Good Practices in Countering Terrorism and its Financing in Low-Capacity and Exposed Contexts: Strengthening Capacity, Enhancing Operational Cooperation and Ensuring Balanced Implementation of International Standards (Counter-Terrorism Week Side Event)

Good afternoon, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, the colleagues.
It's a great honor and pleasure for me to welcome you all to this side event on the good practices in countering terrorism and its financing in low capacity and exposed context, strengthening capacity, enhancing operational cooperation, and ensuring balanced implementation of international standards.
I really have a great honor to facilitate today's discussion, but we have also very tight schedule, so I proceed immediately with giving the floor to our distinguished guests and it's my greatest pleasure to introduce the Islamic military Counters Coalition is one of the lead partners of this event and supporting a number of member states through capacity building, specialized training, and operational coordination.
We are so honored and pleased to have His Excellency, Major General Muhammad Bin Saad Al Mogedi who is the Secretary-General of the Islamic Military Counters Coalition.
Mr.
Secretary-General, you have the floor.
In the name of God, the compassionate and the merciful, may God's blessings be on our prophet Muhammad and his family and friends.
Dear friends, it gives us pleasure in the IMCTC to participate in this meeting that focuses on countering terrorism and its financing in the capacity and exposed context, how to tackle this complex balancing act.
It is being presented in the context of fighting terrorism.
We have already finished the fourth conference of the United Nations on counterterrorism, which focused on a world free from terrorism, giving giving enforcing commitment to multilateral approaches to fight terrorism.
We would like to thank the officials of the United Nations Office, the UN CCT for in preparing for this week, which really shows how deep partnership and cooperation is among states and international communities to fight terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.
Terrorism knows no boundaries and does not distinguish between people and it targets the security of people.
The alliance has been established under a an initiative of His Royal Highness, the custodian of the two shrines, King Salman Bin Ablazz and was declared open by his Royal Highness, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Bin Ablazz also owed the crown prince on December 9th, 2015, so that we can coordinate and unify and combine efforts among the 43 member states and promote capacities in the field in the ideological, mass media, combating financing terrorism.
And in the military field.
As such, the alliance works through its programs and initiatives to build national capacities and promote the institutional abilities of member states so that they become ready to face terrorism when it strikes.
Fighting terrorism should be a comprehensive and integrated process because knee jerk reactions when a terrorist act strikes, despite sometimes positive results, is something that really consumes the resources of states and therefore, proactive approaches and forward looking approaches remain the optimal solution.
Those environments, particularly in areas that suffer from terrorist threats, face further security, political and economic challenges, which makes it very important to build national capacities.
The second ministerial conference of the Ministers of Defense of the Alliance countries, which was held in Riyadh in 2024, chaired by his Royal Highness, Prince Hailed Man Salman, the President of the Council of Ministers of Defense of the Alliance countries, resulted in very important strategic results, which um which already brought some of the strategic initiatives which were specifically designed to meet the needs of member states and enhance its capacities.
His Royal Highness already declared that the kingdom will be providing financial support for the initiative fund in the h at the value of 100 million Saudi reals in addition to 46 education programs and training programs to train national staff in different fields of counterterrorism.
This generous support by the Kingdom led to the implementation of more than 116 initiative and program in 2025 that included 30 member states and more than 4,200 specialists benefited from the training in different fields of counterterrorism.
We opted to achieve practical results that can be translated into impact in building capacity and promoting solidarity.
In conclusion, I would like to thank the president of the UN CCT for the efforts made to make this meeting successful and we'd like to thank all participating states, hoping that you will get the benefit resulted from this session.
We hope that we all can achieve our aspirations in eliminating the scourge of terrorism.
May God's peace be upon you.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Sec Jan, for your kind words for reminding also that we have a strong cooperation through a memorandum of understanding and are providing joint capacity building to the benefit of member states.
Thank you for being here at the Candors week.
I'm also very pleased and honored now to I invite the next speaker from the Kingdom of Bahrain is one of the organizing member states and brings a very important regional perspective also from a security council angle giving their membership.
Very pleased to invite their Excellency Ambassador Nancy Jamal, Deputy permanent representative of the Kingdom of Bahrain to the United Nations.
Madam Ambassador Geofo Thank you very much.
Thank you, everybody for attending.
I love that this is a full room, so it's really good to have you here.
I'm going to start my national speech in Arabic, so let's swear our speakers, please.
Ahab Sada and Excellencies, may God's blessings be upon you.
It is my pleasure at the outset to express my thanks to the permanent mission of the Kingdom of Sadia Arabia, as well as the IMCCT for holding this event today together with the permanent mission of the Kingdom of Bahrain.
Let me express my thanks for UN CCT and CFT.
It's also my pleasure to express thanks and appreciation to all present here today representing the US Treasury, CTA, Interpol, experts from various member states who bring various experiences and expertise.
I am convinced that the participation will add great value to our discussion.
This wide, varied participation in this side event sends a clear message that combating the financing of terrorism is a joint responsibility for us all.
It is also a reflection of a joint understanding of the fact that confronting this global challenge requires more cooperation and coordination among member states, international, regional organizations, as well as UN bodies.
The kingdom that is committed to combating terrorism and all threats represented by terrorist groups and trans border activities has a clear position vis-à-vis counterterrorism, including preserving peace and security regionally and internationally.
In our efforts national and regional against terrorism, we rely on cooperation with a number of national bodies set up by the Kingdom to coordinate regionally and a nationally to ensure that the kingdom is able and ready to confront all these challenges.
We have a center that is at the highest level in combating the financing of terrorism and terrorism itself.
The Kingdom has participated in the center's activities since it was created in 2017.
It is a multilateral body between the GCC countries and the United States.
It acts through its executive council In coordinating measures among its members, namely one joint classification of hampering illegal financing, the members of the center have coordinated measures through sanctions and other measures to hamper the activities of terrorists and their financial circles.
Since the creation of the center, sanctions have been imposed on more than 100 individual or entity through eight rounds of coordinated classifications, including ISIS, Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Taliban, the IGRC, Boko Haram, Al Shabab, and ISIS Somalia.
Second, exchanging information.
The center supports the member states by sharing information on terrorist groups and their activities.
Cyclical sessions are held to coordinate and consult among member states.
Third, capacity building of partners.
We have training programs for member states to improve government capacity in confronting the threats of terrorism financing.
Workshops are held on best practices, as well as United Nations Security Council resolutions and FTA.
We have hosted workshops, including experts from various national organizations in member states.
Issues have varied in these workshops.
They include the threats of financing terrorism, cipher currencies, as well as money laundering.
The center also holded a held a finishing program created in 2024 to draw in experts on financing of terrorism from various member states in order to set up a network of such experts.
We participated actively in this program, representing experts from various national bodies, the foreign ministry, the Interior Ministry, as well as the Central Bank participated in conclusion.
We believe that this side event today, together with the UNCCT is in line with what we all wish a world free from terrorism, a stable world where we combat terrorism in all its form and create networks and partnerships to support such activities in a complementary way.
Thank you.
Thank you very much, Madam Ambassador, and thanks to the Kingdom of Bahrain for all the support and leadership in organizing this event with the other partners.
We moved to another of our strong partner, which we have, of course, signed a memorandum of understanding through the Presidential state security, but the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, it's the founding partner of the UN Counter Tmp Center and we are extremely proud of this partnership.
I'm very proud to have His Excellency, General Abdul Amin Al Badir who is Assistant Director General for International Cooperation at the presidency of State Security of the Kingdom.
Mr.
General, thank you.
Welcome to New York and you have the floor.
Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, may God's peace be upon you.
Let me at the outset, thank you and OCT for organizing this, this extremely important meeting that comes at a time when our world has seen rapid and complex shifts in order to counter terrorism all over the world.
We need to concentrate on capacity building in member states so that we can disrupt the networks financing terrorism.
It is a collective responsibility that calls for cooperation and coordination among member states and international and regional organizations.
Kingdom has confirmed its rejection of terrorism in all its forms, manifestations, and motivations, and we would renew our our belief in the need to address this phenomenon and to dry up its sources of financing in a way that is compatible with international law and UN resolutions.
In this regard, the Kingdom provided financial support in efforts to counter terrorism and we continue to provide support for the implementation of the global counterterrorism strategy of the United Nations because we believe in the efficacy of building capacities in countries that are exposed to terrorism.
Because we believe in and we are committed in the international commitments, we are a member of FAF and as well as a member of the International Forum to Counterterrorism since 2011.
We are part of the strategic alliance to defeat ISIS since 2014.
We continue to work with the Sahel region, and at the regional level, we continue to promote international cooperation and build partnerships.
We believe in the need to combat financing terrorism.
We established a center in 2017, which is the TFCT.
The center has members from the GCC countries.
We cooperate and coordinate our information so that we can target networks financing terrorism and to defeat networks that threaten security in member states.
We We continue to make every effort to target these networks.
We also reach out to regional partners so that we can all mobilize our capacities, the center, complements the information that is already shared among partners.
We trace information that has to do with networks, including targeting threats by either states or organizations.
We had nine rounds of classifications that had to do with different terrorist organizations.
The center works on coordinating measures such as targeting terrorists with sanctions or other measures and to provide support to participants who need help in capacity building so that they can face terrorist threats.
We also have our own record of best practices in cooperation with FAT, We we cooperate with many law enforcement parties, including the legislative and legal agencies with the participation of organizations.
We're talking about the support group established by the Security Council on fighting ISIS.
We continue to cooperate with partners to support international peace and security and to combat terrorism in all forms and manifestations.
May God peace be upon you.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Janna.
Shukran Jazirn Lake Eeni to deliver my own remarks on behalf of the UN Office of Counterterrorism, I would like to start by expressing my sincere appreciation to the Islamic military counterterrorism Coalition, the IMCTC, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for the leadership in convening this very timely discussion.
I also, of course, thank the Terrorist Financing Target Center for its close partnership.
We are particularly grateful to IM CTC, including for your financial support, which has made these events possible.
But particularly we appreciate the partnership we have with the Islamic military counter terrorism Coalition on countering the financing of terrorism among other areas, including through the joint development of capacity building training to support member states in strengthening their response to countering the financing of terrorism.
Today's event asks how international counterterrorism financing commitments can be implemented effectively where resources are limited, institutions are under pressure and exposure to terrorist financing risks is high.
Terrorist financing remains a critical enabler of terrorist activity in low capacity in exposed contexts, these risks are compounded by limited technical resources, uneven regulatory frameworks, porous borders, fragile institutions, and rapidly evolving financial systems.
For UNCT, these challenges are both a policy and operational priority.
In particular, through our global program on detecting, preventing, and countering the financing of terrorism, we support member states in strengthening legal, institutional, and operational capacities, including financial intelligence, investigations, interagency coordination, international cooperation, and risk based supervision.
At the same time, implementation must be balanced.
Effective countering or financing terrorism measures must be risk based, proportionate, context sensitive, and fully consistent with international law, including, of course, human rights, international humanitarian law and refugee law.
Poorly calibrated measures may contribute to financial exclusion, they're risking restriction on legitimate civil society activity, or impediments to principled humanitarian action.
Ensuring that effective application of humanitarian exemptions where applicable is, of course, essential.
Today, we will focus on some practical lessons.
First, how to better tailor capacity building and strengthen operational cooperation to disrupt terrorist financing networks, and second, how to implement international standards in ways that are robust, realistic, and sustainable.
I really look forward to a substantive and forward looking exchange and I thank you.
I now return to my role as moderator and I have also the greatest pleasure to invite our dear friend, miss Carmen Cantor, Deputy Executive Director of the Coder Asment committee Executive Director, so that we can hear a seated perspective on the assessment, on the implementation, and the technical assistance priorities.
The common.
The Deputy Executive Director, you have the floor.
Thank you.
Excellencies, distinguished delegates, colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon.
Buenos Tares.
I thank the co organizers of today's important discussion and the invitation for the Executive Directorate to take part.
Throughout our work on monitoring member states compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions, we consistently identify limited law enforcement capacity, political instability, ongoing conflicts and corruption as factors influencing the nature of terrorism and terrorism financing risk in the affected jurisdictions.
We have also highlighted that to finance their activities, terrorist organizations can take advantage of weak state capacities, inability to assert authority in certain remote areas, insufficient border controls, weak government services, lack of infrastructures, and so on, allowing them to profit from large scale illegal activities and to access natural resources such as gold, gems, and timber to generate funds.
Some of the world's most dangerous criminal and terrorist organizations thrive in such contexts, operating across borders and exploiting informal economies.
The recent report of the Financial Action Task Force, the preparation of which CT had the privilege to co lead with the French Treasury examines these factors as contextual elements that shaped the nature and methods of terrorism financing.
Last fall, CET also released its thematic assessment, spotlighting persistent gaps in the fight against terrorism financing in almost 30 states in Africa, identifying their priority needs for technical assistance.
The report calls for context specific solutions supported by international partners.
Priorities include building stronger risk assessments, enhancing cross border coordination, regulating vulnerable sectors, and improving capacity to track new technologies, and online fundraising.
Addressing the identified systemic gaps will require not only political will and resources, but also sustained international cooperation and support for such states to strengthen their resilience against this evolving threat.
We insisted hope that the priority areas identified as being in dire need for technical assistance will helpfully guide tailored and targeted capacity building initiatives that many of you are supporting and implementing.
Thank you, Michel Gracias.
Kerman, thank you so much.
Last but not the least, I'll turn now to the last speaker of this session, Mr.
Christopher Al Koury, acting Co Director of the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center from the US Treasury.
You have the floor, please.
Yeah.
Thank you so much and thank you for the opportunity to be here today.
I wanted to start by just introducing myself.
As you noted, Christopher Al Koury, I'm currently both the acting Co Director of the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center and the acting Assistant Director for the Regional Office and Treasury's Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, responsible for the Middle East.
I would like to also extend a huge thanks to the UN CCT, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for convening this important side event at this year's United Nations Counterterrorism Week.
It's one of the challenges having such close like minded partners all on the same panel.
You may hear some of the same points made a few times here today.
I wanted to just say that if I miss anything, I know that Ambassador Nancy Jamal here can fix any errors I make and keep me honest.
It's through the TFTC that just earlier this morning we announced the joint designation of 21 targets affiliated with Al Kara Al Hasan, a Lebanese Hezbollah affiliated financial institution that masquerades as a non governmental organization.
AQH provides financial services similar to banks and in practice illicitly moves funds through shell accounts and facilitators.
Hezbollah uses AQAH to facilitate its destabilizing militant activities, having long exploited under service communities in Lebanon and undermined the Lebanese people's ability to rebuild while enabling the group's own interests.
This is a great example of just one recent action, joint designation, conducted through the TFTC, which has proven to be an effective multilateral mechanism for the United States to work very closely with our golf cooperation council to operationalize cooperation and disrupt terrorist financing networks.
With my TFFC and not TFTC hat on, the US Department of Treasury also does a lot of work bilaterally with countries around the world to share information, primarily financial intelligence and coordinate action against terrorist financing networks.
We also offer bilateral capacity building opportunities, both via bilateral fora, multilateral fora, and things like the FAF style regional bodies and the FATF itself.
We additionally provide targeted technical assistance in unique cases where it makes sense to have actual financial budgets to accompany some of those capacity building opportunities because we believe that we are collectively stronger and more effective when we work together shoulder to shoulder to protect the integrity of the global financial system.
Be that through enhancing and enforcing global CFT standards, similar to the ones here at the UN and that you all design or at the Financial Action Task Force, or taking disruptive action against shared threats.
I look forward to speaking in greater detail about the critical work of the TFTC during the panel discussion, and that's all.
I thank you very much, Mr.
Al Koury, and we will now move to the expert panel discussion.
The discussion is organized on three themes first capacity building in low capacity and exposed context.
Second, operational cooperation and disruption of terrorist financing networks, and thirdly, implementation realities and balanced application of CT and CFT frameworks.
The first panel discussion, as I mentioned, we'll focus on capacity building in low capacity and exposed context.
And we will particularly consider how international assistance can better respond to the needs of member states facing terrorist financing risks while also operating with limited capacity.
In fact, we'll try to bring different perspective, in particular from IM CTC and CETA and how we could link practical capacity building Specialized training and operational coordination with the assessments and risk based insights on particularly implementation needs, gaps, and technical assistance priorities.
I'm very glad to first turn the floor to doctor Abdullah Al Modifas the head of the competitors financing cluster at IM CTC.
You have the floor, doctor Abdullah.
In the name of God, the compassion is and the merciful and peace be upon our prophet.
Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, may God's peace be upon you.
It gives me pleasure today to stand here as a representative of the Islamic military Counterterrorism coalition so that we can together shed light on a case that is extremely important and complex, which is countering terrorism and its financing in low capacity and exposed contexts.
In this presentation, we will review the way in which we can tackle this complex balancing act to maintain security, guarantee financial integrity, and uninterrupted humanitarian action.
You might very well know that low capacity countries, particularly countries that are exposed to threats of terrorist groups, face many complex challenges that touch upon security, political, as well as economic aspects.
This reality confirms that building national capacities is not only an option, but has become a basic need to consolidate peace and security at the national and regional levels.
However, what do we mean by building capacity? We are here talking about enabling countries and training personnel so that they can develop their security, military, legislative, and technical institutions.
Our purpose is for these countries to be able to undertake the task of countering terrorism, in a sustainable manner while fine tuning their performance.
In an interconnected world, this role is no longer entrusted to major powers.
It becomes a participatory action that includes alliances, coalitions, and international and regional centers.
The IMCT here becomes an integrated model to coordinate efforts of supporting countries so that we can build the capacities of countries plagued by the scourges of terrorism and extremism.
I will join you on a journey on two different axises.
The first is a short and a brief overview of the IMC CTC, and we will shed light on our practical experience in building the capacity of exposed countries and particularly in the field of financing terrorism.
Our strategic vision is clear.
We would like to be pioneers in countering terrorism and the first partner in international efforts to preserve international peace and security.
We combine and coordinate efforts of our 43 member states in the military media and ideological spheres to counter terrorism and its financing through a partnership with friendly countries and international organizations.
We focus on media.
We focus also on the military and financing terrorism.
The coalition includes 43 countries that work within an overview vision to combat terrorism.
Working is not in isolation from the international community.
We garnered the support of member states like the United States, the United Kingdom, and the French Republic.
We concluded 18 cooperation and partnership agreements, the most important of which is our partnership with the UNCCT.
Through these partnerships, we design qualitative strategic initiatives specifically built to respond to the needs of member states.
We have also specialized programs like the program of the IMCTC to fight counterterrorism in the Sahel, the capacity building program for candidates of member states provided by the kingdom to train national candidates.
Your Excellencies, in the span of one year, the coalition achieved tangible results.
116 initiatives and programs were executed from which 30 member states benefited, over 41 participant had access at a rate of about ten programs monthly.
Our achievements can be divided on four axes.
The ideological field, we focused on countering extremist views and promoting centrist values and correcting concepts.
We have 40 programs in this field in which 25 member states benefited and more than 1,300 beneficiaries had access to this program.
In the information field, we implemented 15 programs to enhance social awareness and to build a mass media platform in which we counter terrorist publicity.
12 member states benefited and over 900 beneficiaries benefited.
In the field of fighting terrorism, 25 programs were implemented to promote prevention covering up such acts and limiting financing terrorism.
15 member states benefited and over 35,000 people benefited.
In the military field, we have 63 programs implementing initiatives that focused on the readiness of member states and enhancing its capacities in countering terrorist groups.
27 member states benefited and over 800 beneficiaries were able to benefit from the programs.
We We see in this way how we cooperate in different fields so that we can build the capacities of member states and promote their abilities in fighting terrorism in all its manifestations.
After reviewing our experience, let us focus on our subject matter, which is, how can we use these experiences to build capacities in order to counter financing terrorism? Why is capacity building considered a strategic tool in low capacity contexts? Because we focus on four targets, promoting international and regional stability by supporting the country's ability to face up to the challenges.
Second, to limit the emergence of terrorist organizations by improving the capacity of oversight bodies because supporting peace and security is the basis for any social and economic development.
And finally, promoting international partnerships by exchanging experiences and by benefiting from best practices in building these capacities.
In order to achieve our objective, International efforts use specific mechanisms and tools, basically continued training of personnel, technical support including cybersecurity, AI, developing policies and legislations and facing up to extremist ideology by raising awareness, by curriculum, and by supporting research centers.
Despite these efforts, we really face many challenges and we would like to focus on six points.
First, the limited financial resources.
Second, the weak political and security stability in some countries.
Third, shortage of human resources and qualified personnel.
Fourth, challenges in sustaining outcomes after the conclusion of support programs.
Fifth, limited abilities to keep pace with the evolving nature of terrorism, and sixth, difficulty operating in certain international environments due to the lack of infrastructure.
In view of these challenges, we need to focus on combining our efforts through different paths.
Some of the major paths we're going to discuss in the field of financing, terrorism, we need to strengthen the capabilities of financial intelligence units and developing systems for tracking suspicious financial flows, supporting the implementation of international standards for countering money laundering.
In addition to developing international cooperation, in the rapid and secure exchange of financial intelligence information.
It also covers enabling states to monitor informal channels of financial transfers, while ensuring that legitimate transfers are not affected, particularly in humanitarian contexts and strengthening the capacities of regulatory authorities and law enforcement agencies in support of legislation.
In the field of technical and cybersecurity, we focus on building secure and digital infrastructure that supports states capabilities to use digital analysis and AI in addition to supporting partnerships with global technology companies to monitor extremist content and limit its spread.
The major challenge is striking the integrity between humanitarian action and financial integrity.
Designing smart oversight mechanisms that secure humanitarian work is not exploited while enhancing transparency in the work of non profit organizations and building capacity to comply with international standards.
We believe that counterterrorism financing is a fundamental pillar in countering terrorism.
It requires not simply tracking funds or bank accounts, but include integral system of legislation, modern technologies, training and education.
Therefore, our approach is based on three capacities, legal training program, initiative on counterterrorism guide, initiative to provide consultations to competent authorities in member states to reduce terrorist financing operations, expertise, and initiative to develop training programs, capacity building.
We have also achieved traceable achievements in combating financing, which are an extension of our efforts and an investment of the achievements we've already realized.
In view of the above, ladies and gentlemen, we would like to submit Some recommendations.
First, unifying the efforts of member states and organizations by coordinating programs and developing a model for low capacity countries, promoting the adoption of artificial intelligence with partners while focusing on the needy countries and encouraging international partners who contribute to international organizations.
In view of the cybersecurity needs.
And finally, strengthening strategic partnerships and institutional cooperation between international organizations, particularly the UN, to ensure the integration of international efforts.
Finally, addressing the challenges faced by low capacity environment in countering terrorism is not something that we can do alone.
It's a collective responsibility that requires active partnerships and long term commitments while continuing to build national capacities.
Institution we strengthen and every system we develop and every training program to personnel is an additional phase to dry up the sources of financing terrorism and we can as such, protect our societies.
We in the coalition would like to renew our commitment to continue to work with member states and our international partners because we believe that building capacities is not simply a response to current challenges, but an investment in the security of our future, a promotion of international peace and security as well.
By this, I would have come to the end of my presentation.
I hope that I have successfully provided information.
Thank you for listening and may God's peace be upon you.
Thank you very much, doctor Al Malefa for this excellent presentation.
We'll hear now from the perspective of CETA and the assessments and the risk based analysis.
Please to turn the floor to miss Betwa Martov is the CFT coordinator at CETA.
Betlaa have the floor.
Thank you very much, Mara, and to all the co organizers of this important discussion for involving us I We can move on to the first slide.
Yes.
Thank you.
I will give you the perspective that as Mao said in the introduction, is based on our assessments, but also on our partnerships with the financial action taskforce and its global network.
It's really a joint effort that we have been implementing together to understand what works and what doesn't in this area.
As my Deputy Executive Director mentioned in her opening remarks, we have established that terrorist groups like Daesh and Al Qaeda and their affiliates do exploit political instability, ongoing conflicts, porous borders, food insecurity informal economies, and can also benefit from territorial control in some areas that comes with then access to various types of resources that are present in those territories.
Terrorist groups also continue to reorganize and expand their financial networks, adapting very quickly to enforcement measures, but also exploiting regulatory and operational gaps.
This is really a huge challenge for countries with lower institutional and operational capacities, as well as countries weakened by conflicts and terrorist activity.
Seated analysis, and this is also reflected in our annual assessments of gaps in the implementation of key CFT requirements, which we publish annually, as its name suggests, shows that while legal frameworks on CFT are improving, effectiveness of the implementation remains very uneven.
CETA identifies persistent weaknesses in national risk assessments which are often outdated, inconsistent, or disconnected from broader CFT strategies.
Terrorism financing investigations and prosecutions remain very limited with financial intelligence units and law enforcement authorities lacking the capacity and the coordination to pursue complex cases.
Furthermore, links between terrorism financing and organized crime, including such types of crimes as trafficking and illegal mining, are insufficiently analyzed and the oversight of affected economic sectors remain weak.
Informal and cash based economies, including, for example, mobile money service providers and money value transfer system or alternative remittance networks remain the preferred means for moving funds undetected.
In combination, emerging technologies add further risks, but in depth assessments and investigative capacity does not measure up to those challenges.
Oversight of these sectors as well must be reinforced through effective regulation and public private partnerships.
We've also noted a particular concern about the continuous challenge to counter and address financing issues related to foreign terrorist fighters with networks using sophisticated technologies and informal channels combined to raise and move funds to allow for their movements.
Implementation of targeted financial sanctions also lags by weak designation processes, delays in freezing assets, and limited cross border cooperation.
Most governments still lack systems to analyze or share data on cross border cash movements, making detection rare.
Next slide, please.
I.
So what do we do to address all these problems? There is still a lot to do, of course.
First of all, understanding exact risks, threats and vulnerabilities is essential to address them with risk based and evidence based approaches.
The diversity of risk exposures that we've noted through this discussion among different regions and jurisdictions also means that detailed national or supranational risk analysis are needed to complement any comprehensive global analysis.
Harmonizing legal networks globally helps reducing opportunities for terrorist organizations to benefit from regulatory discrepancies and loopholes.
Effective cooperation in terrorism financing investigations and prosecutions based on coherent criminalization of the offense and robust information sharing channels compliant with international law is also essential to dismantle terrorist networks operating in multiple jurisdictions, which is almost very frequently, at least, if not almost always the case.
Multilateral designations of terrorist organizations, notably under the UN Security Council sanction regime, still appear as the most overreaching sanction instrument to obstruct terrorism financing, especially in relation to tackling transnational TF schemes.
Addressing technologically advanced methods of terrorism financing or those interlinked with organized crime, as I mentioned earlier, require advanced expertise and capacity.
In this regard, I would just briefly remind the participants of this event about the recent non binding guiding principles adopted by the counterterrorism committee that are known by Algeria guiding principles as they deal with preventing, detecting, and disrupting the use of new and emerging financial technologies for terrorist purposes.
They were adopted by the committee in January 2025 and we stand ready to support all of you as partners and jurisdictions to follow the recommendations and implement the actions recommended in this important document.
CETA has also repeatedly emphasized, and I think several speakers before me have also mentioned that many states still lack institutional frameworks to consider, evaluate, and eventually mitigate the effects of CFT measures on humanitarian activities.
In this sense, it is also useful to recall that UN Security Council provided for the exemption of certain humanitarian aid providers from asset freeze measures imposed by notably the ISIL and Al Qaeda sanctions committee, and many states and financial institutions still need updated regulation and guidance to implement such exemptions in practice.
I'm also very pleased to highlight that just a week ago, the FATF has implemented amendments to its methodology to reflect these humanitarian exemptions, and we are now much closer to being on the same page about this.
Um, terrorism financing threats are not confined to a particular continent or sub region, as many of you already mentioned, and terrorist financing networks are highly adaptable.
Vulnerabilities in just one jurisdiction can be exploited to finance terrorism elsewhere.
Again, as emphasized by our Deputy Director, CTA assessments and recommendations are intended to guide targeted technical assistance and capacity building initiatives, ensuring that measures to combat terrorism and its financing are really context specific, effective, and compliant with the international law.
We therefore stand ready to continue cooperation with all of our partners to support the collective action in this regard.
Just briefly last slide, please, it's only for your information and reference if these slides are distributed.
These are our recent um analytical and research work, but also work on supporting the guidance and policy guidance on various topics.
You will see that I mentioned the annual assessment of gaps.
I think this is of particular relevance to the discussion here.
But also, we had the pleasure to co lead with the French Treasury, the FATF most recent comprehensive update on terrorist financing.
That is a very comprehensive as its name suggests a set of trends, but also recommendations, the Algeriia principles that I mentioned earlier, and then a whole list of more sectorial and subtical issues that we continue to analyze in our work and bring to your attention.
Thank you.
Thank you very much, miss Martinova.
We now turn to the second panel, which is looking at how we can ensure the disruption of terrorist financing networks through operational cooperation.
We have two excellent examples, if I may say, one at the regional level and one at the global level.
We will start with the regional level.
I give the floor again to Mr.
Al Koury from the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center.
Thank you so much.
I think we're still waiting to get the slides presented.
I'll give it 1 second.
But this was doctor Abdallah's really fantastic presentation.
It was a useful reminder of why I usually do remarks and not PowerPoint presentations.
I apologize in advance for a slightly less exciting visual, but we'll do a quick overview of the work of the TFTC.
I know that some of my colleagues spoke to it earlier, but we'll dive into hopefully some more details and also I'll go off script hopefully so that we can say some new things.
Next slide, please.
So as my colleagues alluded to, the Terrorist Financing targeting Center was established in 2017 at a Rad summit.
The co chairs are the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States, but the GCC and the United States are in an equal partnership here.
Every member must agree unanimity is required to proceed with any action.
Next slide, please.
So I think the three core pillars of the TFTC really align exceptionally well with today's conversation.
I think the three pillars of the TFFC are sharing information, capacity building, and coordinated action.
That aligns very neatly with the mechanisms to structure and operationalize cooperation, and then mechanisms to operationalize disruption.
In the sharing information and capacity building context, that is a way for member states to understand threat actors in a similar fashion, to understand how best practices apply in each of our jurisdictions and globally.
It's a way for us to lend expertise to one another.
But we'll focus more on the coordinated actions in today's discussion, but I will speak briefly on each of these.
Next slide, please.
I think for information sharing, it's critical that we establish a common operating picture of the threat environment.
In some cases, individual member states may have only one or two pieces of a larger puzzle and one TFTTC member may receive a suspicious activity report or identify concerning typology or some activity in their jurisdiction, but only by sharing that piece of the puzzle or that node in a network with other member states, can we collectively see an entire network or understand the size, scope and scale of a threat.
Terrorist financiers, terrorist finance is constantly evolving.
We're operating in a constantly evolving and quickly changing environment and subsequently, it's really critical that we all share our expertise and our knowledge of that threat so that we can prevent it from occurring and or we can jointly disrupt it.
So if a threat actor is using a new or novel tactic, technique, or procedure, information shared by one jurisdiction can inform the other member states so that they can more effectively monitor for similar sex activity or take preemptive action to fix a potential vulnerability that could have been exploited by a terrorist actor.
I'll just note that obviously information of this nature, operational information is quite sensitive.
It is important to establish mechanisms by which you can share secure classified potential information quickly with your partners.
This often results for us in having actual information sharing sessions where we come together so that we can share information in a secure environment.
Next slide, please.
I obviously won't dive into capacity building, which was the topic of this first session, but I did want to highlight a few quick notes and echo some of the points my colleagues have made.
Our capacity building initiatives have created regular opportunities for member states to collectively learn from subject matter experts, from public and private sector actors, and indeed from one another and to advance our counterterrorist financing regimes and implement regional and global best practices.
Obviously, these are high capacity environments, these are not low capacity environments.
It's not the same conversation you may be having in some jurisdictions, but it's still important that we learn from each other's experiences and understand how we're each interacting and dealing with certain threats and implementing best practices.
These workshops and the recently established fellowship program have also created opportunities for us to build enduring relationships with one another and with like minded AML CFT professionals.
I think this is really critical.
It's built a community.
I know who to call in a foreign jurisdiction if I have something that I need or if there's an urgent issue that I think needs to be addressed, and that ability to connect with one another quickly is a huge benefit, I think, of this organization and this structure.
Next slide, please.
Just two recent photographs of some of our workshops.
We had a workshop back in February of last year in Muscat Oman focused on emerging technologies and virtual asset trends and typologies.
We recently just in January here in DC launched the 2026 fellowship.
This is our third fellowship cadre.
Again, it's mid career professionals, MLCFT professionals from each of our jurisdictions joining forces and teaming together to interact and to effectively learn from one another.
Next slide, please.
I think this is where it's critical that information sharing can and frequently does culminate in coordinated disruptive action and that is really critical.
We're not talking just to talk, we're intentionally sharing information so that we can take joint action.
The TFTC's mission is to take that concrete action against terrorist organizations, terrorist financiers and operatives to prevent them from raising, storing, moving, or using money that they rely on to conduct terrorism.
That coordinated disruption does not always need to be public, and I think this is also critical.
While most of our joint actions do ultimately result in a joint designation action, we are actually, as of today, 100 and more than 120 individuals and entities jointly designated by all member states.
It doesn't necessarily need to be that way.
We also encourage our partners to take domestic legal action, domestic law enforcement action where it's appropriate in instances where the joint membership doesn't necessarily see a reason to add an individual or an entity to a public designation list, that doesn't mean that we can't work together as an organization to take disruptive action more quietly.
While the TFTC is primarily focused on the Middle East, I think we've successfully targeted wide array of threat actors.
Next slide, please.
Just a quick breakdown of the range of threat actors that we have jointly taken action to disrupt.
I'll reiterate here that while unilateral action can disrupt a node and a network or a network that is operating in a single jurisdiction, terrorist groups and the money they rely on to fund their activities are rarely isolated to one geographic area.
That's why coordinated action can be far more effective in targeting several nodes of a network simultaneously or dismantling a network that spans multiple jurisdictions in one go.
I think this is also critical in that it doesn't allow for asset flight.
I think oftentimes when one state takes direct action against a network they see in their jurisdiction, it just creates the pressure and that pressure is released potentially to a neighboring state or elsewhere, where that network may have previously or had maintained operations.
And that's why the simultaneous and coordinated action is the most effective mechanism by which we can disrupt these types of threats.
I think to wrap all this up, by sharing information, aligning our actions, and using our financial authorities in tandem, we can collectively make it far harder for terrorist organizations and their facilitators to exploit the international financial system and prevent them from accessing financial resources that they rely on to threaten regional peace and security.
The TFTC is just one truly fantastic example of this, but it is not alone, and we would encourage all of you to pursue multilateral, bilateral, or other mechanisms to do the same.
Thank you, Chris, again, very much for this excellent example of cooperation.
We now turn to the global perspective of Interpol.
I'm very glad to welcome Carmen Munoz in a new capacity as the new Director of counterterrorism at Interpol.
Welcome to probably first canters week.
Carmen, please, you have the floor.
Thank you very much.
Dear Excellency, distinguished delegates and partners.
Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to begin by expressing Interpol sincere gratitude to the Kingdom of Bahrain and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and to our colleagues from the Islamic military counterterrorism Coalition and UN of City for co organizing this side event and for inviting Interpol to contribute to this discussion.
One of the defining trends of our era is the shift toward decentralized technology enabled financing.
This demands new tools, new reflexes, and enhanced international cooperation.
Through its global law enforcement network, Interpol stands ready to assist member countries by providing the tools and secure cooperation mechanisms needed to address these emerging threats together.
We have played a crucial role in supporting the implementation of the UN Global counterterrorism strategy over the past 20 years, helping member countries strengthen their capacity based on FATF standards and respond to CTE technical recommendations.
We are a bridge translating policy into practice alongside side member countries and our partners.
Let me highlight concrete examples of what this looks like.
Operation Catalyst conducted last year in partnership with Africa was a landmark operation targeting terrorism financing across six African countries.
Authorities screened more than 15,000 persons of interest, arrested 83 individuals, and uncovered about $260 million, including in virtual currencies with links to terrorism related activities.
The operation also highlighted the expanding nexus between terrorism and organized crime and demonstrated how these threats increasingly transcend national boundaries and exploit international connectivity.
In Kenya, a suspected money laundering operation using a virtual asset service provider was identified as having potential links to terrorism financing.
In a separate case, two individuals were arrested for the online recruitment of young people from East and North Africa into terrorist groups with funds traced through a cryptocurrency trading platform back to individuals in Tanzania.
The second example speaks to the value of cross border case work on a smaller scale.
In 2025, one of our member countries in Europe requested assistance with a live terrorist financing investigation in which the suspect had financed the travel of family members and others to conflict zones by transferring funds of approximately 18,000 euros.
Our specialized officers liaised with four other member countries across Africa, the Americas, and the Middle East, where funds had been transferred.
At the request of the investigating country, Interpol published a red notice for the suspect who was subsequently arrested in other member country and extradited for prosecution.
18,000 euros, five countries, three continents, one suspect.
That is the geometry of modern terrorist financing, and it is why no country can fight in it alone.
Allow me to turn now to three specific instruments that are reshaping how Interpol combats terrorism financing at the operational level.
The first is Grip, Interpol's global rapid intervention of payments, stop payment mechanism.
This mechanism is designed to facilitate real time cooperation between countries, enabling them to trace, intercept, and freeze criminal proceeds quickly.
When a suspicious transaction is identified, information is shared instantly through Interpol secure channels, allowing involved member countries to act before funds move beyond reach.
Since its launch in 2022, member countries have used Grip to intercept more than $200 million, stemming largely from cyber enabled fraud In one operation, authorities were able to block over 82,000 suspicious bank accounts, seizing a combined total of $300 million, including 200 million in hard currency and over 100 million in virtual assets.
Grip is not just a financial crime tool.
It is a counterterrorism tool because the same illicit financial channels are increasingly exploited by both organized criminal groups and terrorist actors.
The second instrument is Fu Connect.
One of the most persistent structural weaknesses in counterterrorism financing is the gap between financial intelligence units and law enforcement.
Fuse hold critical data, suspicious transaction reports, financial profiles, and a set trails.
But that data has historically been solid from the police databases where it could generate the most actionable intelligence.
Interpol is championing the extension of 247, our secure global police communication system to fields across the world, and promoting the systematic inclusion of financial information in Interpol alerts related to terrorist subjects of interest.
IF Con takes this further, giving financial intelligence units direct access to Interpols databases, connecting the dots between financial red flags and known terrorist profiles in real time.
When a few in one country flags a suspicious bullet, F Co allows that signal to be cross referenced against Interpols global holdings immediately, rather than weeks later through a formal request.
Speed matters.
Impunity rips in the gap between detection and action.
Finally, the third instrument is the silver notice, Interpol's latest color code notice launched in January 2025.
It allows police in over 80 countries to publicly request information of illegal assets and thus facilitates the tracing and identification of criminal assets for seizure or recovery.
Today, we have seen great successes in rolling out the silver notice.
We currently have over 200 active silver notices, requests seeking to trace a total of $2.2000000000 billion in assets.
With more than 2,500 responses shared by participant countries and over $40 million in assets already traced or identified.
We encourage all member countries to make full and systematic use of this instrument.
Together, I grip, IF Connect, and the silver notice represent a new generation of financial intelligence infrastructure built for the speed, decentralization, and digital character of today's threat environment.
But we must also honestly confront what is not yet working.
Assad recovery rates remain very low, 2% according to recent reports, meaning that 98% of the proceeds of financial crime are never identified or recovered.
That figure is true for terrorist financing and as it's for organized crime.
There is also the persistent challenge of information silos.
Financial intelligence held by one agency in one country, rarely reaches the investigators who need it in another country in time matter.
Delayed sharing is a pressing concern.
It is the gap through which terrorist financing flows.
Interpol calls all member countries to strengthen financial intelligence units, invest in the technical capacity of law enforcement agencies, and make full use of Interpols channels and tools, including Grid, F Connect, and the silver notice to facilitate the timely, real time exchange of information across borders.
The threat is structural and so must be our answer.
That means breaking down silos, investing in financial intelligence capacity, and making use of every tool available, including those Interpol has built precisely for this proposal.
I thank you very much.
Thank you very much, Director Munoz.
We are running a bit late, so we will hopefully extend this side event up to 3:00 and we have come to the moment where we really want to hear from the implementing countries and the challenges that you face.
We're very glad to have three different scenario countries will present, followed by a presentation by my colleague friends from UNCCT to see, in fact, what efforts are put in place to Tyler make capacity building.
We will start with Kenya.
The three countries are actually members of IMCTC and we are very glad to have miss Evelyn Maya, who is the lead candidate financial intelligence analyst at the Financial Reporting Center of Kenya.
Very pleased to have you.
You have the floor this.
Your Excellency's distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon.
It's an honor to be part of this side event on behalf of Kenya's Financial Intelligence Unit.
I want to express our sincere gratitude to the organizers for convening this timely and vital side event and specifically for the IMCTC for the invitation to share our experiences.
For Kenya, evolving TF threats are not a theoretical challenge, but an operational reality.
Today, I want to share how Kenya translates global obligations into practical, effective measures that respond to our national risks while safeguarding financial inclusion and humanitarian operations.
As we confront evolving global TF threats, we must recognize that a one rigid, one size fits all enforcement model is not only ineffective in low capacity and exposed contexts, but it is also counterproductive.
Now how do we ensure that CT and CFT implementation is truly risk based and tailored to national context rather than being mechanically prepared? For Kenya, this answer lies in dynamic data driven risk understanding.
So risk understanding must be dynamic, reflecting the evolving terrorist financing typologies, domestic threats, and sector vulnerabilities.
This means that financial institutions should be empowered and should be allowed to justify controls through documented risk analysis rather than blanket measures that lead to mass risk.
In Kenya, our national terrorism financing risk assessment has allowed competent authorities and reporting institutions to identify exactly where elevated risk lies.
So this allows us to direct our regulatory resources strategically to high risk areas rather than dispersing supervisory efforts equally across all sectors.
This targeted approach is sustained by continuous collaborative dialogue and feedback loops between the regulators and the private sector through guidance, typology reports, and feedback to ensure that the risk based decisions are both consistent and responsive to our national realities.
Secondly, how do we reinforce these regulatory systems without creating unintended barriers to financial inclusion? For many developing economies and particularly in Kenya, financial inclusion itself is a core security objective.
When we have individuals and small businesses excluded from the financial system, they often migrate to informal channels where transactions become significantly more difficult to monitor.
Kenyan's mobile money ecosystem demonstrates that financial inclusion and financial integrity can reinforce one another.
We do this through robust customer identification, transaction monitoring and reporting mechanism that have expanded access while also strengthening transparency.
So rather than viewing innovation as a threat, Kenyan regulators manage emerging risks without undermining financial inclusion.
So regulation must facilitate access when mitigating risks, utilizing simplified customer due diligence for lower risk transactions to keep vulnerable populations within the form of financial safety net while still maintaining financial integrity.
Thirdly, our framework must protect the legitimate operations of humanitarian actors in fragile settings.
Humanitarian organization often operate in high risk environments affected by conflict and weak governance.
However, a blanket application of CFT restriction can choke off vital funds.
Guided by the United Nations guidance on human rights and counterinterrorist financing, Kenya actively rejects the narrative that the entire NPO sector is inherently high risk.
Our regulatory frameworks are designed to isolate specific vulnerabilities rather than penalizing an entire sector.
Domestic coordination is also vital in ensuring that a risk based and proportionate approach is applied to deal with these identified risks.
In conclusion, security and financial inclusion must coexist.
Framework that cause financial exclusion or block aid only for the marginalization that terrorist networks exploit.
But effective implementation of these CFT obligation demands strong national capabilities.
This is why international organizations like the IMCTC, the UN CCT, and the UN OCT play a vital role in strengthening national capabilities through specialized training, knowledge sharing, and institutional capacity building.
Kenya has proactively sought this partnership, including the requesting participation in the IMCTC, reflecting its commitment to strengthen national resilience, adopt international best practices, and contribute to the collective global security.
Thank you all.
Thank you very much, miss Mana, for this very practical, but very, very insightful presentation.
We will hear now the experience of two other countries, Niger and Chad through video recorded messages.
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Last but not least, I'll turn to France Le Muner at the end of our counter terrorist financing program.
France, please, only 3 minutes because we have to close.
Excellency distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen.
As terrorist financing continues to evolve, we are seeing a widening gap in many low capacities and vulnerable jurisdictions between emerging risk and the capacity to respond effectively.
As noted earlier by CETAT, many member states are still in the process of developing the legal and regulatory frameworks necessary to comply with international law, including FATF recommendations, while the terrorist financing landscape is evolving rapidly through in particular, the increasing use of new technologies.
Emerging financial technologies and new terrorist financing behaviors are reshaping the environment in which member states pursue security, financial integrity, and sustainable development.
These developments affect not only how we detect and disrupt terrorist financing, but also how we safeguard financial inclusion, humanitarian action, and the rule of law.
We see today populations that are already among the most vulnerable facing a threat that is evolving faster than the institutions responsible for addressing it.
Closing this gap is hence urgent priority, but it must be done in a way that strengthens, not undermines financial inclusion and preserves the operational space on which communities and humanitarian actors depend.
From UN CCT perspective in delivering technical assistance on countering the financing of terrorism, several implementation realities deserve a particular attention.
I'll echo here Kenya by mentioning that the risk based approach first as the cornerstone of the FATF recommendation one.
In many low capacity jurisdictions, translating this principle into practice remains, however, a significant challenge.
As doctor Abdullah from ICTC already noted, national authorities are often expected to put in place CFT measures with limited means, limited statistics and data, and without the analytical infrastructure needed to fully understand their risk landscape.
And this is precisely where CTT assessments and mutual evaluations again the FATF standards are essential for our capacity building mandate at UNCCT.
Those reports provide the evidence base that enables us to support the member states in developing frameworks that reflect their specific risk context rather than replicating models designed for very different operating environments.
Closely linked to this principle of risk based is the proportionality.
Both Security Council Resolution 24 62 and FATF recommendation, notably the eight recommendation, underscore that CFT measures should avoid unintended consequences, including financial exclusion, De risking and restrictions on civil society.
In fragile contexts, CFT measures introduced with security objective can disrupt remittance channel, exclude rural communities from the formal financial system, or impede humanitarian operations.
Effective implementation therefore requires measures that are carefully calibrated.
For this reason, UNCCT places particular emphasis on mitigating, de risking, promoting financial inclusion, and re inclusion in the near future, supporting the operationalization of humanitarian exemptions, and we also assist member states in designing frameworks that enable financial institutions to maintain services in higher risk environments or apply customer due diligence and facilitate the work of legitimate non profit organizations without imposing disproportionate compliance burdens.
These are fundamental elements of balanced implementations that we all pursue.
Finally, no CFT framework can be effective without stronger and more structured engagement with the private sector.
That has been also said previously.
In many low capacity contexts, banks and money transfer operators are often the first to identify suspicious transactions, but they are also the first to withdraw services when regulatory expectations or risk profiles remain unclear.
Strengthening public private partnerships enables authorities to share topologies, clarify expectations, and reduce the uncertainty of that often drive de risking.
These partnerships are not simply beneficial, they are indispensable to the effective implementation of proportionate and risk based CFT framework.
Ultimately, balanced implementation of CFT measures is not about lowering international standards.
It's just about applying them in a way that strengthens resilience, protect financial inclusion, and preserve the humanitarian space on which vulnerable community depends.
With these partners, UN CCT stands ready to continue supporting member states in building CFT systems that are effective in practice, proportionate to risk and fully aligned with the international obligations.
I thank you for that.
Thank you very much, France.
We have come to the closing of this event.
I'll turn immediately to Secretary-General Margheri, please.
You have the floor.
Thank you so much.
Said Sada.
Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, let me first of all, thank Mr.
Mo for the help in holding this side event.
Thank you to all organizations and member states that have joined us to express their expertise.
This is not a traditional meeting.
We exchanged practical opinions among us.
We look forward to further sessions of this kind to promote dialogue, to share experiences among international, regional organizations, and member states.
Ladies and gentlemen, the clear conclusion that confronting threats based on terrorism and its financing requires coordination among states, support, training, and particularly in highly vulnerable contexts.
The Islamic Coalition is committed to supporting member states continuously to find practical solutions on the ground to combat terrorism in all its manifestations.
In conclusion, I truly hope that we met the objective through this important meeting.
And once again, Mr.
Mauro, thank you very much again for your support and the center's support in the success of this meeting.
Let me wish you all dear participants the very best and thank you very much.
Thank you very much Secretary-General, I'll try very briefly to summarize today's discussion that reaffirm several important messages.
First, terrorist financing remains an evolving and adapting threat.
It exploits gaps in capacity, regulation, technology, coordination and geography and low capacity and exposed context.
These gaps are especially difficult to address while institution are under pressure and resources are limited.
Secondly, capacity building must be practical and linked to operational impact.
International standards and national frameworks are essential, but their value depends on whether they help authorities identify risks, use financial intelligence, investigate and prosecute cases, disrupt networks, and cooperate across borders.
Thirdly, support to member states must be tailored to context.
Low capacity and exposed environments require approaches that are realistic, sequenced, and responsive to national priorities, and partnerships that connect policy guidance with operational tools, technical assistance, and regional cooperation.
Fourthly, balance and implementation is central to sustainable effectiveness.
Risk based, proportionate, and context sensitive measures strengthen the legitimacy and precision of counterterrorism methods.
They help protect financial inclusion, preserve humanitarian space, safeguard legitimate civil society activity, and ensure compliance with international law and support humanitarian exemptions.
This is where also UNIC and UNCCT have a very important role to play.
We will continue to advance policy coordination, support implementation of the counter strategy, and promote coherence across the United Nations system.
Through the center, we will continue to help member states strengthen counterterr frameworks, enhance operational cooperation, and implement international standards in a manner that is effective, proportionate, and adapted to national realities.
As we continue with the s week, today's discussion reminds us that the implementation of the counter strategy must remain connected to realities on the ground where coherent, practical, and sustained support is most needed.
I really hope that the insight shared today really from everybody will inform our continued cooperation beyond this week and contribute to more resilient and inclusive society.
I want to thank particularly all of our partners today, of course, starting with the Ym CTC, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and of course, the terrorist financing Targeted Center and all of you for attending this event.
A lot of thanks also to the interpreter for viewing with us a time.
But before we close, the Secretary-General would like also to honor all of us representing our institution with some small gift from IMCTC.
May I ask you, Secretary-General and I call upon Madam Ambassador to please be the first one to receive Secretary-General honor.