The situation in the Middle East - Security Council, 10164th meeting

These.
A very good morning to you all.
The 10,164th meeting of the Security Council is called to order.
The provisional agenda for this meeting is the situation in the Middle East.
The agenda is adopted.
In accordance with rule 37 of the councils.
Provisional Rules of Procedure.
I invite the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey to participate in this meeting.
It is so decided.
The Security Council will now begin its consideration of item two of the agenda.
I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document.
S stroke 2026 stroke 453.
A letter dated the 28th of May 2026 from the Secretary General addressed to the president of the Security Council.
I now give the floor to Miss Izumi Nakamitsu.
Thank you, Madam President.
Distinguished members of the Security Council, thank you for the opportunity to brief the Council once again on the implementation of the of of Security Council Resolution 2118 on the elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic.
Since the last consideration of this matter by the Council and consistent with established practice, the office for Disarmament Affairs has been in regular contact with counterparts in the OPCW Technical Secretariat on activities related to resolution 2118.
In addition, regular contact with the mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations has continued and I held a meeting most recently on 22nd of May 2026 with His Excellency Ambassador Halabi.
Madam president, since the Council's last meeting on this matter, the OPCW and the Syrian Arab Republic have continued to engage on how to eliminate any remnants of the chemical weapons programme developed by the previous government.
As previously reported, since 2014 the OPCW Technical Secretariat has not been able to confirm that the declaration submitted by the previous government was accurate and complete because of of of the insufficient and inaccurate information it contained.
The OPCW Technical Secretariat reported serious concern over the declarations issues, as it involved large quantities of potentially undeclared or unverified chemical warfare agents and chemical munitions.
The current government of Syria has been working with the OPCW Technical Secretariat to obtain clarifications on the full extent and scope of the programme developed by the previous government, and ensure serious long term compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC.
Madam president, given the significant and long standing challenges to overcome in these efforts, I welcome the continued cooperation on this important work, and I am pleased to report that significant progress has been made since the Council's last meeting.
In this month's report OPCW Technical Secretariat says that following an improvement in the regional security situation that permitted a safe and secure resumption of operations, the OPCW Technical Secretariat recommenced its deployments to the Syrian Arab Republic in coordination with the Syrian National Authority at the beginning of May 2026.
A team from the OPCW Office of Special Missions Osom, deployed to the Syrian Arab Republic to advance efforts to establish a complete and accurate inventory of the remnants of the chemical weapons programme deployed by the previous Syrian government.
This deployment focused on several high priority undeclared sites in the northern, coastal and central areas of of the country, broadly within the geographic triangle and encompassing hammer, Homs and Latakia.
Visits to these sites were conducted in full coordination with the Syrian National Authority and with substantial support from the relevant ministries of the Syrian government.
Although the deployment was ongoing as of the cut off date of the latest monthly report, the OPCW Technical Secretariat was already able to state that a significant amount of undeclared chemical weapons related materials and documentation were discovered at the site.
The findings include dozens of chemical munitions previously undeclared to the OPCW, including the same type of aerial bombing bombs, and were used that were used in the chemical attacks in Latimer in March 2017 and Sheikhoun in April 2017.
Rockets were also found of the same type as those that were used in the chemical weapons attack in Ghouta.
In April 2013.
The OPCW further reports that findings include quantities of separately stored chemicals and related equipment which is currently being analysed, and thousands of pages of documentation.
Madam president, these findings are a momentous discovery not just for Syria, but for international security and the global disarmament regime.
This significant step was made possible due to the tireless efforts made by the officials from the OPCW Technical Secretariat for more than a decade to uncover the full scope of Syria's chemical weapons programme and to eliminate it in line with the CWC.
The continued advocacy by members of this Council for cooperation to resolve outstanding issues, and for accountability for those that dare to use such weapons.
And, of course, the urgency with which the current Syrian government acted to ensure serious compliance with the CWC and the courageous work of the Syrian teams on the ground to facilitate activities needed to complete these tasks in order to reach this stage.
Extensive cooperation was required from all stakeholders.
The OPCW Technical Secretariat has further emphasised the importance of effective support from the current Syrian government.
The OPCW reports that for this most recent deployment, approximately 200 personnel from relevant Syrian ministries contributed to facilitating this mission, including representatives from the newly re-established Syrian National Authority, Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management, Ministry of Defence Ministry of Interior, Diplomatic, Security Services, intelligence services and medical teams, as well as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear Cbrn, explosive ordnance Disposal and demining specialists.
This cooperation will remain critical going forward, as the newly discovered elements now need to be declared and destroyed under the OPCW Technical Secretariat's verification.
In addition, further investigations and deployments to additional sites will be required in order to discern the full scope of the chemical weapons programme developed by the previous government.
Given the risks posed by any remaining elements of the Chemical weapons programme, these steps must be completed with urgency.
Madam president, as previously reported, since March 2025, more than 20 locations have been visited.
The OPCW has also conducted interviews with former chemical weapons experts collected 19 samples and over 6000 documents from the visited locations.
The Syrian government handed over 34 sealed cardboard boxes containing documents to the OPCW Technical Secretariat, which have been scanned and returned to the Syrian National Authority.
The electronic copies will be analysed by the OPCW Technical Secretariat.
Based on the information gathered through the OPCW deployments in 2025 and 2026.
At least four locations visited by the OPCW could be declarable under the CWC, the OPCW is planning further activities to determine the full scope of chemical weapons related activities conducted at these facilities and their subsequent declared ability.
Madam president, the OPCW Director General has emphasised that if chemical weapons or related components are discovered during site visits, these sites must be secured and the chemical weapons related components must be relocated to a protected storage facility pending their eventual destruction.
Under the OPCW Technical Secretariat's verification.
I understand that at that latest, weapons found in May 2026 have been transferred to a secure location and consultations on destruction.
Plans are ongoing between the Syrian government and the OPCW Technical Secretariat.
This is a crucial step to undertake in line with resolution 2118 and decisions by the OPCW Executive Council, and will require the support from the international community.
Madam president, distinguished members of the Security Council.
As I have previously emphasised, this is a critical opportunity for the disarmament and non-proliferation regime.
I welcome the continued cooperation by the Syrian National Authority with the OPCW Technical Secretariat, which is essential to these efforts.
Significant and consistent support from the international community is also needed to complete the extraordinary efforts to rid Syria of all chemical weapons.
I once again urge the members of this Council to unite and show leadership in providing the support that this unprecedented effort requires.
I also take this opportunity to reiterate the United Nations support for the integrity, professionalism, impartiality, objectivity and independence of the work of the OPCW.
The United Nations stands ready to support and will continue to do our part to uphold the norm against the use of chemical weapons anywhere, at any time.
I thank you very much for your attention.
I thank Ms..
Nakamitsu for her briefing.
I now give the floor to those council members who wish to make statements.
And I give the floor to the Russian Federation.
Madam president, we thank the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Committee for her briefing.
We carefully familiarize ourselves with the latest report of the Director General of OPCW, Fernando Arias And at first we had a feeling of déja vu because in the time passed since the last Security Council meeting on this issue in March of this year, all of the three reports by Arias circulated in the council were carbon copies of each other.
Such a coincidence is understandable to us, taking into account the armed aggression of the United States in Israel against Iran, which plunged the entire region into chaos and instability.
And because of this, the safe work of OPCW personnel in Syria could not be guaranteed.
However, as the active phase of hostilities in the Middle East subsided, the expert activity of the OPCW Technical Secretariat resumed, and then it was discovered that the situation surrounding the Syrian chemical dossier is much worse than the uniform.
Reports from the Director General.
The technical Secretariat, trying as soon as possible to assign blame to the former government of Assad in the part of the concealment of a military chemical programme with a great deal of pomp, announced successes in the matter of discovering evidence of Damascus activity, contradicting the Chemical Weapons Convention.
And this concerns missiles, aerial bombs with chemical warheads and chemical substances found by the experts of the Office of Special Missions of the Technical Secretariat at undeclared sites in the provinces of Hama and Homs.
By the way, these statements very successfully coincided with the sacred Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha.
Today, the proponents of illegitimate methods of OPCW work and its biased approach rejoice when they loudly declare the discovery of what they had been seeking for so long.
However, colleagues, I am compelled to call your order.
A new statement must have beneath him a clear, verified, unquestionable evidentiary basis which, alas, judging by the report, is absent there to provide it to the Technical Secretariat is indeed quite difficult for a number of reasons, and the main of them is the absence of trust in the OPCW, which has many times and long ago compromised itself.
First of all, over the years of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, a significant part of the territory repeatedly passed under the control of various armed groups, many military and industrially important facilities were destroyed or seriously damaged as a result of massive airstrikes carried out by the Western coalition and Israel as well, and under such conditions.
Speaking about proper collection of new samples, discovery of documents at sites is just simply not possible.
By the way, the OPCW also agrees that the situation in the region is complex because of regularly note in the monthly reports of the Technical Secretariat, including as reasons for cancellation of planned activities of the organization.
Specialists in the field.
Second, it is obvious that under such conditions, it is impossible to speak either about safeguarding of material evidence or their reliability and suitability for objective analysis, or about the completeness of the picture that could be reconstructed.
Especially relevant.
This is in the light of the chronic violations by the technical secretariat of the principle of the chain of custody, and in order to avoid irrationally wasting the valuable time of the Council, I will not here once again list the relevant examples, especially since we have repeatedly covered them in our statements in this chamber.
All this is the international something that the international community observed during the investigations by the technical Secretariat of the incident in Saraqib in August 2016.
In March 2017, Nahan Shaykhun in April 2017 in Duma in April 2018, and Aleppo in November 2018.
Thirdly, it does not help us to form that very evidentiary basis because of the hastily adopted in October 2025 decision by the OPCW to have an accelerated destruction on site in Syria of any detected chemical weapons.
This decision allows for us to immediately destroy the supposedly found elements of the military chemical program, and only thereafter to report a vivid example of how this works in practice is the case of the so-called low cost 75 cylinders at a site in Aleppo.
Let me remind here that they were taken to a scrap metal base and cut up their experts of the technical Secretariat, who arrived there some time later, then took samples from the remains of these cylinders and the results of which they will report in due course to the Syrian authorities.
That's all the evidentiary bases there is.
As a result, the context is new but the methods are old violations of the methodology of evidence collection provided by this convention.
Fabricated evidence, conclusions contradicting basic scientific laws, and false testimony of so-called witnesses colleagues.
But what kind of trust in sensational discoveries of the OPCW can we be talking about? In addition to the OPCW that has spoiled its reputation, a new extra conventional structure has appeared the so-called international working group called Breath of Freedom.
We consider that it operates outside of the framework of the OPCW.
Nobody assigned to it any functions to detect and destroy the remnants of the Syrian military chemical program even less to bring assigning responsibility of those involved in illegal chemical activity.
The Security Council has no relation to it and should not discuss results of its work.
No fewer questions are raised by the participation in IT of the OPCW Technical Secretariat.
Nobody gave them authority to do this.
In fact, the Director general, Mr.
Arias who is leaving this year, has drawn the organization to yet another dubious adventure.
I will again emphasize that Russia consistently spoke for the earliest resolution of the remaining issues connected with Syria's initial declaration.
This is the only logical way of closing the Syrian chemical dossier in the council.
We also throughout all of these years called on the Technical Secretariat for Impartial and Professional work based strictly on its technical mandate, as well as for a depoliticized approach strictly within the framework of the convention.
At the same time, each time we became witnesses of completely the opposite actions of this once authoritative organization, all activity of the OPCW on the Syrian track was and continues to be aligned to this, to a single goal search for the so-called.
Concealed by the former authorities.
Elements of the military chemical program of the Syrian Arab Republic.
Under the angle of accusing the past government of chemical crimes.
Such an approach is not constructive and is not capable of yielding positive results, even despite the constructive interaction between the new authorities of Syria with the OPCW, which was demonstrated and which we highly appreciate, I thank you.
I thank the representative of the Russian Federation, and I now give the floor.
To the distinguished representative of the United States.
Madam president, and thank you, High Representative Nakamitsu, for your important and informative briefing.
The United States welcomes the return of the OPCW inspection teams to Syria and their much anticipated access to high priority sites in the northern and coastal areas.
We are encouraged by the meaningful progress made by the Syrian government and the OPCW on the ground since the redeployment, including the significant discovery of undeclared chemical munitions, chemicals and related equipment.
This is a major milestone for both Syria and the international community.
These developments follow the August 2025 and January 2026 sample analysis that identified two chemical warfare agents, as well as a degradation degradation product in buried barrels.
The latest discovery serves to underscore what we all know that the Assad regime never fully declared the extent of its chemical weapons program.
As more sites and materials are discovered and assessed, we call on the OPCW and Syria to set the groundwork to enable expedited on site destruction where needed in exceptional cases.
The United States took note of the director General's assessment that at least four locations visited by the Secretariat could be declarable under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
As such, we also urge Syria to update its national declaration in accordance with its obligations under the convention.
The United States is eager to see progress on the Syrian chemical weapons file.
Our meeting today marks a year and a half into OPCW effort in Syria to find, secure, declare and verifiably destroy any remnants of the Assad regime's chemical weapons program.
While the mission faces myriad challenges, the OPCW and Syria have demonstrated adaptability, flexibility, and a shared commitment and determination to uphold the convention and to close this chapter of serious history.
As Syria's permanent representative to the OPCW noted last month, Syria's progress thus far would not have been possible without the strong support of the international community.
The United States, therefore, encourages member states to consider both voluntary contributions to the OPCW Syria mission and direct support to the Syrian government's counter CW efforts.
Thank you.
I thank the representative of the United States.
I now give the floor to the representative of Bahrain.
Saida Rice.
Madam president, I'd like to express our thanks to Miss Izumi Nakamitsu, the Undersecretary general of the United Nations, and the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs.
We thank her for her valuable briefing on the latest monthly report related to the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2118.
I also welcome the participation of the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Turkey.
In today's session, the Kingdom of Bahrain has followed with great interest the latest report of the organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons the OPCW, and the subsequent significant field developments as announced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic and its mission to the OPCW.
The announcement was on the discovery of munitions, materials, equipment and documents linked to the former regime's chemical program.
This was done within the framework of cooperation with the organization and ongoing efforts to address the remaining aspects of this file.
The Kingdom of Bahrain believes that these developments constitute an important step towards concluding the Syrian chemical weapons file.
We stress the importance of continuing the cooperation and coordination between the OPCW and the Syrian government so as to ensure the completion of activities to verify, secure and destroy such weapons in accordance with relevant international obligations.
Madam president, the Kingdom of Bahrain affirms its full support for the Chemical Weapons Convention as one of the fundamental pillars of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime.
We reiterate our categorical rejection of the use of chemical weapons under any circumstance and by any party whatsoever.
Bahrain underscores the importance of accountability and the prevention of impunity.
In this context, I would like to address the following points.
First, the Kingdom of Bahrain commends the OPCW professional efforts in carrying out its mandate and the progress it has achieved in verification activities.
Field visits and the collection of relevant information and documentation.
Despite the security and logistical challenges it faced during the past period.
Second, the Kingdom of Bahrain welcomes the level of cooperation that exists between the organisation the OPCW and the Syrian government, including the facilitation of access to relevant sites and the provision of required documents and information, as well as support for ongoing technical activities.
We believe that the results achieved in recent months demonstrate the importance of building on this positive momentum and continuing cooperation in a spirit of transparency and shared responsibility.
Third, the Kingdom of Bahrain welcomes the measures taken by the Syrian government to follow up on cases still under investigation and review.
Bahrain encourages continued joint work with the organisation to address the remaining issues on bases that are technical, professional and objective and in a way that contributes to completing the full picture of this file and closing it definitively.
Madam president, what has been achieved during the past period demonstrates that constructive cooperation between the OPCW and the Syrian government is the most effective path towards achieving real progress in this file and in this context.
The Kingdom of Bahrain calls upon the international community to continue its support for the efforts of the OPCW and the brotherly Syrian Arab Republic to accelerate the completion of verification activities, activities to secure and destroy such weapons, and to enhance security and stability in Syria and the region as a whole.
I thank you, Madam President.
I thank the representative of Bahrain.
And I give the floor to Greece.
Thank you, Madam President.
At the outset, I would like to thank the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, for her briefing.
I also welcome the participation of the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic and the representative of Turkey to this meeting.
Greece reiterates its full support to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Syria, as well as to a fully inclusive Syrian led and Syrian owned political transition.
In the spirit of UN Security Council Resolution 2254.
The ongoing political transition in Syria will remain incomplete without the final resolution of the chemical weapons file, which remains an important legacy issue and a consequence of the prolonged conflict.
In this regard, I wish to highlight three points.
First, we welcome the positive developments as highlighted by the High Representative, regarding the ongoing efforts of the new Syrian government to uncover the remnants of the Assad regime's chemical weapons programme, secure the associated materials and equipment, and prevent any potential threat to civilians.
In particular, the reported recent identification of chemical materials, equipment, stockpiles and munitions that are directly linked to the Assad regime's chemical weapons programme, as well as their transfer to a secure storage facility, constitutes a crucial step towards the goal of the total elimination of the remaining chemical weapons in the country.
Greece encourages the Syrian authorities to continue their constructive cooperation with OPCW, aiming to accelerate field visits to suspected sites and destruction operations.
Nevertheless, we are concerned that 19 outstanding issues on Syria's initial declaration remain unresolved, especially noting that, according to OPCW Technical Secretariat, they involve large quantities of potentially undeclared or unverified chemical warfare agents and chemical munitions.
Allow me now to turn to the issue of the reported removal and destruction of 75 cylinders of category three chemical weapons in the Aleppo region last January, without prior notification of OPCW Technical Secretariat.
In this regard, we welcome the preliminary information provided by Syria through its latest monthly report, and we take note that investigations are ongoing to determine the circumstances of the incident.
Second, gracefully supports the efforts of Syria to resolve all all outstanding issues of the Syrian chemical file.
In this regard, we are engaging with the competent Syrian authorities with a view to provide further assistance and capacity building.
Third, Greece strongly condemns the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, at any time and under any circumstances.
It constitutes a grave violation of international law and may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.
All perpetrators should be held accountable as a necessary means to provide justice to the victims.
We commend OPCW Investigation and Identification Team for its professional work towards establishing accountability for all those involved in the use of chemical weapons in Syria.
To conclude, Madam President, we reiterate our call for the unity of the Council into upholding resolution 2118 and the international norm against any use of chemical weapons.
The Syrian people deserve to finally close this dark chapter of the recent history and move swiftly to a more democratic, stable and peaceful future.
Greece is committed to supporting Syria in in a tangible manner throughout this process.
I thank you.
I thank the representative of Greece, and I now give the floor to the representative of Somalia.
Thank you, Madam President.
I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the A3, namely the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and my own country, Somalia.
We thank the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr.
Nakamitsu, for her briefing.
We welcome the participation of the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic in today's meeting.
At the outset, the A3 reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the full implementation of Chemical Weapons Convention and reiterates its unequivocal condemnation of the use of chemical weapons anywhere, by anyone and under any circumstances.
We maintain that the use of such weapons is unacceptable, and that accountability for their use is both a legal and moral imperative.
Against this backdrop, the A3 wishes to highlight the following points.
First, we note the Technical Secretariat Recommencement of the deployment to Syria following the temporary suspension due to serious security concerns in March 2026 which demonstrated a resilient framework for verification despite a challenging security environment.
We also welcome the deployment conducted at the beginning of May 2026 to high priority undeclared locations in northern, coastal and central areas.
Second, the A3 commends the Syrian Arab Republic as continued constructive cooperation and commitment to providing all necessary facilitation to the Technical Secretariats teams, ensuring their access to Syrian territory and enabling them to complete their tasks through this cooperation.
Dozens of undeclared chemical munitions, such as aerial bombs and rockets, alongside thousands of pages of documentations, have been identified.
These findings represent indispensable steps toward providing the necessary clarifications on the Syrian chemical weapons programme.
Third, while we welcome these technical developments, the potential presence of undeclared chemical warfare agents and munitions remains a serious matter that requires continued transparency and investigation to ensure that the declaration can finally be considered accurate and complete.
We also take note of the ongoing consultations regarding the expedited on site destruction of chemical weapon remnants, and encourage the finalization of arrangements that ensure the safety of personnel and the preservation of evidence.
Fourth, progress continues to be influenced by regional security environment, and we note the security advice that led to the temporary relocation of personnel earlier this year.
We call for an immediate cessation of all external military actions against Syrian territories that undermine verification efforts.
The A3 recognises the critical importance of the needs and gaps assessment, and urges the international community to provide the estimated 12 million and a half euros required for 2027 to maintain operations and support capacity building measures.
In conclusion, Madam President, the A3 reiterates its steadfast support for the sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic.
We emphasize that progress towards the complete elimination of chemical weapons in Syria requires sustained international support.
We encourage continued dialogue and cooperation between Syria and the OPCW to permanently close this file.
I thank you.
I thank the representative of Somalia, and I give the floor to the representative of Latvia Thank you, Madam President.
Let me also begin by thanking the High Representative of Disarmament Affairs, Izumi, for her informative briefing and also the Director General of the OPCW for the report.
And I welcome the participation of the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic and representative of Turkey to this meeting.
Madam president, Latvia would like to emphasize the important example set by Syria.
In a time of increased tensions and in a region seized with conflict.
The new Syrian authorities are pursuing efforts towards stability, transparency, cooperation with the international community, and compliance with international law.
The elimination of one of the most dreadful types of weaponry is not just a clear proof of the good faith of the Syrian authorities, but also a powerful signal to states suffering from division and conflict that a new day and a better future are possible.
The use of chemical weapons is completely unacceptable anywhere, at any time and by anyone.
It is critical to promptly and comprehensively investigate, identify and destroy all chemical weapons.
Transparency and accountability over the brutal crimes perpetrated by the Assad regime against its own people play an integral part in the Syrian transitional justice process.
We therefore note with concern that the security situation in the region negatively affected the ongoing efforts to eliminate chemical weapons in Syria.
With the technical secretariat of the OPCW having been temporarily withdrawn from the country due to security concerns, was the important cooperation continued in the meantime? It is regrettable that regional escalation delayed these crucial efforts.
We sincerely welcome the renewed deployment of the Technical Secretariat to Syria, the resumption of its activities on the ground and its continued cooperation with the Syrian authorities.
The importance and effectiveness of full and unimpeded cooperation were vividly illustrated by the recent discovery of dozens of previously undeclared chemical munitions and related material.
As a result of the courageous and dedicated work of the Syrian team, we look forward to receiving further details regarding this ongoing deployment and the analysis of these considerable discoveries.
In this regard, we also welcome the complementary role of the recently launched Breath of Freedom Task Force, which is led by Syria.
In another example of its robust commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Madam president, we continue to stress the need to strengthen and develop the technical capacities and resources of the Syrian authorities in order to eliminate all remnants of Assad's regime.
Chemical weapons programme and we reiterate the positive example of the aforementioned task force in this regard and hope that further regional and international financial and technical support will follow.
In conclusion, allow me to once again express Latvia's appreciation for the good work of the OPCW and its technical secretariat, as well as for the dedicated cooperation of the Syrian authorities.
Latvia will continue to remain a committed partner in the pursuit of our common goal Syria free of chemical weapons.
I thank you.
I thank the representative of Latvia.
I now give the floor to the representative of Panama.
Thank you very much, Madam President.
We thank the Under-Secretary, General and Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, for her briefing.
We also extend a warm welcome to the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey whose participation honors us today, 18 months after the political transition in Syria.
The authorities continue to confront challenges that are deeply rooted in the dark era of the Bashar al-Assad regime.
Among these, the chemical weapons dossier stands out because of its particular complexity, both because of the technical aspects involved and also because of its implications for regional security and the credibility of the international non-proliferation regime.
Panama believes it's important to recognise that the authorities inherited an issue that had accumulated over decades, and whose resolution will require perseverance, transparency and close cooperation with the OPCW and the international community.
The challenges are considerable but so too is the opportunity to make progress through cooperation and compliance with international obligations.
Panama reiterates its firm commitment to the fundamental principle that the use of chemical weapons by any actor, under any circumstances and under any conditions, is unacceptable, since their use constitutes crimes against humanity and their devastating effects transcend generations.
We take note of the Director General's report and of the progress achieved.
In particular, we note with interest the cooperation that has developed between Syria and the organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons as well as the support provided to the verification activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat.
We consider that these developments represent an important opportunity to move toward the definitive resolution of a dossier that has remained open for more than a decade, and whose successful conclusion would bring relief to the victims.
We encourage the Syrian authorities to deepen their cooperation with the OPCW.
Transparency, timely access to sites of interest, the preservation of relevant evidence and documentation, and the continuous exchange of information are essential elements for achieving full compliance with the obligations arising from the convention.
We also express concern regarding the worsening of security at various times during the period covered by the report, which forced the temporary suspension of an on site verification activity.
In this context, it is essential that all actors refrain from actions that could aggravate the regional security situation and thereby hinder the important work that the OPCW is carrying out on the ground.
We also take note of the recent findings reported by the Technical Secretariat at previously undeclared locations These discoveries confirm the importance of continuing verification efforts and establishing the facts always on the basis of technical, objective and impartial criteria.
Madam president, the complete and verifiable elimination of Syria's chemical weapons programme should not be viewed solely as a legal obligation.
It also constitutes an essential contribution to the security of all Syrians and to the stability of the region.
Panama will continue to support efforts aimed at promoting cooperation, transparency and full compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, with the aim of ensuring that these weapons are never used again.
Thank you very much.
I thank the representative of Panama, and I now give the floor to the representative of Denmark.
Thank you, Madam President.
I also thank the High Representative Nakamitsu for her briefing and welcome the representatives of Syria and Turkey for this meeting.
Since our last meeting, we have seen further progress on the chemical weapons file in Syria.
As we heard from the High Representative, the cooperation between the Syrian government and the OPCW has continued.
Just last week, a significant amount of undeclared chemical weapons related materials and documentation of the former Assad regime's chemical weapons programme were discovered by the OPCW and the Syrian government.
This represents another example of sustained positive development towards the closure of this file.
Denmark commends the Syrian government for its commitment to this file and its close cooperation with the OPCW.
This is essential to finally establish the full scope of the former regime's programme, and to move towards its verified and irreversible elimination.
Denmark also welcomes the establishment of the Syrian led Breath of Freedom International Task Force for the Elimination of Chemical Weapons of the former Assad regime, and wishes to acknowledge the leadership displayed by the involved states.
Madam president, despite these positive developments, we would stress that the task ahead remains complex considering the complicated security environment and with many potentially relevant locations across Syria.
It is important to continuously prioritise this file.
The Syrian authorities have previously stated that they do not possess the necessary means and resources to implement the country's obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
It's therefore important that the Syrian government receives adequate support, and we encourage all actors to extend technical and financial assistance to Syria and the OPCW.
This is crucial to secure progress, including deployments to the remaining sites.
Development and implementation of plans for the safe destruction of identified materials, and the submission of a complete and accurate declaration of all remaining chemical weapons related materials and activities.
Madam president Denmark recognises the efforts to achieve accountability for the atrocious crimes committed by the former Assad regime.
In this regard, we note the recent arrest of 18 people suspected of involvement in the former regime's chemical weapons programme.
Transitional justice remains key to a just and prosperous new Syria, and the government's commitment to an independent, credible and transparent Syrian led process on this agenda is of vital importance.
Madam president, to conclude, closing this file will send a strong message to the Syrian people that a new era has truly arrived, that there will be accountability and justice for past crimes, that the threat of chemical weapons can and will be eliminated once and for all.
Denmark will continue to support efforts to this important end.
I thank you.
I thank the representative of Denmark for her statement.
I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom.
Thank you president.
I thank High Representative Nakamitsu for her briefing today, and I welcome the participation of the Permanent Representative of Syria and the representative of Turkey in today's meeting.
The United Kingdom remains steadfast in our commitment to the complete verified elimination of chemical weapons in Syria.
Ridding Syria of Assad's chemical weapons is a complex task.
The former regime denied, concealed and lied about its chemical weapons programme.
Despite this opaque and challenging context, Syria is achieving tangible results and accelerating the operation to identify and ultimately destroy the legacy of Assad's chemical weapons programme.
Syria's significant operational support to the organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Deployment in early May allowed access to priority sites, enabling the identification of dozens of chemical munitions, such as aerial bombs and rockets.
This is an important moment.
Not only has this reduced the residual chemical weapons threat to the Syrian people, it also provides further proof of Assad's attempt to actively deceive the international community.
The Assad regime claimed repeatedly that it had no active chemical weapons programme after 2014.
This discovery demonstrates unequivocally that this claim was false.
Colleagues sustained international support will continue to be essential for Syria, free of chemical weapons In March, the UK was proud to stand by Syria and international partners to launch the Breath of Freedom Task Force here in New York.
This task force, working in full coordination with the OPCW Technical Secretariat and other states parties, brings together expertise, experience and support to identify, secure and verifiably destroy the Assad regime's chemical weapons programme.
It also serves as a vehicle to de-conflict and to direct broader offers of support from the international community.
We encourage all states parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention to support Syria's efforts.
We would also like to take this opportunity to thank the outgoing OPCW Director general, Fernando Arias, for the central role that he has played president for over ten years.
The international community has sought justice for those who suffered under the brutality of the Assad regime.
Owing to Syria's efforts, accountability for those who used chemical weapons is now in reach.
The recent arrests of the alleged perpetrators of the 2013 Ghouta sarin attack represents an important step.
Together, we should maintain this momentum and eradicate chemical weapons once and for all.
I thank you.
Muchas gracias.
I thank the representative of the United Kingdom.
I give the floor now to the representative of China.
Madam president, I thank the High Representative Izumi Nakamitsu for the briefing and welcome the representatives of Syria and Turkey to this meeting.
China stands consistently and firmly against the use of chemical weapons by any state, organization or individual under any circumstances.
Any use of chemical weapons must be strongly condemned.
China takes note of the recent progress on the Syrian chemical weapons issue and supports the OPCW Technical Secretariat's engagement and cooperation with Syria on its outstanding issues The Syrian chemical weapons issue has been under discussion for over ten years and should be swiftly brought to a close to help Syria redirect resources towards national reconstruction.
We commend the Syrian Transitional Government for reaffirming its commitment to fulfilling the obligations under the CWC and recognise its cooperation with the OPCW.
We take note of the efforts made by Syria to rebuild its national justice system and support Syria in following the Syrian led, Syrian owned principle to advance an inclusive political transition, achieve early reconciliation and avoid internal division.
The accountability functions of the Investigation and Identification Team and the office of the Special Missions have exceeded the mandate of the convention.
Over the years, the Syrian chemical weapons related accountability mechanisms have become a hallmark of the OPCW being politicised, seriously jeopardizing its authority and effectiveness.
The Technical Secretariat should uphold the mandates of the convention, maintain an objective and impartial position, and rigorously observe the provisions of the convention in handling the alleged use of chemical weapons to make sure its findings can stand the test of history.
Once the Syrian missions are complete, the Syrian related mechanisms should also come to an end to allow the OPCW to get back to its technical character and avoid creating antagonism and confrontation.
President.
Madam president, the OPCW is one of the platform's global counterterrorism.
When addressing the Syrian chemical weapons issue, the international community should consider counter-terrorism as an important aspect.
China urges the Syrian Transitional Government to fulfil its international obligations by taking all effective measures to resolutely counter all international terrorist organizations listed by the council, including the Etim.
The OPCW should strengthen early warning and monitoring and assist states parties in enhancing capacity building on compliance to prevent dangerous chemicals and sensitive technologies from falling into the hands of terrorists.
Thank you, Madam President.
I thank the representative of China.
I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan.
Thank you, Madam President.
I thank Under Secretary General Izumi Nakamitsu for her briefing.
We welcome the participation of Syria and Turkey in today's meeting.
Pakistan reiterates its firm opposition to the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere and under any circumstances.
Chemical Weapons Convention remains a cornerstone of the global disarmament framework, and we support all efforts for its Universalisation as well as its full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation.
Madam president Pakistan appreciates the commitment of the Syrian authorities to extend full cooperation to the organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
This includes providing necessary facilities to ensure the success of the work of the Technical Secretariat teams and their unrestricted access to all suspected sites associated with chemical weapons program.
Such cooperation contributes to accelerating the process of elimination of potential remnants of chemical weapons program.
We also note the OPCW Director General's report that 19 out of 26 outstanding issues still remain unresolved.
The Technical Secretariat continues to identify locations that could be declarable under the convention.
The Secretariat has also identified needs and gaps assessment with a non-exhaustive list of gaps between what the Syrian authorities must provide and the capacity they have at their disposal.
In addition, the security situation and occupation of parts of the country continue to impact the timely and effective implementation of the mandate.
It is important to enhance capacities and extend cooperation to Syrian authorities in overcoming obstacles and challenges associated with this complex file.
The cooperation is critical in addressing several challenges, including the nature of suspected sites, institutional constraints and limited technological capacities, and experience of Syrian national teams in handling, transporting and storing chemical munitions.
We commend all those extending cooperation to Syrian authorities to build capacity and enhance institutional capabilities.
In this respect, we particularly wish to recognise efforts by brotherly countries of Turkey and Qatar.
Madam president, the OPCW Technical Secretariat must continue to be enabled to carry out its independent verification to eliminate suspected chemical weapons in Syria and any risks of proliferation in compliance with the CWC.
We hope that the continued positive engagement between the Technical Secretariat and Syrian authorities will further build on the positive momentum to resolve all outstanding issues at the earliest, and close this file.
I thank you.
I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement, and I now give the floor.
I would like to give the floor to the representative of France.
Madam president.
Thank you, Madam President.
I welcome the presence of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mrs.
Nakamitsu here and the representative of Syria and Turkey, Madam President.
We listened with a great deal of attention to the briefing by Mr.
Nakamitsu, and we welcome the the independence, the rigour, the professionalism and the commitment of OPCW.
We all remember the images of the victims of Ghouta, of Kanshi Hun, or of Duma, the men, women and children massacred by chemical attacks using sarin gas, which was perpetrated by the regime of Bashar al Assad to terrify freedom fighters.
And we saw these tragic images again at the launch of last March of the international initiative Breath of Freedom, which I was France's duty to join.
And together with our partners, we support the new Syrian authorities and their cooperation with the organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons so as to dismantle the military chemical programme inherited from the Assad era, which was carefully developed under Hafez al-Assad before being used by his son Bashar al-Assad.
For years.
And despite joining the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2013, the ousted regime used these inhumane weapons against That their own population in a way that was established in at least nine cases documented by independent investigations.
It makes no sense to try and deny that it has obstructed the activities of OPC teams, provided incomplete statements on the status of its chemical program, and concealed the true extent of its weapons stockpiles.
The OPC work in Syria is only just beginning to reveal the extent of the program hidden from the international community.
An important milestone was reached last month.
Visits to undeclared sites.
They allowed the OPCW to discover dozens of munitions and chemicals, aerial bombs and rockets, as well as thousands of pages of documentation.
And this is a first.
Since the beginning of the transition, we congratulate the Syrian authorities and the experts of OPCW on this work.
It is essential that these chemical weapons stockpiles be secure and destroyed as soon as possible.
We commend the Syrian authorities cooperation with the organization to this end.
This is opening a new page in the history of their country.
We thank the OPC w teams for their professionalism and call on them to continue to keep the Security Council informed of their progress.
France will continue its financial support to the OPCW activities on the Syrian issue.
Much remains to be done to achieve Syria's complete and verified chemical disarmament.
And in addition to the 26 declared sites, nearly 100 undeclared sites remain to be inspected.
Syria's continued effort will be necessary to heal the legacy of the Assad era chemical program.
Syria is deploying significant resources to assume its responsibilities as a state party to the convention and to thus meet the expectations of the organization and all states parties.
The.
This way, the restoration of Syria's rights and privileges as a state party to the convention can be seen as a prospective.
The discovery and declaration of the remains of this program will contribute to the fight against impunity, and France will continue to mobilize the International Partnership Against Impunity for the use of Chemical weapons With this in mind, Madam President, Syria's chemical disarmament sends an important signal to the international community as a whole.
It contributes to resilience and the effectiveness of the international verification mechanisms.
It is a decisive step for Syria in building a new Syria, which is stable, sovereign, respects the rights of its citizens, is fully integrated into its regional environment and is a responsible actor within the international community.
France reaffirms its support for an inclusive political transition in Syria, in accordance with the principles of Security Council Resolution 2254.
I thank you.
Gracias.
I thank the representative of France for their statement.
And I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Colombia.
I thank High Representative Izumi Nakamitsu for her briefing.
I would also like to welcome the presence of the permanent representatives of Syria and Turkey.
In light of the information presented, I would like to highlight the following points.
Firstly, my delegation views positively the sustained efforts of the transitional government toward the full and verifiable implementation of the international obligations assumed by Syria under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Colombia recognizes the concrete progress that has been made in the areas of investigation and providing information, which are the result of the transitional government's cooperation with the OPCW.
In this regard, my country urges the further strengthening of that cooperation in order to achieve a comprehensive clarification of the scope of the chemical weapons program and to ensure compliance.
Likewise, in line with the information contained in the report, Colombia calls for the provision of financial and technical support for the implementation of OPCW activities and for the development of the technical capacity required for those purposes.
Secondly, my delegation reiterates its call to intensify efforts to resolve the outstanding issues relating to potentially significant quantities of munitions and chemical agents that have not yet been declared or verified.
The information reported by the OPCW demonstrates the need to adequately, adequately secure suspected sites and prevent the loss or alteration of evidence.
All actions leading to the verifiable and definitive closure of this file can make a concrete contribution to the security and stability of Syria and the region.
Thirdly.
Although Syria has remained relatively insulated from the escalation of tensions in the region, the security situation continues to constitute an operational constraint on achieving progress.
My delegation notes with concern that the latest reports continue to highlight security challenges attributable to hostilities in the region, which prevent access to relevant sites.
Colombia insists on full respect for the political independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Syria.
In conclusion, my country reaffirms its recognition of the technical, transparent and impartial work carried out by the organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons OPCW, as well as the importance of the full implementation of the convention and of the International Disarmament and Non-Proliferation regime.
At the same time, it reaffirms its absolute rejection of the use of chemical weapons by any state, organization or individual under any circumstances and for any purpose.
Thank you very much.
I resume my function as president of the council.
I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.
Thank you, Madam President.
First, I'd like to congratulate you and your friendly country, Colombia, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council this month.
And I wish you success.
And I also thank Mrs.
Nakamitsu Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs for her briefing.
I thank her for her cooperation and her care to maintain continuous communication with us.
Madam president, distinguished colleagues, the Syrian government is committed to preserving national and regional security and to safeguarding the global non-proliferation regime.
And in this context, the intensive efforts of the Syrian national teams have recently led to identifying and securing missiles and chemical munitions linked to the chemical programme of the former regime, similar to those used in its attacks against Syrians, men and women.
In this regard, we thank the friendly delegations that have commended these efforts.
We believe that such praise has been earned and earned well by the national teams, primarily who worked tirelessly day and night.
They worked tirelessly and were behind this achievement.
These teams hailed from the Ministries of Defence, the interior Intelligence, Emergency, Health and Foreign Affairs and they were able.
These national teams to achieve this progress.
Despite challenges such as the severe shortage of specialised personnel, the lack of advanced equipment and supplies, not to mention the scarcity of high quality information on suspected sites.
All while working in an extremely difficult security environment.
Our teams successfully reached high priority and high risk sites and handled highly sensitive materials and munitions with professionalism.
This included transporting and securing them and facilitating access for the Technical Secretariat teams to carry out verification procedures in accordance with approved standards.
What we are witnessing today is a result of months of diligent labour involving gathering and analyzing information and pursuing and monitoring persons suspected of involvement, conducting investigations with detainees and building the capacities of our teams through consultation and cooperation with our international partners Our teams have accomplished a mission that is a decisive turning point in efforts to uncover Al Assad's chemical programme.
They've achieved a major leap forward in the path towards accountability.
In doing so, they've rendered a valuable service to the region and the world by confronting the risks of proliferation and enhancing the their security and stability.
This despite the magnitude of the challenges.
We salute their efforts and dedication, those of our national teams.
Madam president Syria has facilitated 32 visits by the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW to suspected sites and has provided it with more than 60,000 pages of documents related to the chemical programme of the former regime.
These efforts have significantly reduced the number of suspected sites and helped identify priorities.
This enabled Syria to move from the role of facilitator of these efforts to that of leading such efforts towards the elimination of all the remnants of the chemical programme.
Madam president, distinguished colleagues.
The positive sentiments arising from this progress are mixed with pain at recalling one of the darkest moments of the previous regime's era.
The technical teams that worked on transporting these munitions recalled the suffering of past years as they documented the crimes committed with similar munitions used by the Al Assad regime.
But the difference is that this time they reached these munitions before they were used against them.
We survived.
The discovery of these munitions provides an extremely important database for uncovering and documenting evidence.
It helps advance investigations, thereby strengthening efforts at accountability and the identification of those involved.
And here and in the context of justice and accountability.
Syrian authorities have arrested a number of individuals who worked on the chemical programme that we inherited, and in the field of international cooperation here, the Syrian Minister of Justice, Mr.
Madhar Alvez, met in early May with the Director General of the OPCW, Mr.
Fernando Arias at the organization's headquarters in The Hague.
They discussed ways to enhance the OPCW s role in achieving justice through supporting national accountability efforts exchanging information and cooperating in investigations.
The Permanent Mission of Syria and The Hague, in cooperation with several friendly missions, organised an event entitled Roles and Responsibilities in the Pursuit of Accountability, in partnership with a Syrian human rights Organisation.
Madam president.
Syria has suffered from chemical weapons for over 12 years since they were first used at the end of 2014, and today, Syria is determined to rid itself of this legacy.
Despite what was mentioned in terms of the complexities surrounding the chemical file, be they those related to gaps and shortcomings in institutional memory and structure, or those related to weak human and technical capacities.
Despite all this, the Syrian government continues to work diligently.
The government, as you have mentioned, took the initiative to establish an international working group, The Breath of Freedom, as a Syrian led coordination framework to support related efforts.
Syria looks forward today to the support of the international community for this team as addressing the risks of proliferation that affect our collective security is a responsibility that is shared by all the multifaceted complexities of the inherited chemical file.
Make it difficult for any single entity to address it adequately.
This is a fact that highlights the urgent need to give all possible support to overcome these challenges, be it operationally or in terms of advancing justice and holding the perpetrators accountable.
Madam president, Syrians have suffered because of the tensions that surrounded this file in the past.
They suffered from the previous regime's policy of denial, manipulation and misinformation, and its obstruction of investigative and inspection inspection teams Today, we have a new.
We have an entirely different Syria, a Syria that was a victim of chemical weapons.
Syria that is determined to rid itself of the effects of that era.
A Syria that views all member states of the OPCW as partners with shared goals and.
In light of the new positive atmosphere made possible by the transparent and open approach of the Syrian government.
We stress the importance of avoiding a return to outdated practices in handling the chemical file.
We must keep it away from politicization by preserving its technical nature Given the harm that any politicization may cause to the progress that can be achieved there, supporting Syria's efforts here will help transform this file, which has caused much polarization in this council and in the OPCW.
It would help transform this file into a consensual issue, and it would turn it into a model for international cooperation in supporting the global non-proliferation regime Finally, Madam President, in the space of time between the previous briefing and the current one, I had the opportunity to attend the commemorations of the anniversaries of the Duma and Khan Sheikhun attacks in Syria in April.
And while there I made a pledge to the victims families a pledge to work to make this forum one that preserves the rights and works to hold those who committed atrocities against them accountable.
This was our promise and we are here to fulfil it.
I thank you, Madam President.
I thank the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic for their statement.
I now give the floor to the representative of Tokyo.
Thank you, Madam President.
I would also like to High Representative Izumi Nakamitsu for her comprehensive briefing.
Madam president, the chemical weapons fight in Syria remains one of the most tragic and disturbing legacies of Assad era.
At the same time, now there are grounds for optimism.
Syrian government has been demonstrating a genuine commitment to addressing this issue in close coordination with the international community.
We welcome the progress achieved on the ground facilitated by Syria's constructive engagement and the support extended to the personnel of the OPCW Technical Secretariat in carrying out their duties.
We also commend the professionalism and dedication of the Technical Secretariat, including its efforts to visit numerous sites conduct interviews and collect and analyze samples.
To that end, we particularly commend the efforts undertaken jointly by Syria and OPCW in recent months to locate remnants of the former regime's clandestine chemical weapons programme, including undeclared chemical munitions agents, equipment and related documentation.
We view this development as an important step toward the complete elimination of the remnants of former chemical weapons program.
At the same time, these discoveries once again serve as a stark reminder of the scale of repression and suffering inflicted upon the Syrian people by the former regime.
As mentioned by the Syrian representative about the attacks on Douma and Han Jae Hoon, especially on the de-escalating de-escalation zones declared by the United Nations.
Madam president, we all recognise that the chemical weapons file is highly technical and operationally complex.
Following years of concealment and obstruction, significant information gaps continue to complicate verification efforts and operational planning.
We firmly believe that sustainable progress can only be achieved through gradual, practical and well coordinated cooperation with Syria, taking fully into account the realities on the ground.
In this regard, the breadth of Freedom Task Force plays an important role in supporting the Syrian government in both technical and logistical terms.
The task force provides a practical framework for aligning international assistance with Syrian priorities and operational requirements.
Turkey will continue to contribute to the efforts aimed at strengthening Syria's preparedness and technical capacity to address chemical weapons related challenges, in line with OPCW standards.
In this context, Turkey hosted the first workshop of the task force in Ankara on 16 and 17th February this year.
We also look forward to the upcoming meeting in The Hague next week.
Madam president, we are encouraged by the Syrian government's stated commitment to ensuring accountability for chemical weapons attacks.
The time is ripe to reinstate the suspended rights and privileges of Syria under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
In closing, we encourage all Member States to lend their full support toward achieving a chemical weapons free Syria.
Turkey reiterates its strong support for Syrian led and Syrian owned efforts to identify, secure, declare and destroy chemical weapons related materials in cooperation with the OPCW and other relevant stakeholders.
Because securing and safe storage of these materials is critical not only for Syria's national security, but also for regional and international peace and security.
Thank you again.
I thank the representative of Turkey for their statement.
There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers.
The meeting is adjourned.