Advancing the fight against nuclear terrorism (2026 NPT Review Conference Side Event)

Excellencies, Distinguished Representatives, Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you very much for spending this lunch hour with us for the side event where we will be looking at the Ixant Convention and the work we are doing on that. And without further ado, I will give the floor to Mr. Maro Miedekow, the Director of UNCCT-UNOCT. Thank you very much, Ulrich. Good afternoon, Excellencies, Distinguished Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen. And on behalf of the United Nations Office of Counterterrorism, it's really my honor to welcome you to this side event on advancing the fight against nuclear terrorism, recommendations and tools for the universalization and implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, or as we all call it, Ixant. I really would like to start by expressing my appreciation to our partners, and notably the European Union and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC, for their continued support, close collaboration in promoting Ixant through our joint project since 2019. And, of course, I also thank the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs for the strong partnership we have built. I'm most grateful to you, to the member states representative, who have agreed to share their experience of adhering to and implementing Ixant with us today. In fact, today's discussion takes place at a critical moment, and as it was stated by the Secretary General during the opening of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, this conference provides a timely opportunity to stand together and safeguard humanity from the grave threat of nuclear annihilation. At the same time, strengthening the international legal framework to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism remains an urgent priority for the international community. The humanitarian, environmental, and economic consequences of such terrorist acts would be catastrophic and would undermine international peace and security. In this context, Ixant stands as a cornerstone of the global nuclear security architecture. Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly here in New York in 2005, and in force since already 2007, Ixant is the only legally binding instrument specifically dedicated to the criminalization of acts of nuclear terrorism. In fact, Ixant requires state parties to establish relevant offenses under national law, prosecute or extradite offenders, and promote international cooperation in investigation, information sharing, and prevention. Together with other complementary instruments, such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment, Ixant contributes to a comprehensive legal foundation to prevent, detect, and respond to acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material. In the final document of the 2010 non-properation treaty review conference, state parties encouraged all states to adhere to Ixant as soon as possible. And some 15 or 16 years later, today's meeting seeks to advance these shared efforts by reinforcing the global nuclear security architecture and promoting both universalization, but also the effective implementation of the Convention. In fact, despite its importance, Ixant has not achieved universal adherence. As of today, 120 states are parties to the Convention, far from a universal ratification. As the study presented today highlights, several states continue to face challenges that hinder adherence and effective implementation. Limited awareness of the Convention, competing legislative priorities, and capacity constraints in translating international obligations into national practice are all aspects that need to be addressed. Through close cooperation with partners, including UNODC, with the general support of the European Union, the UN Office of Counterterrorism Treats, UN Counterterrorism Center, has been actively supporting member states to address these gaps. The study we will be presenting today was developed also in collaboration with the verification research, training, and information center, Vertic, and offers valuable insight into the challenges faced by member states along with actionable recommendations to address them. Importantly, it also offers concrete implementation tools, including instruments to support legislative analysis and model legislative provisions that can assist states in aligning their national frameworks with the extent requirements. These efforts ultimately contribute to stronger national nuclear security regimes, which collectively enhance global resilience against nuclear terrorism. The path towards universalization is not only about increasing the number of state parties, of course. It is equally about ensuring that states are equipped to fully implement their obligations once they join. This requires robust legal frameworks, strong institutional capacity, sustained international cooperation, and integrating legal instruments like ICSANT into broader national nuclear security strategies and practices. As we look ahead, let us use the findings and tools that will be presented today to accelerate the progress, close existing gaps, and reinforce the global regime against nuclear terrorism. At the UN Counterterrorism Office, we remain fully committed to supporting all member states, working closely with all partners to advance nuclear security and safeguard future generations. I really wish you a productive and engaging discussion today. And thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Miedeco, for these opening remarks, setting the stage for our discussion. And I will now pass the floor to His Excellency Ambassador Stephan Clement, European Union Special Envoy for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. And this will enhance the capacity and promote the international cooperation also of states. And here at the UN, of course, in the context of the NPT Review Conference, we are very well placed to stress this point. And, of course, Ixan is a very concrete expression of the rules-based international order, with the United Nations at its core. It provides a robust legal framework to address acts of nuclear terrorism. And the convention such is, of course, designed to prevent, detect, and respond to acts involving nuclear or other radioactive materials, which could be used for such malicious purposes. And why is it so relevant? It's the only legally binding international instrument that addresses this very dangerous concern, which has to be kind of countered. And it's also, in a sense, a very concrete instrument, because it establishes very clear obligations for the prevention, investigation, prosecution, and education of such potential incidents. For states, parties themselves, Ixan is a key tool to strengthen domestic legislation, to enhance coordination among competent national authorities, and ensure effective criminal justice response to investigate, prosecute, and educate cases. As I said already, the convention also facilitates international cooperation between states. And this helps, of course, by comparing the different legal frameworks. This helps to make it even better and close potential gaps. And, of course, since we're dealing here with non-state actors, it's very important, I think, that international cooperation is established, because they work, unfortunately, in trans-border manner. And, obviously, what we've been seeing over the last few years, we have seen a world where nuclear security challenges are increasingly complex and interconnected. And this makes an instrument like Ixan even more relevant than ever. And the increasing use, of course, also of nuclear and radioactive sources worldwide in different applications further highlights the importance of the need to make the Ixan a universal convention. However, of course, the effectiveness of Ixan depends on the organization, as I said. But as long as some states are not yet part of the convention, there will remain gaps in a global legal framework, which can weaken the collective ability to prevent and respond to nuclear security threats. From our, I mean, the European perspective, promoting the organization and its effective implementation of Ixan is a clear priority, as I said. And UNOCD has made its part in this regard, for example, through high-level advocacy in national parliaments. And this can ultimately help significantly to promote utilization. And we have seen recently some accessions like Albania and Tajikistan, which, of course, very welcome developments. And recently, we have also seen the accession of Seychelles in December 2024, but also Ecuador in February 2025. So we see a pattern of success, and this will strengthen the cause of the fight against the risk of nuclear terrorism. And, of course, let me also here say that we encourage, of course, all of us, all member states, to support efforts towards the realization. Everyone can contribute in order to be actively engaged as appropriate states, which are not party, and with a view to promote their accession to the convention. But, as I said before, beyond universalization, we also aim very much at strengthening national legal frameworks and enhancing national capacity, promote international cooperation, in close cooperation with this organization. And we have here in New York the United Nations Counterterrorism Center, the UNCCD, which is led by my colleagues here. And this co-hosts and these EU initiatives and allows for spreading the capacity building exercise in assisting states through the regional technical workshops. And also, we have done tabletop exercises in this framework, as well as some technical national trainings. From a purely EU angle, we also contribute to capacity building through our signature initiative, which is the CBN Centers of Excellence, which we have for chemical, biological, and radiological and nuclear risk mitigation. And these are organized with different hubs on a global scale, and they can also contribute to this. Maybe finally, I would also like to stress how, in the context of our EU support, a first meeting of XR and Points of Contact was held in Vienna earlier this year. And this is also a reflection of the very good work which has been carried out together with UNOCD and UNODC. Let me maybe conclude, because we want, of course, to listen to practical experience from participants, by reiterating that only through collective commitment and sustained cooperation and full implementation of XR and we can absolutely ensure that nuclear security remains strong, effective, and also universal. Of course, let me reconfirm that the EU stands ready to work closely with UNODC and others, including the IEA, of course, to advance the objectives of ICSANN and to reinforce our collective efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Your Excellency. And also, thanks for really bringing together the elements of how we need to consider both the universalization, the legal framework, and the implementation. that these are three components that all really fit together, and for the EU to prioritize this important subject. Both speakers have already mentioned the study that has been undertaken in terms of finding out some of the challenges that are to adherence and pathways towards universalization and effective implementation of ICSANN that was done by Vertec, and that my colleague, Ms. Alma Pinter, will now present. So over to you, Alma. Thank you. Thank you very much. Good afternoon, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, dear colleagues. Thank you for joining us today. I work at the Countering Terrorist Use of Weapons Unit of UNOCT, UNCCT. Today, I have the pleasure to share with you the key findings from our study on why some states have not yet joined ICSANN and how we can support both accession and implementation. But first, I would like to start with why does this matter? The threat of nuclear terrorism remains a global concern. Nuclear or radiological terrorism would have global, humanitarian, environmental, and economic consequences. The intent has been confirmed, as well as the possibility of potential access to dual-use radiological materials from state or from medical facilities. Risk is primarily linked to theft, poor security, or legacy sources. As technology evolves, so do risks involving non-state actors. Non-state actors, thankfully, lack the infrastructure and technical expertise to produce radiological sources and are dependent on pre-existing sources. But new technologies can be enablers. Creating an RDD or a dirty bomb or an RED is considered within capacities if materials are obtained. Therefore, strong universal legal frameworks are essential safeguards. As part of the 19 Instruments Against Terrorist Acts, ICSANN plays a critical role in criminalizing and preventing such acts. Next slide. What is ICSANN? ICSANN, International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, was adopted in 2005. It entered into force in 2007, and as of May 2026, it counts 127 states parties. It provides a legal basis to prosecute acts involving nuclear or radioactive material, such as possession, use, or making of radioactive material or devices for harmful purposes. It covers threats, attempts, accomplice liability. But importantly, ICSANN only applies to non-state actors. It also facilitates international cooperation, which is essential in cross-border threats, something that we have advocated a lot and worked on in our regional tabletop exercises. ICSANN complements existing frameworks, such as NPT, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and its amendments. Another thing to point out is that ICSANN is not applicable in an armed conflict. Armed conflicts are governed by international humanitarian law. Now, on to the study. I would like to give you an overview of the key findings of the study on reasons and challenges of the United Nations member states for not becoming party to ICSANN, as well as tools for its effective implementation. I will briefly present the legislative analysis tool and sample legislative provisions developed to assist member states in implementing ICSANN that are also contained in the study as an annex. The study is grounded in realities that are faced by member states. It aims to move beyond assumptions and to identify actionable solutions. It was conducted to understand better why, despite progress, around one-third of the member states are not yet party to ICSANN. The objective was to identify the underlying reasons for non-adherence and to develop evidence-based recommendations, along with practical tools, to support universalization efforts. In essence, the study provides a comprehensive assessment of the barriers to adherence across different regions, as well as tools that are available to support its effective implementation. As mentioned earlier, it was developed by Vertic in coordination with UNOCT-UNCCT within the framework of the EU-funded project promoting ICSANN. The methodology combined multiple sources, including questionnaire responses from member states, a review of national legislation and policy frameworks, analysis of global adherence trends, as well as academic and policy literature. Let's now pass to the global adherence trends. Following the adoption and entry into force of ICSANN in 2007, there was a strong early momentum, with a significant number of countries immediately ratifying the convention. However, this momentum has stalled in the recent years. Today, the remaining non-parties span multiple regions, and they reflect a wide range of developmental levels. This suggests that the issue is not the lack of support for the convention, but rather presence of various systematic barriers that need to be addressed. The graph itself that you see on this slide stops at 2022, and since that year, the adherence space remained quite steady, with approximately two countries adhering per year. Now, we will pass on to adherence by regions. The study also analyzed different patterns of adherence, grouping member states into the five United Nations regional groups, Africa group, Asia-Pacific group, Eastern European group, Latin American, Caribbean, and Western European and others group, which is a standard UN framework used for this kind of representation coordination. The percentage of state parties was therefore calculated and presented for each geographic group to highlight various regional trends, as well as variations in the participation to the treaty. If you look at the graph, you will notice that within African group, the adherence to the Ixant is lowest. We are presently standing at 54%. In the Asia-Pacific group, we are at 61%. Eastern European group, 91%, where we have the highest adherence to Ixant. Latin America and Caribbean, 61%, and Western European and others, 79%. Next slide. So what would be the key drivers that were found for the non-adherence? While Ixant is broadly supported by most member states, the non-adherence is rarely a political opposition. There are certain cases, but this is a very rare occurrence. It often has a low visibility outside of the specialized nuclear security and legal communities. And in many countries, there are various competing legislative priorities, which means that ratification is delayed or simply not addressed. And in some cases, nuclear terrorism is perceived as a low probability risk, which then reduces the political urgency to ratify the convention. Next slide, please. Now, in terms of the legislative and technical complexity, implementing Ixant is not a simple legislative step. It requires comprehensive legislative work, including criminalization of a range of offenses, which may not be already criminalized under the domestic laws, establishment of jurisdiction provisions, and development of also extradition and mutual legal assistance frameworks, so the aspect of the interaction between different member states additionally adds complexity to it. Taken together, this means that the implementation would require cross-sector legislative reform and sustained coordination, which can be challenging for many states unless there is a dedicated expertise or focused political attention. Next slide. In terms of capacity constraints, many states support the objectives of the convention, but they face capacity constraints, meaning that their legislative drafting resources are stretched or limited. There may also be small administrations that are managing a multitude of various treaty commitments, and there's also a need for specialized legal expertise, which can additionally slow down the process. But it is not all doom and gloom. We also have the solution for this. Now, next slide. In terms of the national coordination challenges, study also found that there are significant challenges when it comes to implementing XANT, because it requires cooperation across multiple ministries and agencies, which would include justice, foreign affairs, security, nuclear regulatory authorities, and so on, which can also create delays due to complex interministerial processes, unclear ownership, and lengthy approval procedures. These challenges are particularly visible when we look at the states by income groups. So low and lower middle income states represent 42% of the states globally, but they account for 60% of the states that are not yet party to XANT. This suggests that financial, technical, institutional capacity constraints significantly affect adherence and can slow down the ratification process. Therefore, targeted assistance, capacity building, could play an important role in accelerating universalization. However, the economic aspects would not be the only factor, and sometimes that's only one part of the picture. Political priorities and perceptions of the relevance of XANT can also influence the decision to adhere. Next slide. So the study itself has some recommendations to face these challenges and move us further towards the universalization and effective implementation of the convention. Main recommendations. First, there's a need to increase awareness and political engagement, including elevating XANT within a broader nuclear security and counterterrorism agendas, and to promote outreach at the highest level. Secondly, the study highlighted the importance of providing sustained legal and technical assistance. That includes capacity building activities such as national trainings, regional workshops, support for legislative drafting, review, and the development of practical tools. And finally, thirdly, strengthening partnerships and cooperation is essential. That includes peer-to-peer learning, regional dialogue, better coordination of international assistance efforts, including with NGOs. And one of the clear conclusions that can be seen from this primary research that was undertaken in the study is that there is an interest in external assistance to support the adherence process. These are some of the main regional recommendations for the Africa and Asia-Pacific group. The findings point when it comes to Africa that there is a need for sustained international assistance and a stronger political advocacy. Engagement also with regional institutions, such as African Union, would be particularly important, along with reinforcing that XANT is relevant for states even without a nuclear program. When it comes to Asia-Pacific, the focus would be on scaling up regional, sub-regional workshops, strengthening peer learning, delivering long-term technical assistance. And in this case, regional platforms as well, such as ASEAN, can play a key role in promoting the convention. When it comes to Europe and Latin America, for Eastern Europe, the adherence gap is small, but it requires targeted engagement. The study recommends direct outreach to remaining non-state parties, leveraging frameworks such as European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to increase political prioritization. And finally, in Latin America and Caribbean, the emphasis would be on high-level advocacy events and reducing the technical and financial barriers to adherence, including through regional organizations, such as Organization of American States and Caribbean Community. Overall, we identified that there is a need for tailor approach. There is not one-size-fits-all solution. And I wanted to bring to attention that UNOCT will be organizing on 2nd of June in Washington an event with the OAS, Organization of American States, as well as another event with the African Union Counterterrorism Center on 10th of June in support of these recommendations of the study. Next slide. When it comes to the practical tools for implementation, the study is divided into two parts. The second part already started that process of developing some of these legislative assistant tools that are identified in recommendations. And one of them would be the Ixant sample legislative provisions. Now, on the legislative analysis tool, its primary purpose is to provide a structured way to understand how existing legal frameworks align with the convention. It helps also identify which gaps exist to map existing national legislation to treaty requirements and support the planning of the necessary legislative reforms. Next slide. You have here an example. This is an excerpt of the tool itself, which has indications that point to specific offenses and penalties in national law as compared to respective Ixant articles. And this tool itself is available in the study as an attachment. Next slide. The sample provisions themselves are intended to be used as a practical drafting support tool for the states. And they offer ready-to-adapt model provisions that could then be tailored to the national legal systems. Next slide. Try in the interest of time. So we are long-standing friends here. We have been implementing UNOCT jointly with UNODC and with the support of the European Union since 2019, this project under different names, but always with the same spirit. So the first project that ran from 2019 to 2023 focused on universalization and effective implementation. The objectives of the project were to encourage and to accelerate adherence processes, to support effective implementation through capacity building, and also to reduce legislative burden through sharing of practical tools. Here are some of the examples of our past activities that were implemented by UNOCT in line with the study recommendations, such as high-level awareness events with various parliaments, capacity building at the national level, capacity building at the regional level. And over the course of the past six years, we have managed to engage over 1,000 officials coming from 120 member states. And this collective work, of course, by UNOCT and UNODC, led to 12 additional state parties joining the convention since 2019. Now, when it comes to our upcoming work, we will continue with the additional support from the European Union to raise awareness on the convention to ensure effective implementation, and we absolutely encourage the states that are interested to reach out to UNOCT and UNODC, which will also introduce some of the assistance available and additional tools that they have developed in the presentation following. In terms of the key takeaways from the study, one of the clearest findings is that there is already a broad support for ICSANT, and it is very rarely a matter of political opposition. The barriers are primarily practical in nature, and the research has also shown that targeted assistance can make a difference. Tools have been developed, support mechanisms are available for member states, and finally, the study really reveals that cooperation is essential to closing the remaining gaps. My last two slides speak about a call of action. This is a clear action for the states that have not yet joined ICSANT, the states that are parties to ICSANT, and also to international assistance providers. For the states that are to join ICSANT, we encourage them to strengthen their national implementation frameworks, to make full use of available support. For those states that are already parties to ICSANT, to continue advocating for ICSANT, to share the best practices, to support other states in joining. And for assistance providers, the priorities are to continue promoting ICSANT at political and institutional levels. And together, these efforts will be essential to advance the universalization-effective implementation. And last but not the least, this is a guidance on how to join the convention. In order to become a party, a signatory must express its consent, bound by ratification, acceptance, approval. And the states must seek approval for the convention at the domestic level, and enact any legislation necessary to implement it domestically. At the international level, to join this treaty, it is necessary to deposit the instrument of ratification with the Secretary General of the United Nations. And it is imperative that the instrument is signed by one of the three specified authorities, the head of state, the head of government, or the Minister for Foreign Affairs. And in practice, the states must deliver the original instrument to the treaty section of the United Nations. And with this, I think I can conclude. We're very happy to share this information after the meeting as well, because we are aware that it's a lot, and the study is so. Thank you. Thank you very much for that. I'm very interested to hear more about the study, and I'm sure we will, I think it's not quite ready to share yet, right? But we'll put it on our website as soon as it's ready and it's completion. And on the last element, certainly, of course, member states, encourage to reach out to us and to the colleagues from UNODC for any guidance on adherence. With that, I would like to turn to Ms. Vivian Okeke, the representative of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the United Nations and Director of the IEA Liaison Office in New York. Madam, you have the floor. Thank you, moderator. So, excellencies, the stringy delegates, ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of the International Atomic Energy Agency, I'm delighted to attend this side event to share IAEA's perspectives on synergies with the Convention for the Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendments, A slash CPPNNM. As we announce the peaceful use of nuclear science and technology for the benefit of all, we need to recognize and address the threats posed by the potential misuse of nuclear and other radiative materials and strengthen our ability to stop those that will seek to use these materials to cause harm. These threats are real and constantly evolve. All states should be impacted, could be impacted by an act of nuclear terrorism, and so it behoves on all states to play a role in establishing and maintaining a robust legal framework to combat such acts. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, CPPNM, which entered into force in 1987, sets forth legal obligations for its state parties concerning the fiscal protection of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes during international transport. It also mandates the criminalization of specific offenses involving nuclear material such as theft, robbery, or unlawful taking, and provides for international cooperation, including assistance and information exchange in responding to such incidents. The amendment to the CPPNM, A slash CPPNM, which entered into force 10 years ago this month, on May 2016, substantially broadens and enhances the original treaty scope. It extends fiscal protection requirements to cover nuclear facilities and nuclear materials in domestic use, storage, and transport. The amendment for that defines and criminalizes additional offenses. It also provides for international cooperation in responding to sabotage of nuclear material or of a nuclear facility or credible threats thereof. The CPPNM and its amendments were adopted under the auspices of the IAEA, and they remain the only internationally legally binding undertakings in the area of physical protection of nuclear material and of nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes. The adoption and entry intervals marked by a voter-almostro in the development of international legal framework for nuclear security. Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, the CPPNM has amended and licensed share several complementary elements including the criminalization of specific offenses, the requirement for safe parties to establish jurisdiction over the offense in certain cases, and the obligation to prosecute or extradite alleged offenders to prevent them from finding safe heavens and evicting justices. As already highlighted by previous speakers, the expert reference to the CPPNM in the preamble of ISANT highlights the close interrelationship between the two instruments. These instruments offer shared benefits, collectively enhanced national, regional, and global nuclear security by deterring potential offenders from engaging in prohibited conduct, minimizing the risk of impunity and denying safe heavens to offenders, creating a common baseline and minimum standards for legal framework, addressing nuclear terrorism and related crimes, thereby contributing to the harmonization of criminal legislation across jurisdictions, promoting international cooperation in criminal matters among state parties, and with competent international organizations, including true extradition, mutual legal assistance, and information exchange. together, the CPPNM, as amended and ISANT, provide a framework for establishing effective nuclear security regimes, forming a basis for international cooperation and assistance, and helping ensure that persons engaged in criminal acts involving nuclear and other radioactive materials are brought to justice and are denied safe heaven. Ladies and gentlemen, it goes without saying that the more countries join the amended CPPNM and ISANT, the stronger the international legal framework becomes. It is important to note the growing global commitment to these legal instruments. As of today, there are 165 parties to the CPPNM, of which 138 have joined the amendment. The IAEA plays a recognized central role in strengthening the nuclear security framework globally and in coordinating international activities in this field. At the IAEA, we focus on the universalization of the CPPNM and its amendment to further adherence by all states. In this regard, the IAEA helps in many ways from raising awareness on these instruments to providing legislative and technical assistance to adhere to implement them upon request. This assistance is built on the solid foundation of the IAEA's nuclear security guidance, which is consistent with and helps states implement obligations under the legal binding instruments, including the CPPN and its amendment, ISANT, and the Security Council Resolution 1540. Based on this guidance, we work with states to develop integrated nuclear security sustainable plans, INSSP, that help review national nuclear security regimes and identify areas where they need to be strengthened. Currently, 94 states have approved the INSSPs. We further offer support in strengthening national nuclear security regimes in line with relevant legal instruments and guidance through peer review missions, such as international fiscal protection and advisory services IPPAS and international nuclear security advisory services mission, INSSF, conducted by international IAEA-led team of experts. To date, we have one round 10 IPPAS missions and 89 INSSF missions which have been carried out. The approach of the IAEA nuclear security training and demonstration center, NSCC, further enhances countries including operators' capabilities in fiscal protection of nuclear and other radioactive materials and associated facilities. We have heard from the presentation about the need for capacity building. This training center has been three years old and has already trained over 1,000 experts from one round 14 countries. As preparation for the second conference of parties to the A-C-PPNM schedule to be held in Vienna in April 2027 and underway, the IAEA will continue its support for the universalization of the convention and its amendments. For example, in 2025, the IAEA conducted several outreach events and awareness-raising activities, including two technical meetings, two regional, subregional workshops, three consultancy meetings with parliamentarians, and one side event in the margins of the annual general conference. The IAEA actually got calibrated with member states and international organizations, including UNODC, Interpol, the EU, to promote further adherence to and full implementation of the C-PPN as amended and ISAN, reinforcing the shared commitment to strengthening global nuclear security. In closing, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to highlight that nuclear security plays an essential role in ensuring the safe, secure, and peaceful use of nuclear technology. Universal adherence to and full implementation of both the C-PPN as amended and ISAN, together with the applications of the IAEA nuclear security guidance, will help enable states to enhance the advantages of nuclear science and technology while effectively managing and mitigating risk to human health, society, and the environment. Ultimately, this will make us all more secure. It is in everyone's interest that all states join and implement both these key treaties. The IAEA will continue to play a central role in this dynamic field. I would like to thank the United Nations Office of Counterterrorism for organizing this event and inviting us to participate. Thank you. Thank you very much, Ms. Okeke, for this statement on the engagement on C-PPNNM as amended. I'm learning a lot of additional acronyms today. We really benefit from the close cooperation with IAEA, including when we're looking at the implementation aspects, because that's really where the different bodies need to work together with the member states. With that, I will turn to Ms. Xiaohong Li, the representative of the New York Liaison Office of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, to provide an overview of legislative tools and assistance opportunities available to member states. And as already noted several times, our close partner in the implementation of this EU-funded program, Onyxand. Over to you. Thank you, moderator, for giving me the floor. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, and dear colleagues, I would like to start by extending our gratitude to our colleagues at UOCT for inviting UODC to contribute to this event. It's also an example of our close partnership. So in this presentation, I would like to provide you with an overview of UODC's legislative and technical assistance at the disposal of states to support the adherence and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, so-called ICSI. I would like to echo the previous speakers on the importance of states establishing robust legal frameworks to counter the threat of nuclear or other radioactive materials being misused to facilitate terrorist or other criminal acts. Next slide, please. So UODC is currently serving as a de facto secretariat of ECSENC. At the meantime, it has been mandated by the General Assembly to promote the other 18 terrorism-related international legal instruments which embodies criminal justice-based approach to counter-terrorism. So in the past 20 years, the Terrorism Prevention Branch of UODC has served as a center of expertise delivering technical, legislative, and operational assistance to states in the field of counter-terrorism. So it provides legislative assistance to support states in drafting and reviewing national legislation to comply with the delegations contained in these international legal instruments. It also offers capacity building to enhance national counter-terrorism expertise including to prevent and suppress nuclear and radiological terrorism. Finally, it also assists states to strengthen international and regional cooperation in criminal matters. So UODC delivers tailor-made counter-terrorism assistance on the ground through its extensive field network covering about 170 physical locations. And also at our headquarters in Vienna, it also has a dedicated multilingual team working full-time on the prevention of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorism. So next slide. please. Our technical and legislative assistance services in the area of nuclear terrorism prevention is currently represented by three complementary and synergistic projects funded respectively by Canada, the European Union, and the USA. So on the screen, you could see the focuses of these three projects. And as mentioned by my colleagues from UNOCT, the project funded by the European Union has been jointly implemented by UNODC and UNOCT. Next slide, please. So basically, UNODC's activities in support of ICSEND are two branches. for the states that are not parties to this convention, our support focuses on raising awareness of the obligations contained in these conventions, and also the advantage to be adhering to it. So on the other side, for the states that are already parties to convention, we provide a wide range of technical and legislative assistance and capacity building to promote more effective implementation. Next slide. So just now, I and my colleagues presented the findings of the study on the obstacles faced by this in adhering to the convention and also provided recommendations. So I would also like to provide further information on what UNODC has done in this area. So firstly, relating to technical assistance. So through various manners of technical assistance, such as workshops, judicial trainings, mock trials, tabletop exercise, UODC has trained thousands of criminal justice and other relevant officials all over the world on the legal, technical, and operational aspects of the convention, thus contributing to strengthening nuclear security at the country, regional, and international levels. Next slide, please. On the development and dissemination of knowledge, UNODC hosts a library, including a large number of tools and resources, all of which are available in six UN official languages. resources. So these tools and resources can be used for self-paced training, references for policymakers and legislators, and also guidance for practitioners in law enforcement prosecution of relevant offenses covered by ICSEN. Next slide, please. I would like to draw your attention to the four toolkits recently developed by UNODC to support this convention. So the first one is a toolkit on model criminal provisions covering the offenses set forth in ICSEN and the CPP-NM and its 2005 amendment. Second, a toolkit on synergies among ICSEN, the CPP-NM, and its 2005 amendments. And the third, a toolkit on jurisdictionary aspects of ICSEN and a toolkit on complementarity between ICSEN and the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors. Additionally, we also launched a roadmap for states to become party to this convention which outlines the steps a state might take in order to adhere to this instrument. Next slide, please. So this is a dedicated website developed by UNODC. So all resources, tools mentioned just now can be found on this website which is also available in six UN official languages. So since it's launched in 2021, it has received more than 120,000 visits. Next slide, please. So I would also like to emphasize that UNODC does not work in isolation. Rather, we partner and work closely with a wide range of other entities including international and regional organizations, civil society, and also academia. For example, we have already closely worked together with UNOCT, IEA, Interpol, and NGOs. We also participated in various capacities in a number of relevant initiatives and coordination mechanisms. So you could get further information from the slide. Next slide, please. So before concluding, I would like to spend a few words on results and achievements of our work in connection with this convention. So firstly, our work has led to a steady increase in the rate of adherence to the convention, which now comes with 127 parties, as mentioned by our colleagues just now. So some adherence are outcome of years of engagement and continuous follow-up with relevant countries by UODC. Most recent examples include Ecuador, Mozambique, and Palo. Next slide, please. In relation to the enhanced capacity of criminal justice systems, we worked on this in this regard by various capacity-building efforts which have strengthened criminal justice systems bolstered this capacity to prevent and respond to nuclear or other radiological crimes falling under the purview of this convention, I would also like to mention that the international cooperation, as expected and established by this convention, has been further strengthened and revitalized. one example is the first meeting of the ECOSEND points of context for exchange of information was convened on 25th March 2026 in Vienna. So it improves global coordination and international cooperation in the implementation of this convention. So next slide, please. I would like to recap this presentation through this slide, which shows new ODC's comparative advantages, including strong substantive expertise, extensive field presence, effective partnership, intersection between terrorism and other crimes, and also long track record of building capacity in this area. So the last slide. Last but not least, UNODC's dance committed to support the states in adherence and implementation of this convention by working closely with our partners. Thank you. Thank you very much, Ms. Li, for this presentation and for the excellent cooperation that we have with UNODC. I'm conscious of the time and I do want to make sure that we also hear from our member state representatives. So we do have a pre-recorded statement from the colleagues at the 1540 committee, but I think I will use my moderator's prerogative and instead give the floor to Mr. Safar Ramanov, the third secretary from the permanent mission of the Republic of Tajikistan to the United Nation to present on your experiences relating to the extent. You have the floor, sir. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair, distinguished colleagues. First of all, I would like to express my appreciation to the UNCTC and the UNODC as well as all partners for organizing today's event dedicated to promoting the universalization and implementation of the international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism. Tajikistan considers the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism to be a serious challenge to international peace and security. The potential consequences of radioactive materials falling into the hands of terrorists or extremist groups could be transboundary and long lasting with implications for international security, sustainable development, humanitarian conditions, and environmental protection. For Tajikistan, this matter remains particularly pertinent given the broader regional dynamics, the continued presence of tourist threats in Central Asia and the country's proximity to areas where international designated terrorist groups remain active. Tajikistan has consistently advocated for strengthening the global counterterrorism architecture and for the full and effective implementation of the relevant international legal instruments. In this context, we note that in June 2022, Tajikistan ratified the nuclear terrorism convention, a step we regard as an important contribution to national and international efforts aimed at preventing terrorist acts involving nuclear or other radioactive materials. Tajikistan is also a party to international instruments in the field of non-proliferation and nuclear security, including the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the convention on the physical protection of nuclear material and its amendment and actively cooperates with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Our country consistently supports the central coordinating role of the United Nations in global counter-terrorism efforts. At the national level, Tajikistan continues to strengthen its legislative and institutional framework in the field of counter-terrorism and extremism and hence export control and border security mechanisms as well as a system for preventing the illicit trafficking of dangerous materials. particular attention is paid to strengthening regional cooperation. Tajikistan is convinced that effective countering of modern terrorism threats is impossible without close coordination among states, international and regional organizations. Within the framework of regional cooperation, Tajikistan actively engages engages with the United Nations, the CIC, the CSTO, the SCO, and the IEEA, and other partners on countering terrorism, extremism, and transnational organized crime. terrorism. I would also like to highlight the high-level international conferences on countering terrorism and its financing convened within the framework of the Dushanbe process at the initiative of Tajikistan in cooperation with the United Nations. These conferences have evolved into important international platforms for developing practical approaches to strengthening collective security measures, sharing experience, and advancing international cooperation. I would further note that in June of this year, on the opening day of the United Nations counter-terrorism week, another conference under the Dushanbe process will be convened jointly with the state of Kuwait and the United Nations. We are also convinced that the promotion of the universalization of nuclear terrorism convention should be accompanied by the provision of practical, technical, and expert assistance to member states. For many countries, particularly developing ones, signification challenges remain in terms of limited institutional capacity, shortage of specialized expertise, and the need to adapt national legislation. In conclusion, Tajikistan refilms its readiness to continue actively contributing to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global nuclear security architecture and countering terrorism in all its forms and manifestation. Thank you for your attention. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Ramanov, for this very interesting presentation and for all the efforts that Tajikistan has made, both on Ixant, but also in support of our office. We have a very close cooperation, so thank you for that and also for noting the event during Citi Week. I can say there will also be a side event on Ixant, so we hope to see you all again at that time. I understand we do have a little bit of time, so we will run the presentation from our colleague at the 1540 team, Mr. Jiangming Yao, regional coordinator for Africa on United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 with the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. It will sound ideally. Regional Coord... to join you virtually at this side event. For the past 10 years, I have been working across the continent on arms control and the broader peace and security space. It is a real pleasure for me to contribute to today's discussion. Excellencies, colleagues, let me begin with the words of UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres. Nuclear weapons deliver no security, only the promise of an annihilation. I am grateful to join this discussion today on how we can strengthen the global response to nuclear terrorism through the complementary implementation of 1540 and the IC end. from an African implementation perspective. I will be quite practical in my intervention because from where I sit, working on 1540 implementation across Africa, the issue is not so much the framework itself. That part is solid. It is the implementation side where things become more uneven. And that is also where the complementarity complementarity between these two instruments really shows up. In simple terms, 1540 and IC sent are not separate conversations. They are part of the same security reality. IC sent is about what happens when something goes wrong. 1540 and 1540 is about making sure we reduce the chances of that happening in the first place. It is about domestic controls, legislation, export controls, border measures, physical protection. So one is prevention, while the other is response and accountability. And in practice, you really cannot separate them. What we see in our work across African states is that the main challenge is rarely political will. More often, it is how systems are organized internally. You have customers doing part of the job, border agencies, another part, regulators, somewhere else, law enforcement, then the judiciary, all of them important, but not always working as one system. So even when countries are engaged and committed, the implementation can become fragmented. And when that happens, gaps open up, and those gaps really matter. What also makes the current environment more complex is the way non-state actors themselves are evolving. The threat today is no longer limited to highly organized terrorist groups operating through traditional structures. Networks have become more decentralized, more adaptive, and in some cases, more technologically sophisticated. limited. We are seeing how illicit procurement channels, criminal intermediaries, trafficking networks, online facilitation, and the misuse of dual-use materials can together create vulnerabilities that non-state actors may seek to exploit. And in regions affected by instability or weak institutional presence, these risks become even harder to detect because the lines between organized crime, trafficking, and terrorism are often blurred in practice. This is why implementation cannot remain static. Both 1540 and ICSENT require states to continuously strengthen and adapt their legal, regulatory, and operational systems to a threat landscape that is increasingly interconnected, transnational, and fast-moving. This is where 1540 and ICSENT reinforce each other in a very practical manner. 1540 helps build the preventive layer, the laws, the controls, the coordination between agencies, the day-to-day systems that stop diversion before even it happens. ICSENT then ensures that if something does happen, there is a clear legal pathway to respond, investigate, prosecute, cooperate internationally. When both are working together, you are no longer looking at two separate frameworks, you are looking at one system, even if it is built from two different legal instruments. We are starting to see this more clearly in part of Africa. In West Africa, for example, there is a growing understanding that you cannot treat nuclear security as a set of isolated obligations. It only really works when institutions coordinate properly across the mandate. Where that coordination improves, implementation becomes more stable, less dependent on individuals, more embedded in systems. In the Sahel, the picture even more instructive. Security threats are not static, they are adaptive, and they do not respect institutional boundaries. Terrorist networks exploit exactly the spaces between systems, between agencies, between legal frameworks, between national and also cross-border enforcement. So if our systems are fragmented, that is where vulnerabilities will appear. This is why prevention cannot be something occasional or reactive. It has to be built into daily practice. At borders, in licensing decisions, in customers' checks, in regulatory follow-up, that is where 1540 really matters. It strengthens those everyday systems that reduce risks before it materializes. ICSENT complement this by making sure that if prevention fails, states are not left without tools. There is a legal pathway, there is cooperation, there is accountability. From an African perspective, there is also a broader point here. Africa has made a clear and collective choice through the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty to remain free of nuclear weapons. That is not just symbolic, it reflects a deep conviction that security cannot be built on weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, we are very aware that nuclear risk is global. If there are ever an incident involving nuclear terrorism, the impact would not stay contained in one country or one region. It would affect economies, public health systems, the environment, and political stability far beyond where it happens. So this is not a distant issue for Africa. It is a shared global vulnerability. And that is why implementation of 1540 and ICSENT is not just a technical exercise. It is really about building resilience, collective resilience. Let me close with a simple reflecting from the field side of this work. These frameworks are not really tested in conference rooms. They are tested at border posts, in customer offices, in regulatory agencies, in laboratories, in courtrooms. That is where the system either holds or does not hold. And that is why this complementarity matters so much. 1540 is what strengthens prevention. It reduces the chances of dangerous materials being diverted or misused in the first place. ICSENT, is what strengthens accountability. It ensures that when something happens, there is a legal and cooperative framework to respond. Together, they allow states to build something more complete, not perfect, but more coherent, more connected, more resilient. and ultimately, as Secretary General Antonio Guterres has reminded us, nuclear weapons delivers no security, only the promise of annihilation. our responsibility is quite simple, but also quite demanding. To make sure that promise never becomes reality through better implementation, better coordination, and systems where prevention and response actually work together in practice, not just on paper. I thank you very much. We thank Mr. Xiaming Miao for this compelling statement. I think it really brings in the practical perspective as well, including the African perspective in particular, and how this fragmentation creates gaps that we need to fill. So very useful, I think, to hear that. With that, I will turn to the closing statement. First from you, Mauro. Thank you, Ulrich. And we've come to the close of today's event, so I really wish to thank all of you for being present, and all of the speakers for really their insightful contributions. I think the discussion today has clearly highlighted both the progress that has been made, but also the challenges that remain ahead with the universalization and the effective implementation of XSENT. And we have all seen that while XSENT provides a critical legal foundation to prevent nuclear terrorism, the gaps in the adherence and the implementation still persist. And the study in particular that was presented today, with also the other legislative tools and the resources that have been developed, give us clear pathways for states to adhere, to the convention, to strengthen the national legal frameworks, but also to cooperate with each other on the global priority. I think the study also highlight important regional and thematic trends, as we have heard, particularly across Africa and in parts of Asia Pacific or Latin America and the Caribbean regions. there is strong political support for XSENT, which was evident, but yet progress is slowed by capacity constraints, complexity of legislative priorities, or even translating international obligation into national law, which we know is never easy. In other regions, there is more of limited awareness of the convention, relevance, including within the broader nuclear security frameworks, but also encouragingly, I think the study has shown that there were targeted legislative assistance, or specific awareness-raising events, or even peer-to-peer cooperation and assistance are provided, then progress towards adherence and implementation can be accelerated. I think we have all collectively shown the impact of our work in support of member states. So these insights really, I think, reaffirm the importance of sustained outreach, tailored capacity building assistance, and strengthened regional cooperation to ensure that no state is left behind in building their capacities and contributing to a truly universal legal regime against nuclear terrorism. We therefore really encourage all of you present today, but all of member states, to use the findings, the recommendations, and the tools that we're presenting today to ensure we advance with the adherence to Ixant, and enhance national capacity, particularly also in the implementation of the convention, it's only through sustained commitment and initiative, if I may, such as this one, of strong partnership with the European Union, UNODC, and UNOCT, that we can support better member states in making the legal framework against nuclear terrorism truly universal and effective. So I thank you again for being with us today, and I wish you all a good rest of the afternoon. Thank you. Thank you, Mara, for this. We'll turn finally to Ambassador Clement for your closing remarks. Thank you very much, and let me first echo the thanks for the organization of this event by all participants, but also more importantly for all the important work carried out over the past years, and I think the study has shown successes, and it also in a certain way shown a potential way forward on what is still to be done, and being last speaker, you will not expect that I will say anything new, but reinforce what my colleague Mauro has just been saying. What can you really in operational terms take home? I think there are three key messages. One is you can help to raise awareness in those countries which have not yet acceded to the convention in your original context and in other events. I think this is number one. Number two, in terms of national implementation, I think in the regional context, you can also often, with the help of UN and UNODA, you can compare notes how difficult it is to implement this convention, because I understood there are some challenges which can be overcome, but the starting point is in. And number three, what you can take home, is of course the international cooperation. Staying in touch with points of contacts is absolutely crucial in this kind of threat scenario, which is transnational crime, and this nuclear kind of nuclear terrorist threat does not know any borders. So these are the three key messages. in a very nutshell summarized way. And with this, thank you very much for your participation, and thank you to all the speakers for being here. It was a very interesting and pleasant event. Thank you. Thank you, Excellency, and thank you, everybody, again for coming. The meeting is adjourned. Thank you.