(Main Committee II) Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

ladies and gentlemen, the meeting is called to order.
IDcla opened the fifth meeting of the main Committee two of the 2026 Review conference of the parties to the Trey on the nonproliferation nuclear weapons.
Excellence, Distinguished delegates.
As you are aware, the president has issued a draft final document in PT slash dot 2026 slash CRP dot two and has allocated the following paragraphs to this main committee and to subsidiary B two.
Preamble paragraphs 11, 14, 15, paragraphs 1 and 3, paragraphs 4 to 22, paragraph 74 to 79, and paragraphs 83 to 85.
Elements related to regional issues, including with respect to the 1995 Middle East resolution have been considered yesterday in subsidiary 42.
In this meeting, we will continue our consideration of paragraphs related to the main committee.
Please send your written statements and comments on the draft to the email address pt at un.org.
Emails sent to this address should be clearly stating in the subject line that the email contains written comments on the zero draft outcome document and identify that your comments relate to main committee two.
The time limit for group statements is 8 minutes and 5 minutes for national statements.
There will be a timer shown on the screen indicating 1 minute before the microphone will be cut off.
I kindly ask delegations to inform the Secretariat in advance if they are speaking on behalf of a group, so that we can be sure to allocate sufficient time.
Delegations are encouraged to provide statements in case they have them available for the interpretation services by sending them to the email address, estates at un.org.
Finally, delegations are requested to please inform the Secretariat as soon as possible if they wish to exercise their right of reply.
Rights of reply will be heard at the end of this meeting.
Those delegations that wish to take the floor are requested to press the button in front of you at this time.
We will proceed in the order in which requests for the floor are received with priority given to the groups.
The first speaker on my list today will be Ambassador Francisco Tropei of Argentina, who based on past practice will address the committee on the Argentina's capacity as current chair of the nuclear supplies Group.
He will be followed by Egypt on behalf of the Arab Group.
Argentina, the floor is yours.
No.
A very good afternoon.
Thank you very much, Chairman, Your Excellency Ambassador Tyrod Lanv.
It's my honor to address this committee in Argentina's capacity as chair of the nuclear suppliers group, the NSG.
As you know, this is a group of responsible nuclear exporter countries who work to reinforce the objectives of Article 32 of the NPT and to contribute to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons through export controls.
In this regard.
The role of the group brings value to the nonproliferation architecture by drafting and implementing guidelines for nuclear transfer.
Published by the IAEA as document 254, providing information on material nuclear technology in Part two, equipment, material software, and related dual use technology for nuclear use.
In 2025, the NSG marked its 50th anniversary of its establishment in 1975, reflecting five decades of cooperation among nuclear supplier states.
The robust and effective export controls implemented by the NSG promote responsible supplier behavior, enabling legitimate cooperation and investment.
At the same time, the NSG guidelines constitute important tools that can assist all NPT states parties to effectively implement national export, transit, transshipment, and re export controls.
On a voluntary basis, many states have harmonized their national export control systems with NSG guidelines.
Through implementation through national legislation and licensing practices of participating governments consistent with their international obligations.
Furthermore, the importance of export controls has been recognized in action 36 of the final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
Mr.
Chair, if I may, I would now like to update main Committee two about the NSGs work since our presentation to the last NPT Review Conference in 2022.
Since then, the group has been chaired by Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and currently by Argentina again, my country.
Over these years, the group has adopted a number of recommendations related to changes to the trigger list and the dual use annex following the 2023, 2024 and 2025 plenary meetings published on the NSG website and by the IAEA in the latest revisions.
Of circular information document 254 Parts one and two as amended.
This in accordance with the group's established three year publication cycle.
During the year 2023, under the Argentine chairmanship, the Buenos Aires Plenary reaffirmed the strong commitment of participating governments to maintaining the vitality of the NSG and to continuing cooperation in addressing global proliferation challenges.
The participating governments also continue to exchange views on national practices of awareness raising and tools for interaction with industry, as well as scientific academic research institutions related to NSG controlled items.
In 2023, Under the Brazilian chair, the group continued the group's technical work related to the implementation of the NSG guidelines and control lists.
The participating governments endorsed the results of a five year review of enrichment technology and commercial practices, which concluded that no changes were required to the arrangements contained in the NSG guidelines.
There was also the fourth workshop with industry bringing together participating governments and national industry representatives to discuss responsible supplier behavior and the effective implementation of export controls.
In 2025 under the South African chair and within the framework of the 50th anniversary of the NSG, the group reaffirmed the continued relevance of the group's guidelines and control lists, focusing on outreach activities, strengthening them, including a collective and interactive seminar with African states that are implementing or looking into implementing the NSG guidelines.
The goal there was to share experiences and good practices.
Recently, the NSG also agreed to update its outreach document, the nuclear Suppliers Group, its guidelines, origin, structure, and role to reflect factual outcomes from recent activities in advance of the 11th NPT review conference.
Mr.
Chair, in the current context, the role of the NSG is important as a contribution to the exercise of the inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology through international cooperation by providing a framework of predictability and confidence for governments, also for industry and international partners.
Argentina in its capacity of chair of the NSG remains committed to working with all participating governments to ensure that the group continues to effectively address proliferation challenges while supporting peaceful nuclear cooperation consistent with the objectives of the NPT.
Finally, please allow me to invite delegations to our side event.
Nuclear supplies Group, NSG and Zanga Committee, nuclear export Controls that will take place on May 15th at 1:15 P.M.
In conference room E.
Thank you very much, Chair.
I thank Ambassador of Argentina for the statement on behalf of the NSG.
Next, on my list, I have the representative of Egypt on behalf of the Arab Group.
Egypt, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Chair, I have the honor to speak on behalf of the Arab Group.
The Arab Group expresses its appreciation for the language contained in the zero draft under the nonproliferation pillar and the group considers the draft a useful and reasonable basis for further discussions and recognizes the important elements it contains on the central law of the IEA, the importance of compliance with safeguards obligations, and the need to uphold the integrity and credibility of the treaty.
The Arab group had explained yesterday at SB two in details its views regarding paragraphs 83 to 85 on the implementation of the 1995 resolution and the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
We will annex SB two statement to this statement for further reference.
The ARA Group reaffirms its principal support for the safeguard system of the IA as a fundamental component for the nuclear nonproliferation regime as an essential confidence building element for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
At the same time, the group stresses that safeguards language and the outcome document should remain firmly anchored in the treaty, the IAA statute, the respective safeguards agreements, and agreed review conference language.
That said, the ARA group believes that this section could benefit from further refinement in a limited number of paragraphs.
On paragraph four, the group believes that while the current text rightly reaffirms the importance of safeguards, it should also reflect the full legal balance contained in Article 3, paragraph three of the treaty, particularly that safeguards will be designed to comply with Article 4 and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of states parties or international cooperation in peaceful nuclear activities.
On paragraph six, A group proposes a slight adjustment to align the text with the agreed language, ensuring that the safeguards compliance concerns are addressed through the IEE on the basis of supporting evidence and information and in accordance with its statute and relevant safeguards agreements.
On paragraph nine, the group proposes retaining the agreed legal formulation reflected in the 2010 review conference outcome, which refers to the access by the IE, including its Director General to the Security Council and the General Assembly, while referring to the compliance procedure in accordance with Article 12C of the IE statute and paragraph 19 of ICRC slash 153.
On paragraph 11, the Arab Group suggesting adding a new paragraph 11 B and we believe that the text should preserve a balance by recalling the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in nuclear weapon states under the relevant voluntary offer safeguards agreements.
This additional paragraph would reaffirm that safeguards form part of a broader architecture of the treaty and should not be addressed in a manner that places emphasis only on the non nuclear weapon states.
On paragraph 12, the Arab Group proposes a precise adjustment to preserve the voluntary sovereign nature of the decision to conclude an additional protocol.
The group also proposes replacing increased confidence with the agreed formulation of increased assurances and reflecting the relevant IEA general conference language in this paragraph that says, For states with both a comprehensive safeguard agreement and an additional protocol in force or otherwise applied, agency safeguards can provide increased assurances regarding both the non diversion of nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the state as a whole.
On paragraph 13, the Arab Group proposes aligning the paragraph with relevant IEA general conference language to preserve the distinction between the universalization of comprehensive safeguard agreements as the Article 3 legal obligation and the wider conclusion of additional protocols as a sovereign decision.
The amendment therefore gives a primary emphasis to the universal application of the agency safeguards and the comprehensive safeguards agreements, while retaining the encouragement to conclude and provisionally apply additional protocols.
On paragraph 16, the AA group favors using the agreed 2010 language as an alternative to this paragraph, which recommends that the IE safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly, and that decisions adopted by the IE policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of safeguards should be supported and implemented.
This formulation provides a clear, agreed, and legally sound basis for addressing the evolution of safeguards.
On paragraph 18, the group recalls that safeguards and technical cooperation are both rooted in the statutory functions of the agency.
While the agency should have the necessary support to fulfill its safeguards responsibility, this should be without adversely affecting the resources available for technical assistance and cooperation.
On paragraph 20, the Arab Group believes that the reference to the nuclear security should be moved out of the Article 3 safeguard section.
Nuclear security is important, but it is distinct from safeguards on a legal basis, nature, and implementation.
We suggest moving it to the third pillar on peaceful uses.
On paragraph 22, the group believes that language on supply arrangements and export controls should reflect both the nonproliferation requirements under Article 3 and the obligation to facilitate peaceful nuclear cooperation under Article 4.
Supplier arrangements should promote transparency and should not impose undue restraints on or hamper the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes by states parties in conformity with the treaty.
The group proposes adding additional language after paragraph 22 based on agreed language of previous NPT review conference to encourage all states parties to facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and materials and international cooperation among states parties in conformity with Articles one, two, three, and four of the treaty and to eliminate any undue constraints inconsistent with the treaty.
In paragraph 73, the group is of the view that this paragraph needs to center its focus on the added value of the establishment of nuclear weapons free zones, including on regional and international peace and security.
There can be a separate paragraph that recalls the 1999 principles and guidelines adopted by the UNDC as substantive guidance on nuclear weapons free zones.
Mr.
Chairperson, the Arab group wishes to underline that these comments are intended to strengthen the draft and to make it more refined and capable of commanding broad support.
The objective is to ensure that the outcome document reflects the centrality of safeguard system in a manner consistent with the treaty, the IAA statute, and the agreed Review conference outcomes.
The credibility and sustainability of the NPT regime depends on the balanced implementation of its three pillars, a robust safeguard system and the full realization of the right to peaceful uses are mutually reinforcing, not competing objectives.
Preserving this balance is essential to the integrity of the treaty and to the confidence of all state parties in its implementation.
Finally, Mr.
Chair, the Arab Group will share its textual proposal revisions in writing with a view to facilitating their consideration and possible incorporation into the draft.
I thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinct representative of Egypt for the statement on behalf of the Arab group.
I don't see any other speakers.
I don't have any other speakers on my list.
So it means, okay, I have Denmark, you have the floor.
I'll join others in thanking the president and all involved for the preparation and early release of the draft.
I would like to offer Denmark's position on some of the paragraphs in the draft on MC two.
In the preamble, we support underlining the mandate and independent and objective role of the IAEA and the importance of the safeguard system.
We also support mentioning that not only breaches but also noncompliance undermines the treaty.
In the main body in OP seven on Iran, we propose to mention the relevant IAEA Board of Governors and Security Council resolutions and to make clear that Iran must never be allowed to acquire or develop a nuclear weapon.
On Ukraine's Sista nuclear power plant, we should mention why there are issues with the safeguards.
It is because of Russia's illegal invasion, use of force and occupation.
We suggest a new paragraph 18 this setting out that the conference should recall the severe implications and safeguards due to Russia's illegal use of force, including illegal seizure and militarization of a nuclear power plant.
Export control is a key element in supporting peaceful use and legitimate transfer of nuclear technology and knowledge.
It's also a key element supporting nonproliferation.
Both the nuclear supplies Group and the Sinai Committee play very important roles, and I commend the presentation made by Argentina on the NSG issues.
So these elements should be better reflected.
At the same time, we propose to delete the references to undue restraints or constraints, which is a subjective assessment, and it is not clear to us what undue restrictions or constraints actually refer to.
On the DPRK, we have proposed to strengthen the language.
We should reflect the DPRK should abandon its nuclear program in a complete, refiable and reversible, irreversible manner.
We should call on the DPRK to refrain from nuclear and missile tests and return to full NPT and IAA compliance as well as join the CTPT.
These proposals have all been handed in in writing.
We'll be looking forward to the one and appreciate the president's work and the work of all involved in it.
Mr.
Chair, you can count on our continued support and cooperation.
Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
I thank the distuced representative of Denmark for the statement and for the kind words addressed to the presidency.
The next speaker I have on my list is the representative of Brazil, followed by Republic of Korea.
Brazil, you have the floor.
Thank you very much, Chair.
This is not the first time that my delegation takes the floor on this main committee.
We have made suggestions before, but just to make some of them clearer, we have suggested to replace compliance by noncompliance in paragraph six.
That is to be in line with on paragraph three to be in line with paragraph six.
On paragraph six, we would like to refer to 2010 agreed language because we have established mechanisms set out in the IAA statute with respect to non compliance.
Paragraph nine describes role for the General Assembly and the Security Council in compliance that is not in line with the IAA statute.
We'd therefore like to insert a reference to Article 12C of the IA statute.
We suggest the deletion of the final part of paragraph ten about limited level of assurances on CSAs, We would like to add the word voluntary after sovereign on paragraph 12, related to the additional protocol and suggest deletion of paragraph 13.
We have said in the previous intervention that paragraph 16 was not completely clear to us.
It has to do with action 32 of the 2010 action plan, but at the same time, all safeguards are related to obligations that we undertake.
So we would therefore like to have 2010 agreed language reflected on this paragraph.
My delegation has a stake on paragraph 19.
The text reflects a carefully balanced compromise and we are not in a position to accept additional processes or provisions that would call into question the IA's legitimacy in engaging dialogue with the states concern, nor undermine the established compliance record of states that have duly fulfilled their nonproliferation obligations.
Brazil notes the inclusion of language on nuclear security in paragraph 20 in this section, notwithstanding the fact that is already addressed under the section related to Article 4, we therefore suggest deletion of paragraph 20.
My country can also support the suggestions made by Egypt in the name of the Arab Group on paragraph 11 this about voluntary offer agreements for nuclear weapon states, the language on increased assurances on paragraph 12 and some of his other suggestions.
This will be provided in written for the Secretariat.
I thank you very much.
I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil for the statement.
Next speaker on my list is representative of Republic of Korea, followed by Japan.
Republic of Korea, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
We have listened carefully to the views expressed by other delegations and very much look forward to achieving a consensual outcome document.
In this regard, however, we cannot help but express our deep regret and concern over statements made by a very few allegations and justifiably claiming the deletion of language related to the DPR cases nuclear programs, which represents only the bare minimum that the international community should clearly reaffirm in order to safeguard the amputee regime.
In particular, there have even been remarks by one state party that appears to accept the DPRKs misleading assertions regarding its withdrawal from the treaty and seeking to obstruct discussions on the DPRC nuclear issues at this review conference.
In this regard, I would like to explain our position as follows.
The DPRK is the only case that benefited from the AP regime, announced it to withdraw and openly continued development of nuclear weapons.
The DPRK nuclear issue is therefore directly linked to the integrity and credibility of the amPT.
The UN Security Council resolutions has adopted a series of UN SS resolutions addressing the Turkish nuclear and ballistic missiles programs, which pose a threat to the international peace and security.
These UN SSC resolutions clearly stated that it demands DPRT returns to NPT and IEA safeguards.
The NPT Review Conference has likewise consistently called upon the DPRK to return at an early date to treaty and IA safeguards to fully comply with them while reaffirming relevant UNSC resolutions.
The Article 25 of the UN Charter, which stipulates the fundamental obligation of UN member states to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council.
Furthermore, Article 10 of the NPT was never intended to legitimize nuclear proliferation.
Allowing such a situations to persist would risk establishing a dangerous precedent that could undermine the very foundations of the international nonproliferation regime and the integrity of the empathy regime itself.
Therefore, we believe that the outcome document should retain the language of the DPRK and where possible further strengthen it as called for by numerous allegations in order to send a clear and unequivocal message to the international community.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Republic of Korea for the statement.
The next speaker is the representative of Japan, followed by United States.
Japan, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Japan would like to reiterate its gratitude to the president, the chair, and the team for their tireless effort.
We submitted our written comment last Friday.
Today, I would like to offer some points based on previous discussions.
Regarding North Korea, there has been some remarks from the other delegations questioning paragraph 78 and 79.
On this issue, Japan stresses again the importance of retaining this paragraph in supporting the remarks in this regard made by previous speakers, particularly by Lipavo Korea.
The North Korea issue is not crossed.
Responsibility for violation of the treaty obligation remains until it is properly addressed.
Any violation must be dealt with in the most serious manner in order to preserve the credibility and integrity of the treaty.
We need to urge North Korea to return to full compliance with the NPT and IAE safeguards to fully comply with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, and to take concrete steps towards c the ID of North Korea's nuclear weapon, any other existing WMD and ballistic missiles of all ranges, as well as its related programs and facilities in accordance with all relevant UN SEs resolutions.
North Korea cannot have the status of nuclear weapon states under the treaty.
Regarding export control, Japan has proposed several modifications focusing on its positive aspect to make the language more balanced.
We consider that some national rules and regulations are necessary to give effect to the commitment to transfer of nuclear and nuclear related dual use items.
On safeguard issue, first, we emphasize the important role played by the IAEA and support other delegations stressing that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the IAE.
Regarding the AP, we share the view expressed by other delegations that the CSA and AP are the current verification standard.
Today, 140 states have concluded their CSA and AP, including Somalia and Guinea, which have most recently brought them into force.
We commend the effort undertaken by all relevant parties.
The IAE broader conclusion that all nuclear material remain in peaceful activities can be drawn only for a state with an AP.
The assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a state provides greater confidence among the states, creating an environment conducive to cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology.
We all know that the measures specified in the AP, including complimentary access play an important role in preventing nuclear proliferation to strengthen our collective city.
Therefore, it is important to retain paragraph 13.
Besides, there is no contradiction between paragraph 12 and 13, which are both in line with 2010 final document and 22 2022 final draft.
We would also add that we are willing to extend support to states in difficulties with implementing the APs.
That concludes our comment for today.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Japan for the statement and for the kind words addressed to the chair.
The next speaker is the representative of the United States, followed by Philippines on behalf of Asean.
United States, you have the floor.
Chair Umov, over the past two days, we have engaged in substantive back and forth on the zero draft text.
In our interventions, the United States has made clear that Iran's non compliance with the treaty should be of utmost concern to all of us and must be addressed in the final document text.
After all, we are gathered here to review the treaty implementation.
We would be failing in our mandate if we did not discuss the fact that one state party has blatantly violated it.
Indeed continues to violate it as I speak, and we would be remiss in our duties if we did not consider better ways to identify and hold violators of the treaty to account.
In that regard, I wanted to go on the record with a serious substantive concern that I think warrants further consideration.
While we have talked extensively about the IAEA Board of Governors finding on Iran's noncompliance with its safeguards agreement and that Article 3 focused discussion is essential, we have not discussed verification and enforcement of Article 2 obligations under the treaty.
While acknowledging that there were discussions during NPT negotiations on the scope of the obligation not to manufacture nuclear weapons under Article 2, I think it's appropriate for us to once again discuss what the article means as it applies to the facts and circumstances we see today.
We can all agree that if we wait until a nuclear weapon is finally assembled to find an NPT violation, we have in fact waited too long.
It's therefore difficult for us to discuss verification and enforcement of Article 2 unless we focus on what it is we are enforcing.
When a country that has pursued nuclear weapons in the past is violating its Article 3 obligations, has a massive stockpile of highly enriched uranium for which no credible peaceful justification exists and whose officials openly boast about having all of the capabilities needed to build a nuclear weapon, we should ask ourselves what more can be done to detect and deter violations of Article 2.
The obstacles of acquiring the knowledge, material, and equipment needed to manufacture a weapon are much lower today than they were when they was negotiated more than 50 years ago.
Verification and enforcement mechanisms must adapt to keep pace with the proliferation challenge, or we will run the risk of only detecting Article 2 violations after the fact.
As Iran's past and present nuclear activities make clear, it is imperative that we explore ways to strengthen verification and enforcement of Article 2 to reduce the ability of a non nuclear weapon state to pursue a covert nuclear weapons program.
I'm not proposing specific measures at this time, but I do think it is important that we explicitly acknowledge this challenge, and I hope this is something we can all ponder both now and in the future.
It is incumbent on all of us to use this review process as it was intended to review the implementation of the treaty and to work together in good faith to ensure that it is living up to its full potential.
That includes identifying violations of the Article 2 obligation not to manufacture when such violations occur, holding violators to account, and preventing future violations.
After all, we all benefit from a healthy NPT regime.
The United States stands ready to work with you in this regard.
I thank the chair.
I thank the distinguished Representative of the United States for the statement.
The next speaker I have on my list is distinguished Represent of Philippines on behalf of Asean.
Followed by China, Philippines, you have the floor.
Delivered a statement on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, all members of which are state parties to the NPT.
As this is the first time that Asean is speaking as a group, we'd like to express our appreciation for your leadership of our committee and that of the president.
Through you, Mr.
Chair, Asean reaffirms its full support for Vietnam's presidency of this Review Conference and appreciates the efforts of the president and his team, as well as the Secretariat in ensuring the efficient management of this process in a transparent, inclusive, and balanced manner.
Asean attaches great value to the success of this review conference, to the adoption of a meaningful consensual outcome document where the integrity and credibility of the NPT regime, as the interests of all state parties are maintained and reinforced in a balanced manner.
In this regard, Asean views the zero draft circulated on May 6th as a good basis for further discussions and negotiations toward a consensual outcome document.
Asean remains ready to engage constructively and with flexibility with all delegations in this spirit, and we have been listening very closely to the interventions on responding to the zero draft.
Asean reaffirms its commitment to preserving Southeast Asia as a nuclear weapons free zone and free of all other weapons of mass destruction as enshrined in the Treaty of Southeast Asia nuclear weapons free zone, also known as the Bangkok Treaty, as well as the Asean Charter and to enhancing its profile globally, including through strengthening cooperation with other nuclear weapons free zones.
We further reaffirm our commitment to continuously engage all other nuclear weapon states, all the nuclear weapon states, including those with reservations, and to intensify efforts to resolve all outstanding issues in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Southeast Asia nuclear weapons F Zone Treaty.
We welcome any nuclear weapon state that are ready to and willing to sign and ratify the protocol to the treaty without reservations and provide further formal assurance of this commitment in writing to go ahead with the signing.
We welcome nuclear weapon states readiness to work with Asean to resolve these issues and to support the full and effective implementation of the treaty.
In this context, Asean in principle, supports the zero drafts the information of the contribution of nuclear weapons free zones to the objectives of the NPT.
Asean believes the current formulation of zero draft provides a balanced basis for consensus.
Having said that, Asean looks forward to continued engagement on the relevant paragraphs in the draft outcome document.
Asean deserves the option of offering further constructive comments and inputs, particularly on nuclear weapons free zone treaties.
Asean continues to call on all state parties to the NPT to renew their commitment to its full and effective implementation, particularly Article 6, to redouble efforts to protect the credibility and integrity of the NPT and to rally towards a much desired meaningful consensual outcome document of this review conference.
Mr.
Chair, Asean remains fully committed to the NPT regime and endeavors to work constructively with all state parties to ensure a balanced outcome towards the success of this review conference.
Asean will submit this statement to the Secretary.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Philippines for the statement on behalf of Asean and for kind words addressed to the presidency.
Next on my list is the Rest of China, followed by Ireland, China, you have the floor.
Xi Ju in J.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
China presented its preliminary views on the draft document in MC two last week.
In light of the discussions in the conference, China wishes to further elaborate its position as follows.
On paragraph two.
Nuclear sharing constitutes a matter of nuclear proliferation and should therefore be discussed in MC two.
China concurs with the position of several delegations to further strengthen the language of this paragraph.
Specifically, China proposes the following.
First, we must explicitly state that nuclear sharing is inconsistent with Articles one and two, as well as the object and purposes of the MPT.
Second, we express concern over the maintenance and strengthening of existing nuclear sharing and extended deterrence.
Third, we expressed serious concern over public statements and advocacy by certain countries in support of the acquisition of nuclear weapons in contravention of Articles one and two of the treaty.
Fourth, we call for the dismantlement of nuclear sharing and extended deterrence arrangements, the withdrawal of nuclear weapons deployed overseas and the cessation of deployment of nuclear weapons or the construction of nuclear weapon related infrastructure in non nuclear weapon states.
On para 16, China proposes the addition of a new paragraph following this one, encouraging the IAEA to adopt a prudent approach.
In cases where there is a serious imbalance between the supply and demand of nuclear materials, the IAEA should further strengthen its safeguards in a timely manner, establish early warning mechanisms, and deter potential cases of non compliance.
On page 19, China proposes expressing concern over the transfer by nuclear weapon states to non nuclear weapon states of weapons grade highly enriched uranium for military purposes, including the naval nuclear propulsion reactors.
China further emphasizes that safeguards relating to such transfers should be discussed and developed by consensus through an open, transparent, and inclusive intergovernmental process within the framework of the IAEA.
Para 21.
The current formulation does not yet fully reflect the need for strict controls.
China therefore proposes language calling on nuclear weapon states to refrain from transferring to other states weapons grade, nuclear materials, technologies, or equipment for military purposes so as to close potential loopholes in the nonproliferation regime.
On para 22, China proposes further strengthening the language by incorporating references to maintain a balance between non proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
It should be emphasized that any nonproliferation measures must not undermine the legitimate right of all states to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
China further calls for the abandonment of double standards.
The cessation of unlawful unilateral sanctions and long arm jurisdiction opposes actions that undermine international treaties and arrangements in the field of non proliferation and reject attempts to place geopolitical interests above international non proliferation obligations, such proposal help the text more accurately reflects the current international realities, China's additional comments will be submitted to the chair in a separate note.
Thank you.
Rest of China for the statement.
Next speaker is the representative of Ireland, followed by Indonesia, Ireland.
You have the floor.
Chair, thank you and through you, I would like to repeat our thanks to the president and his team for the work that has gone into the zero draft.
We have submitted our comments on the issues covered by this committee as well as across the zero draft in writing.
Allow me to highlight some of the relevant contributions we have submitted.
First, the impartial, independent, and objective role of the IEA should be highlighted in the text.
We have made a suggestion, paragraph five to that effect.
Second, we think that the way in which export controls are treated throughout the text needs careful attention and balance.
We have therefore made a suggestion to affirm that IEA safeguards implement the obligations of Article 3 of the treaty in paragraph four.
We've also suggested including a factual reference to the role played by relevant multilateral export control regimes, including the Sang Committee and Nuclear Suppliers Group and resolution 15 40 in paragraph 23.
Third, we welcome the factual recognition of the IA Board of Governors finding concerning Iran's non compliance with its safeguarding agreement and emphasizing the necessity of Iran effectively implementing its agreement and engaging fully with the IAEA in paragraph seven.
We also welcome paragraph eight noting grave concerns about the consequences of attacks on nuclear facilities.
Similarly, we welcome paragraph 42.
During this review cycle, we have seen multiple instances where nuclear facilities have been put at risk with the potential for severe and widespread consequences beyond state boundaries.
It is therefore important that this conference sets out accurately and comprehensively the framework of international law, including international humanitarian law and IEA regulations to seek to arrest the erosion of this norm.
That regard, we've also submitted written comments on the situation at the illegally seized Sap Asia nuclear power plant where attacks represent a direct threat to nuclear safety and security and the need for compliance with all UN General Assembly and IEA resolutions.
Chair, we have listened carefully to discussion on nuclear weapon free zones on paragraph 74 to 76 and the specific treatment of Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in paragraphs 83 25.
Ireland is a longstanding supporter of the establishment of the Middle East one, which is an integral part of the 1995 indefinite extension of the NPT.
We call for its full implementation.
Finally, we welcome paragraph 78.
The DPRK can never be recognized as a nuclear weapon state.
It's unlawful nuclear and ballistics, missiles activities must stop and the DPRK should immediately undertake steps towards the complete and irreversible denuclearization of the Kreme Peninsula.
Thank you, Chair.
We look forward to further engagement on these important issues on Revision one of the draft.
I thank the discipled representative of Ireland for the statement.
Next speaker on my list is the representative of Indonesia, followed by Canada.
Indonesia, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I Adnitia welcomes the zero draft outcome document as a good basis for discussion and negotiation.
We wish to highlight some issues within the mandate of main Committee two.
We underscore the need for a full balanced and non discriminatory implementation of the three pillars of the treaty to maintain its integrity and credibility.
This should be reflected in preamble of paragraphs 11 15.
Mr.
Chair, in preamble of para 14, the conference should emphasize that the IAEA safeguards are fundamental not only for peaceful uses, but also to support the advancement of safeguarded worldwide disarmament as stipulated in Article 3B one of the IAEA statute.
In paragraph one, Indonesia stresses the necessity of the full, effective and non discriminatory implementation of Articles one and two.
Any form of proliferation, horizontal and vertical must be addressed, including nuclear weapon sharing and extended deterrence, which run counter to Articles one, two, and six of the treaty.
We strongly urge all such states parties to cease this practices under all circumstances.
Initia recognizes that IAEA as the sole competent authority responsible for verifying safeguards compliance.
In paragraph three and six, we believe the issue of noncompliance must be addressed exclusively through established mechanism and diplomatic means in accordance with international law and the UN Charter.
We also suggest revising paragraph nine to ensure that references to mandates accurately reflect their respective roles under the UN Charter and the IAEA state.
Paragraph four should underline that safeguards must be implemented in a balanced manner fully consistent with Article 3, Paragraph three and without hampering the ineligable right under Article 4.
In the same vein, paragraph 22 should stress that supplier arrangements should not impose undue or discriminatory restrictions on peaceful uses.
Int appreciates the reference on Naval nuclear propulsion in paragraph 19.
While this provides a solid basis for discussion, we propose adding a clause with a view to ensuring compliance with their respective legal safeguards obligations and preserving the integrity and credibility of the safeguard system to reflect the various developments that have taken place since then.
In paragraph eight, the conference should express grave concerns at attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities and call upon all states to exercise maximum restraint to avoid such attacks.
This paragraph may also be considered to be moved to 45 B.
On the issue of nuclear weapon free zone, Indonesia views the language contained in paragraph 75 of the zero draft as a good basis for further discussions and negotiations towards a consensual outcome document.
We propose strengthening the paragraph by adding the phrase, Without delay and without reservations contrary to the object and purposes of the treaty.
As a state party to the Bangkok Treaty, whose protocol has neither been signed nor ratified by any nuclear weapon state.
Indonesia considers the call for the immediate signature and ratification as a legitimate right.
We also propose strengthening Paragraph 83 and 84 to reaffirm the validity of the 1995 resolution and encourage all states in the Middle East region, without exception to contribute to the realization of Middle East nuclear weapon free zone.
Mr.
Chair, proliferation challenges should not discriminate between regions or countries.
Paragraph 77 should avoid singling out specific countries or region.
In the same vein, paragraph 78 should urge all parties to exercise self restraint and escalate tension in addressing the issue of the current Peninsula.
Indonesia remains committed to working constructively with all state parties to achieve a balanced, substantive and consensus based outcome of that strengthens the NPT.
Indonesia will submit written recommendations for language to be considered in the text.
I thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the Distinct Representative of Indonesia for the statement.
Next speaker is Canada, followed by Norway, Canada, you have the floor.
Sorry.
Canada reiterates its appreciation to you, Chair, the president, and the Secretariat for the preparation of the zero draft outcome document.
We reiterated that it represents a constructive basis for our continued negotiations.
Our delegation provided some initial comments during our session last Thursday and I would like to expand on these briefly today in line with the written feedback we submitted yesterday.
Canada fully sports language reinforcing the IAA's core role in the effective implementation of the NPT's nonproliferation obligations through safeguards.
At a time when several parties seek to question or undermine the agency's rule, we would propose the inclusion of language in preamble paragraph 14, reaffirming the importance of respecting the mandate, technical authority, and independence of the IAEA.
The language in paragraphs 3 and 6 related to the importance of compliance with the treaty's nonproliferation obligations is essential to the treaty's credibility.
Canada welcomes the inclusion of paragraph seven outlining serious concerns with Iran's non compliance with its NPT safeguards obligations as per findings of the IA Board of Governors.
We believe this review conference is the correct venue for consideration of these issues and we propose a strengthening of the language to underscore the need for Iran to resume cooperation with the IEA and resolve outstanding safeguards issues without delay, including with respect to its declared stockpile of HEU, for which there is no credible civilian purpose and which raises significant nonproliferation concerns.
We welcome the draft language related to this comprehensive safeguards Agreement and additional protocol, which we believe reflects an appropriate balance that also recognizes the enhanced verification standard that the AP provides.
While we support paragraphs 12 and 13 as drafted, we would suggest that it could be strengthened to reflect the fact that 142 state parties, a clear majority, have now ratified the AP and applied the current verification standard under the treaty.
We support language stressing the need for IA safeguards to be evaluated regularly in light of technological developments, but have proposed added language on the need to support agency efforts to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards in paragraph 16 and the need to reaffirm the importance of member state support programs, paragraph 18, as a means to ensuring that the IA has the necessary technical, political, and financial resources for safeguards implementation.
The current language in paragraph 22 related to export controls is unbalanced and not reflective of the significant contribution that export control regimes make to nonproliferation and facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear technology.
We propose an explicit reference to the nuclear suppliers Group and anger Committee that underscores their respective roles in enabling legitimate nuclear trade while supporting efforts to continue to promote transparency.
We thank Argentina for their statement earlier on behalf of the NSG.
Canada is deeply troubled by the continued suggestions made by some delegations that the DPRK nuclear issue is closed.
In light of the escalating nature of the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile programs, this position lacks credibility and undermines the integrity of the NPT's nonproliferation pillar.
Canada calls for paragraph 78 on the DPRK to be further strengthened and would not support its deletion in the final outcome document.
Finally, Canada supports the language on nuclear weapons free zones, including paragraphs 83 to 85 related to the Middle East, which reinforce the validity of past commitments and support the creation of nuclear weapons free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by states in the respective regions.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Canada for the statement and for the kind words addressed to the presidency.
Next on my list is the representative from Norway, followed by South Africa, Norway, you have the floor.
Thank you.
Chair, we want to express our thanks again for the work that has gone into this draft, which we believe is a good basis for our future work.
For work.
We have sent our full comments in writing.
I will highlight some issues.
In general, we think that the zero draft outcome document appropriately underscores the importance of addressing all non compliance issues.
We welcome the preambula paragraph nine in this regard.
Ensuring compliance is not only a legal necessity, but also essential for preserving trust and safeguarding the balance between the treaties is three pillars.
A consistent rule based approach to compliance strengthens the legitimacy of the regime and helps prevent politicization of sensitive issues.
Chair, on paragraph seven and eight, addressing cases of noncompliance remains a crucial and sometimes sensitive issue.
Norway supports retaining clear and specific language on such cases, including with regards to Iran on OP seven.
Full and timely cooperation with the agency is indispensable to restoring confidence.
In line with the importance attached to addressing all non compliance matters in preambular paragraph 11.
We suggest deleting OP eight and incorporating the essential elements of it into the first sentence of OP seven.
Chair, we appreciate that the zero draft reflects the IAEA IAA's independent and essential role, including safety, security, and safeguards.
We underscore that the IAEA budget must reflect its increasing responsibilities and workload as recognized in OP 18 and 34.
We also emphasize the importance of universalizing the comprehensive safeguards agreements and promoting the additional protocol as the verification standard.
Together, these instruments enhance the agency's ability to provide credible assurances regarding both declared and undeclared nuclear activities.
Sir, OP 21 and 22.
Another important issue under discussion is the implementation of Article 3, including export controls and safeguards obligations.
Norway recalls the requirements to apply safeguards to exported nuclear materials and equipment is a binding obligation under the treaty.
Export control arrangements should therefore promote transparency and reinforce nonproliferation objectives while being implemented in a manner consistent with the treaty.
It is important that we recognize that export controls regimes enable access to peaceful nuclear technology and do not represent a hindrance.
We must avoid formulation that suggests otherwise.
Chair, We welcome the zero draft in OP 74 and 76276, reaffirm support for nuclear weapon free zones which contribute significantly to strengthening both regional and global security.
We also stressed the importance of maintaining clear language on regional proliferation challenges, including the DPR cases, nuclear weapons, and missile programs in OP 78 and OP 79, which continue to undermine the global nonproliferation regime, It is everything but a closed issue.
Finally, Norway underscores the continued relevance of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and welcomes the text in OP 83.
Progress on the issue remains essential to maintaining confidence in the treaty.
Particularly among states in the region.
Chair, Norway remains committed to engaging constructively.
In these issues, we will continue to work with all partners to ensure that the outcome of the main committee to is balanced, credible, and firmly anchored in the treaty obligations and principles.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinced representative of Norway for the statement.
Next, on my list is the representative of South Africa to be followed by Russian Federation, South Africa, you have the floor.
Chair, thank you for giving me the floor.
As previously stated, we recognize a number of positive elements reflected in the text, and in the spirit of constructive engagement, we would like to offer the following observations and proposals aimed at further strengthening the draft.
South Africa attaches particular importance to the balanced promotion and implementation of all three pillars of the treaty, which, as reaffirmed in the 2010 review conference outcome, are interrelated and mutually reinforcing.
In this regard, South Africa will propose the inclusion of an additional preambular paragraph to reflect this important principle in the text.
Regarding paragraph 11, the current formulation appears unbalanced given its narrow focus on non proliferation obligations without reflecting the equally important obligations under Article 6 and the importance of balanced implementation of the treaty as a whole.
We therefore propose the following formulation.
Recognizing the need for compliance by all states parties with all obligations under the treaty and emphasizing the strict adherence to all provisions of the treaty is essential to upholding its integrity and credibility while recognizing the importance of resolving non compliance concerns through diplomatic means in accordance with international law and the charter of the United Nations.
On paragraph 15, we would welcome a balanced formulation which links compliance with all three pillars of the treaty.
We propose that convinced by be replaced with concerned and that breaches be replaced with non compliance with obligations under the treaty.
The formulation reflects the 2010 understanding that the pillars are interrelated and mutually reinforcing, tying compliance to all three pillars with the integrity of the treaty.
Chair, shifting our focus to paragraphs 1 and 3, South Africa recommends that the text illustrate balanced implementation across all three pillars of the treaty and that it not only singles out Articles one and two without references to nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses.
Similarly, we caution against isolating only non proliferation obligations from the broader treaty framework.
This is in line with agreed language in the 2010 RevC outcomes document.
With respect to paragraph four in the second sentence, we propose quoting the full text of Article 3, paragraph three of the treaty, including the language that safeguards should be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article 4 of this treaty and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities.
On paragraph six, we propose the following reformulation.
States parties with concerns regarding compliance with safeguards obligations should direct such concerns together with supporting information to IAEA policy making organs for consideration and decisions on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.
Chair, regarding paragraph eight, we note the effort to find broadly acceptable language.
South Africa proposes the FBLing formulation.
The conference notes the grave concerns expressed at the legality of attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities in terms of the UN charter and international law and calls upon states parties to exercise maximum restraint to avoid such attacks.
Paragraph 19, the current formulation is cautious and does not reflect the discussions of the past two weeks, nor does it address the perspectives of states concerned about proliferation and safeguards implementations of naval nuclear propulsion, particularly in the context of HEU and safeguards exemptions under Article 3.
South Africa proposes the following formulation in an effort to strengthen the text.
The conference notes that the topic of naval nuclear propulsion remains a matter of interest and concern to the states parties regarding its potential implications for the objectives of the treaty.
The conference underscores the importance of continued transparent and open dialogue on this topic among states parties and the IAEA.
The conference further emphasizes that any non nuclear weapon state pursuing naval nuclear propulsion should engage with the IEA in an open and transparent manner and in full conformity with its safeguards obligations under Article 3.
Chair, our proposals have been submitted in writing, and we look forward to receiving the RVO.
I thank you.
I thank the distinct Representative of South Africa for the statement.
Next on my list is the representative for Russian Federation, followed by Iran.
Mikuch Vs law.
I will not dwell on the editing proposals or repeat the draft text.
We have all of this in the comment that the Russian delegation had already sent to the chair.
Of the review conference.
I simply mention some important points.
We cannot agree with attempts to force states parties to al themselves with statements about Iran's noncompliance with the IA safeguards under the pretext of non consensual and politically biased decisions of the board of governors.
Russia voted against these decisions, including language in the outcome document including this language in the document would be a justification of the attacks against Iran and essentially violation of the treaty.
I'd like to note with regard to the comments of certain speakers today that neither the treaty nor safeguards agreement can justify or have anything to say about the degree of enrichment of the uranium in these states.
And we propose a leading paragraph seven.
For the same reason, we once again highlight the crucial importance of condemning the use of NPT as a pretext for military aggression of Israel and the US against Iran.
Which has led to the gravest of consequences for this country as well as for the NPT.
In this regard, we strongly insist on strengthening the language in paragraph eight, adding a condemnation of the attacks of West Jerusalem and Washington against Iranian nuclear facilities.
This took place in June 2025 and February and March of this year.
And we have sent proposals.
The situation in Iran and the rhetoric of certain states about the DPRK, we cannot agree with that in paragraph 78 and 79.
It's absolutely obvious that the DPRK was forced to take extreme measures to defend its own security and sovereignty which was threatened by other countries.
We regret that We hope this will not be included in these paragraphs.
Next, we believe it's wrong to say that the comprehensive safeguards agreement only provides for a limited verification of a nuclear weapon state.
This document was developed in accordance with Article 3 of the NPTA and provides a sufficient level of verification.
The additional protocol is simply an additional tool, as you can see from its name.
And it's a fully voluntary measure.
And we Yes.
Believe that states that carry out joint nuclear missions or carry out missions territory of other states, they should be included under this agreement.
Promoting the idea of the additional protocol as almost a replacement for the safeguards agreement, we can't agree with that position.
Next, we believe it's very important to note that the safeguard system of the IAEA should be objective, depoliticized, technically justified and in line with the rights and responsibilities of states parties and Secretariat as laid out in the charter of the IAEA.
We believe it's important to add to the draft the following language relevant language.
Also, we should add that the application of these safeguards should be transparent and understandable for all states where they are applied.
On regional issues, we've already presented our comments during meetings of the subsidiary body too.
Thank you.
Thank you the distinguished delegate of Russian Federation for that view.
Representative of Iran, followed by Cameron, Iran, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
While my delegation has already explained its position with regard to different paragraphs under the purview of this main committee, and we have offered our written inputs to the text, it's now a good occasion to give a feedback to some remarks that we hear during this discussion.
We take note that on and on the US and other nuclear umbrella states are express that illegally flawed statement that Iran must not have nuclear weapons.
In fact, we believe that this is a flawed statement and lacks any credibility.
Because if we analyze the logical result of this statement, singling out only one non nuclear weapon state and remaining silent on other non nuclear weapon states, It can be interpreted.
This statement can be interpreted as if other non nuclear weapon states can have access to nuclear weapons.
This is wrong overall and we believe that if the speakers could have analyzed better this result of their statement, they would stop to express such a position.
Furthermore, it arises several questions and especially with regard to the actual nuclear weapon program in our region, which is held by the Israeli apartheid regime.
Of course, for Iran, it's not surprised that these countries are silent on the actual nuclear program, but in the meantime, because they are the real supporter of Israel and this is a real case of double standard.
I don't think that having a country specific language on non nuclear weapon state in any document of the conference can lead to success of the conference.
Therefore, we reject all those statements and proposals.
With regard to cooperation between Iran and the IAEA, I think that the best source to evaluate Iran's cooperation is the annual reports produced by the IAEA itself.
If you visit those reports, you will see that only 25% of the inspections of the IAEA throughout the world have been conducted in Iran.
This shows real and sincere cooperation of Iran because without cooperation of Iran, those inspections could not have been conducted.
It is, again, surprising that the nuclear weapon states do not have courage to refer to the root causes of the current situation which has been triggered by the illegal aggression of the United States and the Israeli regime against Iran and including its nuclear facilities.
Because currently there is first a legal vacuum on how to conduct inspection in militarily attacked nuclear facility.
Furthermore, practically speaking, there is risk of nuclear radiation, there is risk of unexploded ammunitions dropped by those aggressors, and there are other risk around it.
So really, this is astonishing and a case of double standard.
Finally, with regard to the US, I think that the US itself is on non compliance because it is the only nuclear possessor that continues to hold nuclear weapons, produces new types of nuclear weapons and lowers the threshold of use of nuclear weapons, promote nuclear sharing, and what is its position with regard to its own allies clearly seeking to have nuclear weapons.
With that, I start I thank the District Representative of Iran for the statement.
The next speaker is the representative of Cameroon, followed by Singapore.
Cameroon, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
My delegation thanks you for contributing this opportunity to contribute to the debates of the paragraph that the committee is dealing with this afternoon.
Now, regarding preambular paragraph 11, 14 and 16, my delegation wishes to recall that these provisions together form the essential balance of the treaty, the inalienable right of all states parties to peaceful development of nuclear energy, as well as the imperative of non discrimination and mutual trust and the need to facilitate the broadest exchange possible of equipment, material, and scientific information.
My delegation underscores that these principles must not be watered down by arrangements from outside of the treaty imposing restrictions that would be unacceptable.
That's why my delegation calls for a strict and transparent interpretation of these paragraphs, guaranteeing that no rule from the export control regime should contradict and restrain the rights entrained in the preamble.
My delegation also insists on the needs to translate these preambular commitments into operational safeguards and guarantees non discrimination between states parties and progressive universalization of commitments between suppliers.
It is only by respecting these conditions that this paragraph will uphold its full normative scope and will make the document well balanced and respectful of the sovereignty of all states parties.
My delegation fully aligns with paragraphs 1 to three that clearly affirm the authority of the nonproliferation treaty as the cornerstone of the international nonproliferation and disarmament regime.
My delegation welcomes the fact that these paragraphs recalled the importance of the universalization of the treaty as well as comprehensive respect for its three pillars and also the need for a balanced and non discriminatory implementation.
My delegation nevertheless insists on the fact that these general principles must not fall on deaf ear as they must concretely guide the interpretation of all of the following provisions, in particular those related to nuclear technology transfer for peaceful purposes.
In that regard, we recall that the implementation of the paragraphs implies fully preserving the inalienable right of all states parties to peacefully develop nuclear energy pursuant to Article 4 and to reject all restrictive reading under the cover of nonproliferation could cause asymmetry between supplier and non supplier states.
Cameroon therefore expresses its support for these paragraphs whilst calling for the spirit of balance and non discrimination to prevail throughout the final document.
On paragraph 78, my delegation reiterates its serious concern regarding the current situation in the Korean Peninsula.
We share the legitimate concerns of other delegations and we call for strengthening the text in order to improve the scope and operability of it.
In this regard, we reaffirm the need for a peaceful solution through dialogue and diplomacy, fully respecting the United Nations Charter.
The text must promote the stability and security of the whole of the Korean Peninsula, including the legitimate concerns of the Republic of Korea for its security without prejudice to the rights and responsibilities of all of the parties concerns.
We also underscore the importance of comprehensively respecting applicable Security Council resolutions and the rapid resumption of credible confidence with transparency and reciprocity.
This must be made operational to sell peace and to achieve the complete and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Cameroon for the statement.
Next speaker is representative of Singapore, followed by Saudi Arabia.
Singapore, you have the floor.
Chair, as this is the first time my delegation is commenting on the draft outcome document in this main committee, we would like to thank the MPT president and his team for a balanced and reasonable zero draft, as well as the inclusive and transparent manner in which he has conducted this ongoing review process.
Delegation has previously spoken about the risk arising from the proliferation of nuclear technology and material, the potential use and threat of use of tactical nuclear weapons, as well as dual use items for military purposes.
A strong nonproliferation regime with the NPT as its cornerstone is critical in ensuring such risks are minimized alongside a strengthened IAEA serving as the linchpin of the nuclear non proliferation regime.
In that regard, Singapore underscores the central, independent and indispensable role of the agency in the verification and monitoring of safeguards.
We have two comments on the section of the zero draft under consideration by this main committee.
First, given the binding nature of safeguards obligations, Singapore's view is that the outcome document should emphasize the essential role of the IAEA in nonproliferation.
In that regard, language in paragraphs 4 and 5 should be strengthened to underscore the central, independent and indispensable role of the IAEA in the verification and monitoring of safeguards and nonproliferation obligations, as well as a reaffirmation of NPT states parties full support for the IAEA in discharging its mandate.
In this regard, Singapore also supports the retention of preambula paragraphs 11 and 14 on the need for compliance by NPtee states parties with their nonproliferation obligations.
We welcome the inclusion of paragraph 16 on the need for IAEA safeguards to be assessed and evaluated regularly in light of technological developments, which will enable the IAEA to continue to tackle new and evolving challenges while maintaining its impartiality, integrity, and professionalism.
Second, Singapore aligned itself with the statement just delivered by the Philippines on behalf of Asean on references pertaining to nuclear weapon free zones.
The language on nuclear weapon free zones in Paris 75 of the zero draft highlights the important role the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones play as concrete and practical building blocks towards a nuclear weapon free world.
Singapore supports Paris 74 and 75 of the Draft, which not only reflect and reaffirm the collective positive contributions of all nuclear weapon free zones in strengthening the nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime as provided under Article 7 of the NPT, but highlights the contributions of nuclear weapon free zones to regional and international peace and security.
We believe that the current formulation provides a reasonable and balanced reflection of views on this issue.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguish representative of Singapore for the statement and for kind words addressed to the Chairman.
Next on my list is the representative of Saudi Arabia, followed by Australia.
Saudi Arabia, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
At the outset, I would like to thank you for your excellent management of this meeting.
We make these remarks and the proposed adjustments to the paragraphs.
We align ourselves with the intervention by Egypt on behalf of the Arab group.
As for paragraph nine, we suggest going back to the agreed upon formulation in the final outcome document of 2010.
We think that this formulation is a clearer legal basis that is more balanced by referring to Article 12C of the statute of the IAEA and paragraph 19 of the comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
Both accurately reflect the framework that is applied and that governs the implementation of safeguards and the commitment on reporting.
We believe that maintaining an agreed upon language previously would maintain the legal basis and would help us avoid any unintentional comprehensive loose interpretations.
As for paragraph ten, we suggest keeping the proposed language that affirms the role of the comprehensive safeguards agreement Article 3, paragraph one of the NPT, as it provides assurances on the peaceful nature of nuclear programs.
We think that this language more accurately reflects the existing safeguards framework and the technical goals of the verification activities of the IAEA.
At the same time, we suggest deleting reference to limited level of assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
Such a formulation could unintentionally implicitly show that there is a legal shortage in the safeguards agreement or create unintentional discrimination between the countries.
We think that describing the level of assurance in the safeguards agreement as limited would not accurately reflect the long record of implementation of these agreements by a big number of states parties.
These agreements have been effectively implemented by the vast majority of non nuclear weapon states for decades.
With very few limited cases of non compliance, most of them have been resolved later on.
We stress that the challenges of safeguards were shown in a number of other different arrangements as for para 12.
We suggest deleting or reviewing the reference on the arrangements in both instruments is enhanced verification criterion here.
We think that this formulation could be construed as implicitly mentioning that these would constitute the limited safeguards that would be enhanced by the additional protocol.
This can unintentionally expand the safeguards sped the MPT beyond the legal framework set forth in Article 3 and the comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
Also, I would like to recall that the comprehensive safeguards agreements are the only verification commitment that is legally binding and set forth by the NPT for non nuclear weapon states.
Despite the fact that decision to conclude initial protocol is a sovereign decision by any states, we think that reference to these protocols should not in a way or a manner that would implicitly mention that this would go beyond the legal requirements of the NPT.
As for paragraph 13, we suggest that this paragraph be deleted.
We think that the comprehensive safeguards agreements adopted as per Article 3, and those agreements are the only legally binding instrument for all state parties that are non nuclear weapon states.
I thank you, Mr.
Chair, and I would like to note that the rest of the remarks were sent to the secretary.
I thank you.
I thank the distinct representative of Saudi Arabia for the statement and the kind words addressed to the presidency.
Next speaker is the representative of Australia to be followed by Mexico.
Australia, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Australia welcomes the zero draft outcome document and the opportunity to state our views and respond to those made by others.
We have already stated our views on a range of issues covered by main Committee two in previous interventions in the general debate, MC two and SB two.
I would like to focus my intervention on the zero draft text and areas where we can provide constructive feedback.
As outlined in our previous statement to MC two, Australia has consistently supported the IAEA by upholding our obligations, bolstering its capacity, and protecting its independence.
We agree that the combination of a CSA and additional protocol represents the modern verification standard.
To strengthen the zero draft text on the IAEAs important role, we have suggested adding a sentence to paragraph five, namely, it is the conviction of the conference that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the IAEA in that regard.
Australia also supports calls to celebrate recent progress on CSA universalization in paragraph ten in the form of the recent accession by Guinea and Somalia.
On export controls, we thank Argentina for its remarks on behalf of the nuclear supplies group.
Specifically on paragraph 22, we share the concerns expressed by a range of states, including Denmark, Japan, Canada, and Norway at this session, that the current phrasing is imbalanced by implying that effective export controls may hamper peaceful uses.
We've suggested amending paragraph 22 on export controls to make it more balanced by drawing on language from the 2010 action plan, action 35.
We have conveyed this text proposal to the Secretariat.
As we mentioned yesterday in SB two, we support calls from a broad range of states to retain and strengthen language on the DPRK and Iran.
On the DPRK, we've recommended the conference reiterates its grave concerns rather than mere concerns over the DPRKs nuclear weapons and delivery system programs in paragraph 78.
This would reflect the exact phrasing of multiple UN Security Council resolutions which also expressed grave concerns.
We also support Japan's request to retain paragraph 78 and 79, and we echo the intervention from the Republic of Korea in support of paragraph 82 on the withdrawal of states from treaties.
Like others, Australia remains deeply concerned by Iran's continued failure to comply with its legally binding safeguards obligations, and we'd like to see this accurately reflected in the text.
On the topic of naval nuclear propulsion, as mentioned in previous sessions of the subsidiary body, Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom propose strengthening paragraph 19 so it sufficiently reflects the IAEA's independent mandate and technical authority in relation to naval nuclear propulsion and safeguards arrangements.
We have relayed our proposed text to the Secretariat as follows.
The conference notes that the topic of naval nuclear propulsion is of interest to the states parties to the treaty.
The conference also notes the importance of continued transparency on this topic and in this regards takes note of the ongoing transparency by relevant states and the IAEA Director General at the IAEA Board of Governors.
The conference further notes that non nuclear weapon states that pursue naval nuclear propulsion should continue to engage with the IAEA on relevant safeguards arrangements consistent with the IAEA's independence, mandate, and technical authority.
The conference emphasizes the need for full compliance with the treaty and safeguards obligations under the relevant safeguard agreements.
Full stop.
Australia looks forward to working constructively with all parties towards a consensus outcome.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Australia for the statement.
Next speaker is the representative of Mexico to be followed by Algeria.
Mexico, you have the floor.
Thank you very much Chairman.
Yesterday, my delegation expressed its intention to share proposed language.
On nuclear weapon free zones.
In this spirit, we have submitted to the chairmanship three new paragraph after the current 75 that seek to better reflect the historic contribution of these regimes to the goals of the treaty and to the maintenance of international peace and security.
First of all, Mexico believes that it's important that the conference reaffirms that nuclear weapon free zones are not an end into themselves, but rather they are concrete and effective measures that help to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international oversight.
This language reflects the historic understanding that said zones contribute directly to the implementation of Article 7 of the treaty and at the same time, they strengthen the broader goals of nuclear disarmament.
Secondly, We believe that it is necessary for the document to more clearly recognize the substantive value of these regimes for regional and international security.
Nuclear weapon free zones are not only political agreements, but rather they are legally binding instruments that prohibit the possession, acquisition, development, of testing of manufacturing, storing, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons.
It's for this reason that Mexico proposed language that underscores its concrete contribution to the strengthening of regional and global stability.
Finally, we propose including a reference to the adoption of Resolution 79 stroke 241 of the General Assembly on the broad study of nuclear weapons free zones and all their aspects.
As we've heard from other delegations, this process represents a relevant contribution to the strengthening of existing zones.
Identifies new practices and reflects on the challenges and opportunities that these regimes face.
Furthermore, for us, it's relevant to recognize the work of the qualified experts group convened by the Secretary-General in follow up to that resolution.
Thank you very much.
I thank the Representative of Mexico for his statement.
Next speaker is Representative of Algeriia to be followed by the United Kingdom.
Algeria, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Good afternoon to everyone.
Algeria associates itself with the interventions and proposals made by the Arab group.
On the proposed amendments by the Arab groups, we believe they are precise, legally grounded, and drawn from the treaty text and REAA status provisions and agreed recs language.
If we can summarize the group's overarching message with respect to paragraphs relevant to PDR two, is that the safeguards sections must preserve the legal balance between Article 3 and Article 4.
Safeguards section that operates without the counterweight of Article 4 rights undermines the treaty grand bargain and threatens the confidence of developing states parties in the regime.
From our perspective, the relevant paragraphs of the zero draft must be read in conjunction with the disarmament and peaceful uses pillars in order to assess the overall balance.
Mr.
Chair, we have received a last minute instruction from Capital, we would like to propose it in our national capacity.
It is one additional amendment relating to paragraph 16 of the draft.
The Arab group submitted two options for this paragraph.
The preferred option of the group is using the agreed language from 2010 as an alternative to this paragraph.
I'm not going to read it now.
Option two of the Arab group is to amend existing paragraph 16 of the zero draft.
To add at the end of this paragraph 16, the following, and I quote, without adversely affecting the resources available for technical assistance and cooperation, endnote.
While Algeria strongly supports the option one of the group, if the conversions choice retain is option two, Algeia proposes to add at the end of the proposed addition by the Arab group, and I read the proposal, I quote, and recalling that the principle of balance between the promotional and other statutory activities of the agency, in particular, verification and peaceful uses related activities needs to be strictly observed, end quote.
The rationale for this addition is that the principle of balance between IAEAs promotional and verification functions is a fundamental safeguard against the progressive securization of the agency at the expense of a developmental mandate.
As one of the largest beneficiaries of the IAEA technical cooperation in Africa, Ageria has a direct interest in protecting technical cooperation resources.
This addition converts the Arab groups without adversely affecting That's the proposal of the group formula into an explicit principle of statutory balance.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Algeria for the statement.
The next speaker is for the Representative of the United Kingdom, followed by Argentina, United Kingdom.
You have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
I would like to begin by again expressing our sincere appreciation to the President, committee chair, and the team for the work undertaken thus far and for the continued efforts to reflect and accommodate the views of states parties throughout this process.
We have listened carefully to the perspectives shared by all delegations, but would now like to offer some further comments based on the discussion today.
We welcome the emphasis throughout the draft outcome document on the importance of the IAA's work, the safeguard system, and the need for compliance with nonproliferation obligations.
We consider that references to the IAs important work could be further refined in particular through including additional language on the IAA's independence and professionalism in the preambular paragraphs and a reference in paragraph five to ensuring that nothing should be done that undermines the IAA's authority.
Similarly, on paragraph 16 regarding the need for IAA safeguards to be assessed regularly, a reference to clarify the aim of this being to ensure the continued effectiveness, efficiency, and credibility of safeguards would be welcome.
We are also grateful for the efforts to make this outcome document concise, but believe that some additional clarifications would improve intent.
In this regard, we echo comments made today by Denmark, I and others in relation to the balance of the draft outcome text relating to export controls and are grateful for the updates on the work of the NSG this afternoon by the distinguished representative from Argentina.
Paragraph 22 could be further refined on these matters with a recognition that multilateral export control guidelines, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Sang Committee, reinforce the effective implementation of the treaty by providing transparency, predictability, and confidence that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes can proceed without increasing proliferation risk.
As stated previously, we also don't accept that export controls impose undue restraints or hamper the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
Similarly, paragraph 20 is concise but important reference to nuclear security, which we welcome, but suggests that it is enhanced with a small addition to note that nowadays nuclear security is not just about physical threats, but includes important issues like cybersecurity.
Mr.
Chair, we also welcome the language on the IAA additional protocol in paragraph 12 and like Canada, would suggest a reference to welcoming the fact that a significant majority of states have now concluded such an agreement.
We would also encourage reflecting in the text that the combination of a CSA and AP represent the verification standard envisioned under Article 3 of the treaty.
Chair, this statement is in addition to comments we have made in this committee so far in subsidiary B two and in writing.
This includes our suggestions in relation to strengthening language on non compliance in the text, particularly related to Iran.
We would also echo comments made today by the Republic of Korea, Norway, Canada, and Japan in relation to DPRK.
Finally, Chair, we have already noted our views on naval nuclear propulsion, but would like to emphasize that we firmly support the suggestions made today by the Australian delegation.
We look forward to continuing our discussions on the next revision of the outcome document.
Thank you, Chair.
I think the Distinguished representative of the United Kingdom.
Next speaker is the representative for Argentina, followed by France Argentina, you have the floor.
Would yes.
Thank you very much, Chairman.
Following the statements made by the Netherlands and the main committee and the elements already submitted to the Secretariat, we also wanted to make a series of references in response to the paragraphs that are under consideration this afternoon in the interests of having a short test in line with the one presented by the chair of the conference.
The idea is to have a balanced one not only in terms of references to nuclear safeguards, but also with respect to Articles three and four of the NPT.
I reiterate that my country believes that the draft circulators a good and acceptable basis for the discussions, given that it correctly reflects what was presented not only in this room, but also what came out of the regional consultations.
In this regard, I wish to underscore the following elements.
First point on paragraph six, my country had initially suggested the removal of the second sentence based on the understanding that the reference there was conflicting with the primary source of the information on safeguards is provided by states.
On proposals, the proposals submitted on this today, and we would be prepared to discuss them in order to improve the drafting.
Secondly, with respect to paragraph nine, we believe that this is of the utmost importance, and of course, we would be prepared to add reference to the statute of the organization and 53 as it works in paragraph ten of the document agreed on in 2010.
Our third point, my country also wishes to formally propose the inclusion of a paragraph that addresses bilateral and regional mechanisms.
For safeguards and the promotion of transparency and mutual trust.
Corresponding languages in paragraph 21 of 2010 has been submitted by our country to the Secretariat.
It's important to have this reference, bearing in mind the role that the mechanism plays in the relationship between them.
Four, when it comes to paragraph 12, my country wishes to add a reference to voluntary.
Under the additional protocol.
I'm replacing the word assurance with confidence in line with the carefully negotiated and agreed language from 2010.
Our fifth point, my country has noted language in paragraph 13 urging parties to conclude and bring into force additional protocols.
Although this language has some clear things, we think that it is part of the existing balance of my country mentioned and it would be better to include it merge it with paragraph 12.
The reference as soon as possible, seems to establish a deadline that must be eliminated.
On the additional protocol, my country cannot support references to the current verification standard as other delegation have mentioned in their statements.
Our six point on paragraph 16, we believe that it would be beneficial to have reference to the um decisions made by the current conference and the governing board of the IEA in order to uphold and maintain and make more efficient the safeguards regime.
Now, on paragraph 20, my paragraph welcomes the language, and we believe that this is important, although there was a lack of reference to the work of the IEA and the systems of that, the section on peaceful use in paragraph 39 refers to physical nuclear security and it would be beneficial, I think, to um merge those references.
On paragraph 22, my country reiterates the need to use positive language for the export control regime.
Other countries have requested this and we believe that this should reflect the facilitator role and progress for the access of nuclear technology for peaceful uses.
My country has reiterated the positions of the regional group over the last few days on Iran and the DPRK.
We also support strengthening the role of the IAA in preamble of paragraph 14 and additional language on the fact that nothing should erode the safeguards and provisions coming out of the agency.
Thank you.
I thank the Distinguished Repative of Argentina for the statement.
Next speaker is representative of France, followed by Malaysia.
France, you have the floor.
President Chair, our delegation submitted written proposals in detail on various pairs of the text, and we also were able to present our positions during the work of this committee.
Allow me now to briefly come back to certain points in particular.
First of all, I'd like to commend the recognition in the preamble of the need for states parties to uphold their nonproliferation obligations under the treaty, as well as the importance of resolving all cases of noncompliance in order to protect the treaty's integrity.
In addition, I believe it's important to reaffirm in a new separate paragraph that the full, entire and effective implementation of the nonproliferation regime in all of its aspects plays a key role in the promotion of international peace and security.
With regard to the operative paragraphs, I would like to welcome the reaffirmation in paragraph five of the IEA's authority for verifying and ensuring compliance by states parties of the safeguards agreement concluded under their obligations.
Therefore, we believe it's important to underscore that nothing should be done that could undermine the authority of the IEA.
In this regard.
Therefore, the conference should recall the decisions and resolutions concerning the guarantees, the safeguards undertaken by its governing bodies, that is the Board of Governors and the General Conference.
The conference also should underscore in Paragraph 11 the importance that states should fully honor their respective safeguards agreements concluded with the IEA and implement them under all circumstances.
The implementation of these obligations should not be done in an a la carte manner nor unilaterally suspended.
The conference also ought to highlight the importance for states to comply with their international obligations under Security Council resolutions and should call upon all member states of the UN to apply them in full.
I would like to commend the documents reference to the proliferation crisis in Iran and expression of this conference's concern with regard to the noncompliance of Iran with its obligations under its safeguards agreement.
With regard to the DPRK, the paragraphs in the draft document reflect the troubling situation that we are witnessing.
The DPRK cannot, in accordance with the NPT, obtain the status of nuclear weapon state and must abandon all of its nuclear programs in a complete verifiable and irreversible manner in accordance with the relevant security Coutions.
More than 80 sponsored states and the EU have joined a joint declaration on this topic.
And lastly, Mr.
Chair, on Paragraph 22, our delegation holds that export control regimes are in no way an obstacle to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
On the contrary, they contribute to facilitating the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while strengthening the prevention of proliferation, mutual trust and transparency.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of France for the statement.
Next speaker, the representative from Malaysia.
The floor is yours.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
My thanks the president for the early circulation of the zero draft, which has enabled timely and substantive consideration of the text.
Lisa welcomes the trust of paragraphs under Article 3, which underline the centrality of IEA safeguards to the effectiveness of the treaty and to sustaining confidence that nuclear energy is not diverted from peaceful uses.
Support the affirmation that the IAEA is the competent authority for verification under Article 3, and we particularly welcome the emphasis on full compliance, timely cooperation, and adequate political, technical, and financial support for the agency as its safeguards responsibilities expand.
NSA also supports the strong focus on strengthening state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material and welcomes references to IAEA capacity building initiatives, which are practical enablers for effective implementation.
In our view this safeguard section provides a sound basis for consensus and should be preserved.
On paragraph six, Melissa supports the emphasis on addressing noncompliance with safeguards obligations in a timely manner and in full conformity with the IAEA statute and state parties legal obligations.
We would encourage that the tax be framed in a manner that avoids politicization and reinforces the principle that safeguards concerns should be handled through established IAEA processes guided by evidence and due process.
NSA also welcomes the balanced approach reflected in paragraphs 12 and 13 on the additional protocol, recognizing that the decision to conclude an additional protocol remains sovereign, while noting that once enforced, it constitutes a legal obligation and enhances the IAEA ability to provide assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material activities.
We also support paragraph 14 on the need to amend or rescind updated small quantities protocols so the IEA can draw sound safeguards conclusions.
In addition, NASA welcomes paragraph 19 on naval nuclear propulsion.
And supports continued open and transparent dialogue, including engagement with the IAEA as this issue has clear implications for safeguards, confidence, and the long term credibility of the regime.
Mr.
Chair, MalisA aligns itself with the statement delivered by the Philippines on behalf of Asean on the importance of strengthening regional approaches that reinforce the NPT, NASA supports the reaffirmation that nuclear weapon free zones enhance peace and security and contribute to nuclear disarmament objectives.
We welcome the current formulation of paragraph 75, which calls for nuclear weapon states to ratify or accede to the relevant nuclear weapon free zones protocols and to review any reservations or interpretive statements that undermine the object and purpose of such protocols while engaging in dialogue with Zone members.
MSA supports the emphasis in paragraph 76 on establishing nuclear weapon free zones where they do not yet exist, especially in the Middle East, consistent with the continuing validity of the 1995 resolution and the importance of universality for the treaty's credibility.
NASA also supports the language in paragraph 78 and 79.
We reaffirm unwavering support for complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization and we support calls for full implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions alongside a clear emphasis on diplomacy and negotiation as a path toward a peaceful and comprehensive solution.
NASA considers it important that the text preserve both firmness on nonproliferation principles and a steady encouragement of dialogue and de escalation.
Mr.
Chair, MSI offers these observations in a constructive spirit.
We support preserving the overall balance of these sections, strong safeguards, credibility, effective implementation, and regional confidence building while refining language where needed to maintain unity and maximize the prospect for consensus.
PSI stands ready to engage constructively with all six parties to achieve a balanced and forward looking outcome that strengthens the NPT and our collective security.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative from Malaysia for the statement.
Next speaker is.
Sweden, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair and thank you for your safe hands in guiding this conference and your efforts to shape a balanced outcome document.
My delegation raised a few items in subsidiary B two, and we thank you for the opportunity to address a few points of particular pertinence in main Committee two as well.
In the preambular section, we welcome the reference to the IAEA and the fundamental role of safeguards.
In addition, we think that the positive contributions over time of the IAEA as the primary instrument for nonproliferation efforts deserve to be reflected in a more explicit way as well in this part of the document.
We furthermore welcome the reference in paragraph seven on Iran's non compliance with its obligations under its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
Being the most evident proliferation challenge of the treaty, the paragraph should also convey that Iran must never be allowed to seek, acquire, or develop a nuclear weapon.
The UN Security Council resolutions create obligations for all UN member states and decides that Iran shall suspend several proliferation sensitive nuclear activities.
In paragraph 12, we see the merit of clarification, namely that for a non nuclear weapon state party with a comprehensive safeguards agreement supplemented by an additional protocol in force and that measures contained in both instruments constitute the current IAEA verification standard under Article 3 of the amputee.
This regard, the conference should stress that military activities continue to challenge the implementation of IAEA safeguards and welcome that the IAEA has continued to implement safeguards and undertake in field verification activities and recall the importance of continuing to be able to do so in accordance with Article 3 of the MPT.
Also, we would like to add that in conformity with Denmark and several other delegations, the text needs more balance when it comes to supplier arrangements and export control with an addition that such arrangements promote transparency.
Such arrangements build trust that contributes to facilitating legitimate transfers of nuclear technology and scientific knowledge to maintaining a predictable, transparent framework and a well defined level playing field for international nuclear trade and to improving overall trade and growth.
Many other delegations has pointed out, we propose a deletion of the reference to undue restraints in paragraph 22 as it is a subjective perspective and not in conformity with the reality experienced by several other delegations.
On the DPRK, we propose to insert a reference to Security Council resolution 23 97 calling for abandoning its nuclear weapons program in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner.
The text should also add clarification on DPRK status as a non nuclear weapons state and not a closed case or any other status, as well as pre existing commitments to a moratorium on all missile launches and nuclear tests and return to an early date to full compliance with the treaty and its comprehensive safeguards agreement.
Thank you.
I thank the Spent of Sweden for the statement and for kind words.
Next on my list is representative of Brazil, followed by the Philippines.
Brazil, you have the floor.
Chair, my delegation, which is to support the suggestion of Argentina on the drafting on the bilateral and regional safeguards agreements, given that these play an important role in transparency and in building trust in non proliferation.
Thank you.
I thank the representative of Brazil for the statement.
Next on my list is the representative of Philippines, the Floriss.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
The Philippines attaches great importance to the success of the Re conference and to the adoption of a meaningful and consensual outcome document that preserves and reinforces the integrity and the credibility of the NPT.
In this regard, the Philippines views the Presidents draft as a balanced and carefully calibrated basis for further discussions and negotiations towards consensual outcome document.
For its part, the Philippines remains fully committed to engaging constructively with all delegations in support of a successful and consensus based outcome, this review conference.
The Philippines supports the zero drafts reaffirmation of the contribution of nuclear weapon free zones.
The objective of the treaty.
We believe that the current generic formulation of nuclear weapon free zones in paragraph 74 and 75, the zero draft strikes an appropriate and balanced approach that contributes to the overall coherence and integrity of the draft outcome document and provides a sound basis for consensus among states parties.
We further believe that retaining the current formulation appropriately recognizes and highlights the valuable contributions of all existing nuclear weapon free zones on an equal basis, consistent with the inclusive and balanced period of the treaty and with the review process.
In our view, preserving the current formulation would help maintain the careful balance already achieved in the text and avoid reopening elements that may affect the broader equilibrium of the negotiations.
The Philippines, therefore prefers retaining the language contained in the zero draft.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Philippines for the statement.
Excellencies, distinguished delegates, that was the last speaker on my list for today.
Excellence, the senior delegates, I know that there is one request from United States delegation to exercise the right of reply pursuant to Rule 19 of the rules of procedure, we will hear it now.
United States, you have the floor.
Chair Umov, I know I have already spoken about Iran, but I would like to supplement my remarks based on remarks by the Korean, Japanese, and other delegations.
The Iranian delegation has taken umbrage about being singled out during the course of this RevCon and has said over and over again how their nuclear program is entirely focused on peaceful uses and is not now and has never been about seeking nuclear weapons.
There is only one problem with this oft repeated claim.
It does not reflect reality.
One only has to look at the nuclear file to see what kind of danger an Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons would pose.
I would like to remind my colleagues and other delegations that the assessment of Iran's long identified conduct is not the assessment of the United States or any other single state party, but rather the assessment of the IAEA.
The IAEA concluded in 2025 that with respect to the three locations where Iran had failed to provide answers to their questions, they were part of a undeclared structured nuclear program carried out by Iran until the early 2000s, and that some activities used undeclared nuclear material, unquote.
The IAEA further outlined that Iran refused to credibly answer its questions on these three locations and noted that Repeated statements by former high level officials in Iran related to Iran having all capabilities to manufacture nuclear weapons continue to provide concerns in this area, unote.
Those kinds of statements from former high level officials signaling that they would have all capabilities to manufacture a nuclear weapon are not consistent with the behavior of a responsible non nuclear weapon state, nor is their often discussed degree of enrichment of uranium, which we have covered in previous statements.
But as much as they are not consistent with their behavior of a responsible non nuclear weapon state, we fear for the strength of the health of the NPT should Iran withdraw from the treaty.
While the United States reaffirms every nation's sovereign right to participate in or withdraw from international treaties, I think it is clear to this body that Iran's withdrawal would essentially be an admission that its nuclear program was entirely focused on obtaining nuclear weapons and that it would be seeking to escape accountability.
Simply stated, Iran would have no reason to withdraw from the NPT if they desire peaceful uses, given that one of the main goals of the treaty is to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Such a peaceful nuclear program would require IAEA suspension supervision, but that is a commitment by all non nuclear weapon states pursuant to the NPT.
For those who would argue we are an uncharted territory, respectfully, we are not.
The DPRK manipulated NPT membership to obtain expertise, funding, and other support from the IAEA in the international community, only to use all of that support to develop a nuclear weapons program.
The DPRK manipulated the NPT and lied to the world in order to obtain nuclear weapons.
We fear that Iran may become DPRK 2.0.
Iran has spent decades refusing to answer the IAEAs questions in developing undeclared structured nuclear program carried out by Iran until the early 2000s, while claiming to have an exclusively peaceful program.
And we are concerned about the effectiveness of the review conference if we do not recognize these dangers when we see them and call them out.
Let me put this another way.
If one of the fundamental goals of the MPT's nonproliferation pillar is to prevent noncompliance among non nuclear weapon states, then a failure by this Rev Co in its outcome document to at the very least call out noncompliant states parties will raise serious questions about the MPT's effectiveness.
For the sake of the NPT, global nonproliferation efforts, and the safety and security of the international community, I truly hope everyone here understands that failure to address noncompliance head on will do far more damage to the reputation of the NPT than the absence of an outcome document on May 22nd.
I thank the chair.
I thank the representative of the United States for the statement.
I have another request for rights of reply from Iranian delegation, Iran.
You have the floor.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
In fact, I didn't have the intention to take the floor and take the precious time of the meeting, but hearing only lies from the US representative, I'm obliged to reject them all.
It is not a secret that US has been following a politically motivated agenda with regard to Iran and what we hear from the US representative is only political and politicized interpretation of Iran's peaceful nuclear program.
It is in fact the crying wolf and it is silent about its own behavior.
It is the country triggering continuously wars of aggression against regional countries, including Iran.
It is the country that holds illegally weapons of mass destruction.
It is the country that has the real intention to resume nuclear testing, to develop new types of nuclear weapons and lowering the threshold of use of nuclear weapons.
Overall, and from a fair perspective, we should call the US to behave correctly and to abide by the rules and to comply with its obligation.
The nuclear disarmament obligation is a legal obligation clearly mentioned in the treaty and other international documents.
The US has no moral ground to complain about Iran while it is silent about Israel, while it is silent about its own allies seeking clearly nuclear weapons.
Iran's officials and Iran's position has been totally consistent.
We have been rejecting the option of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.
We have said it and we have been consistent in complying with our obligations.
Iran has been the country respecting its obligations and international commitments.
We have been cooperating with the IAEA and if there is any problem, it is because of the illegal aggression triggered by the US against Iran, accompanied by its proxy regime in our region.
So we reject all those kind of interpretation or statements, and we think that this does suffice to reject all those unwarranted and unsubstantiated allegations about Iran.
I thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinct representative of Iran for his statement.
I don't have any more requests for reply.
Excellencies, distinguished delegates.
The next meeting of main Committee two is scheduled on Thursday 14th of May at 10:00 A.M.
Here in the rusteorship council chamber.
The meeting is adjourned.