(Main Committee III) Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

ladies and gentlemen, I hope that you have found your place behind your nameplates.
The fifth meeting of the main Committee of the 2026 Review conference of the parties to the Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is called to order.
Excellency, distinguished delegates.
Main Committee three will continue its work to discuss and negotiate the relevant elements of the zero draft outcome document which was circulated last Wednesday and bears the symbol PT slash confer dot 2026 slash Rp dot two.
I propose that we dedicate our meeting today to hear allegations of views on preambular paragraphs 12, 13, and 16, paragraphs 23 to 45, paragraphs 81 and 82.
I look forward to your reactions on the elements of the text related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the right of withdrawal from the treaty.
As the main Committee three also covers the issues related to the strengthening of the review process which were tackled under the subsidiary body three, additional comments on paragraphs 86 to 91 are also welcome.
I would like to remind delegations that in addition to the discussions in the main committees, delegations are encouraged to send written comments on the draft to NPT at un.org.
Emails sent to this address should clearly state in the subject line that the email contains written comments on the zero draft outcome document and identify which main committee subject matter it refers to.
Distinguished delegates, before we move to the list of speakers, please allow me to remind you of some guidelines for the conduct of our deliberations.
As usual, there will be a strict time limit of 8 minutes for group statements and 5 minutes for national statements.
There will be a timer shown on the screen.
Your microphone will start to blink when there is 1 minute remaining, and it will be cut off once the time limit has been reached.
Finally, delegations are requested to kindly inform the Secretariat as soon as possible if they wish to exercise their right of reply.
Rights of reply will be heard at the end of the meeting today.
Those delegations that wish to take the floor are requested to press the button in front of you.
Are there any delegations wishing to request for the floor? The first speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you, Chair.
Building on our statement on Monday's session, the UK believes we should increase our collective ambition to drive progress on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with a greater focus on the practical cooperation required.
Chair, the wider context is evolving.
Rising global energy demand and widening development disparities mean that access to safe, secure, and safeguarded nuclear technologies is more important than ever.
We are aware that there are IA initiatives that require scaling and an expanding number of Footnote A projects.
We know that the IA is indispensable, but the growing scope of request underscores the need for strengthened partnerships and coordinated international engagement.
Our collective approach must therefore adapt accordingly.
The UK would like to see states parties come together to mobilize non traditional stakeholders and amplify existing resources in a way that complements rather than replicates the agency's efforts.
This would reinforce the agency's activity and ensure that its impact on peaceful uses of nuclear energy can be secured over the longer term.
This includes strengthening partnerships, better aligning financial, technical, and regulatory efforts, and securing the input and expertise from the global nuclear industry.
To secure this industry expertise, the UK would like to see recognition that measures relating to nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation build public and commercial confidence to enable peace for users.
With that in mind, we would like to offer two small proposals for consideration.
Firstly, as an addition to paragraph 29, we propose the addition of language calling upon state parties to exert individual and collective efforts to mobilize people and amplify resources in close partnership with the IAA, and in full adherence to the highest levels of safety, security, and safeguards.
Secondly, As in addition to paragraph 38, the UK would like to add that the conference acknowledges the role that nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation measures play in enhancing public and commercial confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear applications.
We will, of course, share these proposals in writing.
Chair, the United Kingdom would also like to be clear on a central point of interpretation.
The NPT does not confer a standalone right to uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing.
Article 4 acknowledges an inalienable right to develop, research, produce, and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
But that right is conditioned on conformity with Articles one and two.
It cannot therefore be read as granting an automatic entitlement to sensitive fuel cycle technologies.
This interpretation is not a narrowing of Article 4, but a faithful reflection of the balance of rights and obligations at the heart of the treaty.
It is important for the outcome document to reflect this accordingly.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom for her statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Norway.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you, Chair.
We want to express our thanks yet again for the work that has been done into this draft, which we believe is a good basis for further work.
We have sent our full comments and suggestions in writing.
I will highlight some issues relevant on the main Committee three.
In general, as I said, we think that the zero draft outcome document appropriately underscores the importance of addressing pillar three, peaceful uses.
The right to access nuclear technology for peace purposes covering both nuclear power and non power application is central in the treaty.
These applications play an increasingly important role in achieving sustainable development goals and improving quality of life worldwide.
Norway appreciates that the draft reflects the IAEA independent and essential role.
We underscore that the IAEA budget should reflect its increasing responsibilities and workloads as recognized in OP 18 and 34.
On OP 21 and 22, we underline that export control regimes are essential tools for ensuring that nuclear cooperation takes place.
Properly implemented, they strengthen, not hinder this pillar by building trust and facilitating transparent and predictive cooperation.
We have submitted text proposals with formulations that align with the treaty language and avoid unduly suggesting that export control arrangements constitute a barrier to peaceful uses.
On OP 24, we see no clear justification for the final clause or the final sentence and suggest its deletion.
On OP 25 26, we support retaining reference to sustainable development and the needs of developing countries.
On OP 27 and 28, we support reference to facilitating decarboniization and the transition to low carbon energy economy, as well as the emphasis on the involvement of non governmental institutions, research, and academic communities, which we consider important.
On OP 32, we regret that this is the only paragraph with reference to gender perspectives.
We suggest a dedicated preambular paragraph on gender as this issue is relevant across all pillars of the treaty.
Chair, on OP 36, minimization of highly enriched uranium.
This is a long standing objective in the NPT context recognized in action 61 of the 2010 action plan.
During the 11th review cycle, significant international progress has been made on HIU minimization, including through an international symposium in Oslo.
The outcomes of which are reflected in working paper 36.
Norway believes that the conference should recognize these efforts and encourage state on a voluntary basis and where feasible to further minimize civilian HIU stocks and use, including through experienced sharing transparency, and regular updates.
We suggest new text on OP 36 B on HIU minimization.
Finally, OP 45 on Ukraine in general, we consider the language on Ukraine insufficient.
It's important that the outcome document reflects reality on the ground.
We support strengthening the text, including by referring more clearly to Russia's illegal seizure of San nuclear power plants, as well as to nuclear threats and rhetoric.
Thank you, Jack.
I thank the distinguished representative of Norway for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Denmark.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chair.
Let me join others in thanking the president and all involved for the preparation and early release of the draft.
As we have not taken the floor on this issue under main Committee three, I'd like to add some brief remarks and proposals from Denmark to the paragraphs allotted to the MC 33 in the draft.
Our comments have also been handed in writing.
On paragraph 42, we see new proposed language on nuclear facilities not used before.
We've heard the discussions and have proposed that we replace the language now in paragraph 42 with language from the IAEA General Conference nuclear security text.
C G 69 RES slash eight from September 2025, inter Alea recognizing that any attacks and threats or threats of attacks, including cyberattacks against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful activities may compromise nuclear security.
On Ukraine in paragraph 44, we should be factual.
I mention that Ukraine's Sabri power plant has been illegally occupied and that the Revkn has grave concerns over safety and security of nuclear facilities and materials in Ukraine due to Russia's illegal use of force.
On reporting in paragraph 89, we should be specific that it is for nuclear weapon states.
There is, in our understanding, no provision for dedicated substantive engagements on non nuclear weapon states implementation reports.
We have proposed to insert a new paragraph 88 B that recalls the distinction between nuclear weapon and non nuclear weapon states and that each of the two categories of states have their own distinct set of reporting requirements in accordance with the decisions from 1995, 2000 and 2010.
Mr.
Chair, we'll be looking forward to the Reg one and appreciate the president's work and the work of all involved in it.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Denmark for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of China.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Chair.
In previous discussions, China has presented its position on the peaceful use of nuclear energy and its proposals for amendment.
Take into account the relevant views and aspirations expressed by all parties, China wishes to reiterate the following principles.
First, China highly agrees that the peaceful use of nuclear energy is an inalieable right of all state parties to the treaty and in particular, supports the legitimate aspirations of the countries of the global cells to safeguard the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
In January 2026, China formally started implementing the atomic energy law, which provides legal guarantee for better support for international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
China is ready to continue to actively participate and support the development of nuclear energy in the world, expand international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, fulfill its irrelevant international obligations, promote nuclear energy for the benefit of all so as to better respond to the challenges of climate change and contribute to the realization of the 2030 agenda for sustainable development.
Second, China has noted that the demands of developing countries for more diversified cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and the strong call for the elimination of excessively restrictive and discriminatory export control measures, the Okan document should send the right signals in terms of properly balanced approach to the relationship between the peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear nonproliferation.
Realization of non nuclear nonproliferation objectives should not be based on jeopardizing the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy, and states should ensure that their policies, laws and practices do not conflict with the promotion of international cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy and that excessive and unreasonable restrictions to be removed.
Third, the peaceful use of nuclear energy should be carried out on the basis of ensuring safety, which cannot be overemphasized at a time when nuclear energy is enjoying a renaissance.
The impact of nuclear safety events transcends national boundaries and all countries should participate in nuclear safety matters.
China calls on all state parties to ae to and comply with the conventions and instruments in the field of nuclear safety and security.
Supports strengthening of cooperation between all countries and IAEA, promotes the safety and security of nuclear facilities, deepens technical exchanges in the areas of life extension and decommissioning of nuclear power plants and the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste, and responsibly handles nuclear accidents with cross border implications until the negative impacts have disappeared.
China will further submit its views and proposals on the basis of the new draft tests circulated by the GA for the present consideration.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of China for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Cameroon.
You have the floor, excellen see.
President Chairman, my delegation, thanks you for giving me this opportunity to contribute to the paragraphs that we're currently discussing.
We welcome your leadership.
We would like to suggest some targeted strengthening to several of these paragraphs to better reflect the aims of the Treaty and of non nuclear weapon states, particularly African non nuclear weapon states.
We would like to legally consolidate the achievements made and to clarify the ambiguities affecting developing countries.
In paragraph II, the broadest possible exchange enables countries to participate in the exchange of equipment, et cetera.
However, countries continue to face external restrictions.
My delegation therefore suggests adding criteria or restrictions not explicitly provided for in the treaty.
Preamble.
Now prebula paragraph 13, we recognize the specific benefits of nuclear science.
We believe that it would be helpful to introduce the principle of equity without undermining security.
We therefore suggest adding underlines the need to ensure equitable access to these benefits for all state parties in particular developing countries.
Pamla Preamba Paragraph 14, improving the review process.
We support this as it is, as it is essential to mutual trust.
Now, on operational paragraph 23, we note that often this is weakened by the creation of a justification mechanism without export controls.
Therefore, we suggest adding the following.
Any national or multilateral measure that will have the effect of denying or limiting this right must be justified under the provision of the treaty and subject to periodic review by state parties.
Paragraph 26, contribute to sustainable development.
My delegation believes that nuclear can help us achieve the SDG, but superfluous obstacles are affecting developing countries to overcome these obstacles, we suggesting calls for the removal of unnecessary obstacles that hinder developing countries from fully benefiting from nuclear application.
My delegation supports paragraph 29, which also suggests adding the following.
Non binding, but politically committed guidelines that prevent discriminatory denial of transfers.
This is to deter discriminatory use of this.
In paragraph 30, we believe that technical cooperation is vital, but often it is underfunded or subject to conditions.
To avoid conditioning, we believe we should add that the agency's technical cooperation program should be adequately funded on predictable and assured basis without conditionalities on related to safeguard.
Paragraph 31.
This addresses quality of life.
We believe that peaceful benefits should benefit all, particularly non nuclear weapon states.
We therefore suggest adding the following.
These activities should be expanded in response to growing needs of non nuclear weapon states benefit.
This is so that the benefits of peaceful nuclear applications, particularly in health, culture, agriculture and energy are accessible to countries that need them the most without any form of discrimination or undue obstacles.
I'll stop there for now and I'll take the floor at a later stage again.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Cameroon for his statement.
Is there any other delegation wishing to request for the floor.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Cameroon.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Chairman.
I'll take the floor since no one else is requesting it so that I can carry on with reading my proposals.
On paragraph 32, this is ace of Hope Zodiac and other programs have a direct benefit for vulnerable countries to ensure the global scope, particularly in Africa, we suggest adding the following.
State parties in a position to do so to provide extra budgetary contributions to these initiatives with a view to ensuring their global rate particularly in Africa and least developed countries.
Paragraph 20 copulation.
Paragraph 33, technical cooperation, we suggest adding the program should be free from politicization and from any condition that goes beyond the treaty provisions.
Paragraph 34, resources, we suggest adding Force open all state parties to refrain from using voluntary contribution to influence the independence, needs based character of the technical cooperation program.
Paragraph one.
Paragraph 35, Laboratories, we suggest adding and encourage the IU to further expand training and technology transfer opportunities for scientists from non nuclear weapon state.
So the paragraph.
Paragraph 30 the paragraph on resources, we suggest adding the following.
I voluntary contribution to Ifencegraph? Now, in paragraph 35 on laboratories, the IAA laboratories, we suggest adding the following.
Encourage the IOR to further expand training and technology transfer opportunities for scientists from non nuclear weapon state bouquets so that scientists from non nuclear weapon states, particularly African states can fully benefit from training capacities and technology transfer.
On paragraph 38, this takes up Article 3 of the NPT, we suggest adding the following.
The implementation of SF grants shall not be used to impede the economic and technological development of non nuclear weapon states.
Rapt This is to recall a fundamental provision of the treaty which is often forgotten in practice.
On paragraph 39 on non discriminatory security, we suggest adding the following requirements should be applied in a non discriminatory manner, taking into account the specific circumstances of developing countries so that essential safety standards don't become unjustified barriers to countries with limited capacities.
On paragraph 40, International Convention, we suggest adding the provisions of technical and financial assistance to developing countries to facilitate adherence and implementation.
Where is it? This is to help countries wishing so to implement these instruments without being, bound by a lack of resources.
Now, in paragraph 41, we suggest adding the following of inclusive, non discriminatory and transparent guidelines for the transfer of such technologies to non nuclear weapon state.
This is to ensure that access to small modular reactors is done in clear and equitable conditions.
Thank you.
That's all for now.
I thank the distinguished representative of Cameroon for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguish the representative of Canada, followed by Japan.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you, Chair.
Canada previously laid out our positions on the draft and highlighted some proposals for the paragraphs covered by this committee that we have since submitted to the Secretariat in writing.
However, I'll take a few minutes today to reiterate a few key issues for Canada and to react to some statements made today and during our last meeting.
Canada reaffirms that all states parties have the right to develop, produce, and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes so long as these activities are conducted in full compliance with the treaty, and we recognize the important role of international cooperation, both through the IAEA and between states to support and enable the use of nuclear applications.
We have concerns with the language at the end of paragraph 24 that calls for the elimination of undue constraints and some of the suggestions that measures to prevent proliferation are somehow impeding access by all states to nuclear technologies.
Export controls play an essential role in implementing states nonproliferation obligations under the NPT, and they facilitate peaceful nuclear trade.
These are not undue constraints.
They are a critical means of ensuring that we are implementing all pillars of the NPT.
Canada fully supports the interventions made by many delegations, both today and in our last session in support of including gender considerations into the text.
This is an important issue for Canada and something we had raised during subsidiary body three discussions.
I would note that Canada has provided some suggested texts in this regard, notably calling for the conference to recognize the full, equal and meaningful participation of women as vital to the NPT review process.
We would also like to comment on some statements suggesting that the conference should not refer to the importance of applying the highest standards of nuclear safety and security.
While we agree that nuclear safety and security are a national responsibility, it is also important to recognize that IAEA member states come together as an international community to develop nuclear safety and security standards based on lessons learned over the years.
It's crucial that this conference encourages implementation of these highest standards of nuclear safety and security.
On the paragraphs related to armed conflict, Canada has provided written suggestions for paragraphs 42 and 45, notably in 45 to clarify the source of the safety and security challenges in Ukraine with suggested language coming from IAEA Board of Governors and general conference resolutions.
Canada reiterates our full support for the references to the IAEA Director General seven indispsable pillars for nuclear safety and security during armed conflict, which are indeed based on IAEA standards and guidance and are applicable to all circumstances of armed conflict.
Finally, Chair, Canada supports retention of the language on withdrawal in paragraphs 81 and 82.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Canada for her statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Japan.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Good morning, everybody.
As I said on Monday, Japan reiterates its appreciation for the chair's tireless efforts to guide us to find a common ground.
Japan would like to reiterate some of the comments offered on Monday for the sake of clarity.
Number one, since the paragraph 81 and 82 are under the purview of MC three, Japan wish to reiterate once again its basic position on withdrawal.
While acknowledging Article 10, withdrawal of any state party after acquiring nuclear weapons or nuclear capabilities against its obligation not to do so would have an enormous impact on the credibility and integrity of the treaty.
Japan emphasizes that notice of withdrawal should not and cannot acquit any state party of illicit acquisition of nuclear capabilities.
Japan welcomes paragraph 81 and 82 on the responsibility of state parties for any violation of the treaty committed prior to withdrawal.
And the second point in echoing some of the previous speakers on this specific issue of export control or constructive aspects of effective management of exchange in equipment, materials, scientific technologies information.
Effective management of those information exchange or equipment materials information exchange have multiple positive aspect, namely, they are essential to prevent proliferation.
They are conducive to build trust and transparency, and after all, they contribute to facilitate peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
These basic fundamental understandings are duly shared by state parties.
Number three, again, on nuclear safety and security safeguards, we reiterate that the highest levels of safety, security, and safeguards are quintessential when developing nuclear energy in order to maintain the broadest confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
And finally, in terms of the safety chair, while nuclear safety is a national responsibility, adequacy and appropriateness of national policies and actions are to be reviewed only in accordance with international obligations arising from existing legally binding international instruments and relevant international safety standards established by the IAEA, which is the International impartial authority in this regard.
Nothing else.
I thank Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Japan for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Sweden.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you, Chair.
In addition to our written comments, we would like to highlight a few items on the indicated part of the document for this session of the main Committee three.
We welcome the language and generous exposure of references to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
This constitutes an important part of the balance between the three pillars and should be properly reflected.
We welcome the reference emphasizing the need for more transparency, not least as an integral part of the strengthening the review conference process.
In light of the clear, strong and broad demand from state parties manifested throughout this review cycle, and in particular during subsidiary audit three, we see merit of elaborating this important and forward looking effort to strengthen the functionality and credibility of the APT.
In addition, I would like to address an area where we see a lack of balance in the zero draft document.
One such error is recognizing the importance of highlighting the full and equal participation of women and men.
We have in our written comments suggested in addition to the preambular text as follows, acknowledging the importance of the full and equal participation of participation and leadership of women and men in nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control.
An additional point is that in our assessment, certain central issues with direct relevance to security in Europe are insufficiently reflected in the zero draft document or entirely absent.
On Ukraine, paragraph 42, we agree with Denmark that we should be factual in the wording in the text.
Paragraph 45 addresses concern for safety and security of nuclear facilities in Ukraine.
The paragraph needs to clarify the reasons for this situation, namely Russia's control and attacks on the aba nuclear power plant and Russia's reckless behavior that poses a great danger to the principles of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards.
This should properly be reflected in the document.
Sweden strongly supports Paragraph 86 to 90 and would welcome even stronger language.
In our written comments, we that suggest a reference in Para 87 to include and in line with the UN 80 agenda.
Furthermore, we suggest in our national written comments, an additional 88 B to further strengthen language regarding the review process to encourage supporting and promoting the equal participation and leadership of women and men in nonproliferation, disarmament and arms control, as well as integrating a gender perspective into discussions across all pillars.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Sweden for her statement.
Are there any other delegations wishing to request for the floor? That was the last sorry.
It was not the last The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Brazil.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you, Chair.
Pardon my late request for the floor.
Just to reiterate quickly a point that my delegation has already made on safety and security levels.
IAA member states should continue to work collectively on these issues and we do engage constructively on those.
However, delegations do have different views on what constitutes highest levels, especially regarding other countries activities.
So in our view, the way out to this is to bring back agreed language for 2010, stressing the need for appropriate and effective levels and amending paragraphs 38 and 41 accordingly.
We feel that appropriate and effective, this language demonstrate quite well our shared end goal here.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil for his statement.
The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Cameroon.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for giving me the floor once again.
My delegation would like to propose the following after Paragraph 42 to add a cross cutting paragraph in order to reaffirm the primacy of the treaty and in order to protect the rights of non nuclear weapon states, their rights against external unpredictable provisions under the NPT.
This paragraph would thereby underscore the following English.
Reaffirms that the implementation of the above paragraphs must be guided by the principles of non discrimination, transparency, and predictability, and that no external arrangement outside the treaty may diminish the rights of non nuclear weapon state as set out in the preamble and in the Article 4, F.
End of quote.
My delegation takes note of paragraphs 43 and 44 on security and safety in conflict zones and supported without modification.
And we also support the language of paragraph 81 and 82 on the right to withdraw as drafted here, specifically the reminder of the fact that previous obligations regarding withdrawal remain in effect.
We also support paragraphs 86 to 89 on the review process without modification, Mr.
Chairman, I would like to also note that these enhancements are, in our view, substantiated and they do not call into question any existing commitment.
In our view, these revisions help to ensure and clarify the equality that provision under the treaty.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative Caraon for his statement.
Is there any other delegation wishing to take the floor? The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Argentina.
You have the floor, Excellency.
Thank you, Chairman.
I'd like to take the floor briefly to support the intervention made by the delegation of Brazil a few moments ago with regard to the need to respect the different positions on the meaning of highest levels.
And we would like to support the idea that the most appropriate outcome on this issue is to refer to the agreed language from the 2010 document.
Also on the proposal made by the United Kingdom for a new paragraph.
We think that we should apply the same criteria.
We don't have any objection to the paragraph in general, but we do believe that it should be applied to the reference to highest levels.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative from Argentina for his statement.
Are there any other delegations wishing to request for the floor? That was the last speaker on my list for this session.
Distinguished delegates, one country has requested the floor to exercise its right of reply pursuant to Rule 19 of the rules of procedure.
May I remind delegations that in accordance with Rule 19, such statements shall be as brief as possible.
I urge the delegations to limit their interventions to 5 minutes.
May I also remind delegations that in accordance with the established practice, the number of interventions in the exercise of the right of reply for any delegation is limited to two.
The second intervention should be limited to 3 minutes.
I now give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
During the discussions on the zero draft of the final document, baseless allegations were made by the United States and certain Western countries against Iran's peaceful nuclear program.
My delegation firmly rejects all such politically motivated claims.
The peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program is not a matter of speculation or debate.
It is a matter of fact established through the record and continuously verified by the IAEA.
The agency has repeatedly confirmed in its numerous reports that there has been no diversion in Iran's peaceful nuclear program.
In an attempt to substantiate their unfounded allegations, these countries referred to a resolution adopted by the Board of Governors, a resolution that itself was adopted by a narrow, deeply divisive vote.
Such a politically motivated resolution cannot serve as credible evidence or a substitute for verified facts and technical assessments of the agency.
The repetition of these unfounded allegations against Iran's peaceful nuclear program serves only one purpose to divert attention from the elephant in the room of this review conference, namely, the unlawful attacks carried out by the United States and the Israeli regime against Iran and its peaceful nuclear facilities.
A matter that certain delegations are brazenly attempting to ignore.
These attacks struck directly at the very foundation of the NPT, which is premised on the assurance that peaceful nuclear activities shall not be threatened or target.
Mr.
Chair, nothing is more outrageous than the United States, a state that together with the Israeli regime carried out unlawful attacks against Iran's peaceful nuclear facilities, attempting to portray Iran's peaceful nuclear program as a source of concern for this conference.
Delegations can judge for themselves what should be truly be the utmost concern of this review conference.
Iran's peaceful nuclear program, which remains subject to the most extensive IAEA verification regime in the world or the unlawful military attacks by the United States and the Israeli regime against safeguarded peaceful nuclear facilities.
They are deeply concerned about the credibility and effectiveness of the review conference if this grave threat is ignored.
If one of the fundamental objectives of the NPT is to guarantee the inalienable right of a state parties to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, then the failure of this conference at the very least to condemn such blatant violations will raise serious questions regarding the effectiveness and integrity of the treaty itself.
My delegation sincerely hopes that all delegations understand that failing to address the unlawful actions of the United States and the Israeli regime, while instead reflecting baseless allegations against Iran's peaceful nuclear program would send a dangerous message of impunity by effectively rewarding the aggressor and penalizing the victim.
Such an approach would cause for greater damage, would cause far greater damage to the credibility and integrity of the treaty.
In response to allegations regarding uranium enriched to 60%, my delegation wishes to underscore that the treaty does not establish any numerical ceiling on uranium enrichment.
Article 4 explicitly recognizes the inanable right of all state parties to develop, research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.
Therefore, From a strictly legal perspective, enrichment to 60% is not in and of itself prohibited under the NPT.
Finally, in response to some statement we heard today and during the past days, we reject any conditionality for peaceful users, which is an inalienable right under Article 4 of the treaty and is not subject to any conditions.
I thank you, Mr.
Chair.
This concludes my list of speakers for this meeting.
I remind delegations that the next plenary of the review conference starts today at 5:00 P.M.
In the trusteeship council conference room, which we left this morning.
The meeting is adjourned.