparency, and regular updates.
We suggest a new text, OP 35 B on HIU minimization.
I quote, The conference welcomes efforts to use non highly enriched uranium technologies for the production of radio isotopes, taking into account the need for an assured and reliable supply of medical isotopes.
The conference welcomes and encourages further efforts by states parties to minimize highly enriched uranium in civilian stocks and use share experiences on HIU minimization, take stock of status and provide updates on progress made in this regard.
Quote.
Finally, on OP 43 and Ukraine, more generally, we find the language on Ukraine insufficient.
It fails to address the absence of reference to the deeply concerning safeguard situation arising from Russia's war of aggression and illegal occupation, including at sapo NPP, as well as nuclear threats and rhetoric.
We need to address the challenges relating to IAEA access and verification activities in Ukraine, including responsibility for this situation.
I thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Norway for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Egypt.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I have the honor to speak on behalf of the AA group.
The AA group wishes to note the circulation of rev one of the outcome document, and the effort that has been put in compiling the comments that were raised by member states during deliberations in pillar three and as well as the submitted amendments.
The group appreciates the reflection of some of the amendment proposals put forward by the group, including on technology transfer, training of skilled labor, and expanding the scope of nuclear applications for peaceful uses to a wide array of domains.
That said, the A group wishes to raise the following points.
First, paragraph 23 still fails to affirm the necessity of respecting countries' sovereign decisions in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as long as they are in line with international obligations.
The group cannot find proper justification for the maintaining of the current language that only calls upon states to respect these decisions.
Second, paragraph 37, the group expresses its disappointment that its proposal on replacing the term highest safety and security with efficient and appropriate has not been reflected.
To the contrary, the use of the term highest was actually expanded and particularly paragraph 40.
Mr.
Chairperson, the term highest safety and security is not only not a consensual language, but it's as well barely quantifiable and we caution against its potential use as a backdoor to hamper or obstruct the inalienable right of countries to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Accordingly, the Arg strongly requests the reflection of its previously submitted amendment to replace the term highest by efficient and appropriate in both paragraph 37 and 40.
In addition to removing the word safeguarded from paragraph 40 when alluding to the development of SMRs.
Third, the group still sees merit in adding reference in paragraph 32 to the need that IAEA technical cooperation programs be financed in line with the concept of shared interests of all member states or at least in a predictable and sustained manner.
Fourth and last, the group notes the changes that have been applied to paragraph 41 on the safety and security of nuclear facilities and highlights the need for maintaining the original language in this zero draft that in its view was more balanced and better served the objective of safeguarding the safety and security of nuclear facilities.
Mr.
Chair, these amendments would be submitted in writing to the Secretariat.
Thank you so much.
I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Ukraine.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Mr.
Chair, at the outset, we would like to once again express our appreciation to the president of the conference, the Bureau, and the Secretariat for circulation of the revised draft outcome document.
We would also like to share our views on the revised document.
While we positively not the overall improvement of the language across different parts of the text related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy pillar, we believe that further strengthening is still required in several areas.
Particularly, we reiterate our support for paragraphs 42 and 43, which underscore the importance of the IAA Director General seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during armed conflict, as well as the IA Director General's five concrete principles for nuclear safety and security at the Zapposan nuclear power plant.
The same time, the paragraph 44 remains unchanged and does not adequately reflect the reality of the nuclear safety and security situation in Ukraine.
Particularly, the paragraph fails to address the root cause of this situation, Russia's ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine, including the illegal seizure and militarization of the Z NPP.
In this regard, we stress the crucial importance of ensuring that the draft outcome document clearly states that the ZNPP is a Ukrainian nuclear facility.
The document should also call for the immediate withdrawal of Russian military forces and other Russian unauthorized personnel from the plant and for its return under the full control of the competent regulatory authorities of Ukraine.
We further believe that particular attention should be paid to the importance of the IAA assistance program in supporting Ukraine in maintaining nuclear safety and security.
Including through the continued presence of agency staff at all Ukrainian nuclear power plants, including the NPPM.
In addition, Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has created an entirely new and unprecedented dimension of nuclear risks, namely Russia's repeated deliberate and large scale attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure, which is important for offside power supply of nuclear power plants in Ukraine.
We also regret that the draft final document contains no reference to the 40th anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, commemorated by the international community just two weeks ago, a strategy that remains a powerful reminder of the critical importance of nuclear safety as an underlining part of the NPT.
Last but not least, the conference should also condemn the Russian drone strike against the new safe confinement at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and underscore the importance of its timely repair and continued functioning in ensuring nuclear safety and security.
Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
I thank the distinguished representative of Ukraine for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Sweden.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you, Chair.
We echo the voices commending you and your team for your continued constructive efforts to shape an outcome document that can be a base for consensus.
Please accept our sincere gratitude to you and your team.
Sweden will continue to support this important endeavor and following the CAS directive yesterday, we will focus our comments on issues with divergences, paragraphs where diversities remain to be bridged.
Regarding the use of civil nuclear energy in accordance with the Trey Rev one, this reflects the balance of discussions is moving in the right direction.
Thank you.
On the wording in paragraph 44, the current wording does not address the cause of concern regarding the safety and security situation in Ukraine.
It is a result of military attacks by the Russian Federation on civilian nuclear facilities.
Oomitting that fact in the paragraph is misleading.
We stand ready to propose clarifying changes to this paragraph and will submit suggestions in writing.
Sweden remains strongly supportive of the language on strengthening the review process.
It is an area of work with broad regional support among state parties.
It promotes the credibility and functionality of the treaty and it is a path to foster a stronger culture of transparency and accountability to the benefit of future progress.
Non nuclear weapon states should report on a strictly voluntary basis.
In addition, the ongoing UN 80 process to increase system wide efficiency of the UN is as relevant to this forum as to other parts of the UN.
Therefore, in paragraph 88, we find it appropriate to place them within the broader framework of the UN 80 initiative and we will suggest a small adjustment to do so in writing.
Regarding paragraph 90, we note the reference to inclusion of women's and young people's perspective.
However, to describe 68% of the population in the world, women and youth as part of a diverse range of stakeholders is not an appropriate wording and needs to be amended.
We call for a text that recognizes the critical contribution of women to all aspects of disarmament and non proliferation and arms control.
Their full equal and meaningful participation is essential not only for inclusivity, but for achieving more effective, sustainable and impactful disarmament outcomes.
In our written comments to the zero draft, we suggest to strengthen the language with reference to the equal participation and leadership of women and men in nonproliferation, disarmament and arms control, as well as integrate gender perspective into discussions across all pillars.
We stand ready to work with you and your team to find a more suitable language.
Finally, we take note of paragraph 92, where our reading of the rule regarding this para in the zero draft was that there was support for the wording.
Therefore, we regret the weakening of the wording and the commitment by all nuclear weapon states to present the national reports where the sides have been replaced with welcomes.
Looking forward to the further discussions.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Sweden for her statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of France, followed by Austria.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Monsieur President.
Mr.
Chair, first of all, I would like to thank you for your efforts and for presenting this revised version of the final document, which allows us to move in the right direction.
First of all, France believes it is essential that the text maintain a balanced and legally precise understanding of Article 4.
The right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy is exercised in the context of the treaty as a whole, in particular in accordance with the obligations in Article 1, two, and three.
That means that civilian nuclear cooperation must remain fully compatible with the nonproliferation goals and IAEA safeguards.
The promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including through knowledge sharing and technology transfer referred to in paragraph 28, goes hand in hand with respect for nonproliferation obligations as well as the highest levels of nuclear safety and security.
France feels that the focus should be placed on these fundamental and enabling conditions.
Mr.
Chair, France supports the addition of a preambula paragraph on the financing of civilian nuclear energy.
Financing was mentioned by many delegations and it is an essential condition for states that wish to do so for the development of civilian nuclear programs that are safe, sustainable and in accordance with their international obligations.
Paragraph would recognize the importance of mobilizing public and private financing and the role of financial institutions to support the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
It would also be an opportunity to recognize the efforts made by the IAEA in this regard.
Mr.
Chair, France would also like to reiterate its position concerning attacks on nuclear facilities.
We share the goal of preventing any act that could compromise nuclear safety and security.
However, It is important for the text to precisely lay out the state of international law as it exists without creating legal ambiguities.
France feels that the applicable existing legal framework is fully sufficient.
During armed conflict, international humanitarian law includes provisions that allow for the protection of all civilian nuclear facilities and through Article 56 of the additional Protocol one to the Geneva Conventions enshrins strengthened legal protection for nuclear power plants.
Paragraph 41 should thus recall that civilian nuclear facilities must be protected in accordance with international humanitarian law and that all parties should abstain from any action that runs contrary to this legal framework.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of France for his statement.
The next speaker on Mls is the distinguished representative of Austria.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you so much, Mr.
Chair and let me thank the presidency for presenting this Ref one revision and for your work in guiding our discussions under the cluster three.
We see a lot of good elements in the Ref one, and therefore, I will only now focus on the elements where we would propose further adjustment.
I will start a by supporting the comments made by the French delegations about the important reference to the highest standards of nuclear safety whenever appropriate in the text.
Now on the paragraphs related to the attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities, so I will speak about paragraph 41 first.
We are ready to work on this basis.
The zero draft paragraph would have also been fine for us, but we would propose that on the basis of the current paragraph 41, we do, um, need some further adjustment.
We would, first of all, need a clear reference on the previous commitments undertaken under the NPT Rec, so that's action 64 of the 2010 action plan that we would add that into the paragraph 41.
We would also like to have a stronger reference to IHL.
So to be very precise, we would add after the first sentence of this paragraph, which ends with the words international law, we would add the conference recalls action 64 of the 2000 action plan and notes, and then the sentence goes on.
Then at the end of the sentence after all threats of attack on such facilities, we would add and to fully comply with its international humanitarian law obligations, in particular, the Geneva Conventions and additional protocols.
Austria has put forward the working Paper 55 for this review conference, and the reason for this working Paper 55 has been twofold.
First of all, we see the rollout of nuclear peaceful facilities, we see also an increased risk that in future conflicts they might be targeted.
Secondly, we see a shortcoming in terms of the implementation of IHL obligations.
And therefore, in the working paper 55, we have proposed that there should be further strengthening of existing IHL obligations.
We do not want to renegotiate IHL here, but we would propose that taking into account the current examples of attacks on nuclear facilities, this conference sends a signal that this has been discussed here and we would propose a new paragraph 41 B The conference encourages states to conclude further agreements among themselves by or multilaterally to provide additional protection for nuclear facilities or installations devoted to peaceful purposes and especially to consider the establishment of demilitarized zones.
This would be simply a signal of encouragement to further complement with IHL obligations.
Now, on the paragraphs related to the nuclear safety and security situation in Ukraine, let me repeat what the Austrian delegations and multiple other delegations have said already on the draft that we do not see any changes here.
Um, we need to correct the reference to the situation in Ukraine in both of these paras, the occupation of the Spia nuclear power plants, the nuclear safety and security in Ukraine are under stress because of a certain reason, and this is the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine.
So we have submitted language in this regard and we would urge that in a further reiteration of the text, this is referenced.
Finally, on the section related to the enhancing the effectiveness of the strengthened review process, we take note that there have been a parallel process established under the co facilitation of South Africa and Switzerland.
But let me now just make one comment related to paragraph 90 and very much echo what the delegation from Sweden has said.
I think this has been formulated in a rather unfortunate way because women are definitely not part of diverse stakeholders, but half of the population and a substantial part of the NPT delegation.
We suggest here to clarify the language and we would propose to add at the end and recognizes the importance of and commit to ensure the equal full and effective participation and leadership of both women and men in the NPT implementation and review and to further integrate a gender perspective in all aspects of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation decision making processes.
Thank you so much, ir.
I thank the distinguished representative of Austria for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Indonesia, followed by Japan.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Mr.
Chair, Indonesia thanks you for the revised draft outcome document and reaffirms the central importance of the inalable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
While waiting for our Capital's written input, I wish to highlight a few initial observation within the mandate of main Committee three.
On the protection of technical cooperation, Indonesia stressed that efforts to strengthen safeguards and address noncompliance must be pursued without prejudice to continued support for the IAEA Technical cooperation Program and nuclear applications, emphasizing the need for balance between promotional and non promotional activities of the agency.
Should be reflected in paragraph 16.
On nuclear safety and security, Indonesia is off the view that paragraph 37 should make clear that the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by appropriate measures of safety and security consistent with states parties national legislation and respective international obligations.
Consider the formulation and appropriate measures to be more technically accurate as safety and security needs vary according to national circumstances, operational conditions, and the specific nature of nuclear activities and facilities.
This formulation will also avoid creating the impression of conditionality on the exercise of the inalieable right to peaceful uses.
We wish to reiterate that nuclear safety and security should be addressed in a comprehensive manner and not only in relation to peaceful uses.
Given that the majority of nuclear material globally remains outside peaceful nuclear programs, including in military stocks and facilities where risk of accident, loss of control, sabotage or unintended escalation may also arise, paragraph 38 should underscore the importance of nuclear safety and security for all nuclear and other radioactive material and facilities, including those used for military purposes.
Indonesia remains committed to working constructively with all states parties to achieve a balanced, subsantive and consensus based outcome that strengthens the NPT.
Indonesia will submit further written recommendations for language to be considered in the text.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Indonesia for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Japan, followed by Russian Federation.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Japan highly appreciates variable works of president and the chairs to craft Rev one.
Japan considers the Rev one well addresses important points raised by the state parties.
Part of Japan's comments to the draft are duly reflected, I highly appreciate.
We've already submitted our comments to Rev one, and I would like to offer some of them for further advancement of the discussion as follows.
0.1, Japan as a strong believer in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which is to continue to be a constructive contributor to IAEA's technical cooperation program and its strategic flagship initiatives in various ways, subject to approval of the relevant authorities.
Positive acknowledgment on the extra budgetary and in kind contributions of member states in the outcome document will be conducive to facilitate this development and in a way to strengthen the treaty.
Therefore, we propose to add in paragraph 33 in second sentence after the conference to add appreciate extra budgetary and in kind contributions from state parties and blah, blah, blah.
Number two, Japan appreciates that Rev one includes positive acknowledgment on export controls in paragraph 20 with new phrases that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to nuclear proliferation.
We welcome this insertion.
This point should be also duly reflected in para 23 as well, because appropriate management of exchanges of nuclear related equipment, materials, scientific technological informations are essential to prevent proliferation and conducive to build trust and transparency, and after all, they contributes to facilitate peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Yes.
Consistent with paragraph 20, Japan is of the view that appropriate handling of these exchanges for the purpose of implementation of relevant articles of NPT does not constitute any undue restriction or constraints whatsoever.
In this paragraph 23, Japan wishes to delete the last part, which starts from and calls upon up until any undue constraints inconsistent with the treaty.
Point number three, Japan welcomes reflection of the adjective highest levels for safety and security in Parsis seven and 40.
Japan sees it is quintessential that safety, security, and safeguards are secured in the same manner to ensure peaceful uses of nuclear energy implemented in conformity with the treaty with the broadest confidence.
For this purpose, we suggest in this paragraph 37 and 40, adding safeguards to the scope of the highest level.
And finally, we highly appreciate the retention of the two paragraphs on withdrawal, especially paragraph 83 on the responsibility of state parties for any violation of the treaty committed prior to withdrawal.
While acknowledging Article 10, withdrawal of any state party after acquiring nuclear weapons or nuclear capabilities against its obligation not to do so would have an enormous impact on the credibility and integrity of the treaty.
Japan emphasizes that notice of withdrawal should not and cannot acquit any state party of illicit acquisition of nuclear capabilities.
I thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Japan for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Russian Federation.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you, Chair.
I'd like to note the vast amount of work that has been done to improve and update the text, taking on board the comments of states parties.
I would like to note some things that would need to be corrected a little bit more.
First of all, we believe that there should not be a loose interpretation of certain provisions of the treaty, particularly when it comes to the condition for states exercising their right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
In particular, In preambul paragraph 14, there is a quote from Article 4 of the NPT, but with some additions, the inalable right of all states parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy is essentially being tied to Articles three and four.
The reference to Article 4 is not appropriate given that the wording of this paragraph in and of itself reproduces the text of that article and the reference to Article 3 in this context seems to be a loose interpretation of the provisions of the treaty.
We've already said that, but unfortunately, this was not taken on board, so we're just reiterating that.
We propose that the wording of this paragraph be brought into line with Article 4 of the NPT.
Moreover, as far as we understand it, the text of PP 14 is practically identical to paragraph 22 of the operative part.
And so it would be good if we could decide exactly where we want to see that wording.
On PP 15, we believe that we also need to adhere to the wording from the NPT.
We are not shedding any doubt on the fact that states have a right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and that should be exercised in accordance with the treaty.
However, the arbitrary addition of this wording on top of the quote from the NPT would not be correct and it would be an interpretation of the provisions of the treaty.
Moving on now to paragraphs 42 and paragraphs 43 and 44 should be deleted.
We've already spoken about that.
Okay.
And we do not see any options for them being included in the final document.
I'm not going to rehash the explanations for that.
I don't see any point in doing so.
Also, Chair, I would like to draw attention to what was said by a number of NATO and European Union states that are clearly trying to introduce wording into the document which would be unacceptable and which would lead to us not having a document.
We're getting the impression that their task here is to prevent the adoption of a document because of reasons that have nothing to do with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Russian Federation for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Nigeria, followed by Mexico.
You have the floor, Miner.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair for giving me the floor.
Let me state that I'm taking the floor on behalf of the African group.
Let me also thank you for the good job you have done to see that we have a balanced test.
However, on behalf of African group, I wish to acknowledge the circulation of revoir of the outcome document and commends the effort made to incorporate the comment provided by member states during discussions on Pillar three.
The group appreciates that several of its proposed amendments have been reflected.
Nonetheless, the African group would like to raise the following points.
One, the group notes with regret that Paragraph 23 continues to fall short of affirming the need to respect country's sovereign decision regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy provided they comply with their international obligation.
We request the addition of a clear reference to the need to respect this decision.
Second, concerning paragraph 41 on the safety and security of nuclear facilities.
The group believed that the original language from the zero draft was more balanced and better serve the shared objective of ensuring the safety and security of nuclear facilities.
We therefore hodge the retention of the original wording including the references to relevant IAEA general conference resolutions.
T, regarding paragraph 37, the African group regrets that the reference to IS safety and security standards is still maintained.
We urge the chair to replace the word IS with efficient and appropriate in line with language endorsed in the 2010 outcome document.
Fourth, we call once again on the inclusion of a reference to ensure that measures to strengthen nuclear security do not hamper international cooperation.
Mr.
Chair, we submit our amendment in writing.
I thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Mexico, followed by the Philippines.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you, Chair.
Mexico would like to thank the Chair for preparing Rev one.
Mike Capital is continuing to study the text, but I'd like to make some preliminary comments with regard to the Main Committee three paragraphs.
We recognize the changes made to preambula paragraph 14, which include an express reference to the inalienable right of all states to the treaty to develop research production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.
We also support the proposal put forward by Norway to have a new operative paragraph 35 aimed at continuing efforts to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes to avoid proliferation that is associated with that material without affecting medical uses and other legitimate uses of nuclear energy.
With regard to operative paragraph 41 on the protection of nuclear sites for peaceful purposes, we thank the chair for having included more legally appropriate language here.
However, we would suggest a wording that would be clear with regard to the dangers and risks of these attacks.
Any threat or attack on nuclear facilities, peaceful nuclear facilities would be a great danger for human life and for the environment and would constitute a serious violation of international law, particularly international humanitarian law and the principles of distinction, need, and proportionality.
In that regard, we support the Austria's proposal to include references to international humanitarian law and to the Geneva Conventions.
With regard to paragraphs 81 and 82, we'd like to thank the presidency for keeping these in in order to clarify the scope and the procedure applicable to withdrawal from the treaty.
And also like Norway, Sweden, and Austria, we think it's relevant that through the text and particularly operative paragraph 90, we improve the language with regard to the significant participation of women.
They should not be categorized as stakeholders because that does not recognize that they represent half of the population.
For that reason, we also support the paragraph proposed by Austria in this regard.
Finally, with regard to operative paragraph 92, we recognize the inclusion of language establishing that the presentation of reports should be done in person at interactive sessions with all member states parties, highlighting the need to focus on national reports in Article 6, ensuring there's a balance between the three pillars.
Mexico's proposals will also be sent in writing.
Thank you very much, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of the Philippines, followed by China.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you, Chair.
My delegation would like to thank you, Chair, your team, and the Secretariat, for the timely circulation and your work on this document.
Our delegation is studying the document and will submit further written recommendations, but wishes to offer the following comments.
We believe that Rev one provides a good basis for further negotiations.
We particularly appreciate the expansion and emphasis on peaceful uses and recognition of the IAEA's role in supporting its member states in this regard.
Similar to other delegations, the Philippines notes the addition of preambular Paragraph 14 with regard to the revised formulation of treaty text on peaceful uses to refer to Articles one and two, but also Articles three and four.
We recognize this as reflecting the broader relationship among safeguards, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses within the treaty framework, similar to the language in paragraph 22.
We, however, caution against expanding existing treaty language and potentially conflating articles as this could cause the intent of the paragraphs to be misconstrued.
Support the expansion and improvement of what was paragraph 28, now 27.
The direct references to areas of application and of nuclear energy highlights the evolving and multifaceted role of nuclear energy is playing in sustainable development.
We need sustained support for the upscaling of nuclear applications, especially non power ones which do not receive the same attention and support as power applications.
Finally, Chair, the Philippines reaffirms the inalienable right of all states parties to develop, research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with the treaty.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Philippines for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of China, followed by Nigeria.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Chair, China thanks the conference president for circulating the new draft, which provides a useful basis for further in depth negotiations among parties.
In line with the tasks assigned to this main committee, China wishes to propose the following amendments to relevant paragraphs.
First, regarding paragraph 31, China acknowledges the IAEAs adherence to the principle of atoms for peace and development and supports a series of initiatives proposed by the DG on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology.
For the sake of objectivity and balance, China suggests deleting the language that presumes the objectives of the atomic technologies license for the applications at Sea initiative.
Second, in the context of nuclear energy revitalization, Safety, nuclear safety should be given greater priority.
The IAEA when developing nuclear safety standards and nuclear security guidelines should not only draw on countries best practices, but also pay attention to lessons learned, particularly regarding real world challenges such as NPP decommissioning, spent fuel management, and addressing the cross border impacts of nuclear accidents.
Only in this way can we enhance the confidence of the international community in the agency's coordination role in advancing global nuclear safety.
China proposes amending paragraph 38 accordingly.
Third, with regards to strengthening the review process, the current review mechanism is viable.
The lack of substantive outcomes at the past two rev cos was the result of the prevailing international security landscape and should not be attributed to the review mechanism itself.
At this conference, measures such as strictly implementing time limits for statements and cutting parallel meetings have made our work more efficient and reduce the burden on all delegations.
China remains flexible towards optimizing the review mechanism.
China is of the view that submitting implementation reports under the NPT framework is in itself a confidence building measure and should, in principle be voluntary on a voluntary basis does not mean non reporting.
As was in previous review conferences in WS and many non nuclear weapon states have submitted reports to this conference, a testimony to their sincerity and respect for the treaty.
China will continue to submit its reports.
The language in paragraph 92 should be brought in line with paragraph 65, which calls upon states parties, particularly nuclear weapon states to submit their implementation reports.
With regards to the interactive discussion of national reports, the current arrangements in the draft still do not address China's concerns.
China is of the view that such interactive discussions should be voluntary in nature.
And should comprehensively address the three pillars of nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
At the same time, in light of the concerns reflected in paragraph two of the current draft, China believes that countries participating in nuclear sharing arrangements should also submit reports and be part of the interactive discussions.
China will subsequently submit specific amendments in writing for the president's consideration.
I thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished Representative of China for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Nigeria, followed by Germany.
You have the floor Excensy.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair for giving me the floor again.
Nigeria aligned itself with the statement just delivered by the African group and wishes to make the following remark in international capacity.
Nigeria appreciate the efforts undertaken in the preparation of of the outcome document and acknowledges the attempt to reflect views expressed by state party on Pillar three.
However, Nigeria wishes to underscore a few issues of importance.
One, the inelible right of state party to develop research, to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes consistent with Article 4 of the treaty must be fully respected.
Peaceful nuclear cooperation should not be subject to undue restriction or politically motivated constraints provided state comply with their international obligations.
Two, one Nigeria fully recognizes the importance of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards, measures in this regard must remain balanced, practical, and should not create unintended barriers to international cooperation, technology transfer or access by developing country to peaceful nuclear applications.
Three, with respect to paragraph 37, Nigella supports the formulation agreed in the 2010 outcome document and believes the reference to efficient and appropriate safety and security measures provides a more balanced and realistic standard than the current wording.
Four, regarding attack or threat against peaceful nuclear facilities, Nigeria's position remains clear.
Any attack or threat of attack against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes anywhere is unacceptable.
Risk grave, humanitarian and environmental consequences must be unequivocally condemned in a balanced and non selective manner.
Lastly, Nigeria wishes to reiterate the importance of sufficient assured unpredictable support for the IA Technical Cooperation Program, which remain indispensable for enabling developing countries to has nuclear science and technology for health, agriculture, food security, water resources management, energy development, and broader sustainable development.
Mr.
Chair, Nigeram committed to a balanced outcome that preserves the integrity of all three pillars of the treaty.
And thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Germany, followed by United Kingdom.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you, Chair for giving me the floor.
We would like to start with thanking the Rev co president and main committee chairs for Revision one.
We also want to express our thanks for your able leadership in guiding us through main Committee three.
First and foremost, from our perspective, Rev one is moving in the right direction.
It is a solid basis to work on with the aim to find consensus.
Nevertheless, we see some wording that needs further adjustments.
Our comments will be forwarded in writing to the Secretariat when reviewing and mirroring with our capital has concluded.
Still, let me make some remarks that we see so far.
On para 25, we would prefer to maintain the previous wording note instead of the new acknowledge.
On para 26, we reiterate our comment that the wording about the growing interest and the potential of nuclear power in meeting the increasing global demand for electricity, enhancing energy security, and facilitating the transition to a low emission economy does not reflect the actual level of interest.
This view is not shared by all the states parties.
We therefore suggest insertion of some in front of states parties and there in front of growing interest.
On para 27, we appreciate the insertion of explicit language on non power applications of nuclear technologies.
On para 32, our request of deleting sustainable manner was not awarded.
We still think that deleting the word sustainable is the best option since the word sustainable is misleading in this context.
In addition, we will forward alternative language in writing.
On paragraph 40, we appreciate that high was replaced by the highest, further strengthening the need for the highest level of nuclear safety and security in the deployment of new and emerging nuclear technologies globally.
On paragraph 41, we think there is some room for improvement still on this para.
As we mentioned in our earlier intervention during main Committee two, we appreciate your streamlining efforts by shifting former para eight into paragraph 41.
At this preliminary point, we are still reviewing the latest revision of the draft.
We will forward explicit comments in writing.
On paragraph 43 and 44, we regret that our request for a reference to Ukraine's S Parisian nuclear power plant and to merge Para 44 and paragraph 45 into one para was not implemented.
We will comment in detail at a later stage and in writing.
Chair, let me conclude by assuring you of Germany's full support and our joint efforts to work on divergent issues and reach consensus.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Germany for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, followed by Algeria.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you, Chair.
I would like to thank the president, you and your team for your work in preparing this revised draft.
We are still considering the text as a whole, but would like to offer some initial preliminary comments at this stage.
Firstly, on Ukraine, we remain concerned that this revision does not reflect the clear and consistent comments made by many delegations across several sessions.
The United Kingdom therefore maintains the position we have previously set out, including that the text must include clear recognition that the Zaporiza nuclear power plant is a Ukrainian facility.
Secondly, we would welcome clarification on a number of additions to the text.
In particular, we query the rationale for singling out specific initiatives in paragraph 25 and paragraph 35.
There are many such initiatives that could be included in this regard.
Thirdly, Chair, we note with disappointment that our proposals tabled yesterday were not reflected in the revised draft.
Given the challenging financial context at the IAA, it is important for all states parties to mobilize people and amplify existing resources so that benefits of peaceful nuclear energy can be accessed by all.
We would therefore wish to reiterate the points made in our earlier statement, in particular, that we would like the outcome document to include, firstly, in paragraph 28, a call for states parties to exert individual and collective effort to mobilize people and amplify resources in close partnership with the IAA and in full adherence to the highest levels of safety, security, and safeguards.
In this vein, we also support the proposal of France in the preambular paragraphs on the need for diversified financing of nuclear energy projects.
Second, in paragraph 37, an acknowledgment of the role that nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation measures play in enhancing public and commercial confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear applications.
With regards to paragraph 41, we have legal and technical concerns, and we will submit further comments in due course.
We recognize this is an important issue for many delegations, but as we set out on Monday, employing language not grounded in established law risks creating confusion, particularly given that a comprehensive legal framework exists for all nuclear facilities and should be applied, respected, and upheld.
Chair, the UK welcomes the additional detail that has been provided in paragraphs 87 to 93 on enhancing the effectiveness of the strengthened review process.
We support these proposals and look positively at new and more ambitious ideas that are put forward over the coming week.
At the same time, we agree with other delegations that the language in paragraph 90 is not clear and we're happy to work on alternative formulations.
We also have concerns with the final sentence of paragraph 93, and the UK does not support UN ODA being involved in the preparation of national reports as this may have mandate and budgetary implications.
We will, of course, submit all proposals in writing and remain committed to working constructively with you and all delegations to improve the text and we'll continue to engage in that spirit.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom for her statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Algeria, followed by France.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Mr.
Chair, thank you and thanks to the president for the timely circulation of the Rev one.
My delegation aligned itself with the statements delivered by the African group and the Arab Group regarding paragraphs relevant to Pillar three of Rev one.
We appreciate the effort of the chair to incorporate member states comments, particularly those concerning technology transfer and the expansion of nuclear applications.
As preliminary comments, we wish to emphasize four priority areas shared by both groups.
First, on paragraph 23, we regret that the current text fails to affirm the necessity of respecting countries' sovereign decisions regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
We request a clear reference to the need to respect these decisions provided they align with international obligations.
Second, on paragraph 37 on safety and security standards, we strongly urge the replacement of the term highest with efficient and appropriate.
The term highest is not is not quantifiable and lacks consensus.
Our proposed language is consistent with the 2010 outcome document and ensures that standards don't become a backdoor to obstructing the inalienable right to peaceful uses.
Third, on paragraph 41 on the safety and security of nuclear facilities.
We believe the original language from the zero draft was more balanced.
Fourth, on international cooperation and financing, including paragraph 32, we call for language ensuring that nuclear security measures don't hamper international cooperation.
Mr.
Chair, while we have further observation, my delegation has limited its remarks to those score points in a spirit of flexibility and consensus building.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Algeria for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of France, followed by the Islamic Republic of Iran.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Chair, allow me to share three comments in addition to my previous statement.
First, we fully recognize the importance of the IAEA's role in promoting the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.
However, we echo some other statements in expressing our concern with the text's imbalance when it comes to referring to IA projects, in particular paragraph 26.
The selection of some projects that are mentioned by name at the exclusion of others gives the impression of a hierarchy that does not necessarily reflect the priorities of the majority of states parties.
In our view, either the text should have a complete and balanced reflection of all of the IAs relevant projects, or we should not name them and refer more broadly to the central role of the IA in technical assistance and civilian nuclear cooperation.
Second, and following on from several other statements, France would like to reaffirm the need to keep in the text a reference to the highest levels of nuclear security and safety.
Respect for safety standards and security recommendations is not a limitation on the right to peaceful use, rather it facilitates cooperation among states parties.
They strengthen confidence, protect populations and the environment, and allow for the sustainable and responsible development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
To conclude the proposals of the United Kingdom in paragraph 28 and paragraph 27 as well on the role of safety, security, and non proliferation in building public trust are entirely appropriate in our view and my delegation would like to lend our support to that.
Very shortly, we will share the remainder of our comments in writing.
Thank you very much.
I thank the distinguished Representative of France for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, followed by Italy.
You have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair for giving me the floor.
We join other delegation in expressing our appreciation to the president for the preparation of rev one of the draft outcome document.
We believe that certain elements of the text could be further improved in order to facilitate consensus on the final document.
To that end, I would like to express our proposals concerning several paragraphs related to main Committee three as follows.
In PP 14, the text of the treaty should be respected.
Accordingly, the reference to Article 3 and four of the treaty in the final part of this paragraph should be deleted.
For the same reason, in PP 15, the phrase in conformity with all the provisions of the treaty should be deleted.
In PP 20, we believe that the effectiveness of the review process depends primarily on the political view of the nuclear weapon states rather than on organizational issues.
We therefore suggest replacing the word welcome with note at the beginning of this paragraph.
Given that during this conference, the right to enrichment was characterized by some as imaginary, it is necessary in paragraph 23 to refer explicitly to the full nuclear fuel cycle, which constitute agreed language from the 2010 action plan.
In the same paragraph, the word undue should be deleted as it is vague and subjective.
We also believe that a new paragraph should be added to this section addressing unilateral coercive measures.
We will submit proposed language in writing in due course.
In paragraph 26, since the agency has several projects and initiatives, there is no need to single out one particular project for emphasize.
We therefore propose deleting the final part of the paragraph regarding the International Project on innovative nuclear reactors and fuel cyc.
We believe that several paragraphs concerning the activities of the agency and its Director General are unnecessary.
In the interest of streamlining the text, we propose deleting paragraphs 31, 34, and 36.
In paragraph 33 concerning practical steps to ensure that adequate resources are available for the technical cooperation program, we propose adding the following language at the beginning of the paragraph.
Conference expresses grave concern that despite substantial increase in the demands of developing states parties to receive assistance in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, there is from one hand, a serious imbalance in the allocation of resources to verification activities and the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the agency's regular budget, and on the other hand, an over reliance of technical cooperation program activities on external budgetary funds, and that the agency's resources for technical cooperation program activities are insufficient, unpredictable, and unassured.
In paragraph 37, we propose adding the following wording.
The conference affirms that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and security shall not be used as a pretext to leverage or leverage to violate, deny, or restrict the inalienable right of state parties to develop, research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.
In paragraph 40, we propose deleting the final part of the paragraph regarding the IAEA platform on small modular reactors and their applications.
Mr.
Chair, we deeply regret that paragraph eight of the zero draft concerning the attacks by the United States and the Israeli regime against Iran's peaceful nuclear facilities has been taken out from the revised version of the draft.
We also regret that paragraph 41 concerning attacks on nuclear facilities has been weakened rather than strengthened in comparison with the draft.
Let us be clear.
The June 2025 and February 2026 attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities of Iran are trying to normalize attacks around the world.
Such normalization would have serious implications for the relevance of the NPT itself.
It can also normalize actual nuclear attacks in the future.
And we already witnessed the increasing rhetoric.
Therefore, the stake is high and goes beyond immediate political interest.
As such, we call for the reinstatement of paragraph eight, as well as for the strengthening of both that paragraph and paragraph 41.
I thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Italy, followed by Lithuania.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Mr.
Chair, at the outset, I would like to thank you for this revised draft.
We believe this is a solid basis for our negotiations and stand ready to engage in further discussions to move closer to consensus.
We support in paragraph 29, the retention of strong language on the essential role of the IAEA in assisting member states in capacity building, including regulatory capabilities and facilitating the safe, secure, and peaceful application of nuclear science and technology, also through the agency's technical cooperation program.
Also appreciate the maintenance of language in support of the efforts by the IAA Director General to maximize the impact of the agency's work on nuclear applications through strategic flagship initiatives cutting across different areas of nuclear science and technology in paragraph 31.
Paragraph 44, we continue to underline the need to enhance language on the grave concern about the safety and security of nuclear facilities and materials in Ukraine.
The situation did not occur in a vacuum.
It is rather the product of the Russian Federation's unprovoked and unjustifiable aggression against Ukraine.
We continue to fully support the agency's efforts to ensure the safety and security of all Ukrainian nuclear sites, as well as the efforts for a solution that ensures the safety and security of the plant while fully respecting Ukrainian sovereignty over the facility and the region.
On paragraph 41 and attacks against nuclear facilities, we reiterate the importance of the application of existing international law and of not creating new legal standards.
Finally, on paragraphs 87 93 and the strengthening of the review process, we believe that further reflection on enhancing coordination, continuity, and efficiency to improve effectiveness, transparency and accountability under the treaty is essential and an important deliverable of this review conference.
We will provide more detailed comments in due course.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Italy for her statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Lithuania, followed by the United States of America.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
We appreciate the updated draft of the outcome document and thank the presidency, the committee chairs, and the Secretariat for their dedicated efforts throughout this complex process.
Lithuania remains committed to engaging constructively towards a balanced outcome document.
As our assessment is still ongoing, we will provide written comments and these remarks are preliminary.
Mr.
Chair, one of the key elements for us concerns the Ukraine's Z Aposan nuclear power plant, the largest nuclear facility in Europe.
We believe the current wording in the outcome document does not adequately reflect the situation and should be strengthened.
We underscore three essential points.
Responsibility for the situation with the safety and security of nuclear facilities and materials in Ukraine must be clearly attributed to Russia Federation.
There must be no ambiguity that the Zaposa nuclear power plant is Ukrainian facility and must be returned to the full control of Ukraine's competent authorities.
Any future restart of the reactors at the Zaporiza nuclear power plant can only be considered once full safety and security conditions are restored and the plant is under legitimate control and regulatory oversight of Ukraine.
We know that there was broad support in the room on this issue with only one delegation expressing a different view.
In this regard, we see clear room for improvement of the text as there's a strong call to further strengthening the text.
We reaffirmed the importance of the EA Director's General seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during armed conflict, as well as the five concrete principles regarding the illegally seized Zapoja nuclear power plant and welcome the inclusion in the draft text.
Mr.
Chair, as many delegations have already highlighted, it is important throughout the text to underscore that export controls enable the peaceful use of nuclear energy and ensures nonproliferation goals.
Also, we would like to support countries that emphasize the importance of the highest nuclear safety and security standards.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Lithuania for her statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of the United States of America, followed by Madagascar.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Mr.
Chairman, my government would like to begin by following up and echoing a number of other interventions by governments today regarding the importance of maintaining language referring to the highest standards related to safety, security, and nonproliferation.
My government believes that this language is not an impediment in any way related to peaceful uses and that there is no evidence to that effect.
In fact, I would take pains to note that the United States has in recent years taken great pains to streamline our process, to maximize our capacity to conduct nuclear trade with all nations who behave in accordance with those global standards.
It is for those reasons, Mr.
Chair, that the United States supports the United Kingdom and French government's proposals related to paragraphs 28 and 37 on these issues.
Further, the United States also supports the French intervention regarding the creation of a new paragraph on financing.
Mr.
Chair, my government also would like to express its disappointment related to the continued inclusion of the phrase sustainable development in a number of portions of the text.
We find this language unacceptable and believe that the phrase long term economic development would be more appropriate in the document.
Mr.
Chair, with relation to Article 41, my government would like to support the interventions of the United Kingdom, France and Italy.
We believe that the language, while improved, still includes indication that every attack on a nuclear facility raises concerns under existing international law.
That said, we look forward to collaborating with you and other governments to find language for this paragraph in order to remain.
Lastly, on paragraphs related to strengthening of the review process, we would like to thank the Swiss and South African colleagues for constituting a separate group.
That said, my government would like to note that while we do have a few red lines associated with this process, on the whole, we are extremely open to the creation of modalities that would allow for a flexible environment under which we believe the collective goals could be achieved.
We will, of course, provide all of these comments in writing.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of the United States of America for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative Madagascar, followed by Canada.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Man.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
First of all, we would like to thank the president of the conference and the Secretariat for preparing this latest version of the text.
We are awaiting instructions from Capitol, but we would like to make some preliminary observations.
On paragraph 93, Madagascar welcomes the addition asking the Office for Disarmament Affairs to provide technical assistance to non nuclear weapon states in the preparation of their national reports.
This is a tangible measure to reduce institutional capacity gaps between states parties.
In paragraph 24, the revised text calls for the elimination of constraints on the exchange of equipment and information.
My delegation proposes strengthening this paragraph by saying that export controls should not hinder projects related to sustainable development, in particular, agriculture and health.
In paragraph 34, as an island state, Madagascar reiterates its request for an explicit reference to a prior notification mechanism for the transport of radioactive materials in adjacent maritime areas for coastal states.
This is a subject that is not sufficiently dealt with in this new version and we will send our proposals in written form in due course.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Madagascar for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Canada, followed by Australia.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you, Chair.
Canada appreciates the effort that has been undertaken to produce Rev one and to reflect views expressed by all delegations and to try to find a balance and compromise on a number of issues.
While Canada would prefer stronger language in some areas, we're ready to be flexible and work with delegations to support an outcome on the basis of this draft.
Like others, we would like to see the reference to undue constraints in paragraph 23 removed as we do not believe that there are undue constraints being applied.
We appreciate the retention of language on the importance of the highest standards of safety and security in a couple of paragraphs in Pillar three.
We do have some questions on the inclusion of new language in paragraph 35 related to the LEU guaranteed reserve in the Russian Federation.
We would like to know if this is an IAEA fuel bank as our understanding was that the LEU Bank in Kazakhstan is the only IAEA fuel bank.
If this is the case, we would suggest avoiding the inclusion of national initiatives in this document as this could result in a long list of proposals as others have alluded to.
Canada could, for example, propose a new paragraph encouraging states to consider can do reactors as a technology that would eliminate the need for enriched uranium altogether.
Not something we intend to do Chair, but as an example of where we could end up in this document.
We take note of the revisions to paragraph 41 on armed attacks.
We believe this is an important issue for the committee to consider given the potential implications for nuclear safety and security.
We welcome the fact that paragraph 42 and 43 have been retained.
However, we note that paragraph 44 has remained unchanged and therefore does not recognize that it is Russia's military aggression and continued occupation of Ukraine's Zaporiza nuclear power plant that are the cause of the safety and security challenges in Ukraine.
We would like to see this paragraph strengthened in that regard.
We also believe that the conference should reaffirm its support for the IAEA's ongoing technical assistance and support to Ukraine, including its presence at Ukraine's five nuclear facilities.
Finally, we appreciate efforts to incorporate gender perspectives in the outcome document, including in paragraph 90.
However, we have some concerns with the text as drafted in line with interventions by a number of other delegations today, including Sweden, Austria, Mexico, and others.
Canada would like to see this text strengthened and to have the conference call on states parties to affirm the importance of the full, equal and effective participation and leadership of women in the NPT implementation and review process.
In this regard, I would recall the joint statement delivered by Canada in the general debate to which 27 states aligned where we emphasize our desire to see gender elements appropriately integrated into this text.
I thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Canada for her statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Australia, followed by Denmark.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you, Chair.
Australia welcomes the Revision one draft outcome document and appreciates the effort by the president to incorporate a broad range of views and perspectives.
We believe this revision represents a positive step towards achieving a consensus outcome.
We are still studying the text in detail, but would like to offer some preliminary thoughts.
We are also concerned that language in paragraphs 23 and 28 may be interpreted as limiting export control regimes.
To strike the right balance, we would like to see language that recognizes that multilateral export control regimes facilitate access to the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology.
While we welcome the attempts to include references to women and young people in paragraph 90, we do not consider these groups merely as stakeholders and would like to see gender perspectives in all aspects of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.
We call for a preambular paragraph that considers the full, equal and meaningful participation of women as vital to the NPT review process.
Australia is disappointed that the language in paragraph 44 on the safety and security of nuclear facilities and materials in Ukraine because it fails to recognize the reasons for these concerns, which are a direct result of Russia's illegal full scale invasion of Ukraine and its continued occupation of Zapoic nuclear power plant.
We would appreciate having this reflected in the text.
While we note the growing interest of states parties in nuclear power, as Germany has already mentioned, this is not the case for all parties and suggest in paragraph 26 that it note the growing interest among some state parties.
Australia will submit written comments to the president in due course.
We look forward to working constructively with all parties to find a consensus outcome.
I thank the distinguished representative of Australia for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Denmark, followed by the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
You'll have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you, Chair.
We would also like to express our thanks to the president and all involved for the work in Rev.
It is highly appreciated, and we have read it with interest, and so have colleagues in Capital who are currently working on it.
Until we get remarks from them, please allow me to offer a few initial observations on Central and Paris in the text.
In OP 20, we would like to see a positive formulation about export control contributing to nonproliferation as well as peaceful use.
Export control does not deny access, but it does contribute to nonproliferation.
We continue to believe that it's important to express the current situation in Ukraine factually.
The Spica nuclear power plant is a Ukrainian nuclear power plant, and it must be reflected in the text in OP 43.
It's relevant because of the state's responsibility for the SP NPP.
It must also be reflected in OP 44 that the reason for the challenges to safety and security of Ukraine's nuclear facilities is Russia's illegal use of force, and that should be reflected.
Without such texts, the text could be read as Ukraine has the lack of will, and that is simply incorrect.
Chair, the substantive engagement on reports are relevant for nuclear weapon states and that should be reflected in OPE 91.
Mentioning various proposals in in 91 vis-à-vis nuclear weapon states as well as non nuclear weapon states does not add value.
We do, however, take note of the parallel consultations on transparency, which we will follow closely.
Finally, we continue to recall that there are two and only two categories of states in the NPT and that each category has distinct reporting requirements which are the same for all states in the same category.
So our proposal for a new OP 91 BIS stands in which the conference recalls that.
We are not here to rewrite the treaty.
We will hand in these remarks and some additional ones in writing, and we continue to be ready to contribute to negotiating in order to find consensus on a balanced text, and we look forward to moving forward.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Denmark for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished the representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, followed by Egypt.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Here, my delegation welcomes to RF one, which we consider to be a solid and genuine basis for further deliberations.
While Capitol is finalizing our written input for this Raf one, we would like to share a few additional comments related to main Committee free.
The Netherlands is pleased to note that the powers on Article 10 have been retained.
These powers touch upon the very foundation of the functioning and legitimacy of the MPT, and we would like to underline once more that we need to have robust language on Article 10.
Weakening of the current language would not be acceptable to us.
On the effectiveness and efficiency of the review process, we welcome the inclusion of further improved time management as well as to continue having proceedings on the rolling paces.
As we have stated before, we believe that these measures can have a meaningful impact on the effectiveness of the review cycle.
We suggest to include the formalization of a chairs bureau and would support making the early circulation of a draft document a standard practice.
Following up on our comments made in Main Committee two earlier today, we take note of the changes in the text with regard to export control regimes, and we intend to make text proposals in writing to better reflect their positive contribution to the objectives of the treaty.
We would like to point out that Power 21 shows strong overlap with Power 25, and we suggest deleting the former.
Lastly, we would like to join other delegations in expressing our concerns regarding the language on the nuclear safety and security situation in Ukraine.
The language remains unchanged, which means that there is still no context provided as to why there are nuclear safety and security risks in Ukraine.
On the contrary, the language right now could be interpreted as Ukraine being the country that is responsible for those nuclear safety and security risks.
We therefore repeat our proposals.
First of all, to see reflected that the Zaposa nuclear power plant is a Ukrainian nuclear power plant and that secondly, that the root causes of nuclear safety and security in Ukraine risks lie with the Russian Federation as a result of its war of aggression against Ukraine.
I thank you for giving me the floor.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Egypt, followed by Brazil.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you, Chair for giving me the floor.
I speak now in my national capacity, and I'll keep my comments to five observations.
First, on paragraph 23, We wish to maintain the current language, particularly at the end of the paragraph that calls upon parties to eliminate any undue constraints inconsistent with the treaty.
This is consistent with the agreed language of action 51 of the 2010 action plan.
That's my first point.
The second point is in paragraph 26.
We agree with what has been raised by several delegations that there is a need to refrain from singling out particular initiatives because questions would arise, why do we specifically reference this initiative, although many of us are part of it.
That's for the second point.
My third point, as regards paragraph 37 and 40, I wish to align myself totally with the statements made by the Arab and the African groups.
I believe chair when in doubt and whether there are divergent views, we need to stick with the agreed language.
The term highest safety and security, in our view, is better served by replacing it with appropriate and efficient.
This is again in line with action 57 of the 2010 action plan.
We call again a new chair to replace the word highest efficient and appropriate in both paragraphs 37 and 40.
My fourth point relates to paragraph 40 as well.
My delegation cautions against introducing language that will increase our areas of divergence rather than increases our areas of convergence.
Particularly when we speak about SMRs to be developed in a safe, secure, and safeguarded manner, I don't think that this is agreed language or has it been referenced before in consensual documents.
We ask you Chair, to maintain the word safe and secure and maybe do away with safeguarded.
My fifth and last point, this delegation f sees merit in what was raised by a couple of delegations regarding and in reference to the need to amplify resources.
To maximize the benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear energy in close cooperation with IAA.
In this time, I believe any amplification or increasing of available financial resources to support our programs is a value and should be supported.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank Trist team, Mr.
Representative of Egypt for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is Trist team, Mr.
Representative of Brazil, followed by Austria.
You have the F E.
Thank you very much, Chair and thank you for providing us with this new revised draft.
We think it's a very good basis for work.
We welcome the inclusion of preambular 14.
Although on preambular 14 and preambar 15, we see this language around conformity on 14 on a specific article, Article 3, and then in 15 in conformity with all the provisions of the treaty, we will send language for you to change some of these expressions.
Um, On OP 22, we had mentioned that we wanted to change the place of fuel cycle.
It sits now at the end of the paragraph, and we'd rather have it without jeopardizing its policies, including on its fuel cycle.
We'll send this again in written.
On OPs 37 and 40, we concur with what was said before by our colleagues from Algeria, Egypt, and the Arab group.
Nuclear safety and security are not NPT matters, and we would rather have the highest levels of safety and security replaced by appropriate and effective levels of nuclear safety and security.
On OP 41, we noticed that this is the only paragraph remaining related to attacks or threats of attacks, and we reserve the right to comment on this later as these are preliminary comments in my capital is to reviewing this draft.
I have a last comment and that's on the strengthening the review process.
Paragraphs 92 and 93, I think are the most important for us in this regard for now.
We cannot accept your language that only welcomes the commitments on nuclear weapon states and then have the conference decide on a reporting for non nuclear weapon states.
For us, the reporting should be focused on nuclear weapon states and Article 6.
We're looking very carefully into, um, paragraph 92, on 93, because this might aggravate a deficit of implementation that we already have.
We have a lot on nonproliferation as it is recognized in paragraph 63, and we don't have much on Article 6.
We are drafting the language and we will provide this in due course.
I thank you very much.
I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil for her statement.
The next speaker on my list is the Distinguished Representative Austria, followed by the Islamic Republic of Iran.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you very much, Chair and thank you for giving me the floor again and I promise to be brief.
First of all, let me lend our support to the comments made by Germany and Australia on the Paragraph 26 that we would also support some adjustments here to reflect the situation that some state parties see the potential contribution of nuclear power, where others disagree on that.
Then, um, to respond to some of the comments made to the highest level of safety, what we believe is important is that here we do not fall back on a language from 2010.
Since 2010, there has been a considerable development around thinking of nuclear safety under the IA general conferences, also because of certain incidents that happened after the 2010 NPT review conference.
So we would rather prefer that we look for some agreed language at the IA general conference and try to incorporate it here.
There are references to the highest standards of nuclear safety or there are also references to the due priority to the safety of nuclear installation so that this is also something that we could work upon and in that sense, we look forward to a further reiteration of the text, keeping this notion.
Thank you so much.
I thank the distinguished representative of Austria for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Islamic Republic of Iran, followed by Mexico.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair for giving me the floor once again to complete our comments on the paragraphs related to main Committee three.
Continuing our comments regarding attacks on nuclear facilities.
I would like to emphasize that the failure to address attacks on nuclear facilities in general and the June 2025 and February 2026 attacks against Iran's peaceful nuclear facilities in particular, which constitute the most significant developments during the current review cycle of the NPT risks seriously undermining the credibility of the conference and its outcome.
We have already submitted our concrete proposals concerning the two relevant paragraphs, and we hope that they will be duly reflected in the next revision of the draft.
Mr.
Chair, regarding paragraph 42, the reference to the seven pillars of the agency's Director General should be deleted.
We believe that paragraph 43 and 44 are unnecessary and should therefore be deleted in their entirety.
With regard to paragraph 83, Article 10 of the treaty is clear and does not require any additional interpretation.
We therefore propose deleting this paragraph in its entirety.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Mexico, followed by Japan.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you very much Chair.
With regard to the section to improve the review process and effectiveness, we'd like to make two additional comments.
In Paragraph 88, we believe that the language on subsidiary bodies should be clearer with regard to the tasks and specific mandates given to them.
In order to avoid duplication of effort when they have been established.
That's why it's important to not limit this exercise to designation of topics.
Then in 1993, references to consultations with regional sittings, it's important to point out that regional group settings, it's important that UN regional groups don't necessarily correspond to the NPT regional groups.
And that's why it's important to take into account and reflect that difference in the text.
Finally, we agree with Brazil's concern with regard to the additional burdens that could be interpreted from the current wording of Article 93 Paragraph 93 and we're looking forward to the text that Brazil is going to propose in this regard.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for his statement.
The next speaker on Mali is the distinguished representative of Japan.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
We take the floor in wanting to make additional comments on nuclear safety.
Paragraph 38 as follows.
While nuclear safety is a national responsibility, adequency and appropriateness of national policies and action to be reviewed only in accordance with international obligation arising from existing legally binding international instrument and Levant international safety standards under the auspice of the IAA.
This point already adequately reflected in the current draft.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Japan for his statement.
Are there any other delegations willing to ask for the floor.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Brazil.
You have the floor.
Thank you for giving me the floor again, chair.
I'm not quite sure that I got the suggestion made by Japan.
But as I see these references that the responsibility for nuclear safety and security rests with individual states.
On paragraph 38, I think we would be better served if we said the conference recognizes that nuclear safety and security are national responsibilities.
I think that would make clear the fact that nuclear safety and security are the responsibility of the state and not of individual states.
It might be ambiguous in that sense.
We will send this suggestion in written again.
Thank you very much.
I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil for her statement.
Are there any other delegations willing to ask for the floor.
That was the last speaker on my list for this session.
Distinguished delegates, one country requested the floor to exercise its right of reply pursuant to Rule 19 of the rules of procedure.
May I remind delegations that in accordance with the Rule 19, such statements shall be as brief as possible.
I urge delegations to limit their interventions to 5 minutes.
May I also remind delegations that in accordance with the established practice, the number of interventions in the exercise of the right of reply for any delegation is limited to two.
The second intervention should be limited to 3 minutes.
I now give the floor to the representative of Russian Federation.
Thank you, Mr.
Distinguished Chairman.
We noticed the arrogant and unprofessional statements by the representative of Canada about the Russian LEU guaranteed reserve in Angask.
I would like to say that this initiative was declared in 2010 by the Russian Federation.
This is the first initiative in the area of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle that received practical implementation.
If the Canadians are jealous of this fact, then I would note that they themselves could create a uranium bank or do something else that would be useful in this area.
They have not done so, but now for some reason, they are insisting on removing a reference to this initiative from the draft outcome document.
I would note that the statement of Canada on this matter is a clear example of how NATO countries are disrupting the possibility of consensus on the outcome document.
Thank you.
This concludes my list of speakers for this meeting.
The meeting is adjourned.