Terrorism and Maritime Insecurity: Collective Efforts to Counter Terrorism in the maritime domain (Counter-Terrorism Week Side Event)

Excellency distinguished delegates, partners, and guests.
Good afternoon.
I warmly welcome you to these City Week side events entitled Terrorism and Maritime Insecurity, collective efforts to counter terrorism in the maritime domain.
These side events examines evolving terrorist threats in the maritime domain, including the misuse of maritime routes, ports, and critical infrastructure, as well as challenges posted by emerging technologies and transnational risks.
It seeks to reinforce international cooperations and information sharing, identify gaps and good practices, and explores measures to prevent and counter terrorist activities at seas while enhancing maritime security and the resilience.
These study events will be livestreamed and recorded.
In addition, a webstory will be published featuring links to the livestream, photos from the events, and any remarks and presentations that can be shared.
Please be sure to visit our website regularly for updates.
We will also share highlights across our social media platforms, including X, LinkedIn, Facebook, and Instagram.
If you are not already following us, we encourage you to do so to stay informed.
May I kindly request all online participants to keep their microphones and cameras switched off unless they are speaking.
Without further ado, I'm pleased to invite Her Excellency Natasha Mali, permanent representative of Melta to the United Nations to deliver her statement.
Excellencies, if you are ready, you have the floor.
Thank you very much, Madam Moderator, for the floor, Assistant Secretary-General, Excellency, distinguished guest, ladies and gentlemen.
It is my pleasure to welcome you today on behalf of the Republic of Malta to this side event on terrorism and maritime insecurity, collective efforts to counter terrorism in the maritime domain.
At the outset, I would like to thank our partners and co organizers, Greece, the Counter Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, the United Nations Office of Counterrorism, and the International Maritime Organization for their excellent cooperation in bringing this important discussion together.
For Malta, a Mediterranean island state, the maritime domain is not simply an economic lifeline.
It is central to our security, prosperity, and connectivity with the rest of the world.
We therefore have a particular interest in ensuring that the seas remains safe, secure, and governed by international law.
This commitment is deeply rooted in Malta's longstanding contribution to maritime governance, which dates to the vision of Ambassador Arvid Pardo.
His concept of the oceans is the common heritage of mankind has helped shape the discussions that led to unclos, but it also remains highly relevant today.
It reminds us that the security of the maritime domain is a shared responsibility.
Today, that responsibility extends beyond safeguarding freedom of navigation and maritime commerce.
While maritime transport continues to facilitate the overwhelming majority of global trade, we must also recognize that the maritime domain remains vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists and organized criminal networks.
Terrorists have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to adapt to changing circumstances, exploit gaps in governance, and take advantage of emerging technologies.
As highlighted in the concept note, maritime routes, vessels, ports, and critical infrastructure may be used not only as targets, but also as enablers of terrorist movement, logistics, and support activities.
Addressing these challenges requires a truly comprehensive approach.
Maritimme security can no longer be viewed in isolation from border management, counterterrorism, organized crime, sanctions enforcement, critical infrastructure protection, and technological innovation.
Effective responses depend on stronger cooperation between governments, international organizations, law enforcement authorities, border agencies, maritime actors, and the private sector.
In this regard, Malta attaches particular importance to Della principles on comprehensive and integrated counterterrorism strategies developed together with CETAT and launched in Malta in 2025.
These principles underline the importance of whole of government and whole of society approaches, stronger coordination between security, border management, and criminal justice actors, protection of critical infrastructure, and enhanced public private partnerships in addressing evolving terrorist threats.
These principles are equally relevant in the maritime domain where no single authority can address the challenge alone.
Colleagues, today's discussion provides an important opportunity to identify vulnerabilities, exchange good practices, and explore how we can collectively reduce maritime domain blindness while strengthening our ability to prevent terrorist exploitation of maritime routes and infrastructure.
I look forward to a rich and productive discussion and thank all participants for their engagement.
Thank you.
Thank you, Ambassador Malley, for your valuable remarks.
I now have the pleasure of inviting miss Natalia Gilman, Assistant Secretary-General and Executive Director of SETT to deliver her statement.
Madam Gilman, you have the floor.
Thank you very much, Dear Madam Moderator, Your Excellency Ambassador Mali, Your Excellency Ambassador Caron, Excellencies ladies and gentlemen, it is indeed great pleasure to open this side event today on terrorism and maritime insecurity.
I would like to thank our co organizers, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Malta, United Nations Office of Counter Terrorism, and International Maritime Organization for advancing this timely and important agenda.
The maritime domain is vital to global trade and stability and yet increasingly exploited by terrorists and organized crime.
They use shipping routes to move people and resources and target critical infrastructure such as ports, offshore installations, and undersea systems.
At the same time, technological advances, including unmanned systems, cyber tools, and sophisticated logistics are expanding the reach and capabilities of terrorist actors into maritime and even subsurface domains.
Maritimme insecurity represents a critical and inseparable component of our collective security.
However, significant gaps persist.
CT assessments indicate that maritime security is often insufficiently integrated into national counterterrorism frameworks.
In sharing remains uneven and ports and maritime infrastructure are not consistently treated as critical assets.
These weaknesses create vulnerabilities with serious implications for international peace and security.
Addressing this challenge requires a shift in approach.
No state, regardless of its capacity or geography, can secure the maritime domain alone.
Maritimme routes connect all regions and vulnerabilities in one area can have global repercussions.
Even landlockged states are affected when insecure maritime pathways facilitate the movement of terrorists and illicit goods.
Cooperation is therefore indispensable.
We must strengthen collaboration at national, regional and international levels, including through hall of government approaches that bring together law enforcement, border management, maritime authorities, intelligence services, and the private sector.
Partnerships with relevant international and regional organizations as well as industry stakeholders are equally essential.
At the core of effective cooperation is information sharing.
Timely, accurate, and actionable information is critical to detect threats, prevent attacks, and disrupt terrorist activity.
This includes sharing data on passengers and crew, enhancing maritime domain awareness, and integrating terrorism related intelligence into maritime risk assessments.
Without robust information flows, even the most advanced security systems will fall short.
We must also continue strengthening the normative and operational frameworks, underpinning maritime security.
International instruments provide an essential foundation, but their effectiveness depends on consistent implementation, supported by capacity building, technical assistance, and sustained political commitment.
In this context, CETAT remains committed to supporting member states through assessments, dialogue, and facilitation of technical assistance.
We work to identify gaps, share good practices, and promote integrated approaches that embed maritime security within broader counterterrorism strategies.
This event provides an important opportunity to advance practical solutions.
Our shared goal is very clear.
To ensure that maritime routes and infrastructure can no longer be exploited by terrorists and that our collective responses are coordinated, proactive, and resilient.
I thank you for your kind attention.
Let me please, on behalf of all of us, welcome Her Excellency, miss Aglaabala permanent representative of Greece to the United Nations and once again, Madam Ambassador, on behalf of all of us, organizers of this event, I thank you very much for your cooperation and partnership in preparing and conducting this timely dialogue.
Thank you.
Thank you very much.
Thank you, ASG Gelman, for your constructive remarks.
I'm pleased to invite Her Excellc' Aglaia Bela Permanent Mission of Grace to the United Nations to deliver her opening remarks.
Excellencies, you have the floor.
Thank you.
Thank you so much.
First of all, I would like to apologize for my delay.
Today, New York traffic reminds us of the high level w traffic and it's because of FIFA Distinguished colleagues.
I wish to thank the head of the Madrid Program Office of UNACT Inato Banez, Assistant Secretary-General and Executive Director of Ted miss German, representatives of the International Maritime Organization, as well as my good colleague and friend, permanent representative of Malta, Ambassador Meli, for their leadership in advancing maritime security in the UN counterterrorism efforts.
Maritme security can no longer be viewed solely through a sectoral lens.
It has become an essential component of the global security architecture.
In an increasingly complex and asymmetrical threat landscape, safeguarding freedom of navigation and maritime security is indispensable to the maintenance of international peace and security.
The maritime domain remains a cornerstone of international trade and economic development, facilitating the movement of energy, food, and essential goods across continents.
Maritme activities continue to rapidly expand and and so do the threats posed by the terrorist groups and transnational criminal networks exploiting vulnerabilities of maritime and counterterrorism frameworks.
Terrorist attacks against commercial shipping, ports and another critical maritime infrastructure jeopardize freedom of navigation, disrupt global supply chains, undermine confidence in international maritime routes, and cause severe humanitarian and environmental consequences for coastal communities.
In addressing these challenges, strong cooperation among states, international and regional organizations, and the private sector remains indispensable.
Close partnership, including with the international shipping industry, supported by a comprehensive and coordinated approach are essential to strengthening resilience and ensuring a secure maritime domain.
In this context, new and emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence are playing an increasingly important role.
Innovation should be an integral part of maritime security strategies based on international law, including respect for human rights.
Reinforcing real time information sharing mechanism and communication networks, strengthening cybersecurity and port management systems, and advancing navigation technologies are essential steps to better prevent, deter, and respond to complex threats and build resilience.
As we recently celebrated the day of the seafarer, we must not forget that seafarers are among the first to bear the human cost of attacks against commercial shipping, ensuring their safety and well being should remain at the heart of our efforts.
For Greece, home to the world's largest merchant fleet and a nation whose history and prosperity are inseparable from the sea, maritime security is not an abstract policy objective.
It is a strategic imperative.
We remain firmly committed to safeguarding maritime security and contributing to collective efforts to ensure safe, secure, and open seas for all.
I thank you.
Thank you, Ambassador Belta for your insightful opening remarks.
Please note the change in the agenda.
Acting under Secretary-General of regrets that he is unable to attend and I now have the pleasure of inviting Mr.
Ignacio Ibans, head of the UNo City Office in Madrid to deliver his statements.
Mr.
Ibanas, you have the floor.
Thank you very much.
As it was said, I will deliver these remarks on behalf of Mr.
Alexander Zuf, acting Under Secretary-General of the United Nations Office of Counterterrorism.
Your Excellency, Ambassador Aglaia Balta, primary representative of Greece to the United Nations.
Your Ecellcy Ambassor Nathali, primary representative of Malta to the United Nations, Natalia Getman, Assistant Secretary-General and executive Director, Counter Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate.
Distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen.
I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the governments of Greece and Malta for their partnership in convening these side events and acknowledge our closed and valued collaboration with CETA and the IMO.
The maritime domain has long been a cornerstone of global stability and prosperity, supporting the transport of over 80% of global trade and underpinning the economic lifelines of nations.
Yet, as member states strengthen counterterrorism measures in the aviation sector, terrorists are increasingly threatening maritime critical infrastructure and exploiting maritime routes for the transit of terrorist operatives, weapons, and illicit goods and substances.
Gaps in maritime security are being actively tested and exploited.
Strengthening our collective ability to prevent and counter terrorist threats in the maritime domain is therefore a security imperative and a shared responsibility.
The multilateral response must be adaptive, coordinated, and forward looking.
The United Nations Office of Counterterrorism is committed to supporting member states through comprehensive capacity building programs aligned with the United Nations global counterterrorism strategy.
These efforts are highly relevant to the maritime domain.
For instance, the multi entity United Nations counterterrorism Terrorist Travel Program, led by UN OCT, has enabled the processing of tens of millions of passenger data records and supporting early identification of threats.
Expanding such approaches to maritime transport, enabling the collection and analysis of vital information on maritime passengers and crew is an urgent priority.
Similarly, the UN Global program on countering terrorist threats against vulnerable targets supports member states in protecting ports, maritime facilities, underwater cables, and energy infrastructure such as offshore platforms from terrorist attacks.
These efforts are essential to ensure resilience across interconnected global supply chains and coastal economies.
UN OCT's programming reflects a need for integrated whole government and whole society approaches, bringing together security operators, policymakers, private sector operators, and security companies, as well as international partners.
Excellencies, this side event is intended to urge greater focus on countering terrorism in the maritime domain, including enhanced cooperation, strengthen legal and policy frameworks, and the effective use of technology and data.
As we look ahead, sustained political commitment and collective action is needed across regions, sectors, and institutions to ensure that maritime domain and maritime routes remain pathways for prosperity, not avenues for exploitation by terrorists.
I think you.
Thank you, Mr.
Ibans for your informative remarks.
This concludes the opening sessions.
I thank the Excellencies for their opening remarks.
We will now move to the panel discussion.
May I kindly remind all participants that we must conclude the meeting at 2:45.
I would therefore be grateful if speakers could keep their intervention within the allotted time.
It's my pleasure to invite Mr.
John Philip Moran, Senior legal Office at seated to moderate the discussion.
I invite the panel to take the podium.
Please allow us a moment to make the change.
State.
Good afternoon, distinguished guests, colleagues, and participants joining us here at the United Nations and online.
Welcome to this panel discussion on terrorism and maritime insecurity, collective efforts to counter terrorism in the maritime domain.
It's a privilege to moderate this timely and important conversation.
As highlighted in the concept note, the maritime domain is central to global prosperity, carrying over 80% of world trade and supporting livelihood of billions of people worldwide.
At the same time, it remains vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist and organized criminal networks, whether for movement, logistic, or targeting critical infrastructures.
Today's discussion brings together a distinguished group of expert to explore how we can better understand evolving threats, close critical gaps, and strengthen cooperation across legal, policy, and operational levels.
We will also examine how innovation, data, and partnership can enhance our collective ability to safeguard this vital domain.
I encourage a dynamic and interactive exchange guided by the key question outlined for this session.
I invite all participants to actively engage during the discussion and Q&A.
As we have a full agenda today, I kindly ask all participants to keep their intervention within the allocated time.
In the event, insufficient time is available during the Q&A session to hear from all participants wishing to take the floor.
Please submit your statement to the master of ceremony so that it can be posted on the event website.
Thank you for your cooperation.
With that, let me now turn to our panelists.
I now would like to give the floor to Mr.
Georgios Cristians, Rear Admiral, Hellenic Coast Guard, Director of Operational Division in the Hellenic Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Insular Policy, who will participate via VTC.
Admiral, how important is international intelligence sharing in detecting individuals who may attempt to conceal terrorist affiliation within mixed migration flows.
Sir, you have the floor.
Good evening from Greece.
Good evening from Pérez from Heleni Coast Guard headquarters.
Yes, this is Real Admiral Gorgos Cristianos I'm the head and the responsible admiral for all the operations and the operational division from Helenni Coast Guard and on behalf of course of Commandant of Heleni Coast Guard, I would like to thank you very much for this invitation.
And I will continue now with the short presentation according the maritime security in the Greek maritime domain, which is a very, very sensitive area with specific particularities.
The Greek Martie domain, first of all, has a huge coastline which is almost 16,000 kilometers.
We are very famous for the big number of islands, more than 6,000 islands and the incidents which they used to take place in our responsibility area, many incidents, of course, and as Greece, as Hellenic Coast Guard, we are obliged to take the proper action for all these incidents.
Hellenic maritime domain is across all of three continents and we have heavy traffic with thousands of vessels, sailing boats, fishing boats, and they are passing from our responsibility area annually.
For this reason, we can find out that we have many incidents with illegal migration, first of all, for at least 15 years now and especially the last ten years, increased numbers of migration flows.
They used to departs from east or from South.
Of course, the destination for all these migration flows are the Greek islands.
In any case, as Ky coast guard, we used to take the proper action in order to control all these migration flows.
At this moment, I would like to thank our neighbors from East Turkey because with this very close cooperation which we have with the Turkish authorities, we have the opportunity for at least a year now to control of these migration flows.
Let me say that behind from this phenomenon, we do not have only migrants, but of course we have many cases with terrorists and we ought, of course, to find solutions for these cases.
Except for the illegal migration, we have also human trafficking in many cases with the victims and what else we have incidents with vessels sailing boats or merchant ships which they used to, let's say, carry drugs and arms.
For this case, of course, as Hellenic Coast Guard, we have the opportunity to detect these suspicious vessels and whenever it is necessary, we used to take action against all of them.
Last but not least, of course, we have the cabin and cyber threats.
We have critical maritime infrastructures in Greece.
The majority of them, of course, are some specific ports.
I will start with the port of Pales, which is the Greece's largest port and especially from this port of Pales, the majority of the vessels used to depart from capital from Athens, from Paros and the destination are all Greek islands.
And another very important, let's say, critical maritime infrastructure structure is the port of Thessaloniki, which has a strategic, let's say position for the port serving for all the Balkan region, and we have the port of Alexandra Police for energy supply.
According to the energy infrastructures, we have the eng terminals, the subsy cables, the natural gas pipelines, and oil installations, and as Hellenic Coast Guard, we do our best in order to success the proper monitoring and surveillance of all these infrastructures and of course, for all our Hellenic maritime domain.
How we managed to do something like that.
By using, first of all, the national integrated surveillance system, which we have in Greece with many radars and thermal cameras and they located, established in specific islands in order, of course, to success the proper monitoring of all these huge area.
What else we have, the ice monitoring, and by using the ice monitoring, we have the tracking vessels identity, the course for all of them, the speeds in real time, and we know exactly what's going on in our maritime domain.
We have, of course, the satellite observations, the intelligence gathering, and risk analysis whenever it is necessary.
According to the role of the Hellenic Coast Guard, we used to participate in counterterrorism policy and due to, let's say to this search and rescue region which we have, which is more than 1,150,000 square kilometers, we have many search and rescue incidents.
For this reason, we provide the proper search and rescue operations to provide the proper assistance to all people who are in danger at sea and we collect and exploitation of intelligence.
We have, of course, the port security and as I mentioned before, the proper surveillance of all the maritime borders and don't forget that our borders, of course, are the European borders.
Last but not least, we have the countering of the illegal activities at sea.
We need assistance.
We need cooperation in order to have positive results for all this action.
Except of the interagency cooperation, which we have with all the rest of Hellenic authorities.
We have a very close cooperation, as I told you before, with Turkey, especially for the illegal migration.
It is very important for us and statistics and numbers always say the truth and believe me, we will not have the opportunity, let's say, degree of these migration flows without this close cooperation with our neighbors.
What else we have? Daily cooperation and communication with the European Border and Coast Guard agency with Frontex with Europol, of course, with joint action we used to take a ans to the organized maritime crime, of course, with NATO and with the national maritime organization.
According to the challenges during the future and especially for the next decade, yes, we ought to take the proper action.
We are obliged to take the proper action to protect for all the subsea cables and the energy installations.
For the cybersecurity resilience, We have the countering of the UADs and the U ships, vessels in order, let's say to protect the sea cables, the artificial intelligence in border surveillance, and we have, of course, the hybrid forms of terrorism.
As conclusion, I would like to say that the Hellenic Coast Guard plays a key role in order to prevent and confront maritime threats for the security not only for Greece, but for all the European Union and of course, for the whole the Eastern Mediterranean region.
In the face of involving maritime threats, our greatest strength is not found in our individual capabilities, but in our collective resolve to cooperate, innovate, and protect the seas that unite us all.
For this case, we used to say in Greece that if you want to go fast, go alone.
But if you want to go far, we are obliged to go together.
That's all from my side and I would like to thank you very much for your attention.
Thank you.
Thank you very much, Amal, for your presentation and your comments.
I would like now to give the floor to miss Salesia Carbone, Director for Transnational Threat and Sanction within the International Development, Economic Affairs General Directorate Global Issues, Maltese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Affairs.
Miss Carbone, given the increasing convergence between terrorism, organized crime, and maritime insecurity, and recognizing the growing importance of critical maritime infrastructures.
What practical measures should state and international organizations prioritize to reduce maritime domain blindness and strengthen collective efforts to prevent terrorist exploitation of the maritime domain.
Madam, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair and thank you for the question posed.
In order to answer the question and to know the measures that you have to employ as a country, you would need to first analyze your risks, and therefore, Malta approaches maritime counterterrorism from a risk perspective.
Firstly, as a member state situated on the European Union's external maritime border and the state which is situated between two continents, our geographical position itself poses a risk.
Secondly, Malta is also a significant transshipment hub.
We also have a very significant large shipping registry, and we also are a very significant financial hub in that we provide a lot of services when it comes to the maritime services.
Therefore, from our perspective, maritime security today extends far from the protection of ships or navigation, but the maritime domain has now evolved into a very complex security environment.
Where counter terrorism needs to be met with counter organized crimes, sanctions evasion, the threats related to hyber and cyber activities, and also the attacks which could be possibly put on critical infrastructure.
It is therefore, in our opinion, not useful or difficult to examine maritime terrorism in isolation.
So we must understand it in a broader ecosystem of maritime security threats.
The United Nations Security Council has constantly emphasized the importance of preventing terrorism movement through effective border management.
Resolutions such as 137-32-1708, and also 23 69 provide a robust framework for preventing terrorist travel and strengthening border controls.
However, unfortunately, much of the practical implementation of these resolutions is traditionally reserved for aviation, rather for the maritime sector.
Maritime routes have always been given less importance despite their strategic significance.
In our assessment, the principal maritime threat today is not necessarily a large scale attack against a passenger vessel or a commercial ship, but rather it is a greater concern that these could be exploited and also there could be the exploitation of maritime routes or critical infrastructure to facilitate terrorist activities such as the movement of fighters, facilitators, the movement of weapons or dual use materials, the financing of terrorism, and also shipping routes and shipping hubs being used for logistical support for terrorist fighters.
Indeed, we are increasingly witnessing convergence between terrorism and organized crime.
Terrorist actors frequently leverage existing criminal and smuggling networks rather than developing parallel infrastructures.
This creates a complex and adaptive thrust environment that cannot be addressed through traditional sectorial approaches alone.
As the question referred to, the concept which has to have a significant importance today is the maritime domain blindness, which refers to the inability of states and relevant authorities to maintain a complete, accurate, and timely understanding of the activities taking place around them.
Like aviation, which benefits from highly structured screening, data collection, and passenger information systems, the maritime domain presents unique challenges.
It encompasses vast geographical spaces, multiple jurisdictions, and extraordinary diversity of actors from commercial shipping to fisheries, to recreational vessels, and to offshore infrastructure.
As a result, authorities often struggle to answer some of the basic but very essential questions such as who is moving, what is being transported, who owns the vessel, and does this seemingly legitimate activity conceal illicit or security related conduct? Maritimme domain blindness may arise from enormerous factors, including the manipulation of vessel tracking systems, opaque infrastructures, false flags, ship to ship transfers, fragmentation of information across agencies, and other challenges.
From a counterterrorism perspective, these blind spots create opportunities for terrorists and their facilitators to move personnel, equipment, funding, and logistical support while avoiding detection.
Importantly, the challenge is not the absence of information, but in many cases, authorities already have a large volume of data.
The challenge is to ensure that the information is accurate, interoperable, analyzed effectively, and shared in a timely manner.
Reducing maritime domain awareness therefore requires a comprehensive approach centered in stronger maritime awareness, enhancing information sharing, improved interoperability, advancing analytical tools, and closer cooperation with all relevant stakeholders.
When we say all relevant stakeholders here, we are also including our foreign counterparts.
In fact, Malta is a strong believer of helping our foreign counterparts.
We also provide capacity building.
Through such support which is being offered to several member states.
We are ensuring that the highest shipping standards are being offered, particularly in terms of ship flagging.
Malta also proudly hosts the Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law, who is also working on this sphere.
Another issue which in our opinion, requires particular attention is the issue of critical infrastructure, whereby recent incidents affecting undersea communication cables and energy infrastructure have demonstrated both vulnerabilities of these systems, but also they are potentially causing severe disruptions.
For Malta, we have critical infrastructures that include the ports, the maritime logistics hub, energy installations, the LNG facilities, undersea telecommunication cables, and also the electricity interconnectors with Mainland Europe.
These assets are deeply interconnected.
A terrorist attack on one of these components can trigger a cascading effect across multiple sectors affecting communications, energy, supplies, and transportation networks.
This makes such infrastructure an attractive target, not only for terrors, but also actors engaging in sabotage, hybrid activities, and other forms of malicious conduct.
Moreover, the threat is no longer exclusively physical.
We must be increasingly at the outlook for cyber threats, insider risk unmanned systems, and also the emerging technologies.
As recognized both in the revised European Nw Union Maritime Security Strategy and the Security Council Resolution 23 41, Protecting critical infrastructure form must not only be an integral component of national resilience, but also of counterterrorism strategies.
Our objective should not be only to prevent attacks, but also to ensure that our critical systems are resilient.
Now let me turn to the final point that I have my notes, whereby one message that we would like to send here today is the importance of information sharing, but not only with the national stakeholders or the foreign counterparts, but also with the private sector.
So in the maritime sector, private actors frequently hold critical data that may provide the earliest indicators of suspicious activities.
In Malta, we have very structured dialogue with our shipping industry, including with the lawyers that represent the industry, and we have seen that shipping companies, port operators, insurance, maritime service providers all can identify patterns even if these are not detected already by the public sector.
Reducing maritime domain awareness blind designer, therefore does not only require strong coordination between us, the public sector, but also that there needs to be a meaningful and structured engagement with the industry.
This can be done through trusted reporting mechanisms, regular dialogues, and also having clear frameworks relating to the exchange of information.
Ultimately, maritime, as Madame German also said, requires a whole of government and a whole of society approach.
Thank you.
I thank miss Carbon for her remarks.
I now give the floor to miss Amaya Sessma, legal officer in the counterterrorism Executive Directorate.
I invite her to highlight where are the most critical gaps and vulnerabilities today.
Amaya, you have the floor, please.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Moderator, Excellencies, colleagues and dear participants.
Also, I wish to welcome you to this very important side event on behalf of CETAT.
Indeed, we have already heard excellencies and colleagues highlight the importance of not only the maritime security, but also that it is still under addressed dimension of global counterterrorism architecture.
Now, As we know already, that maritime security underpins not only the global trade as colleagues has highlighted, but also economic stability.
But however, it has not received so far the equivalent attention in counterterrorism efforts.
There are solid foundation already in the Security Council resolutions from 13 73 of 2001, which already obliges member states to ensure effective border management measures, whether it is air, land, or maritime.
While we also recognize that we have not seen or major reason terrorist attacks taking place in the maritime domain.
This is thanks mainly to the ISPS code and sustained international efforts.
However, this should not lead us to become complacent.
Um, the proactivity was already mentioned by colleagues that this should be the leading proactive measures to strengthen counterterrorism measures at sea rather than waiting that there is a major crisis, attack, or hostage taking situation.
CETAs work focuses on identifying these vulnerabilities through our country assessments that we conduct on behalf of the counterterrorism committee.
Also, we have recent years increased the focused or dedicated port visits and direct engagement with port authorities.
This has allowed CETA to identify gaps promote international standards such as the ISPS code and identify also good practices such as the countries indeed sponsoring this event, Greece and Malta.
This is certainly something that we look for in our assessments.
Importantly, our assessments and the recommendations deriving from those assessments act as a bridge linking the assessments to delivery of Taylor technical assistance in cooperation with our partners such as UN OCT and IMO.
See that has also been instrumental in highlighting some of the emerging trends.
A key trend is displacement.
As we have already heard, that it is always the weak link that the terrorist and criminal organizations will exploit.
They will shift to routes that have lower security.
And we have increasingly seen the so called pro gun travel where individuals use multiple transport modes to avoid detection.
The maritime domain is not only a target, it is also a facilitator for terrorist activity and enabling movement of foreign terrorist fighters, finances, weapons, and other illegal commodities.
Another concern is the convergence between terrorism and organized crime.
The actors share routes, logistics, and infrastructure.
The threat landscape is indeed also evolving fast with technological advancements, unmanned aircraft systems, unmanned maritime systems are becoming more accessible.
Finally, the insider threat, such as compromised port workers remain an under addressed but serious vulnerability.
The main gaps highlighted here derived from over 200 visits we have conducted in member states.
Border security is among the top three recommendations that include gaps in implementation of member states measures to protect maritime security.
There has been progress, but despite this progress, we have several systematic gaps that persist.
The first one is the strategic and policy disconnect.
Maritimme security is often insufficiently integrated international counterterrorism strategies or border management frameworks, which limits coherence and effectiveness.
Information and data gaps are profound.
While systems such as advanced passenger information and passenger name record systems have transferred aviation security, there has been no equivalent global standard for maritime passenger data.
This has created major vulnerability in tracking terrorist travel and identifying high risk individuals.
For this reason, advanced development of booking and reservation information or BRI systems for maritime as a counterpart to PNR is and are developing to strengthen passenger screening and risk analysis.
Capacity and resource constraints continue to hinder many states monitoring coastline ports, and maritime zones.
This requires significant technical capabilities, equipment, trained personnel, resources that remain unevenly distributed globally.
Fourth area is the evolving and hybrid nature of threats that all member states are raising their concerns.
This presents also new challenges.
Terrorism in the maritime domain increasingly overlaps with organized crime, trafficking, smuggling, but this also creates a complex and interconnected risk environment.
Fifth is the critical infrastructure vulnerability.
Ports, offshore installations and undersea cables are rarely identified as critical assets.
That means also that they will remain insufficiently addressed in national frameworks, despite the central importance to global stability.
Finally, the emerging threats that were already highlighted from cybersecurity to unmanned system requires risk based responses.
And specifically in the maritime domain, we see this disconnect that the threat assessment guiding proper risk assessment in the maritime sector is not conducted systematically.
Addressing these gaps will require now renewed international attention and cooperation.
Priorities should include maritime security, international global counterterrorism strategies, advancing the development of passenger data standards for maritime travel, legal frameworks and implementation, scaling up coordinated capacity building efforts.
Equally important is the partnerships.
As I mentioned, seed assessments and recommendations are a bridge to technical assistance.
CAT mandate to facilitate technical assistance supports these efforts in ensuring that identified gaps are addressed through targeted and more focused capacity building.
Strengthening maritime security is not only about protecting sea lanes.
It's reinforcing the integrity of the entire global counterterrorism system before it becomes the weak link.
We work with our partners and member states to continue supporting member states in this vital effort.
Thank you very much.
I thank miss Maya Sesma for this very comprehensive review and for this assessment that rely mainly on the work of CTT, so thanks, Amaya.
I now give the floor to Mr.
Inasio Ibanez, head of the Madrid Program Office and coordinator of the Vulnerable Target Program, Special Project and Innovation Branch.
Uo City.
You will be followed by Mr.
Simon Degnant, program management Officer counting tourist travel Program in also Uno City.
Dear colleagues, you will have the floor and so you can start maybe.
Thank you.
Thank you very much moderator, dear Jean Philippe.
And Actually, most of what has already been said is what I was going to say.
I'm going to be extremely short because I think good news is that most of us are in agreement of what the challenges are, what the possible solutions are.
But I do think that UNOCT, as my colleagues from CT were saying, we help build technical assistance and support member states in developing their capacities can bring some options on the table to support your efforts.
If the presentation can be shown, that will be great.
In addition to being the head of the Madrid Program Office, I am also the coordinator of the global program of the UN OCT on the protection of vulnerable targets.
Next slide, please.
So when we talk about vulnerable targets, what are we really talking about? Most of you know because we have been deeply engaged in the negotiations of the global counterterrorism strategy review and you know perfectly well the language of the General Assembly resolution.
But for many following us online, just to clarify, when we're talking about vulnerable targets, we're referring to both critical infrastructure and public places protection.
Actually the previous review resolution mentions specifically transportation and transport hubs as one of these key areas.
Next slide, please.
So that said, I wanted to basically go over what we consider key terrorist targets in the area of the maritime domain area.
So basically, what critical infrastructure could a terrorist be looking at could be threatening? So you can see there on the screen different colors, Really, that's depending on the level of criticality, what we have says could be more important in terms of the cascading effects that we also heard our colleagues, our experts from Greece and Malta mentioning.
As you can see up there up the list, we have ports and terminals.
We already mentioned the level of volume of global trade that they entail.
Then shipping lanes, of course, we normally think about shipping lanes of cargo, but we also should bear in mind ferries, cruise ships, which are also very interesting targets for terrorists and chokes, international maritime chokepoints.
Some are in cables, telecommunications and data, which they carry more than 95% of global Internet traffic.
Then let's say in the second level, we have pipelines, floating storage units and LNG terminals, and undersea power cables and interconnectors.
A third, let's say, step, we would have the offshore oil and gas platforms, offshore wind farms and energy installations, more and more being developed around the world.
Harbor infrastructure of different kinds, navigation systems and aids.
Remember that we are and have been talking about not only physical protection, but also cyber protection of systems.
And then in, let's say in a lesser level of criticality, but still part of these critical infrastructure, shipyards and repair facilities and maritime surveillance systems.
Of course, we could have a debate about the criticalities, and we will have different assessments.
But as we have heard from our experts already, the risk management cycle will help us determine in each country, depending on the local context, which of these are more critical.
Next slide, please.
So what are the consequences could be the consequences of terrorist attacks on maritime critical infrastructure? I put there a little image.
It's perhaps too small to see from here, basically of an accident that happened with undersea cables on the western coast of Africa which left three countries without Internet services terminated Li but for days and that was an accident.
It's believed that it was some kind of rocks that interrupted the service in the uh Betsy, the interrupted service of those cables.
But it could happen being caused by a terrorist organization.
We have seen scenarios and simulations about hooks, especially with undersea cables that are at a low depth.
This is just an example.
You can imagine if for an accident we have three or four days of interrupted Internet provision services and you imagine the economic impact of that for these countries.
What could happen if a bigger attack could take place against these critical infrastructure or others that we have seen.
Of course, the consequences are difficult to imagine, but you can already see the human impact that that would cause casualties, hostage, taken, humanitarian crisis.
Many of you would remember, for example, the hijacking of the Achille Lado in the 80s of the cruise ship, the economic impact in terms of trade routing, higher freight insurance costs.
These we are seeing also because of the geostrategic context that we're living in so that you can already fathom, as well as energy security risks.
This we are also Experiencing environmental damage, oil spills, infrastructure destruction, especially with certain explosives, and the strategic effects, how that would change the way in which international trade is conducted, how sea lanes could be militarized, the deployments of different navies, et cetera So what are we doing in the UN to try to support member states, next slide, please, in this regard.
So you have heard already that we are working with a number of member states, and we are also working in partnership between different programs of the UN, not only within UN OCT, but also between UN OCT and other UN entities and other UN member states.
Of course, I would underscore the very good cooperation with the IMO in this regard in the context of our global program on vulnerable targets protection, And I know my colleague Simon will now give you an overview also of the City travel program.
So as you can see, joint efforts from the UN based on very firm mandates, both from the Security Council and the General Assembly to protect critical infrastructure and public places, but actually to address the whole chain of threats throughout the prevention, protection, mitigation, investigation, response and recovery.
Resilience is one of the key points from terrorist attacks against vulnerable targets at different levels and in accordance with human rights and gender cross cutting themes.
Next slide.
So I'll pass on these, but just so you can see the volume of what we do in our global program.
Next one, please.
Two technical guides that we have already launched that refers specifically to international good practices, many of them from member states here on the table, both on the public transportation side and on the critical infrastructure side.
Next slide.
And some of the key points that will come out from these technical knowledge guides and some of the work that we have been conducting under the vulnerable targets program.
Some of these recommendations are actually and have already been said in this round table.
Governance and strategy, basically, we really saw that countries that have integrated national strategies on critical infrastructure protection, well connected to other strategies on, of course, counterterrorism side, but also on the security and broader defense side work better, having clear roles across transport security, cyber, and emergency actors and indeed alignment with international frameworks.
The area of risk management, something we have been paying very close attention in the vulnerable targets program.
We really need regular reviews and adaptation to evolving threats.
As our dear colleagues from CET always emphasized, we need to look at the risk management cycle as a whole, including the threat, the vulnerability, the risks, the exchange of information, how you factor in the intelligence, public private cooperation and partnerships, and identifying interdependency and cascading effects throughout the whole risk management cycle.
In terms of coordination and preparedness, our technical guides emphasize, as we have heard already, public private partnerships with operators and industry, and fully agree with our Maltese colleagues in this regard.
In sharing, training and joint exercises and drills together.
I think that cooperation between the public sector and the private sector cannot be limited only to the exchange of information or requests for information from the public sector, but also about developing emergency plans together, about having the inputs of the private sector and private operators, in trainings and exercises, they are fully part of the security chain.
In terms of prevention and security, security by design in ports, something that we are seeing more and more and I'm sure the IMO colleagues will mention platforms and the infrastructure that is within the ports, layered measures both within the ports and outside in the whole maritime domain, in terms of control, surveillance on the cyber side, on the physical side, and as my colleague An Maria mentioned, also the insider threat mitigation, a key component of these efforts.
Finally, on response recovery and resilience, our technical guides emphasize very much crisis plans, ensuring business continuity of essential services, interoperability of communication and command structures, and recovery, focus on rebuilding and long term resilience, of course, very much connected with the whole strength of infrastructure.
With that, I will leave it to my colleague Simon to brief on the city on the counterterrorist travel program.
Simon, I hope you can hear us.
Thank you very much, Nas, just making sure everybody can hear me in New York.
Hello from a very hot and sweaty Budapest.
In the next 5 minutes, I'd like to answer three questions.
Firstly, what is the problem regarding the collection of maritime data? Secondly, what have we in the UN been doing about it? Thirdly, what more can we do? Before I start, I should tell you very briefly what the UN countering Terrorist SaveA Program is.
In short, we help member states to set up passenger information units to collect, analyze, and share traveler information.
Why is this beneficial? Well, if a state collects information about travelers before they arrive, they can do watch listing on known suspects.
They can check against Interpol databases.
They can see suspicious patterns or questionable bookings.
They can do rules based targeting to unveil hidden connections between people and also between people and objects like credit cards or email addresses or phone numbers.
This allows countries to identify not only known persons and known risks, but also unknown persons and unknown risks.
So we support states by first assessing their capacities through a CTAD led consultation, and then delivering support across these four pillars that you see on screen.
Legal, where UNODC terrorist Prevention branch help draft their legal frameworks.
Operationally, where UNODC passenger and cargo Control Program help to set up and train their PIU, On the industry guidance side, where ICO help to engage and connect with the industry, and on the technology front, where we can deploy an analytical system called Go Travel.
It's a one UN initiative bringing together all of the logos that you can see on screen, CTE, IKO, Interpol, UNODC, OICT, and IOM.
Turning now to those three questions.
Firstly, what's the problem? Well, Maria said, at the international level, there is not yet a mandatory standard obliging member states to collect passenger data from maritime vessels.
Without an international legal framework, it is challenging to draft a national legal framework.
Operationally then, maritime presents different risks and challenges than to aviation and the agencies dealing with it often don't include police and intelligence agencies.
In terms of the industry, there isn't one international industry body like we have in aviation with IATA because we have cruise lines, but also ferries, fishing boats, freight, pleasure craft, and others.
Then from the technology perspective, these vessels may not have the technical means for collecting and transferring this data electronically.
Second question, what have we been doing about it? In terms of the international framework, I said we do not yet have one.
The good news is that at the last IMO FL meeting, there was agreement on the language to make the collection of maritime data a mandatory standard.
We expected to be fully adopted at the next FA in 2027.
In terms of our support, we have model legal provisions on maritime data.
We've already started providing it to particular member states.
Operationally, we have terms of reference on how to add a maritime component to a passenger information unit and the training material for how to analyze maritime traveler data.
In terms of industry support, we have a guide on how member states can engage with the maritime industry and also how to deal with non compliance.
On the technology side, we have detailed business requirements for a maritime module in go travel.
In summary, we have the expertise and the guidance material, but we're currently lacking the finance to deliver it.
Third question, what more can we do? Well, from a member state perspective, I would encourage you to support the adoption of maritime data as a standard in the next file.
If you are looking to support the UN, in order for us to be able to deliver the various areas of support that I referenced, we need the resources to do so.
For the member states who have a strong interest in this area, perhaps even the wonderful co sponsors of this event, we would greatly appreciate your support.
Of course, maritime security involves a lot more than just maritime passenger data.
We also need to align with other UN maritime programs.
As Ignacio said, maritime ports are critical infrastructure.
So we've joined forces as well with the vulnerable targets program to propose tailored support to specific regions on maritime security and countering terrorism.
In conclusion, the collection of passenger data for aviation has been a standard for ten years.
We have seen measurable results and impact in the countries we have been supporting since the launch of this program seven years ago, thanks to the donors that you see on screen.
Collecting passenger data is hugely beneficial in countering terrorism and serious crime and in improving law enforcement and border management.
You can see our contact address on screen, ct travel at un.org, and indeed, there's two of our team present in the room, Natalia and Motas.
Maybe you could stand up and wave so people know who you are.
Just to finish by saying now is the time to close the gap that exists when it comes to maritime data.
We have the tools and the guidance, but we need your support to deliver them.
Thank you very much.
I thank Mr.
Ibanz and Mr.
Degant for their remarks.
We are running a little bit short of time, but I'm sure it's going to be okay.
We have to finish in about 15 minutes.
I now give the floor to Mr.
Jeremy Greenhood, Head of Maritime Security Section, Maritime Safety Division, International Maritime Organization.
Mr.
Greenwood will participate via VTC, and I have a question for you, Mr.
Greenwood.
The SAS code provides in all risk framework, but lacks detailed standard and recommended practices like ACS 17 to the Chicago Convention in the aviation sector.
Is it time to adopt a similar approach at IMO? Sir, you have the floor.
Well, greetings, everybody.
Good afternoon from London and thank you very much to our distinguished Excellencies and colleagues, particularly our sponsors, Greece and Malta, and the kind colleagues of CTAD for hosting this wonderful event.
As the United Nations specialized agency with responsibility for the safety and security of international shipping, this topic couldn't be more important to us.
As the head of maritime security, I'm very pleased for the opportunity to discuss a little bit about what we're working on here at IMO, what worries us, and what some of the priorities looking forward in the maritime security sphere with respect to counterterrorism.
Obviously, one of the large events with the headlines today, which includes a lot of work by the IMO, is focused on the Strait of Hormuz and certainly, it has been a very tragic event for international shipping with nearly 50 vessels, commercial vessels conducting international trade being struck by unmanned aerial vehicles and surface unmanned craft.
And one of the great concerns that we look towards here is the possibility of that what I'll call terror contagion.
The demonstration by actors that it is very easy to disrupt international shipping with low cost, easy to fire, easy to direct vehicles.
It's not just in the Strait of Hormuz, as most of us know, it is present in the Red Sea, the Black Sea, and even the Mediterranean.
This is a growing concern for maritime security and while state actors tend to be primary for this action, we know that non state actors have this capability, and they have shown the ability to disrupt global shipping and the world economy with relative ease.
Okay.
Turning to the technology side that's been discussed already, obviously great concern over cybersecurity.
We have just passed a maritime autonomous surface ships code, mass code for short, here at the IMO.
It is a non binding document which will lead into an experience phase that will turn into hopefully a binding document.
But as we think about the complexities of autonomous vessels, the fact that they can be controlled from remote operation centers located far from the coast and far from traditional jurisdictions that regulate maritime security, It is a growing concern that we will have to find a unique and creative ways to regulate this particular field.
That goes in addition for smart ports.
We have seen the growing connectivity of ports, the ship port interface, and the concerns of vulnerabilities have been spoken about already today.
So in the interest of time, I won't go further into them.
But ports have shown a particular vulnerability from unmanned aerial vehicles and surface vehicles during this conflict in the Middle East region.
We have numerous ports that have also been struck showing the ability to impact global shipping very easily, both on land and at sea.
Then of course, we have traditional targeting, which would be, of course, cruise ships, other infrastructure, oil platforms that we need not forget about.
5,000 passengers on a cruise ship is a very unfortunate reality that we must consider as we think about the future.
Quickly in the interest of time, I want to touch on a little bit of the legal and policy framework that embeds maritime counterterrorism work here at the IMO.
As your leading question teed us off to think about, is the International ship and Port Facility Security Code ready for the future threats that we face? And so our member states here at the IMO have challenged to submit new proposals, thinking about new and emerging risks in maritime security to include those presented by Transnational Organized Crime.
And so we welcome member states to continuing this conversation, submit proposals for new work outputs and ways that we could take what has been a very successful instrument, the IPS code, designed post 911 and the counterterrorism threat that existed then, and how can we modernize it, ensure it's ready for future threats, and perhaps make it more prescriptive where necessary if that's what member states decide.
We are working currently on a non mandatory cybersecurity code for the maritime impairment, and work is expected to be completed next year, and then it'll be entered into a non mandatory guidance document, which will lead to an experience building phase and hopefully into a mandatory cybersecurity code.
I've already spoken about our maritime autonomous ship systems code that is currently out and published and available online.
One thing that we do know is that currently within the ISPS framework and within IMO instruments, we do not have a mandatory maritime security audit scheme.
We work very closely with our CTAD colleagues to try to provide that gap where necessary.
But one challenge as we look forward is, is it time to implement some type of mandatory security audit scheme? I put that challenge to the group and I look forward to your questions and in the interest of time, I'll go ahead and stop my remarks and turn it back over.
Thank you very much.
Thanks to you, Jeremy, and thanks for taking into consideration the prime of time we have.
That's why I'm going to ask to the three last speakers to really sum up to the main points they want to share with us, which is about 1 minute per speakers.
I apologize for that, but I'm happy now to give the floor to Mr.
Saran Hasani from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes.
Sir, you have the floor.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Moderator, and in respect of the time, I will keep it as short as possible.
First of all, expressing our appreciation and we're very pleased to join this event and partners as well as the Hellenic Republic and the Republic of Malta to discuss this topic today.
And Just adding to what already has been said, we can also see from our experience and analysis, our own ones that existing links between terrorism and other forms of transnational organized crime at sea is predominant, which highlights the need for coordinated, comprehensive and multi agency responses.
UNODC supports member states through a rule of law based criminal justice approach that strengthens maritime domain awareness, information sharing, operational capacity, legal framework align with international standards and international cooperation.
As emerging technologies reshape the maritime security landscape, We also see the need for continued international cooperation, capacity building, including to strengthen detection capabilities through the collection and analysis of maritime travel data and solid legal framework with appropriate data privacy and protection safeguards.
These remain essential to preventing and countering terrorist exploitation of the maritime domain.
Thank you.
Thank you very much and sorry again for this problem.
I now give the floor briefly to Mr.
Evan Prance, senior project manager, Interpol, who will participate via VTC.
Mr.
Prance, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
I hope everybody hears me well.
Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, conscious of the time.
I will try to be quite brief.
I would like to only stress, I'll bypass the part of the threats.
I would like only to provide one small message about Interpols role in the maritime crime.
It's a proactive approach in critical maritime infrastructure that we provide through support that we provide to member countries who specialized training and operational activities alongside with the partnership.
Our role includes providing operational support, analysts to assist member countries in investigating on complex maritime crimes at sea and coordinating efforts among various stakeholders, jurisdiction, and technical experts.
Enhancing international cooperation to enhance international cooperation, Interpol facilitates information exchange through our databases, through our systems.
We provide mentorship to member countries to advance cases, investigations, to share data nationally, regionally, internationally in order to fight any type of maritime crime.
An important part is the capacity building that we provide to raise capacity to increase capacities and the interagency exercise that we do at sea.
In this, we have recently produced and we will about to launch a maritime investigations guide, which is a short task book for first responders and operators.
The last but not least is to mention the Interpol Global Maritime Security database established in 2011 and backed up by UN resolutions, which serves as a global repository for sharing information on criminals and crimes in the maritime domain, and it's a hub for information to support member countries again in the first response and investigation of the maritime crimes.
With that, I conclude and I give the floor to you.
I would like to thank you for this opportunity.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Prins and our last speaker, Duncan Porter, project coordinator, World Custom Organization.
Sir, in about a minute, please.
Thank you very much.
Thank you, Jeff.
Thank you, everyone in the interest of time, I will do this and I've got the clock on.
So The WCO represents 187 customs administrations and I think it's important to highlight that customs plays a key role when it comes to the detection of goods and people across the borders and ultimately in protecting society like security, economics, and public safety threats, and of course in counterterrorism.
Obviously, with global trade volumes continue to grow, customs administrations must increasingly rely on intelligence led and data driven risk management to identify high risk cargo before it reaches the borders.
So with that, the WCO has developed the WCO Safe framework of Standards, which has become a global foundation for the secure and facilitated trade, and that promotes the use of advanced cargo information and integrated risk management to strengthen supply chain security while supporting legitimate trade.
Ultimately, counterterrorism in the maritime domain, it requires an end to end approach that connects maritime security, border management, customs, law enforcement and the private sector.
By strengthening risk management, information sharing, and trusted partnerships, customs can identify and disrupt high risk movements early in the supply chain, making a direct contribution to global counterterrorism efforts.
The WCO looks forward to continuing to work closely with the United Nations and international partners to strengthen cooperation.
Thank you very much for the time.
I think I'll go within a minute.
Thank you, Chair.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Porter.
Again, thanks WCO, Interpol UNODC, key partners in our work to counter terrorism in the maritime domain.
For any other panelists or intervention, if you have questions, please send question to our email seated at un.org.
We will of course take that.
I think in the interest of time, I will close that meeting.
Thanks again, everybody for joining us today and good luck for the rest of the city week.
Thank you.