(Main Committee II) Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Excellencies, distinguished delegates.
Ladies and gentlemen, I know that you need a little bit of time to talk to each other, and I hope you do it to smooth out some of the issues of rev one.
I encourage you to do that, not in the audience, but outside of the audience.
The meeting is called to order.
I declare open the sixth meeting of main Committee two of the 2026 Review conference of the parties to the Trey on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.
As you're aware, the president has issued a revision of the draft final document in PT slash dot 2026 slash Rp dot to slash rev dot and has allocated the following paragraphs to this main committee and to subsidiary B two.
Preamble of paragraphs 13, 17, 18, paragraphs 1 and 3, paragraphs 4 to 21, paragraph 74 to 80, and paragraphs 84 to 86.
I will now invite state parties to provide their comments and proposals.
Please send your written statements and comments on the draft to email address pt at un.org.
Emails sent to this address should clearly state in the subject line that the email contains written comments on the zero draft outcome document and identify that your comments relate to main committee two.
The time limit for group statements is 8 minutes and 5 minutes for national statements.
As usual, there will be a timer shown on the screen indicating 1 minute before the microphone will be cut off.
I kindly ask delegations to inform the Secretariat in advance if they are speaking on behalf of a group so that we can be sure to allocate sufficient time.
Delegations are encouraged to provide statements in case they have them available for the interpretation services by sending them to the email address estates at un.org.
Finally, delegations are requested to please inform the Secretariat as soon as possible if they wish to exercise their right of reply.
Rights of reply heard at the end of this meeting as usual.
Those delegations that wish to take the floor are requested to press the button in front of you at this time.
We will proceed in the order in which requests for the floor are received with priority given to groups.
I don't see any delegations pushing the button.
I've been informed that Egypt would like to take the floor on behalf of Arab group.
Egypt, you have the floor.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Mr.
Chair, I have the honor to speak on behalf of the Arab group.
The Arab group thanks are present for the circulation of Rev one of the draft text of main Committee two.
At the outset, the group expresses its disappointment with the paragraphs 84 to 86 on the Middle East and the implementation of the 1995 resolution in the Rev one.
It's a source of deep regret that the observations by the Arab group, which were overwhelmingly supported at the subsidiary body two, were not accommodated.
The three paragraphs as proposed lack reaffirmation of the relevant commitments from past review conferences, including the commitment to the full implementation of the resolution by the nuclear weapon states.
They lack any reference to the undertaking concrete and practical steps in support of the implementation.
They are also silent on the longstanding language on the achievement of the universality of the treaty including in the Middle East.
Moreover, the language in paragraph 86 regarding the UN annual conference needs to be strengthened to fairly reflect the commendable work done at this platform and the support it deserves.
We are further concerned by the changes in paragraph 77, revisiting an agreed language at several review conferences.
We strongly call for the restoration of 77 as it stood on the zero draft, highlighting the importance of establishing nuclear weapon free zones where they do not exist without any qualifiers.
Also, paragraph 74 needs to separate the reference to the 1999 UNDC principles and guidelines into a separate paragraph.
Mr.
Chair, on the nonproliferation pillar of the rev one, we welcome a number of positive improvements, including the retention of agreed language on the authority of the IEA, that the decision to conclude an additional protocol remains a voluntary sovereign decision of each state.
The deletion of the reference to assessing safeguards in light of technological developments and the inclusion of language encouraging the facilitation of transfers of nuclear technology and material among states parties.
At the same time, the group believes that limited number of amendments remain necessary to preserve the legal precision, maintain the balance between Article 3 and four, and ensure reliance on agreed review conference and IA general conference language.
On paragraph four, the group proposes adding the full balance reflected in Article 3, paragraph three of the treaty in the paragraph as follows, Safeguard should be implemented in accordance with Article 3, paragraph three of the treaty in a manner designed to comply with Article 4 of the treaty and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of states parties or international cooperation in peaceful nuclear activities, unquote.
On paragraph ten, the group suggests strengthening the language of the universal application of agency safeguards by replacing the second half of the paragraph with the following, end quote.
The conference reiterates the importance of achieving the universal application of agency safeguards, urges all states which have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguard agreements to do so as soon as possible, unquote.
The group proposed adding a new paragraph ten based on action 30 of the 2010 action plan that reads as follows, and I quote.
The conference calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear weapon states under the relevant voluntary offer safeguards agreements in the most economic and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of IEA resources and stresses that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once a complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved, unquote.
On paragraph 11, while the group welcomes a reference to the voluntary and sovereign nature of the decision to conclude an additional protocol, the current formulation is not clear on the findings of the CSA only states and the states with both DSA and AP.
Therefore, the group suggests replacing the middle section of the paragraph with agreed IEA general conference language that reads as follows, I quote, The conference notes that for states with both a comprehensive safeguard agreement and an additional protocol in force or being otherwise applied, agency safeguards can provide increased assurances regarding both the non divergent of nuclear material placed under safeguards and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for a state as a whole, unquote.
On paragraph 12, we request the deletion of this paragraph as it undermines the principle of sovereign choice established in paragraph 11 by imposing a sense of urgency and universal exception that contradicts the voluntary nature of the instrument.
On paragraph 18, the group retreats its proposal to delete this paragraph as the current formulation creates an unprecedented link between nuclear security and the objectives of the treaty despite the distinct legal pieces, nature, and implementation of safeguards and nuclear security.
On paragraph 20, the group proposes restoring agreed language on supply arrangements and export control to read as follows, and I quote, The conference reaffirms that supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non nuclear weapon states should require, as a necessary precondition acceptance of the comprehensive IAA safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and Iote.
The group further proposes reinserting the deleted balance on undue restraints.
I quote, Exports control should continue to promote transparency and ensure that the exports guidelines do not impose undue restraints or hamper the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses by states parties in conformity with the treaty, end quote.
Finally, the Arab Group welcomes the addition of paragraph 21 and supports retaining its language.
Mr.
Chairperson, these proposals are limited, balanced and based on agreed language.
The aim to strengthen Rev one, preserve the legal architecture of the treaty, and ensure that safeguards and peaceful uses are presented as mutually reinforcing, not competing pillars of the NPT.
The group will send these amendments in writing, and I thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt for the statement on behalf of Arab Group.
Next on my list is the representative of Mexico.
You have the floor.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
And thank you to the chair of the conference for this first rev of the outcome document.
Yesterday, we listened very closely to your appeal to consider this document as the basis for possible consensus, and that's how we saw it.
We've seen that as in any good negotiation or any good outcome, this document, It should leave one of the parties very satisfied, which is the demonstration the proof of good negotiation.
However, there are a few matters that we think it's regrettable not to have been included.
As we have said both in the room and in writing, I'd just like to refer to one of those for now in this pillar that is related to the paragraphs on Article 7, particularly the nuclear weapons free zones.
We didn't hear any objection in the room or outside the room on the appeal made by Mexico on various occasions to raise the level of recognition of the contribution that nuclear weapons free zones to international peace and security and to the nonproliferation disarmament regime.
However, the paragraphs continue to have a very light recognition of this.
Therefore, we would like to insist on that.
Paragraph 75, in fact, It contains an issue, we believe is a technical inconsistency, so I need to mention it.
It mentions the Antarctic Treaty together with all of the other treaties on nuclear weapons free zones in densely populated areas.
If we were to list all of the nuclear weapons free zones, including those that are not densely populated, we would also have to include the Space Treaty, which isn't mentioned.
But as we are talking about active contributions of nuclear weapons free zones, over the sovereign decisions of their members to international peace and security, we think that we should only mention the densely populated ones that have a direct relation to the NPT and the incompatibility the compatibility between the Article 7 of the NPT and nuclear weapons treaties.
We'd also like to mention the principles encompassed by these nuclear weapons free zones, not only those that have been adopted, for instance, that nuclear weapons free zones don't represent an end in themselves, they are an intermediate step towards disarmament and nonproliferation.
We will send language to the chair in this sense, but I did want to mention it here in the room because I'll repeat When we've requested this and when we've insisted on it, we haven't found any opposition encountered any opposition.
We think that this review conference is very well positioned to make a much more explicit recognition of the role played by nuclear weapons free zones and the 117 countries that have taken the decision to join those.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative from Mexico for the statement and kind words addressed to the presidency.
We're waiting for other delegations to take the floor.
Where is the last speaker? Okay.
Now I have on my list the distinguished representative of Algeia followed by Brazil.
Algeia you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
I asked for the floor just to avoid the gap.
I have nothing to say.
Hi everyone.
Seriously, our gratitude goes to you, Mr.
Chair and through you to the president and his team for the timely circulation of the Revoin Although a number of comments we have made were not taken into account, we believe that in general, we are going in the right direction.
There are, of course, still a number of concerns that need to be captured adequately.
We align with the intervention and proposals of the Arab Group.
We would like to make the following initial comments in our national capacity.
From our perspective, the paragraphs relevant to Pillar two must always be read in conjunction with the disarmament and peaceful uses pillars.
We are still assessing to what extent we are striking the right balance.
Two specific comments on Pillar two or the MC two relevant paragraphs in this rev one.
First, para three, in our view, could be streamlined by removing repetition of elements contained at the end of para Roman 13, preamblar Second, and as requested by the Arab Group, we call for the deletion of paragraph 12 due to the following concerns.
First, paragraph 12 is redundant with paragraph 14.
If the conference already supports the IAEA role in assisting states that choose to pursue NAP additional protocol.
A separate paragraph encouraging all states to do so as soon as possible is unnecessary and adds repetitive pressure.
Second, there is a contradiction with paragraph 11.
Paragraph 11 explicitly acknowledges that the decision to conclude an additional protocol remains a voluntary sovereign decision of each state.
Paragraph 12, however, creates political pressure by encouraging all states parties to bring them into force as soon as possible.
Paragraph 12 undermines therefore the principle of sovereign choice established in paragraph 11 by imposing a sense of urgency and universal expectation that contradicts the voluntary nature of the instrument.
Third, this power calls on states to implement the AP provisionally pending their entry into force.
This ignores states domestic legal requirements, requesting provisional implementation in French, open national legal processes, and demands a commitment that many states cannot legally fulfill until internal procedures are complete.
Fourth, the document acknowledges in paragraph nine that CSAs are the legally required verification standard under Article 3, paragraph one of the treaty.
Paragraph 11 refers to the AP as an enhanced verification standard.
The NPT only legally mandates the CSA.
By pushing for the universalization of the AP in paragraph 12, the document attempts to establish a new de facto legal standard through an outcome document that exceeds the original negotiated obligations of the treaty.
Finally, how can we call for the strengthening of Pillar two while there is stagnation on Pillar one? How to accept enhanced verification burdens while nuclear weapon states fail to fulfill their own disarmament obligations under Article 6.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguish representative of Algeriia for the statement and for his kind words to the presidency.
Next on my list is the representative of Brazil, followed by Sweden.
Brazil, you have the floor.
Thank you very much, Chair.
Thank you for the revised CRP, for the work of the president and for your work.
I realize that it is not an easy task to reconcile all the different positions on nonproliferation and other issues related to the sections of the CRP.
Um, I have to agree with many of the interventions made by my Egyptian and Algerian colleague on several sections of the revised draft.
We realized that the document in 2010 had a link with Article 4 and sorry, the on preamblary 17, the 2010 document had a link with Article 4.
So I think we support his change in OP four to reflect that better.
OP six, we have to insist on reverting to 2010 language.
This is very important to us because this has to do with non compliance, and we have to follow the process within the IAEA, and the changes made here are not conducive to the following of that process.
So insist on reverting to that language.
We're still evaluating what is the added value and what are the consequences of changing on OP nine pursuant by legally required on the second line of that paragraph.
We support the Egyptian changes related to OP ten.
Both on the universalization and his paragraph on the voluntary offer agreements.
We welcome the change of paragraph 11 in L two as voluntary was added since the additional protocol is a voluntary instrument.
Um, and I think to be more precise in terms of language on the last line of that paragraph where it reads, for that state, we would like to change it for applicable to that state.
We realized this is GC language, but we think that with that change, it would be more confined to the state, the applicable provisions, both CSAs and additional protocol.
Um, we agree with the arguments of our Egyptian and Algerian colleague regarding OP 12.
This is contradictive in nature, with the voluntary nature of the AP, and we therefore, reiterate our suggestion for deletion of this paragraph.
On paragraph 18, we also reiterate our suggestion for deletion of this paragraph.
The NPT is not a treaty about nuclear security, and again, we have language on nuclear security on the section of peaceful uses.
On the issue of nuclear weapon free zones, we are in complete agreement with the intervention made by our Mexican colleague.
We don't think that the revised version reflects the changes that were suggested here, and we support her argument on having more meaningful language here.
Thank you very much.
I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil for the statement and the kind words addressed to the presidency.
Next speaker is a representative of Sweden, followed by Russian Federation.
Sweden, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair, and good morning, colleagues.
Chair, please accept our sincere gratitude to you and your team for your continued efforts to shape an outcome document that strikes a balance acceptable to all states parties.
Sweden will continue to support you in this endeavor by following the chair's directives from yesterday, by focusing on the paragraphs where diversities remain to be bridged.
We have had a first study of the first revised version, and we will submit our comments in writing as well.
Reading the paper, we have identified several paragraphs where we acknowledge your efforts in trying to find middle ground between differing perspectives.
We have also identified text modifications that, in our view, more precisely captures what have been expressed during main committee meetings and subsidiary bodies.
Taken together, we commend you for taking the outcome document one step closer to our common aspiration for consensus.
Having said that, we still have a few observations of concern, texts that needs some further trimming for the paper to strike a better balance.
These concerns of ours belong mainly to the sections of the document that will be addressed in main Committee one, main Committee three, and we will revert to them in the afternoon.
As for the paragraphs indicated for this particular section, we welcome what we consider to be a more balanced version than the previous iteration of this part of the document.
I have the following remarks.
Preamble 14, we welcome the text on IAEA and the safeguards role as a fundamental component for several functions within the framework of the amputee.
That said, we still see merit in adding the contribution that the IAEA has delivered over time to uphold the nuclear nonproliferation regime and that its authority must be maintained.
In paragraph 20, we welcome the more balanced text on the aim and contribution of export controls to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
In the following paragraph 21, we believe that it has improved as we think that the reference to so called undue constraints has been put in a more clarifying frame.
Finally, we regret the weaken language on Iran and DPRK.
These two countries represent the main examples of noncompliance with the treaty and it is a matter of credibility of this conference that this is duly reflected in the outcome document.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Sweden for the statement and the kind words addressed to the presidency.
Thank you very much.
I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation.
Supported by China Russian Federation, you have the floor.
Thank you, Kat Al.
First and foremost, I'd like to express our gratitude to the president of the conference, to you, Kat Alkvch and to the entire team who worked on this revised draft outcome document.
We're going to continue working on this document so as to come up with consensus based wording.
I do have some brief, preliminary comments, if you will.
We continue to believe it advisable to delete para 18 of the preamble, the need to uphold the NPT is something that's reflected in previous paragraphs and then the rest of the text.
Then in paragraph 18 of the preambular paragraphs, we don't think it's correct.
It looks like an interpretation of the treaty provisions.
We also believe it's advisable to delete the last sentence of OP five where it says that we need to Avoid taking any actions that would undermine the authority of the IAEEA.
Who determines who's authorized to determine which actions do undermine the authority or don't? Is it other member states, members of the IAEA? This wording seems to be looks at least like an attempt to preclude any further dialogue on whether any IA Measures or activities are justified or not.
We don't think it's appropriate within the framework of the review cycle.
Perhaps it would be, that would be acceptable, but here it is not.
Paragraph seven on Iran.
Now, we've softened the wording.
It's a bit more veiled.
But there are assertions about the fact that Iran is supposedly in breach of its CSA, its safeguards agreement with the IAA.
We cannot agree with such a provision.
Because including these in the outcome document would be tantamount to recognizing that the US's and Israel's aggression, Iran, its attack is justified.
The US and Israel hit Iranian nuclear facilities and Iran occurred on the pretext of upholding the NPT and the Safeguards agreement.
But we've already said that we need to condemn such actions in the strongest possible terms.
Taking such action on the pretext of defending the NPT does deal a serious blow to the credibility of the agreement.
If we were to accept this, then the outcome document as a whole and also the entire review cycle would lose their meaning.
Paris nine and 11 moving on.
Now there are references here to the fact that the additional protocol decision is voluntary, but de facto, the protocol is being elevated as some benchmark, some gold standard.
We believe these to be mutually exclusive.
The additional protocol is an additional measure.
Therefore, these provisions need to be substantially redrafted.
We will submit the language to you in writing.
We continue to believe it's important to include into the outcome document provisions about the fact that the IEA safeguard system should remain objective, de politicized and technically justified.
This stems from the entire safeguards system of the agency.
This system also should be in keeping with the rights and obligations of IEA member states and the Secretariat as per the IEA statute.
In our view, paragraph 18, nuclear security is not a safeguards issue.
Nuclear security is more to do with nuclear power.
79 and 80, those OPs should be deleted.
We already gave the reasons.
I'm not going to repeat those.
I don't want to waste delegations time.
I thank you.
Yeah.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the president of the conference and the chair of the committee.
I believe distu representative of China, followed by Canada, China, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
China thanks the president for circulating rev one of the draft outcome document yesterday.
We thank you and the chairs of the other main committees and subsidiary bodies for the hard work.
We have sent the new draft to Capitol for review.
To advance the text consultation process without any delay, the Chinese delegation wishes to take this opportunity to offer its preliminary views and suggestions on the new text.
On the whole, the new text maintains the overall structure of the zero draft.
Keeps its conciseness and addresses the three pillars of nuclear disarmament, non proliferation, and peaceful use in a balanced manner and can still serve as the basis for all parties to deepen their discussions.
We also note the president's effort to incorporate the views of all parties in the attempt to narrow differences and build consensus.
Some of China's proposals have been incorporated, yet some proposals have not been fully reflected.
We believe that all parties, just like China, attach great importance to the foundational role of the NPT and hope to work to reach an outcome document that respects and accommodates the concerns of all parties.
In previous discussions, all parties have made clear their concerns and positions and clarified their core demands.
In the days of work that remain, it's worth reflecting how we could efficiently advance our work.
Do we streamline the new text shelf differences and gradually focus on possible consensus, or do we add to the text and continue to focus on differences that are difficult to bridge? We hope that the president will offer some guidance in the direction to go in this regard.
China is ready to work constructively with the president.
Chair, on the paragraphs concerning nonproliferation and Main Committee two, China's comments will focus on the following issues and we hope that they will be fully reflected in the next version.
On paragraphs on regional issues, the new text still fails to comprehensively reflect the root causes of the current regional situations and relevant issues.
We propose that the text be made more balanced and principled, stressing the importance of addressing relevant issues by political and diplomatic means and upholding regional and regional peace and stability.
On paragraph 17, On the nuclear submarine cooperation between nuclear weapon states and non nuclear weapon state involving the transfer of weapons grade HEU, the conference should pay special attention with the focus on launching intergovernmental discussions on safeguards issues of said cooperation under the IAEA framework.
On paragraph 19, given the current international security situation and increasing rhetoric of seeking possession of nuclear weapons, China believes that it is necessary to add such language.
The conference notes the call on nuclear weapon states not to transfer weapons grade nuclear material, technology, or equipment for military purposes to other states.
At the same time, China suggests adding the following in paragraph three.
The conference expresses concern at statements and actions that are incompatible with Articles one and two obligations and commitments provided at previous RevCs on the Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMDs and and not to impede the right to peaceful uses.
China supports the relevant positions and suggestions by Egypt on behalf of the Arab Group.
China will submit to the chair its proposals for amendment in writing.
Thank you, Chair.
Than the distinguished Representative of China for the statement.
Next on my list, the speaker from Canada to be followed by Republic of Korea.
Canada, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Canada, thanks, the Chair.
Thanks Chair, the President and the Secretariat for preparing this first revision of the outcome document.
We take note of the extensive efforts undertaken to reflect the views expressed over the past week.
In our view, this text represents a significant compromise on longstanding agreed language and issues of concern that have been expressed by many delegations.
While we believe this is likely the approach required to achieve consensus, it is also critically important that the text factually represent the real challenges facing the treaty nonproliferation pillar.
As such, Canada would prefer stronger language on several core issues, but is also ready to be flexible to support an outcome on the basis of this draft.
I'll highlight a few preliminary thoughts.
Canada supports the new language in OP five, reinforcing the need to avoid any action that undermines the agency's authority for safeguards implementation.
We welcome the retention of language expressing concern with cases of noncompliance with safeguards obligations and stressing the need to address noncompliance in a timely manner in full conformity with the IAEA statute and relevant legal obligations.
Our preference remains to have stronger language underscoring the severity of Iran's lack of cooperation with the agency on safeguards implementation, with a particular focus on its declared HEU stockpile and its noncompliance with the NPT.
This is an established fact that we must reflect.
We are also concerned that texts related to the conferences concern over the DPRK's nuclear weapons program has been weakened and would support previous calls to strengthen this language.
Having said that, we are flexible on these sections of the text to ensure that these critically important issues are retained given their direct relevance to the credibility of the treaty nonproliferation commitments.
However, any suggestion to remove these paragraphs completely is not acceptable.
We note the improvements made to the text on export controls in paragraph 20, recognizing that these instruments seek to ensure that peaceful nuclear trade does not contribute to proliferation.
We reiterate our view that this text would be more accurate if it also underscored the role these instruments play in facilitating peaceful nuclear trade and cooperation, but stand ready to be flexible given the diverse views on this issue.
We reiterate our support for the language related to the comprehensive safeguards Agreement and additional protocol.
While we note that new language has been added to describe the voluntary nature of the AP, we remain ready to accept this as part of a broader compromise on these very important paragraphs and hope others will be in a position to do the same.
The further weakening of language on the additional protocol would send an unacceptable message regarding this critically important safeguards instrument that has been applied by the vast majority of states parties.
In this regard, Canada would insist on the retention of paragraph 12, which encourages further adherence to the AP.
We are disappointed that the original paragraph 16 related to the need for IAEA safeguards to be assessed and evaluated in light of technological developments has been removed.
We believe this is an important idea to reaffirm amidst rapidly changing technological landscape with direct implications for safeguards implementation.
Some delegations have previously expressed support for language based on action 32 of the 2010 action plan, and we believe this represents a prudent way forward.
Canada also expresses its full support for the retention of paragraph 18 related to nuclear security.
Finally, we are still reviewing the sections related to nuclear weapons free zones in the Middle East, but have some initial concerns related to the removal of a reference to on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states in the region from paragraph 85.
In our view, the language in paragraph 77 and 85 should be aligned in this regard.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguish Representative of Canada for the statement and for kind words addressed to the presidency.
Next speaker is representative of Republic of Korea, followed by Germany.
Republic of Korea, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
We would like once again to convey our sincere appreciation to the president, as well as to you for circulating the draft outcome documents and for guiding us towards constructive negotiations.
We are still reviewing the documents and upon completion of our review, we will provide our comments accordingly.
With that, my delegation would first like to present its view on paragraph 79 and 80 concerning the DPRK.
As we reiterated the seriousness of these issues repeatedly, the DPRK remains the only case that benefited from the ampithe regime, announced its withdrawal from the treaty, and openly continued the development of nuclear weapons.
So My delegation, together with many others, has consistently reaffirmed that the DPRK nuclear issue is directly linked to the integrity and credibility of the APT.
During previous meetings, numerous delegations called for stronger languages on this issue.
However, the current draft outcome document does not adequately reflect those discussions.
The DPRK continue to advance its nuclear weapons and delivery systems programs in violation of its international obligations.
We should seriously ask ourselves under these circumstances, if this R conference, unlike previous conference, fails to express concern over the DPRKs nuclear and missile programs, how negatively this failure will have an impact on the very credibility and sustainability of this MPT regime.
In this regard, my delegation emphasizes that the deleted sentence, which I quote reiterate its concern over the DPRKs nuclear weapons and delivery system program which undermined the global nuclear non peripheral regime should be reinstated.
I would also like to recall that the draft outcome documents clearly expresses concerns regarding other cases of noncompliance.
In addition, as many delegations have voiced concern over reference to DPRK nuclear as a closed issue.
My delegation propose the inclusion of the following sentence at the end of paragraph 79.
I quote.
The conference voices concern over statement or actions, the support, accepts or refer to the DPRS nuclear weapons program as a closed issue.
We hope that this conference will uphold and reaffirm the bare minimum necessary to safeguard the integrity of the NP regime.
I thank you.
I thank the distinct representative of the Republic of Korea for the statement and kind words addressed to the presidency.
Next speaker on my list is the representative of Germany, followed by Australia.
Germany, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I would like to start and commend our president and the main committee chairs for the timely circulation of provision one.
We also want to express our thanks for your able leadership in guiding us through main Committee two.
Chair, first, I would like to join others who took the floor before me underlining that ref one is moving in the right direction and is presenting a solid basis to bring us closer to consensus.
We thank the president and the whole team to keep the balance and conciseness and the structure of this document.
The text is still under review in our capital, but I would like to share with you the following comments on a preliminary basis.
On the preamble, we will comment in MC two and MC three respectively.
Nothing special in MC one.
Coming to paragraph five, we welcome very much the addition in the last sentence of paragraph five underlining the importance to uphold the authority of the IEA.
On Par seven, we appreciate maintaining the mentioning of Iran and Iran's non compliance with its obligations under the safeguards agreement.
We support the deletion of previous paar eight and to have it streamlined in new Paragraph 41, where in our view, it is better placed.
In Paragraph seven, however, we would suggest to include relevant UN Security Council resolutions on Iran.
And with regard to the last sentence on Parra seven, we suggest the wording to go from restoring confidence to building confidence.
On previous para 16, the evaluation of IEA safeguards, we would strongly prefer to maintain the language on regularly assessing and evaluating IE safeguards, also in light of technical developments as it's also referenced in the 2010 action plan.
On Para 20 export control, we appreciate changes made to Para 20 on the benefits of export control in ensuring that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
As far as Para 22 is concerned, we are still reviewing this newly added para and we'll comment at a later stage.
On paragraph 79, we regret that the states parties so far cannot find common ground.
On this para, the RevC should express, in our view, concern about the DPR case nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program.
We therefore would like to retain the actually deleted language in paragraph 79 from the draft.
So, Mr.
Chair, we will share our points with you in writing, including concrete language proposals at a later stage.
Let me conclude by assuring you of Germany's full support in our joint efforts to work on divergent issues and reach consensus.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the district representative of Germany for the statement and the kind words addressed to the presidency and the chair and thank you for your assurance of support.
Next speaker on my list is the representative of Australia, followed by Finland.
Australia, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Australia expresses its appreciation for the revision to the draft outcome document released last night and efforts to reflect a wide range of views.
Like Canada and Germany, we welcome the addition of the line in paragraph five, that no action should be taken to undermine the authority of the IAEA.
Regarding export controls, while we welcome some of the edits to paragraph 20, we are concerned about the inclusion of language on undue restraints in paragraph 21.
Its inclusion does not strike the right balance and fails to recognize that multilateral export control regimes facilitate access to peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology.
We are also concerned that language in paragraphs 23 and 28 may be interpreted as limiting export control regimes, but we will make this point in main Committee three.
Regarding paragraph 17, we continue to underline our interest in being closely consulted on any proposed changes to the current draft text on naval nuclear propulsion.
While the current text represents a finely tuned balance on this issue, we would continue to welcome language that better highlights the IAEA's independent mandate and technical authority, principles which all states parties have previously affirmed.
We reiterate our proposal made on the draft.
We regret that language on DPRK in paragraph 79 has been weakened.
As others have mentioned, it is important that the conference express grave concerns over the DPRK's nuclear program in line with multiple UNSC resolutions.
As we've previously stated, Australia strongly condemns the DPRK's illegal nuclear weapons program.
We urge the DPRK to fully comply with UNSC resolutions, refrain from further nuclear explosive tests and sign and ratify the CTBT.
Regarding paragraph seven, we reiterate our position that the conference should express grave concerns of Iran's failure to meet its safeguards obligations.
In this context, we reiterate Sweden's earlier comment that Iran and the DPRK are the two countries in non compliance of the NPT and that it goes to the credibility of this conference, that this is reflected in the outcome document.
Finally, we support Canada's request to retain reference in paragraph 85 that nuclear weapon free zones need to be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the Sniish representative of Australia for the statement and kind words addressed to the president.
Next on my list is the representative of Finland to be followed by Iran.
Finland, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
We thank the president for all the work he and his team have done to produce the revised draft of the final outcome document.
We really appreciate the president's efforts in trying to find compromise solutions in those parts where there are different views expressed among the states.
While we are still carefully studying the revised draft, I would like to share some preliminary comments on the text.
We will come back with more detailed comments at a later stage in writing.
We see positive that the language concerning the IIA has been fine tuned and specified in many paragraphs.
For us, the role of the agency is indispensable in implementing the treaty and we would still like to highlight it further.
Many delegations emphasized in their interventions earlier that they attach great importance to the IAA's mandate and its impartial, independent, and objective role.
We would like to see this language in the text, for example, in paragraph four of the draft.
We believe this formulation would have a good possibility to reach consensus.
We support the text in paragraph 12 in encouraging all states parties to bring into force additional protocols and support keeping it in the text for balance.
We appreciate the president's efforts in finding compromise language in paragraph seven.
However, we would call for a stronger link between the first and the second sentences, being specifically more clear of Iran's non compliance with its safeguards obligations.
We would also like to express our strong view that we prefer the language concerning the DPRK in the previous draft and would ask strengthening language on this part for the next revision.
In terms of the text on export control, it is our view that export control does not cause any undue restraints or undue constraints.
On the contrary, export control arrangements are essential for non proliferation and facilitate legitimate transfers of nuclear technology for development.
For this reason, we think that paragraph 20 went to right direction.
We stand ready to continue working with the president, the Bureau, and all states parties to get closer to a consensual language and a final outcome document which would be acceptable for all.
I thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Finland for the statement and the kind words addressed to the presidency and the words of support.
Thank you.
Next on my list is distinguished speaker of Iran, followed by South Africa, Iran, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair, and good morning, distinguished colleagues.
I'd like to join other delegations in expression of our gratitude to distinguish chair, his team, and the Secretariat for Scaration of the Rev one.
I hope that by proper attention to the real and genuine concerns of the states parties based on the exact deliberations and provisions of the treaty rather than politically motivated interests of a few member states, we'll be able to reach consensus at the end.
Having said that, I'd like to start with the remarks and proposals of my delegation from preamble or paragraph.
We believe that to address equally all three pillars of the treaty, we need to bring reference to disarmament obligations in paragraph 13 of the preamble.
And also to mention in paragraph 17 of the preamble that implementation of safeguard systems should be consistent with the provisions and obligations of Article 4 of the treaty and to avoid any restriction on peaceful users as well as participation in the fullest term in the international cooperation.
This principled approach should be applied to all references to implementation of safeguard systems throughout the text.
We believe that paragraph 18 of the preamble also should be deleted exactly based on the explanation provided by Russian delegation.
We believe that on paragraph one, we should highlight that all obligations should be implemented in a non discriminatory and balanced manner.
And in paragraph third, we need to highlight that the obligations all obligations should be implemented by all states parties and any case of non compliance should be addressed based on international law and the charter of the United Nations.
At the end of the third paragraph, we need to reject any use of force or threat of use of force clearly at the end.
On paragraph five, we believe that the implementation of safeguards should be consistent with the provisions of the treaty and they have to have only one purpose to verify non diversion of peaceful nuclear materials to military purposes or other explosives and In paragraph six, we need to strike out the last sentence of the paragraph where it refers to non compliance to be addressed by supporting information.
We have seen a lot of misuses of those information and providing fake information to the IAA.
On paragraph seven, first of all, we reject any so called language on strengthening the paragraph with regard to Iran and we believe that they're real and mere violators of the treaty or certain nuclear weapon states, namely US, UK, and France, and also the nuclear umbrella states parties because of their involvement in nuclear sharing and relying on extended deterrence.
We believe that a key for success of the conference is to avoid any party specific language in the text.
We have offered our alternative language with regard to Iran instead of the paragraph on Iran to express clearly that all concerns should be resolved based on international law and the UN charter.
Exclusively through peaceful channels and by collaboration with the concerned states.
I will share.
I thank the distinct representative of Iran for the statement and the kind words addressed to chair and Secretariat.
Next on my list, the representative of South Africa, followed by Denmark, South Africa, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chairman.
South Africa wishes to thank the president for his tireless efforts and for the considerable work that has gone into presenting Rev one.
We recognize the difficult task in consolidating the range of views expressed, and we believe that this revision moves us a step closer to a consensus outcome, which we believe is crucial at this pivotal moment.
We remain committed to participating constructively and in good faith in our collective efforts towards the achievement of a balanced and meaningful outcomes document.
In this regard, we wish to offer the following preliminary observations and proposals to further strengthen the text.
South Africa welcomes paragraph five and its affirmation of the agency's central and independent role as the sole competent authority of verification.
To further strengthen this provision, we propose adding the following phrase at the end of the final sentence, nor its ability to execute its safeguards mandate.
We believe this addition would make the paragraph unambiguous in protecting both the agency's authority and its operation capacity to fulfill its verification functions.
Regarding paragraph eight, South Africa expresses regret at its deletion from the revised text, which we considered to reflect a balanced and measured approach to this issue.
On paragraph 16, South Africa would prefer to retain the original phrasing on the mandate of the IAEA with regard to Article 3.
Chair, on the section pertaining to nuclear weapon free zones, we agree with the views of Mexico and Brazil that the text can be further strengthened, highlighting the important role nuclear weapon free zones play in the maintenance of international and regional peace and security, strengthening non proliferation, and contributing to the realization of nuclear disarmament.
South Africa welcomes the concern expressed in paragraph 78 regarding university regarding universality and the challenges posed by nuclear stockpiles outside the treaty framework.
However, we propose refinement of the text to ensure the language is geographically balanced.
In this regard, we propose replacing the current reference to a specific region with a reference to regions where nuclear weapon free zones do not exist.
This formulation is consistent with language used in previous review cycles and better reflects the global nature of the challenge.
Mr.
Chair South Africa remains fully committed to working with you and all delegations to bridge remaining gaps and to deliver an outcome worthy of this treaty.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of South Africa for the statement and the kind words addressed to the presidency and support.
Next on my list is the representative of Denmark, followed by Madagascar.
Denmark, you have the floor.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chair.
Denmark joins others in thanking the president and all involved for the work on Rev one.
The Rev one is still under scrutiny in my capital, but allow me to offer a few initial considerations on some of the key paragraphs.
We recognize the commendable work done to find consensus by the president and the team and find that there are issues where the text has been substantially improved.
At the same time, we also see the text moving away from consensus or not sufficiently reflecting the breadth of opinions expressed in the room.
I will highlight three points here from our perspective.
First, I will repeat our call for including text in the document on the severe implications on safeguards in Ukraine due to Russia's illegal use of force, including the seizure and militarization of the Ukrainian ablit nuclear power plant.
Such actions challenge national implementation of IAEA safeguards.
Second, we regret, like others, a number of other delegations that language on Iran and DPRK has been weakened and more work is needed on these issues.
Third, we also continue to oppose the use of the ambiguous and subjective term about undue constraints.
We do not see consensus on the use of these terms in OP 21 and OP 23.
It is simply unclear to us what it refers to.
We will hand in these remarks and some additional ones in writing.
Denmark continues to be ready to work with all states to find consensus on the issues and a balanced text.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Denmark for his statement and kind words addressed to the presidency and the voices of support.
Next on my list is the distinct representative of Madagascar, followed by Cameron, Madagascar, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
In turn, we would like to thank the president and his team for sending this new version of the text.
This is a solid foundation which inches us closer to consensus.
Our capital is considering it, but we would like to make some preliminary remarks already at this stage, Paris 11 to 13.
Now there are the revised Document states that an additional protocol is a sovereign decision.
At the same time, it says that there needs to be a verification standard that's tighter.
We believe that we need to delete the sovereign decision bid because against the current backdrop, this standard should be a universal norm, a universal standard for all states parties, nuclear weapons free zones, Madagascar, as a party to the Palandaba Treaty mentioned in Paris 75 believes that Paris 76 needs to be strengthened.
Aside from simply asking nuclear weapon states to review their reservations vis vis the protocols, we believe we need to call for the immediate withdrawal of all reservations that are incompatible with the objectives of zone based treaties in order to bolster regional peace and security.
Paragraph 17, On naval nuclear propulsion, we need to specify that the arrangements measured here should in no shape or form weaken IEA guarantees, nor should they be used to divert nuclear materials preventing them from being verified.
Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Distued Representative of Madagascar for the statement.
The next speaker on my list is Cameroon, followed by Japan, Cameroon, you have the floor.
Fuller, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
My delegation would like to thank you for efficiently steering the work of main Committee two.
We also wish to commend the constructive spirit which has reigned in this committee to date.
We appreciate the new text.
We will painstakingly consider it in the spirit of openness and with a view to garnering consensus.
We are committed to a balanced outcome, a balanced final document which fully reflects the rights and obligations of all states parties to the treaty.
For this reason, Alongside other states parties, my delegation, will work to ensure the NPT remains credible.
It's very fine tuned machine.
It's served as the scaffolding of nonproliferation through mechanisms which can be perfected without a doubt, but which so far have helped us to ring alarm bells alarm bells about the cyclones that nuclear weapons constitute.
Now, it must be said that we can't simply raise our hands to stop the winds in a cyclone situation.
We need shelter.
We need to strike a balance between centrifugal and centripetal forces.
Which are currently buffeting the NPT regime.
That's why for my delegation, it's absolutely vital that we patiently buttress this architecture, the credibility of which hinges on the non discriminatory implementation of its three pillars without favoring any one of the pillars to the detriment of the other two.
My delegation has taken note of the progress made in the revised version.
All the while, we must acknowledge that further work is necessary.
We note with appreciation the efforts taken to factor in concerns regarding the facilitation of nuclear technology transfer.
We welcome the headway made, and we hope it will be fully up and running.
For the non nuclear weapons states continue to seek to strike a balance between their nonproliferation obligations and their inalienable right to peaceful development.
Furthermore, my delegation notes with appreciation the central role the IAEA plays as regards safeguards and additional protocols respecting the voluntary and sovereign nature of the conclusions drawn of the decision taken to enter into such a safeguards agreement and additional protocols.
A lot of work has been done To prepare the ground for this text, it is now time to sow the seeds.
This text is a promising seed which we hope will germinate, resulting in a final document that is robust, ambitious, and very much forward looking, which looks to current and emerging challenges.
Thus, the NPT will be able to resist in the face of heavy gusts of wind and other challenges it faces.
For my delegation, the challenge before us is a pressing one.
It's also crucial that we address it.
It is decisive.
We must hold hold the rudder firm to ensure that we can do justice to what it says in the United Nations charter.
That's the only way to avert Armageddon.
Now, this objective, although it might be difficult, we can work towards it as we face the sort of Damocles and nuclear threat and other challenges as well.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguced representative of Cameroon for his statement and kind words addressed to the chair.
Next on my list is the speaker from Japan, followed by Norway.
Japan, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Japan extends its gratitude to the president, the chair, and the team for the circulation of the revised draft.
We will submit our written commentator.
For now, I would like to offer some preliminary comment.
First, on North Korea, we commend the effort to maintain language on North Korea in the document.
Its nuclear issue is a matter of the integrity and credibility of the NPD.
We are of the view that the text of the draft should be kept entirely with the proposed modification, which is an addition to the language in accordance with all the relevant UN Security Council resolutions just after the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on paragraph 79.
We stress that our grave concern over North Korean problem should be reflected in the text clearly.
For the rest, I would go through main points in the text.
On Oi one, we would like to raise concern about the language balanced in the context of implementation of Article 1 and two.
The obligations under these articles must be observed without conditions.
On Oi five, we welcome the important addition regarding the authority of the IAEA.
On Oi ten to 12, we suse the insertion of the language on CSA universalization and welcome the modification of the verb.
We need to maintain balance with the past agreement and text in 2010, 2015 and 2022.
In this regard, we request addition of as soon as possible and without further delay on OP ten, as we proposed previously.
On OP 11, while we don't disagree the notion that the conclusion of AP is voluntary, we prefer to stick to the wordings in the negotiated text in the past.
On OP 12, we have heard various voices proposing deletion of this paragraph.
I would like to point out that this paragraph comes from the past negotiated text, including the 2010 document, specifically action 28 of the action plan.
Trying to delete this paragraph runs counter to the endeavor to preserve the value of the past aggregate position.
On OP 16 and 19, we welcome our proposed modification.
On OP 21 export control, Japan opposes to the world of und these constraints as it does not properly reflect the value of export control.
We maintain our request to add languages stressing positive aspect of the export control.
On OP 77, we welcome the addition In the same vein on OP 85, we are observed that the deleted language on the basis of arrangement freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned should be restored.
Finally, on OP 78, nuclear stockpiles in South Asia, we are grateful for the clarification of the language.
This concludes our comment for today.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Japan for the statement and the kind words addressed to the presidency.
The next speaker I have on my list is the representative of Norway, followed by Italy, Norway, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
We welcome the revised draft and think it reflects careful and thoughtful drafting with clear efforts to strike balanced compromises.
We particularly appreciate the concise structure.
Allow me to present some preliminary comments.
OP seven Addressing cases on noncompliance remains a crucial and sometimes sensitive issue.
Norway supports retaining clear and specific language on such cases.
On Iran, full and timely cooperation with the agency is indispensable to a resolving concerns and restoring confidence.
In line with the importance attached to addressing all non compliance matters in preambular paragraph 13.
We welcome that the Iran noncompliance case remains referenced.
This is important.
However, the deletion of the explicit reference to the IAEAs board of governors decision unduly weakens the paragraph.
This fact needs to be reinstated, but we are ready to work on the exact formulation.
We appreciate on OP 16, sorry.
Also, we believe that the first two sentences should be consolidated so that the points about the unresolved outstanding safeguards, issues, and non compliance is made directly in relation to Iran.
The current split into two sentences weakens that point.
Now to OP 16 and 33, we appreciate that the draft reflects the IAA's independent and essential role.
We underscore that the IAA's budget should reflect its increasing responsibilities and workload as recognized in OP 16 and 33.
As regards to OP 12 and 14 on the additional protocol, we believe this strong motivational language is important.
We do not see any opposition between this kind of encouragement and the fact that the conclusion of an additional protocol remains a sovereign choice.
The additional protocol, which has been concluded by a large majority of the states parties, strengthens non proliferation significantly, and hence we should be encouraged by this.
OP 20 and 21, export controls and peaceful uses.
It is important that we recognize that export control regimes enables access to peaceful uses nuclear technology and do not represent a hindrance.
It is very important that we avoid formulation that suggests otherwise.
We note that the language has been somehow moderated and we believe that OPF 20 has gone in the right direction.
This is very important to us.
As mentioned by Canada, we believe the paragraph should be strengthened further with factual reflections, not just the aim of export control, but the important role that they do play.
We welcome the current draft on OP 74 and 276 reaffirm support to nuclear weapon free zones, which contributes significantly to strengthening both regional and global security.
Stress the importance of maintaining clear language on regional proliferation challenges, including DPRK on OP 79, which continue to undermine the global nonproliferation regime.
It's everything but a closed case.
We agree with the many who have explained why they need to express grave concern about DPRKs nuclear weapons and missiles program in this text.
Chair, Norway remains committed to engaging constructively in these discussions.
We will continue to work with all partners to ensure that the outcome on the main Committee two is balanced, credible, and firmly anchored in the treaty obligations and principles.
I thank you.
I thank the distinc representative of Norway for the statement and reading to work further in support of the outcome document.
Next speaker is the representative of Italy, followed by United Kingdom.
Italy, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
At the outset, I would like to thank you and through you, the president and the Secretariat for this revised draft.
We are still reviewing the document in detail, but I would like to share some preliminary comments.
We believe that this rev one is moving in the right direction.
We can clearly see the attempt to draft a balanced text.
First, we welcome the retention in the preamble of the need for states parties to respect their non proliferation obligations under the treaty, as well as the importance of addressing all cases of non compliance to preserve the integrity of the treaty.
In paragraph five, alongside the reaffirmation of the role of the IAEA as the competent authority to verify compliance, we appreciate the addition that no action should be undertaken to undermine the agency's authority.
Regarding paragraph 11 and the introduction of the term voluntary, while we recognize that concluding an additional protocol remains a sovereign decision, we would reiterate that for us, comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with the additional protocol constitute the current verification standard, and their universalization should be pursued without delay.
Turning to paragraph seven, while we welcome the retention of language emphasizing the need for full and timely cooperation with the IAEA, we note that it has now been almost a year since the IAEA lost access to the most sensitive facilities of the Iranian nuclear program and lost continuity of knowledge regarding entire aspects of that program.
We regret that the reference to concerns over the findings of the IAEA Board of Governors on Iran's noncompliance has been removed, thereby significantly weakening the previous language.
Furthermore, regarding paragraph 79, we once again stress the need to accurately reflect the nonproliferation challenges posed by the DPRK's nuclear and missile activities.
This remains the most flagrant violation in the history of the NPT and must be accurately reflected.
At this rev Coon, 84 states, including Italy, joined a statement condemning the DPRK's nuclear activities carried out in defiance of its international obligations and accompanied by continued escalatory actions.
Finally, about paragraph 21, our delegation considers that export control regimes do not create undue constraints on the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
On the contrary, they contribute to facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear energy while strengthening proliferation and prevention, mutual trust, and transparency.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Italy for the statements and the kind words addressed to the presidency.
Next speaker is the Representative of the United Kingdom, followed by Yemen.
United Kingdom, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
The UK is grateful for the considerable effort invested in producing this revised outcome document.
We support the president's appeal yesterday to move forward in a constructive and flexible spirit.
Our capital is still considering the text in detail, but I would like to use this opportunity to feed in some initial views.
Firstly, we recognize the content we are discussing today as a good basis for deliberation.
There is much to welcome, including the emphasis placed on the importance of the IAs work, the safeguard system, and the need for compliance with nonproliferation obligations.
On the zero draft, we suggested some technical edits to some of the preambular paragraphs.
Our colleagues in capital are reviewing those, but we do believe that some refinement is still needed for accuracy.
One such example is in PP 13, where the text must accurately reflect the fact that the treaty itself does not have an inbuilt compliance mechanism.
Similarly, in new paragraph one, as noted by Japan, we should be careful in the language not to qualify the implementation of Articles one and two with the addition of new terms or to introduce language implying that there may be scope for lesser forms of compliance.
In relation to paragraph 18, referring to nuclear security, we continue to support its inclusion and again suggest a minor edit is necessary to this important but concise paragraph so it properly reflects the nuclear security challenges of the modern era.
Chair, we welcome new language referring to the near universalization of the CSA and urging the remaining state party to conclude such an agreement.
This would indeed mark an important moment.
But we continue to believe the text should recognize that a considerable majority of member states have now concluded an additional protocol.
The text does accurately recognize the additional protocols voluntary nature.
But this conference should also now surely welcome the fact that a significant number of states parties have chosen to conclude one.
With that in mind, the retention of paragraph 12 also remains important as noted by Canada and others today.
We are also of the view, like others today, that the important language found in the zero drafts paragraph 16 should be reinstated.
This regards the need for IEA safeguards to be evaluated.
Safeguards have a long and established history of being assessed and evaluated in light of technological developments to ensure their continued effectiveness and efficiency.
As we experience more rapid advancement and developments in nuclear technologies, including since the last Rev Coon, there is a strong rationale to retain previous language in this text.
Chair, we can see that this revision has sought to balance the many views expressed so far during this conference, but it remains important to call out those who do not comply with their safeguards obligations and to urge resolution of outstanding issues.
We therefore reiterate our view that this text should clearly express its deep concern with Iran's continued failure to comply with its safeguards obligations, urge Iran to resolve all outstanding non compliance issues without delay, and refer to the relevant Security Council resolutions in this regard.
Similarly, we must ensure the text fully addresses the issue of DPRK as the most egregious violator of the NPT, and we support comments made by Sweden, the Republic of Korea, and others to that effect today.
Finally, Chair, regarding naval nuclear propulsion, I associate myself with the comments made today by Australia.
Chair, we once again thank you for your efforts so far.
We will provide further thoughts in writing as swiftly as possible.
Thank you.
I thank the Distinct Representative for the United Kingdom for the statements and kind words of support.
Next speaker, Representative of Yemen, followed by Cuba.
Yemen, you have the floor.
Vidtan Godzilla Sk.
Allow me to begin by thanking the chair for circulating this revised text.
We congratulate you for your excellent leadership of this work, Chair.
Having taken note of this text, particularly with regard to the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, we support the statement made by the representative of Egypt on behalf of the Arab group.
And in this context, we would like to make the following remarks on paragraph 84, 85, and 86.
Firstly, we underscore that any expert on the Middle East that does not refer to the implementation of the 1995 resolution is not commensurate with the expectations of the region and peoples in the region for calls for security.
Taking specific measures isn't a demand from the people.
It is a demand for stability and for the long term success of the NPT.
Several delegations have put forward proposals and comments.
During the second subsidiary body meeting and we regret the fact that these proposals were overlooked, particularly with regard to the aforementioned paragraphs.
We call for the inclusion of the outcomes of the work of the second subsidiary body.
Secondly, these paragraphs do not contain any clear affirmation relating to the obligation stemming from previous review conferences, particularly with regard to the responsibilities of nuclear weapon states with regard to the full implementation of the 1995 resolution.
We further believe the mission of this is a grave gap in the document.
Thirdly, we call for reference to the UN conference on a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East that will be held for the seventh time this year.
We I would like to see a express reference to the previous versions of this conference and also complimentary processes to the implementation of the 1995 resolution.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Yemen for the statement and kind words.
Next speaker is the Representative of Cuba, followed by United States Cuba, you have the floor.
Thank you Chairman.
Since this is the first time that we are referring to rev one of the document, we'd like to say that we thank the chair for his efforts to put forward a consensus based text.
We recognize that this is a complex task.
However, in this committee, we must highlight that the entire text irremedibly is inclined towards nonproliferation, leaving out the other two pillars of the treaty.
We are still reviewing this with our capitals, but up For now we will reiterate our concerns in this main committee.
We reiterate our thanks, and to the chair for their work on nuclear weapons free zones.
We support the call made by Mexico on the need to strengthen the language on contributions made by nuclear weapons free zones to nuclear disarmament.
We call attention to the fact that we see insufficient language on the creation of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East and we'll send comments on writing.
We continue to be fully committed to working constructively with all parties.
Thank you very much.
I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba for the statement and the kind words of the chair.
Next speaker on my list is the United States, followed by Argentina, United States, you have the floor.
Chair, thank you for the opportunity to offer some initial reactions to the draft before Man Committee two.
We have not yet completed our review and will provide detailed comments as consultations continue.
In the meantime, we wish to thank President Bilt and his team for their efforts as we continue to work toward consensus.
Nonetheless, the current text is inadequate and the United States cannot accept it as written.
Let us be clear about what we're dealing with.
Iran is in violation of the treaty.
The IAEA Board of Governors has found Iran in non compliance with its safeguards agreement, which it is required to implement pursuant to the explicit requirements of Article 3.
Iran has failed to provide credible explanations for undeclared nuclear material and activities at multiple undeclared locations.
These are not procedural disputes.
These are not technical disagreements.
These are fundamental, unresolved questions about the nature and purpose of Iran's nuclear program.
They have persisted unresolved for years.
The draft text before us papers over these facts.
It speaks of unresolved outstanding safeguards issues, language so vague, it could apply to any number of routine or inconsequential matters.
It does not reflect the IEA board's noncompliance finding.
It does not convey the threat that Iran's continued obstruction poses to the integrity of the safeguard system.
Iran's accumulation of 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%, a stockpile that lacks any credible peaceful use and for which Iran has provided no justification is an unquestionable violation of the treaty.
Any outcome document that fails to condemn this violation of the treaty is meaningless.
Chair, if this conference cannot call noncompliance by its name, we have a serious problem.
Every state in this room has accepted IAEA safeguards, has opened its facilities to inspectors, has answered the IEAs questions.
Every one of those states deserves a treaty and review process that means something.
A document that obscures Iran's noncompliance record does not serve those states.
It does not serve the treaty, it does not serve the United States of America, and frankly, it does not serve Iran either because genuine diplomatic progress requires an honest accounting of where things stand.
Chair, we will provide additional thoughts in subsequent interventions and in writing, but let me assure you that the United States is committed to engaging constructively in this committee's work.
Thank you.
I thank the distinct representative of the United States for the statement and kind words addressed to the president.
Speaker on my list is Argentina, followed by Iran Argentina, you have the floor.
All.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
I'd like to begin by thanking you and the president of the conference for this new version.
I thank you and your team also for all of the work that you've done to capture the meetings that we had a few days ago.
We're well aware of the challenge to present a concise text, and we thank you for this effort to condense the thoughts in the room and we know how difficult this is and you can count on our support.
I'd like to comment on the paragraphs that we're addressing.
I'll try to cover all of my points.
Firstly, my country welcomes the change made in paragraph five on the IAEA.
The language has been strengthened there.
On paragraph six, we reiterate that we note the importance of this and we believe that the language could be improved with references to the IAA statute, et cetera Now, on paragraph eight, We think that the reference here to the IAEA statute is positive and the spirit could be reflected in paragraph six, as I mentioned before.
On paragraphs 11 and 12 that my country reads together, We welcome the introduction of references to the voluntary instrument and reiterate Argentina's position that this representative verification valid verification standard.
Now in paragraph 12, the country's problem is to how this is being presented, whether or not it's a separate paragraph and um the reference as soon as possible, which seems to say that we're not strengthening what was said in the previous 11.
This also affects the careful balance that we've sought throughout these safeguard sections and we think that it should be revised.
Now, on what was previously paragraph 16, my country concurs that it's important to include this again and we believe that the language from 2010 could be a good guide for consensus based language here.
My country takes note positively of the progress in the language in paragraph 20 on exports.
I think and export controls.
I think that's a positive step forward.
It reflects the role of these instruments.
However, in 21, we see some negative language relating to undue constraints.
This is a repeat from the previous session.
In paragraph 23, we had some identical language previously.
We think that we lose balance here for various reasons.
I also wanted to add my voice to those countries that have asked for strengthened language on the DPRK and on Iran due to non compliance in various situations.
We believe it's important to reflect this appropriately in line with IAA resolution, Security Council sanctions.
We think that we can do more work to bolster the language here.
I'd also like to refer to nuclear weapons free zones.
On the paragraph that is now 85, we'd like to return to the previous language that reflected the principles of the UNDC in terms of nuclear weapons free zone, particularly the reference to the fact that they need to be freely agreed to among countries in the region.
I also concur with Mexico and Brazil with regard to the need to have language that reflects the contribution of the nuclear weapons free zone.
I think that the Mexican proposal was helpful and didn't find any opposition.
I think it could be included.
Finally, we'd like to recover a paragraph on safeguard verifications, which we didn't hear any opposition to, and we would like to propose the reintroduction of this language that was pre agreed in 2010.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Argentina for the statement and kind words, best of the presidency and teams and voice of support.
Next speaker is representative of Iran, followed by Nigeria, Iran, you have the floor.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chair, for giving me the floor to share with you and the room our remarks on the remaining of the paragraphs under the purview of this committee and also to give a feedback to what we hear, especially with regard to Iran.
We, of course, as I mentioned, reject any proposal to refer to Iran to peaceful nuclear program of Iran in the text.
And as we heard from one delegation to discuss about the established facts and from our perspective, the fact is that the US and Israeli regime attacked Iran's nuclear facilities for the second time while there is no even nuclear enrichment in those facilities.
The fact is that those attacks happened during our diplomatic negotiations with the US.
The fact is that Israel is the only non party to the NPT refusing safeguards of the IAA against the backdrop of numerous international calls and therefore, also we reject to refer to any expired UN Security Council resolution.
And in response to the US delegate, I think that those statements do not warrant any response even because it is nonsense to hear from their president that they have attacked Iran's nuclear facilities in a way that they've been completely obliterated.
And in the meantime, the US delegate requests access to the IAA.
This is nonsense and we reject it.
And as I mentioned, we have shared our alternative languages with regard to prohibition of attack to nuclear facilities.
In fact, it is very unfortunate to see that in the red one, the reference to express grave concern on the attacks against Iran's nuclear facilities has been deleted, but we think that we should bring and incorporate our language in referring those attacks as absolutely prohibited and illegal in violation of international law and constituting an act of aggression and in breach of the right to nuclear peaceful activities.
With regard to access of the IA Director General to Security Council, we believe that sentence should be deleted and we have alternative language exactly in line with the statitute of the IAA requesting any state a state party to have concerns about activities of others, to report it to the board of governors and the board of governors to discuss it and ask the consent parties to make remedy with regard to noncompliance and if decided to be reported to the Security Council and General Assembly.
With regard to naval nuclear propulsion, as we have mentioned, we believe that those discussions should be participated by all state parties and based on a completely comprehensive approach.
Implementation of safeguards agreements should be technical, impartial, and without discrimination.
The text needs to address and acknowledge that there have been some cases that the implementation of safeguards have been politically misused by certain state parties.
We believe paragraphs 14 to 18 should be deleted because they are too detailed and it's not the review conference to address technically issues of the IAEA.
With regard to export control, we believe that those export control regimes are beyond of the treaty requirements and incompatible with the purpose of the treaty and have been a political leverage against targeted countries.
Therefore, we believe that those references should be deleted and instead, facilitation of international cooperation by all states parties should be requested, and also it should be requested from the state parties to remove any restriction on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
With regard to Korean Peninsula, we believe that the first sentence suffices and the rest should be dropped.
And as we don't have enough time to address the paragraph on Middle East, we'll come back I thank the distinct representative of Iran for the second statement.
The next speaker I have on my list is the representative of Nigeria, followed by Indonesia.
Nigeria, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Nigeria appreciate the efforts undertaken in producing this reverse tests, and we recognizes the importance of strengthening the nonproliferation regime under the treaty.
Affirmed that the effective implementation of Article 1, two, and three remain essential to preserving the integrity and credibility of the NPT.
In this regard, Nigeria underscores the central role of the IAEA as the sole competent technical authority for safeguard verification in accordance with its statutes and relevant safeguard agreement.
Nigera supports universal adherence to comprehensive safeguard agreement and encourages broader adoption of the additional protocol on a voluntary basis consistent with national sovereign decision and legal obligations once undertaking.
At the same time, implementation of nonproliferation obligation must remain balanced, objective, non discriminatory, and fully consistent with the right of state parties under Article 4 relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
I generally remain concerned by language that may appear selective or politically targeted as such formulation risk undermining consenso and the impartiality required in this process.
Concern relating to compliance should be addressed through established institutional mechanism, through diplomacy and dialogue, and in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.
We also underscore the importance of ensuring that safeguard implementation does not become an undue impediment to peaceful nuclear cooperation, technology transfer, and technical assistance for developing country.
Finally, Nigera reiterated that threatened nonproliferation must proceed alongside concrete progress on nuclear disarment and Iran access to peaceful uses in keeping with the balance bargain at the heart of the treaty.
In this regard, wish to state that regarding additional protocol, that's paragraph 11 to 12, While we support this paragraph, we have concern that this could create discriminatory conditionality, and it may also restrict peaceful cooperation.
We therefore suggest that the paragraph should read, the conference recognizes the value of the additional protocol as a covenence building verification instrument voluntarily concluded by state consistent with their sovereign decision and legal obligation.
As regards to the issue of a That's paragraph 17.
While we also support this, we believe that the language is too weak and this could create safeguard loophole for non nuclear weapon states.
We therefore make this following suggestion.
The conference notes concern relating to v nuclear population arrangement involving non nuclear weapon state and underscores the importance of transparency, safeguard integrity, and ensuring that such arrangements do not create loophole inconsistent with the objective of the treaty.
As regards to export control, that's para 19 to 20, we so much support this paragraph.
However, we have a suggestion that we believe that this language is not complete, and we have suggestion that we should add to this in order not to leave any loophole that export control measures should be implemented in a transparent, non discriminatory manner, and should not impose undue restrictions inconsistent with the inalible right of state party under Article 4.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria for the statement.
Next speaker is the representative of Indonesia, followed by New Zealand.
Indonesia, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Indonesia, thanks to the president and the chairs of the main committees for the revised trap outcome document.
We appreciate that several of our concerns have been reflected and we will continue to engage constructively in the text.
As we continue to assess the revised text, we wish to highlight several priority issues that, in our view still require strengthening.
On preambular paragraph Roman 13, we propose that non compliance methods be addressed in an objective, non discriminatory and balanced manner.
Concerning Pamular paragraph 17, we believe that the text should recognize that IAAF guard supports the advancement of verifiable nuclear disarmament, consistent with the IAEA statute.
Indonesia welcome the reference to non discriminatory and balanced implementations in paragraph one.
But to be consistent, the same qualifier should also be carried out throughout the text.
Equally important, paragraph four should make it clear that safeguards are to be implemented without hampering the innable rights of states parties under Article 4.
Initia appreciate the effort to strike the balance on paragraph concerning propulsion as reflected in paragraph 17.
Nevertheless, we reiterate our proposals that states parties pursuing NAFL nuclear propulsions engage with the IAEA with a view to ensuring compliance with their respective legal safeguards obligations and preserving the integrity and credibility of the safeguard systems.
On nuclear weapon free zones, we reiterate our appreciation to the acknowledgment on the importance of nuclear weapon free zones.
At the same time, we believe that paragraph 76 concerning the calls for the ratifications and accessions by nuclear weapon states of the relevant protocols should be followed with additions without reservations contrary to the object and purpose of these treaties.
Lastly, on Middle East, Indonesia attach great importance to the 1995 resolution and share with you that adding future directions element is necessary toward the full achievement of the objective.
We remain committed to working constructively with states parties toward balanced consensus based outcome, and we will provide further inputs during our next consultations.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank distinguished representative of Indonesia for the statement and for constructive position which your delegation is willing to take.
Next speaker is New Zealand to be followed by Peru.
New Zealand, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
And our thanks to the President and his bureau for this Revision one draft that we have in front of us.
As with others, we are carefully reviewing the changes, and so these comments are likely initial and incomplete.
Having said that, we recognize this is a constructive undertaking by the president and his bureau to move states parties towards an overall acceptable outcome and to retain a balance and conciseness that were the hallmarks of the draft.
We commend your efforts.
Chair, we were pleased to see that some of New Zealand suggestions submitted in writing were taken up.
We will make further observations and before being specific, I would make a couple of broad comments.
Like other colleagues that took the floor before me, New Zealand seeks strong language on Iran and the DPRK.
These are critical issues for the treaty.
Yes, these are sensitive matters, but they go to the heart of the treaty, and it is critical that we reflect this in an appropriate way.
States parties must be crystal clear about instances of noncompliance and also in the case of the DPRK, an illegal nuclear weapons program.
New Zealand will continue to be constructive on this point, but we again highlight the importance that these issues are appropriately dealt with in any final text.
In addition, the language that discusses nuclear safeguard, safety and security issues in Ukraine that have arisen following Russia's illegal invasion remain insufficiently strong.
It also lacks clarity about where the responsibility lies for these problems.
Chair, I now move on to some specific comments.
In paragraph operational paragraph five, we were pleased to see the additional language underscoring the authority of the IAEA.
We think this paragraph could be further improved by including within the last sentence after the acronym for the agency, the words and the integrity of the treaty to tie this explicitly back to the NPT.
In operational paragraph six, with the removal of the safeguards language, we see this paragraph has lost an important element.
We should reinstate this language to align with the NPT's 2010 outcome.
Like my Canadian, German, UK, and other colleagues, we would like to see the reinstatement of paragraph 16 from the draft.
It is important that we continue to encourage a safeguard system that is responsive to technological developments and see this element as critical in light of text elsewhere in the document that discusses advanced reactor technology.
As others have also said, the paragraphs dealing with export controls have improved.
But in paragraphs 21 and elsewhere in the document outside the remit of this committee, the implication remains that export control regimes impose undue restrictions on the trade in nuclear technology and material.
In fact, export controls facilitate legitimate trade, including through the provision of necessary assurances.
Like others, New Zealand encourages the Bureau to continue to improve these paragraphs.
Chair, once again, these are preliminary comments, but as I said at the beginning, we see this Reiv one as a constructive attempt to bring our delegations closer together.
New Zealand will remain constructively engaged to help the president and states parties achieve an outcome.
I thank you for giving me the floor.
I thank the Distinguished Representative of New Zealand for the statement and his constructive position.
Next on my list is the speaker from Peru, followed by Saudi Arabia.
Peru, you have the floor.
Pre Thank you, Chair.
Please, could you move us after the next speaker for our comments? Thank you.
Please move us to the next round for our comments.
Okay.
So next speaker is the distinguished Repst of Saudi Arabia, followed by Peru.
Oh, you have the floor.
Mr.
Chair, at the outset, my delegation would like to express its thanks to the president and the Secretariat for their valuable effort to issue this new version of the draft outcome document.
We believe that it is a good foundation for further negotiation.
This is especially so when it comes to the second pillar.
We support and align ourselves to the statement of Egypt on behalf of the Arab group in this vein.
We would like to add the following remarks in our national capacity.
My country welcomes the additions stating that an additional protocol will still be voluntary and sovereign for every country on paragraph 11.
We also welcome the deletion of the part on assessing safeguards in light of the technical developments in paragraph 16.
In the previous version of the outcome document, we also welcome the addition of paragraph 21 that encourages technological transfer among member states so long as it is consistent with the treaty.
We stress that some of the comments provided are still valid.
We will send it to the presidency.
We would like it to be taken into consideration in the next version.
To conclude, we renew our thanks to you, Mr.
Chair, and your efforts, and we are ready to work constructively to ensure the success of this conference.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished Side of Saudi Arabia for the statement and kind words addressed to the chair and your constructive mood to work with us further.
Next speaker is Peru, followed by Ukraine.
Peru, you have the floor.
Thank you very much, Chairman.
I'd like to begin by expressing the particular thanks of my delegation to you and to the leadership of Ambassador Viet.
I thank them for their efforts to achieve a balanced text in this Rev one.
Even though we continue to assess it here and in Lima, I'd like to make a few preliminary comments.
On paragraph one, we welcome the language that's been added related to the nondiscriminatory and balanced implementation.
This could represent a standard for implementation.
On paragraph five, we welcome the inclusion of the additional language of the IAEA authority in the sense that no action should be undertaken so as to undermine the authority of the IAA.
On paragraph eight, we express our preference for the previous version with regard to the word emphasizes or stresses rather than acknowledges.
On paragraph 79, we express our support for the current text, although we have had a preference for the preference for the previous version in paragraph 78 of the draft.
Finally, my delegation would like to refer to the paragraphs on the Middle East, that is 84 to 86.
In this regard, we'd like to stress that we concur with the position expressed by various countries, including South Africa, to the extent that the importance of achieving language that reflects the importance of these zones to nuclear disarmament.
Thank you very much.
I thank the distinguished representative of Peru for the statement and the kind words addressed to the presidency.
Next speaker is Ukraine, followed by El Salvador.
Ukraine, you have the floor.
Mr.
Chair, at the outset, we express our appreciation to the president of the Conference, the Bureau, and the Secretariat for the circulation of the revised draft outcome document.
At this stage, we would like to share our preliminary review of the main changes introduced in comparison with the zero draft, particularly with regard to the sections allocated to the work of this committee.
While we positively note the overall improvement of the language across different parts of the text related to the nuclear nonproliferation pillar, we believe that further strengthening is still required in several areas.
We regret that similarly to the zero draft, the revised text does not contain any language related to the implementation of IAA safeguards in Ukraine in the context of Russia's ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine.
As highlighted by various delegations, including our own throughout the deliberations, the IA continues to face serious challenges related to its verification activities, particularly as the Russian occupied the Parisian nuclear power plant.
Due to the ongoing presence of Russian military and other unauthorized personnel at the site, which has resulted in Ukraine's loss of regulatory control over nuclear material.
With regard to the paragraph related to Iran's nuclear program, welcome the fact that the revised draft retains the reference to non compliance.
At the same time, regret the deletion of the reference to the relevant resolution of the IAA Board of Governors.
Would suggest reinstating this language as well as including a clear reference to the relevant UN Security Council resolutions.
Furthermore, we regret that the language on the DPRK has been weakened.
We reiterate the seriousness of the challenge posed by the DPRK, which continues to advance its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs in violation of its international obligations, including relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.
However, as it currently stands, the text does not adequately reflect the continued advancement of DPRK's nuclear program and the threat it poses to the international nonproliferation regime.
In this regard, we would like to request the reinstatement of the deleted sentence contained in the previous version of the draft.
We also believe that the conference should clearly express its concern regarding statements suggesting that the DPRK nuclear issue is a closed issue.
The delegation of Ukraine will submit its written proposals on the relevant sections of the draft outcome of the document at a later stage.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the same frap for Ukraine for the statement and kind words.
Next speaker, the same frap of El Salvador to be followed by Spain.
El Salvador, you have the four.
Thank you, Chair for promptly circulating this revised version of the outcome document.
While my delegation continues to look at the text in detail, we'd like to constructively contribute with some preliminary comments.
With regard to the preamble, we welcome the reference to the safeguard system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which represents a fundamental component of the international nonproliferation regime and an essential part of the implementation of Article 3 and four of the treaty.
Further, we welcome the reference to nonproliferation contained in paragraph 18.
We believe that this strengthens the general balance of the text.
In our view, the safeguard regime and the technical verification work by the IAA remain essential to build international trust and to guarantee the exclusively peaceful nature of nuclear programs.
We value the fact that the text clearly reaffirms the role, mandate, and authority of the agency, and we hope that this reference will be remained in future versions of the document.
On the rest of the content, in particular, paragraph three, our preliminary impression is that the language adequately reflects the importance of nonproliferation obligations which represent an integral part of the treaty.
However, we also believe it's important to preserve appropriate balance between the three pillars.
Therefore, we deem that the text could more explicitly reflect the nuclear disarmament obligations, which also represent fundamental and indivisible parts of the treaty.
On the establishment of nuclear weapons free zones in areas where they did not yet exist, we reiterate our call for the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which formed an integral part of the decisions which led to the indefinite extension of the treaty and whose implementation remains a pending priority.
Finally, we reiterate our suggestion to strengthen the language relating to the role of nuclear weapons free zones.
This was already mentioned today by several delegations such as Mexico, Brazil and Argentina.
For El Salvador, these zones represent specific effective measures that contribute to strengthening regional peace and security.
For this reason, we believe it's important for the document to robustly reflect the strategic value of these zones within the international nonproliferation disarmament architecture.
Thank you very much, Chair, for your efforts.
You can count on the full support of El Salvador in this final stretch of the review conference.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of El Salvador for the statement and the kind words.
Next speaker is Spain to be followed by the United States.
Spain, you have the floor.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
I'd like to begin by thanking you and the president of the conference for the new draft, which we understand as a good basis to continue our work.
Although like other delegations, we believe that we know that this draft is being considered within our capitals at the moment.
For now, I am grateful for the opportunity to make some brief national comments.
In the preambular part of this new draft, we believe that we should once again request the inclusion of a reference to highlight the work authority, mandate, independence, and objectivity of the IAEA.
We believe that the location of this reference could be in current paragraph 14, Roman 14 of the preamble, but we're flexible on that.
Like other delegations, we support the re insertion of the previous paragraph 16 to reaffirm once again, the fact that IAA safeguards should be assessed regularly, bearing in mind technological developments.
On export controls, current paragraph 20, we'd like to make some comments that are very similar to what other delegations have said because we believe that this paragraph expresses that export controls aim to ensure that nuclear exports for peaceful purposes do not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
However, it's also important to balance this reference against the positive effect that these export controls have in terms of safeguarding and facilitating legitimate nuclear trade.
We also request, therefore, removing the references that appear in paragraph 21 and 23 to undue constraints.
In with regard to in compliance with the safeguard cases, we believe that these are essential issues for the credibility of this treaty that must be addressed appropriately within this draft.
In this regard, we concur with other delegations that have requested strengthened language on noncompliance by Iran.
This is language that we believe has been weakened in this new draft and does not reflect reality.
The same goes in our view for the paragraphs related to the nuclear and ballistic program of North Korea.
We believe that we should strengthen these paragraphs to reflect the real threat that these programs pose and to request that the DPRK abandon these programs and not carry out a nuclear test, sign and ratify the CTBT together with those that are already reflected what has already been reflected in this draft on the need to respect the safeguards regime and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.
Finally, on the additional protocols, the IAA additional protocols, we believe it's important to maintain paragraph 11 to highlight the fact that the combination of comprehensive safeguard agreements, CSAs, together with additional protocols which are obviously voluntary currently represent the international verification standard, and this remains the case.
We will send these and other comments in writing.
Thank you very much, Chairman.
I thank the distinguished representative of Spain for the statement and kind words.
Speaker is the United States, to be followed by Netherlands.
The United States, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair for again giving me the floor.
I would like to make a few preliminary observations on the text in addition to the remarks that I've already made.
One key priority for the United States and many in the room based on remarks of the past few weeks is addressing the false characterizations of deterrence and NATO nuclear policy.
We are therefore studying the reference in paragraph two, which does not adequately highlight the contributions these arrangements have made to the NPT's nonproliferation objective.
We have addressed this before and we will continue to raise it.
These arrangements are fully aligned with Articles one and two.
The arrangements have helped advance the treaty's nonproliferation objectives, and they have never stood in the way of the United States making meaningful progress on arms control.
History proves this.
On paragraph 17, the United States wishes to associate itself with the remarks of Australia and the United Kingdom and would like to see language emphasizing the independent mandate and technical expertise of the IEA.
Paragraph 21, the United States supports facilitating transfers of nuclear technology consistent with the treaty.
However, any formulation must make clear that robust export controls remain an essential nonproliferation tool, not an obstacle to be eliminated.
That said, the United States welcome several elements of the current draft.
We are gratified by paragraph ten's recognition that new comprehensive safeguards agreements have been concluded since the last review conference, and we urge the one remaining state party to conclude its agreement without further delay.
On nuclear weapon free zones and regional issues, the United States reaffirms its support for nuclear weapons free zones freely arrived at among states of the regions concerned.
On the Middle East, we reaffirm our commitment to the 1995 resolution, and we'll have further comments on paragraphs 84 through 86 as our review continues.
Additionally, we would like to see the firmest possible language on the DPRK and reaffirm our unwavering commitment to the complete verifiiable and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea.
Mr.
Chair, we are committed to continuing to work with the conference and engaging constructively.
Thank you very much for the committee's work.
I thank the distinced Rest of the United States for the statement and words and willingness to cooperate.
Next speaker is Netherlands, followed by Switzerland.
Netherlands, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Let me begin by joining other delegations in thanking the presidency for preparing the ref one outcome document and for guiding us in the process towards the consensus outcome document.
We welcome this first revised document and understand how complicated your task is.
So we will keep our input short.
Let me underline our key points here while our capital is finalizing our corresponding written input.
First of all, we have concerns regarding the weakening of the language on nuclear safeguards.
It is clear that an additional protocol is needed to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and that this is essential for the operation of the NPT.
Similarly, there has been a longstanding agreement that safeguards must evolve along with technical and other developments in order to remain effective.
We will put forward suggestions to reflect these considerations.
On export controls, we will provide suggestions to better reflect their positive contribution to the objectives of the treaty.
The new paragraph 21 is repeated in the paragraphs below it under the heading of peaceful uses and should be deleted here.
Then arriving at regional issues under MC two, we would like to underline that the issue of noncompliance strikes at the very heart of the NPT.
This should be properly reflected in the outcome document as it concerns the legitimacy of the treaty itself.
So on Iran's nuclear program, we consider the previous text of paragraph seven to be a well balanced and objective text that reflected the very real concerns states parties have on this point based on the work carried out by the IAEA.
We suggest restoring that text.
And last but certainly not least, we note that the current text contains new wording on a DPRK, which we consider an unfortunate weakening of previously held standards.
Let's not forget what we are dealing with here, a state that left the treaty to develop a nuclear arsenal building on technology that it received as a non nuclear weapon state party, which it is now using to threaten others.
We should at the very least be able to send an unambiguous signal as NPT states parties that we consider this unacceptable.
Chair, you can count on my delegation's continued support in working towards a consensus outcome document.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Netherlands for the statement and words of cooperation.
Next speaker is Switzerland to be followed by Thailand.
Switzerland, you have the floor.
Monsieur President.
Mr.
Chairman, Switzerland would like to thank you as well as the president of the conference and your teams for the first revised version of the draft outcome document.
Now, the revisions seek to reflect the comments made during previous sessions and to bridge the gap between delegations.
We are very grateful for it.
We once again would like to express our appreciation of the open, effective, and transparent approach you've adopted throughout this process.
The first revised version contains a lot of headway on a number of issues, and we're pleased with that.
It contains some elements which Switzerland has defended throughout the review cycle, such as nuclear risk reduction and review process strengthening.
It is a useful, robust basis for further work.
We will continue studying this text.
Having said that, we're aware that additional efforts will be required to address a number of differences.
Together with other delegations, Switzerland will strive towards that end.
Main committee to issues.
We wish to make a number of preliminary comments and reserve the right to revert back to these issues later.
We support clear language on the role and importance of the IAEA and the safeguards agreements.
In paragraph five, we welcome the addition of language mentioning the authority of the IAA.
On regional issues, Switzerland believes that it is worthwhile for the conference to take a stance on these issues, especially in light of significant developments in a number of regions since the last review conference took place.
In paragraph seven, we've taken note of the efforts undertaken to bring the text closer to the various positions put forward by delegations.
We encourage further work in that vein.
Regarding the Iranian nuclear program, Switzerland would like to recall its position.
There are significant concerns regarding some aspects of that program, which were recognized on a number of occasions by the IAA and also underscored by various delegations throughout this conference.
Thus, we believe there is very much justification for the Review Conference to take a position on this topic.
We wish to reiterate once again that any doubts about the post peaceful nature of specific nuclear facilities, well, these doubts must be addressed through diplomatic channels, verification measures, and full cooperation with the IAEA.
That is the way to dispel such doubts.
Switzerland is well aware of how difficult to deal with these issues through consensus.
We stand ready to work with all delegations and all parties involved to that end.
On paragraph 16 of the zero draft, which has been deleted from the revised version, we believe that this paragraph should remain in the text.
As a number of delegations said this morning, Switzerland believes that a regular evaluation or assessment of the safeguards agreements will help to achieve their effectiveness.
Paragraph 16 of the previous version is in keeping with the 2010 action plan, especially paragraph 32 thereof.
Paragraph 20, export control regimes.
The role and objectives thereof are more specific, more precise in this version.
Turning to the paragraphs on nuclear weapons free zones, we believe that the language between the various paragraphs needs to be harmonized.
In paragraph 79 regarding the DPRK, Switzerland aligns with a number of delegations to lament the deletion of the information about the conference regarding the DPK's nuclear program.
The conference must clearly state that we cannot accept the DPRK pursuing a military nuclear program.
Mr.
Chairman, we will work in a constructive and flexible fashion in future negotiations in the spirit of compromise and the search for consensus.
We'll be submitting our remarks in writing and once again, rest assured you have our full support.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Switzerland for the statement and the words of support.
Next, the next speaker is Thailand, followed by the Philippines.
Thailand, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Thailand extends its sincere appreciation to the president and his team for their tireless efforts to strike a delicate balance and achieve a meaningful outcome document.
We thank you, Chair, for steering our work on the main committee to We note several improvements and appreciate the efforts in keeping the draft outcome documents succinct.
While we are still reviewing the draft in detail, we wish to offer the following preliminary views with a view to strengthening the nonproliferation pillar of the treaty.
First, on paragraph six, Thailand supports Brazil's proposal to revert to the 2010 Review Conference language on noncompliance, upholding the IAEA statutory mandate and preserving the technical objective and impartial character and integrity of the safeguard system are essential to maintaining international confidence in the nonproliferation regime.
In this regard, Thailand believes that the issues relating to noncompliance should be addressed strictly in accordance with the IAEA statute and the agency's established legal and technical framework, including the respective roles of the Secretariat and the board of governors.
Such matters should proceed through a careful step by step, evidence based and non politicized process, consistent with established procedures and based on the thorough consideration of all relevant information.
Second, on nuclear weapon free zones.
While Thailand welcomes the current text formulation, we see clear merit in strengthening it to explicitly recognize nuclear weapon free zones proven valuable contributions to consolidating nonproliferation norms and building confidence toward a nuclear weapon free world.
We therefore join others in supporting the proposal by Mexico to enhance this language, including the contribution of the zones to international peace and security.
We also support Indonesia's proposal to strengthen paragraph 76 by adding to call on nuclear weapon states to ratify and accede to the relevant protocols without reservations contrary to the object and purpose of the treaties.
Third, on paragraph 21, Thailand welcomes the added emphasis on facilitating transfers of nuclear technology and materials and international cooperation.
We stress that such cooperation must be consistent with Article 4 of the treaty and not be subjected to discriminatory or additional restrictions beyond nonproliferation obligations.
Mr.
Chair, we know that several areas still require further consultation to narrow the remaining gaps.
Thailand will continue to engage constructively with all delegations in the spirit of consensus and shared responsibility.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Thailand for this statement and kind boards.
Next, the next speaker is the Philippines, followed by Norway.
Philippines, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Philippines thanks the President and the Chair's respective teams and the Secretariat for their work on Rev one of the draft outcome document.
Allow me, Mr.
Chair, to deliver some preliminary general comments, which we will expound on in our statements in the succeeding clusters and submit to the Secretariat accordingly as we continue our review.
Overall, we welcome Rev one's attempt to move towards a more consensus oriented language, and we recognize the difficult balance required in finding language capable of commanding broad support across diverse security perspectives and political realities.
At the same time, the Philippines stresses that consensus should not come at the expense of ambition and clarity.
The Philippines notes the stronger reaffirmation throughout the draft of the balanced implementation of the treaty and the central role of the IAA safeguard system.
At the same time, we note that several provisions relating to nuclear disarmament have been streamlined or removed.
We hope that in our collective efforts to achieve consensus, the ambition integrity of Pillar one will be preserved as you try to find a way forward in Pillar two.
The Philippines looks forward to engaging constructively towards a balanced and meaningful outcome.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the District representative of the Philippines for the statement and the constructive willingness to work with us constructively.
Next speaker is Norway, followed by Algeia, Norway, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
In addition to the preliminary remarks made earlier today, we would like to join others in pointing out the very conspicuous absence of texts relating to the deeply concerning safeguards issue playing out in Ukraine due to Russia's war of aggression and occupation, including at the Spori NPP.
We need to address the challenges relating to IAEA access and verification activities in Ukraine, including the responsibility for this situation.
Having the floor, I would also like to support Spain and other countries supporting a stronger language on the IAEA, mentioning the agency's independence, including in the preambler.
On OP 20 and 21, I also want to join Italy, New Zealand, and others recognizing that export controlled regimes enable access to peaceful nuclear technology and do not represent hindrance.
It's important that we avoid formulation that should suggest otherwise.
Thank you.
I thank the Sing President of Norway for the second statement.
Next speaker is Algeia followed by Austria.
Algeia you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair and we take note of the observation made that language contained in Parra 12 is agreed language from 2010 action plan.
We do not contest that.
However, and this comment is valid to all the paragraphs also.
We wish to record that we are engaged here in the process of negotiation on whose fundamental logic is the search for comprehensive and balanced compromise across the whole text.
When a delegation opposes a particular paragraph, this is not an opposition for the sake or its own sake.
It is a negotiating stance aimed at achieving a balance across the document and at linking the acceptance of language in one area to corresponding language that addresses the priorities and concerns of all delegations.
If we are to invoke the principle of agreed language, particularly from the 2010 action plan, we must apply that principle consistently and coherently throughout the entire text.
We cannot selectively invoke agreed language to reinforce obligations in Pillar two, while the same standard is not applied with equal rigor to language concerning disarmament under pillar one.
And the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Pillar three.
A coherent approach demands that what is valid as a reference in one part of the document must be equally valid as a reference in all other parts.
Selective application of this principle undermines the integrity of the negotiating process itself.
We are engaging constructively and in good faith with the objective of reaching a balanced outcome on the text as a whole.
We remain fully available and committed to working with all delegations towards a compromise that reflects the three pillars of the treaty with equal weight and mutual respect.
We trust that the spirit will guide our collective work in the remaining time available to this conference.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Algeria for the second statement.
Next speaker is Austria, followed by France, Austria, you have the floor.
Thank you very much, Chair.
We join us in thanking the president and his team for providing us with the revised version.
We appreciate the work that has gone into this and are ready to continue providing comments in the coming sessions.
For the moment, we are reviewing the text and only can share some preliminary comments in this section.
More detailed comments will be shared with the Secretariat in due course.
On OP seven, similarly to other delegations, we also see the importance of the need to properly reflect cases of noncompliance in this paragraph as was also done in the zero draft and we continue to review this language.
On paragraphs 11 and 12, we also agree with others to keep the language on the additional protocol as it remains voluntary and we see the important contribution of the protocol.
Regard to the previous para 16 that was deleted in the revised version on the review of safeguards in light of technological developments, we also join other delegations in keeping that reference and that paragraph either as it was in the zero draft or slightly different.
With regard to paragraph 44 and 45, we repeat our comments made on the zero draft.
And on having a correct reference to the situation in Ukraine with regard to nuclear safety and security because of the Russian aggression in Ukraine and this needs to be reflected properly in the text.
On OP 74 to 76 on nuclear weapon free zones, we join others in strengthening the language on the positive contribution on nuclear weapon free zones and the role with regard to peace and security.
On paragraph 79, we also join many delegations on the concern over the DPR cases nuclear and missile programs and the sentence that was deleted here, we want to restore the language as it was reflected in the zero draft.
I will stop here with our preliminary comments for the moment.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Austria for the statement and for kind voice.
The next speaker is France, followed by Belgium.
France, you have the floor.
Monsieur President.
Chairman.
Our delegation would like to begin by thanking the chair for this new draft document.
On the second pillar, my delegation would like to make the following preliminary comments.
Firstly, It would be inconceivable for the outcome report not to contain any reference to Iran or the DPRK.
The two most serious proliferation crises that the NPT has known.
The very credibility of the treaty and the nonproliferation regime are at stake.
The non compliance by Iran of its obligations under this treaty are nothing new.
For decades, Iran has failed to keep up with its declaratory obligations regarding its nuclear activities in June 2005, in light of the failure of Iran to cooperate with the IRA and the persistent pending issues with regard to its nuclear file.
The IAEA simply had to state the non conformity of Iran with these obligations for almost a year, Iran has failed to keep to its most basic obligations and the safeguards and the IAA no longer has access to the most sensitive sites of its nuclear program.
My delegation and many others would not be able to accept these elements not being reflected in the final document.
The conference should urge it parties to conform without delay to the NPT and its obligations and to return to the path of the NPT.
With regard to the DPRK, which well before 2003 continued to violate its international obligations in terms of nonproliferation, we cannot accept the lack of references to its illegal nuclear program and this pursuant to many Security Council resolutions.
Secondly, and bearing in mind the serious proliferation crises that we are facing, the need for states parties to respect their nonproliferation obligations under the treaty and to settle all cases of non conformity must be reflected in the preamble of the beginning in the preamble of the document.
In the same spirit, we should also recall in the preamble that according to Article 25 of the charter of the UN, member states are bound to keep to Security Council resolutions and resolution 18 25 of the Security Council.
France has given unequivocal safeguards with regard to NPT and non proliferation and we call for these conditions to be reflected.
Thirdly, France would like to underscore that the international nonproliferation regime contributes to international peace and security.
In this regard, we would like to recall that the conclusion of the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol are the current verification standard and the only one allowing the IAA to confirm that within a state, all nuclear material is being used in the context of peaceful activities.
I would like to reaffirm, just like other delegations have done, the clear authority of the IAA to verify and ensure respect by states parties of the agreements concluded pursuant to the treaty.
In this regard, Nothing should be done that could undermine the authority of the IAA in this regard.
The conference must recall the decisions and resolutions relating to safeguards taken by the directing bodies that are the Council of Governors and General Conference.
Once again, I would like to underscore just as other legislations have done, that the export control regime in no way represents an obstacle to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
To the contrary, it facilitates cooperation by strengthening prevention and by strengthening mutual trust and transparency.
Mr.
Chairman, our delegation will send written proposals on all of these elements.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of France for the statement and kind words.
The next speaker is Belgium, followed by Malaysia.
Belgium, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chairperson.
I would like to join others in thanking you for your efforts to bring us closer to consensus with this new draft.
On paragraph six, we would like to point out that there are other forms of recourse available.
For example, the IAA may refer cases to the UN Security Council.
With regards to export controls, we would support the remarks made by the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
There are presently two paragraphs dealing with this topic in the text, paragraph 21 and 23.
In our view, one reference would suffice and the other may be removed.
On DPRK in paragraph 79, Belgium has a strong preference for the previous language from draft.
As stated in our previous interventions last week on the draft, even the word concern was an understatement for us, given the expansion of the nuclear and ballistic missile program of the DPRK.
Expressing concern should be the least common denominator for delegations in our view.
In addition to the previous language, we would suggest adding at the least language on refraining from testing, re establishing pre existing commitments on a moratorium on all missile launches and nuclear tests, and to sign and ratify the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Belgium for the statement.
Next speaker is Malaysia to be followed by Iran.
Malaysia, you have the floor.
Mr.
Chair, NASA thanks the presidency for the circulation of the revised draft outcome document and welcomes the constructive effort to further refine the text in a manner that preserves the balance of the treaty.
NASA offers the following broad comments on the revised document in a constructive spirit and with a view to strengthening clarity, confidence, and prospect for consensus.
On preamble paragraphs 13, 17 and 18, NASA supports the reaffirmation that compliance with nonproliferation obligations is necessary to uphold the treaty's integrity, and we welcome the emphasis that such matters should be addressed through diplomatic means consistent with international law and the Charter of the UN.
We also strongly support the recognition of that IEA safeguards are a fundamental component of the nonproliferation regime and essential enabler of peaceful nuclear cooperation as reflected in preambular paragraph 17.
NASA considers this language important in reinforcing trust, safeguards credibility, underpins confidence in peaceful users and confidence in peaceful users sustains the NPs long term legitimacy.
In this context, NASA welmes the framing in preambular paragraph 18 that breaches treaty obligations, undermine all three pillars, which is a useful reminder that selectivity or uneven implementation erodes confidence across the membership.
On paragraphs 1 and 3, MSHA supports paragraph one, including its emphasis on full, effective non discriminatory and balanced implementations of Articles one and two, and agrees that these obligations remain essential to international peace and security.
MSA also welcomes paragraph three, particularly the clear affirmation that compliance concerns should be resolved exclusively through political and diplomatic means in accordance with the treaty and the UN Charter.
This is an important anchor against politicization and a useful reaffirmation that the treaty integrity is best preserved through established multilateral processes rather than unilateral measures.
MASH believes that paragraphs help establish a principle rules based foundation for the conference approach to non proliferation.
On paragraphs 4 to 21, MSHA broadly supports the safeguard section and welcomes a clear reaffirmation of the IAA's role as the competent authority for verification under Article 3 and the importance of safeguarding the agency's authority.
MSA also welcomes the emphasis on timely handling of noncompliance with safeguards obligations with concerns directed together with supporting information to the IAEA for consideration and decision as this strengthens due process and reinforces the technical credibility of the safeguard system.
Further strengthening of this section could be explored.
MESA welcome the affirmation that nuclear weapon free zones strengthen global and regional peace and security and contribute to the objectives of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.
MESH particularly supports the retention of the language calling upon nuclear weapon states to ratify or accede to the relevant protocols and to engage in dialogue regarding reservations or interpretive statements as this is central to strengthening legally binding assurances and confidence in nuclear weapon free zone arrangements, including the Bangkok treaty.
Also supports the emphasis on establishing nuclear weapon free zones where they do not yet exist, especially in the Middle East.
With regard to the Korean Peninsula, MASH supports the firm reaffirmation of complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization, the importance of relevant Security Council resolutions, and the clear emphasis on negotiations and diplomacy as the pathway to a peaceful and comprehensive solution.
On paragraph 84 to 86, MSH welcomes the reaffirmation that the 1995 resolution on the Middle East remains until its goals and objectives are achieved and that it is an essential element of the basis upon which the treaty was indefinitely extended.
MASI supports language that sustains the centrality of the resolution while encouraging confidence building measures by states of the region to advance implementation consistent with the principle that progress must be inclusive and regionally anchored.
We are supportive of efforts to strengthen the language.
Mr.
Chair, MASI offers these commands in a constructive and bridging spirit NASA is mindful that several sensitive dossiers continue to present evidences of view and that progress will require careful handling a sustained political will.
In this regard, NASA hopes all state parties will remain flexible and engage in a constructive solutions oriented manner with a view to bridging gaps and preserving the balance and integrity of the treaty.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinct Representative of Malaysia for the statement and encouragement to all of us to work in a constructive way.
The next speaker I have on my list is the representative of Iran, who will be the last speaker for today.
Iran, you have the floor.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chair.
On nuclear sharing, we have offered our language proposal to be added in the respective paragraph to express by the conference that any kind of nuclear sharing arrangements and relying on extended deterrence contradicts the purpose and objective of the treaty is violation of articles one and two of the treaty and the conference should urge the concerned state parties to immediately and effectively put an end to those arrangements.
Also, we believe that this issue should be one of the subject matters to be discussed in the next review conference.
With regard to paragraph 84 on the Middle East, we share the disappointment of many delegations that the language on this issue, unfortunately, has been weakened and we believe that due to the regional developments and very unfortunate attack by an illegal aggression by the United States and Israeli regime against Iran.
We believe that this is the high time to supersede and try to improve the language and we think that the minimum is to quote from the 2010 and I would like to share the language that we have shared and we will share with you on this issue.
We believe that at the end of paragraph 84, this phrase and sentences should be added.
The conference takes note of the reaffirmation at the 2010 review conference by the five nuclear weapon states of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.
The conference regrets that little progress has been achieved towards the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.
The conference recalls the reaffirmation by the 2000 Review Conference of the importance of Israel's accession to the treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.
The conference reaffirms the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the treaty.
The conference calls on all states in the Middle East that have not yet done so to accede to the comprehensive safeguards agreements.
This is the addition that we want to see it reflected and incorporated in the document.
Having said that, Mr.
Chair, Iran will remain constructively engaged with President, his team and all other colleagues to elaborate consensus text at the end.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Iran for the statement and constructive approach to the further work of our conference.
Excellence, Distinguished delegates.
That was the last speaker on my list for today.
I really appreciate everyone for their constructive and very disciplined work today.
The next meeting of main Committee two is scheduled for tomorrow on Friday 15 at 10:00 here in the Trusteeship Council Chamber.
The meeting is adjourned.