(Main Committee I) Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Excellency's distinguished delegates, please take your seats.
Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, the fourth meeting of main Committee one of the 2026 Review conference of the parties to the treaty on the non proliferation of nuclear weapons is called to order.
Excellencies, Distinguished delegates.
Yesterday in the meeting of subsidiary B one, we discussed the zero draft outcome document of this review conference as circulated by the Secretariat on Wednesday six May and bearing the symbol PT slash UNF dot 2026 slash Rp dot two.
In accordance with the guidelines from the president of the review conference, main Committee one will discuss and negotiate the following elements of the draft outcome document, preambular paragraphs, rumor numerals, I to X, paragraphs 1 and 2, paragraphs 46 to 73, and paragraph 80.
Our focus on these elements of the draft outcome document is in accordance with the respective allocations of items to each main committee as decided by the propriety committee and the decision by the review conference to proceed in accordance with that decision.
Distinguished delegates, let me first express my appreciation for the constructive manner in which delegations have engaged with the draft outcome document in subsidiary B one yesterday, notwithstanding that the draft had only been circulated the evening before.
Let me also remind you that the conduct of business in the main committees will now be without a formal list of speakers.
States may request the floor by pushing the button to register their request to speak.
Finally, allow me to kindly remind allegations of the president's request for this committee to focus specifically on those sections of the draft outcome document that I have just cited.
Before we move to our discussions, please allow me to remind you of some guidelines for the conduct of our deliberations.
There will be a strict time limit for delegations interventions.
A timer will be shown on the screen and your microphones will start blinking when 1 minute remains for your intervention, followed by a strict microphone cut off once the time limit has been reached.
Delegations will recall that the time limit for statements is 8 minutes for group statements and 5 minutes for national statements.
Delegations who speak on behalf of a group of states, on behalf of a group of state parties should clearly indicate such when they take the floor.
Finally, delegations are requested to please inform the Secretariat as soon as possible if they wish to exercise their right of reply.
Rights of reply will be heard at the end of this meeting.
Distinguished delegates, you'll recall that at the end of yesterday's subsidiary body meeting, there were four states parties who had requested the floor, but who were unable to do so or to speak due to time limitations.
I had proposed that those states be given the floor first at today's meeting, which I had no objection.
Those four states parties are Thailand, Costa Rica, Switzerland, and the United States of America.
After those states parties speak, if states parties agree, I propose we try to structure our discussions of the zero draft outcome document according to the elements that this committee has been allocated.
In that regard, I will therefore first open the floor to comment on the preamblar paragraphs, Roman numerals one to ten or I to X.
When we have exhausted the comments on those paragraphs, I will propose we move to a focused discussion on paragraphs 1 and 2.
Once that is exhausted, we'll focus our discussions on paragraphs 46 through 73 and paragraph 80.
I do not expect that we'll finish our review this afternoon, in which case, we'll continue where we left off at our next main Committee one meeting on Tuesday 12th May.
I further recall the final planned meeting of main Committee one will take place on Wednesday 13th, May.
At that meeting, I intend to open the floor again for comments on all our allocated sections of the zero draft.
I don't know if they want to ask a question.
Those delegations that wish to take the floor on preambular paragraphs I, X are therefore requested to press the button in front of them at this time.
I will turn to that list following the interventions of the final four speakers on my list from yesterday.
The first speaker I have on my list is the distinguished representative of Thailand.
You have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Thailand appreciates the presidency and the Bureau's efforts in producing the serial draft and welcomes its timely circulation.
We commend the president's able leadership in reflecting the views expressed by states parties over the past weeks of discussion.
This text, we believe provides a useful basis for further discussion.
We note that the draft contains a number of good elements that capture areas of broad convergence among delegations and we appreciate the attempt to reflect the balance across all three pillars of the treaty.
At this stage, Thailand wishes to share initial views on issues to which we attach particular importance, and we will share our written inputs in due course.
First, on the reaffirmation of past commitments, Thailand consider it's essential that the outcome document clearly reaffirm the decisions and conclusions of previous review conferences.
These commitments remain valid and must not be walked back.
We are pleased to see the language to this effect in the text.
We observed regression of disarmament obligations and commitments and deviation from the convergences reached in the tenth review conference.
Second, on Article 6 and humanitarian consequences, Thailand attaches great importance to robust disarmament language, including recognition of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons.
We welcome the text reference.
The absence of such reference would weaken the treaty's credibility, value, and relevance.
Welcome the reference to international law, including international humanitarian law.
To further emphasize this point, we wish to strengthen this element by mentioning that the use of nuclear weapons would be generally contrary to the principles and rules of IHL, as well as referencing the disproportionate impact of nuclear weapons use and testing on women and girls.
Further, we welcome the reference on transparency and accountability.
I would like to echo previous colleagues from yesterday that nuclear disarmament is a legal obligation.
Any caveats or qualifiers should be removed.
Emphasis should be given to the imperative of fulfilling Article 6 obligations in full, including through concrete steps to reduce and eliminate nuclear arsenal based on the principles of transparency, verifiability, and irreversibility.
Third, on the CTBT and testing moratoriums, we strongly support the call for the entry into force of the CTBT and welcome the techs call on nuclear weapon states to maintain that moratorium.
We support Australia's proposal to add the reference to CTBTOs monitoring and verification capabilities.
Fourth, and lastly, Thailand wishes to see the outcome document acknowledge the complementarity between the NPT and other disarmament and nonproliferation instruments and frameworks.
Nuclear weapon free zones treaty, CTBT and the TP&W contribute to regional and global security and to the objectives of the NPT and should be given due recognition.
Thailand looks forward to engaging in detail on text as negotiations progress and remains committed to working constructively with all delegations towards a successful outcome.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Thailand for her statement and I now invite the distinguished Representative of Costa Rica to deliver their statement.
President.
Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
We are grateful for the work done by the Chair of the Bureau and the Secretariat to have in a timely fashion a document which might serve as a basis for negotiations within this conference.
We recognize that the draft is a good attempt at synthesis and strives to cover all concerns and suggestions voiced by member states during the conference.
We now will make a number of initial comments awaiting further comments from Capital.
We are of the view that the text should include a more comprehensive reference to the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.
The draft of the final document from Rev 2022 contain more precise language regarding the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and nuclear tests, including the fact that people and communities would be affected, environmental redress and they need to consider evidence on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons.
Moreover, the draft contains basic provisions on the urgent need for the entry into force of the CTBT.
The dangers of any resumption of nuclear tests, and the need to maintain the current moratorium enforced.
However, the 2022 draft contained more robust provisions language on the CWBTO, particularly paragraphs 1 37 to 142 and action paragraphs 22 to 24.
There were also references to the international monitoring System, the International Data Center, the IDC, the Institute inspection mechanisms, the scientific and civilian benefits arising from the work of these systems.
As regards disarmament, we suggest the inclusion of the recognition of the advisory opinion of the ICJ on the illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons dating 1996, that had been proposed already in 2022.
Finally, but this is very important and connects to the Trey on the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the reference to it in paragraph 73, we note that in the zero draft there is An oversight of similar language in the RevC document of 2022.
This language shall be taken up again.
We recognize that the TPNW complements the NPT and particularly this interconnection is important when it comes to complying with Article 6.
These are our preliminary comments, and we will build on them soon and send them in writing.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Costa Rica for his statement, and I invite the distinguished representative of Switzerland to take the floor.
Mr.
Chairman, I support the delegations made yesterday by my delegations, but by way of supplement, I wish to talk about nuclear risk reduction and emerging technologies as well as IAAI more specifically on risk reduction, we propose making a reference to the strategic and nuclear risks and to reword Paragraph 58 so that it can entren a commitment on part of nuclear weapons states rather than simply calling upon them to identify, explore, and implement more risk reduction measures unilaterally be unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally, the reference to unilateral and bilateral and multilateral risk reduction measures is important because nuclear strategic risk emerge in different contexts and therefore call for different types of measures.
Risk measures that are unilateral will make it possible for states to eliminate nuclear risk within their own postures and decisional, committees.
It's important for bilateral or multilateral risks decisions when the risks are of a different proportion.
Here, for example, CBMs are needed multilateral measures are necessary to deal with systemic threats, strengthen common standards and to guarantee that all states parties can contribute to progress made and evaluate the scope of it.
Maintaining these three types of risk reductions stops us from reducing the scope of risk reduction and means that we can in practical terms limit the likelihood of a threat of use of nuclear weapons.
We will submit a wording proposal in writing.
On new technologies, we welcome the way in which the zero draft deals with science and technology in several sections of the document.
Turning first to Paragraph 61, we propose that this paragraph refer explicitly to AI.
We are in a security environment which is increasingly affected by AI and AI has been developed very quickly.
So the management of the conventional and AI systems are overlapping and AI is being used in command and control and that needs to be referenced.
However, we encourage this paragraph to be further strengthened so we can better apprehend the wider range of nuclear risks linked to AI and the need for states parties to address that fact collectively.
This includes inter alea early warning system and monitoring systems, decision making, support systems, adapted targeting, cyber vulnerabilities, data integrity, automation channels, dynamics of escalation.
And the overlapping of nuclear and non nuclear capacity.
We also attach particular importance to the reference in paragraph 63 to maintaining effective human control over nuclear weapons at all times.
We consequently commend individual commitments taken in this regard by certain nuclear weapon states, namely through heads of states declarations, working documents, and national reports.
However, the lack of a joint statement issued from the P five is key given that this is being considered within the P five group during this review conference.
A final document containing such a joint declaration would send a positive sign and would lend greater weight to individual declarations.
This regard, we also welcome the growing attention that states parties have attached to this issue during this review cycle, namely during the first committee and in the plenary session of this review conference.
We particularly point to work done by Mexico on limiting risks posed by the current integration of AI into command control and nuclear communication system.
This bears witness to broader recognition by non nuclear weapon states of this fact and the fact this is a key area that nuclear weapon states need to commit more greatly to during the next review cycle, we believe it's vital that technology specialists and experts both within nuclear weapon states and non nuclear weapon states should come together to tackle risks, but opportunities linked to AI and other emerging technologies.
Both of these can contribute to strengthening verification resilience and future risk reduction measures and arms control measures.
This isn't simply a risk management issue, but also an opportunity to identify responsible usages of these technologies that can contribute to international peace and security.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Switzerland for the statement.
I invite the distinguished representative of the United States to take the floor.
Chair, thank you for the opportunity to speak again and offer some further comments and clarifications.
I mentioned yesterday the need to strengthen language on testing in the draft by finding constructive ways to restore confidence in testing moratorium and call for improving the threshold to detect nuclear explosive tests of any yield rather than focusing on entry into force of the CTBT.
Given the concerns the United States has shared about some countries having already broken the norm against testing by conducting yield producing nuclear explosive tests, several elements in paragraphs 52 to 55 are problematic.
To give us a specific example, paragraph 53 as written seems to imply that any yield producing tests are or would be detectable under the CTBT and IMS.
I'll refer colleagues to statements we made in this committee and the plenary, as well as US engagement on this issue since February.
But we know this is not factually the case, and unfortunately, IMS detection can be sidestepped.
That is why the United States has proposed restoring confidence in states adherence to their testing moratorium, including through confidence building and technical measures.
We recommend that the outcome document explicitly call on nuclear weapon states to clarify the scope of their moratorium.
We have proposed a working group in this regard within the P five and several states issued similar calls in their main Committee one interventions.
We ask others to join us in calling for these clarifications in the final text.
On transparency about arsenals, I'd like to endorse the UK's intervention yesterday in response to a remark made by China that implied certain of nuclear weapon states should fulfill nuclear transparency responsibilities.
The United States would welcome such a commitment from China, which is in the minority of nuclear weapon states that chose not to hold a side event on its national report at this RevC.
We had looked forward to China joining that exercise and invite it and Russia to support the formalization of this initiative through the decision contained in this draft.
Chair, I support the interventions made yesterday by France and the UK on preambular paragraph three and paragraph 63 regarding humanitarian consequences.
The United States is carefully reviewing this text.
While we accept the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war, we would not agree that any use of nuclear weapons has such effects.
We refer colleagues to the P three statement that reiterated a nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought.
Finally, I want to mention two concepts I overlooked yesterday that we see as positive inclusions in this draft.
First, paragraph 70 and its emphasis on working through the IAEA on verification.
And the further call for moratorium on fissile material production for use in nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
Second, like Switzerland, we also welcome inclusion of a paragraph in this draft dealing with emerging technology as it relates to our subject matter.
We think that paragraph 61 is a good place to affirm a human in a loop for decisions on nuclear weapons employment.
Language to this effect and welcoming this commitment by some nuclear weapon states appears in the P three statement.
The United States is committed to working closely with you chair and with the president of the conference on this text, and we will provide written comments.
We thank the president again for his thoughtful zero draft.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of the United States for the statement.
I have the following list of speakers on my list, El Salvador, China, Iran, Salman Islands, Belgium, Kurbat, Egypt, and Latvia, and we'll take them in that order.
El Salvador, you have the floor.
Gracia.
Thank you, Chair.
El Salvador is grateful to the chair for circulating the zero draft.
We believe it is a concise document and is useful as a basis for our discussions.
We had intended to provide general comments at this time.
However, following your instructions, we are going to provide specific comments on the preambular section.
At this time, these comments are still preliminary in nature and will be subsequently supplemented with written input.
I do excuse you says their says the speaker, my computer is restarting.
Could we give the floor to the next speaker and then could you return to us? Thank you.
Thank you very much indeed for those little break in transmission.
No worries.
Let me just emphasize one fact.
Distinguished delegates, we turn in our focus to preamble paragraphs 1 through ten of the zero draft.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of China.
China, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
The Chinese delegation thanks the president of the conference and his team for circulating the zero draft of the outcome document at an early stage.
China is carefully studying the zero draft and is willing to further state its preliminary views.
China already elaborated its position on relevant parts of the zero draft at yesterday's closed meetings of the subsidiary B one and will not repeat them here.
China is ready to continue sharing its preliminary views in light of our interactive discussions.
First, regarding the ton nuclear sharing in paragraph two, all parties have shown a level of concern about this issue.
China believes that the current wording is rather weak and only further supports strengthening and we support further strengthening the relevant text.
Nuclear sharing has been one of the major focal issues during the current review conference, and majority of countries, including the non aligned movement have raised questions about nuclear sharing, while many states participating in such arrangements have repeatedly defended their position and they have to come up with some cliche in saying that the nuclear arrangement under NATO actually preceded the current arrangement that fully attached to the fact that the further discussing of the nuclear sharing, including opposing further nuclear sharing is absolutely necessary.
Like many countries, China does not believe that such treatment is in alignment with the purpose of NPT, nor does it believe that it helps to prevent nuclear proliferation.
In essence, nuclear sharing arrangements create unequal and discriminatory practices among non nuclear weapon states and constitute themselves an act of proliferation.
This funnancial nature does not change simply because such arrangements have existed prior to the Treaty War for a long time.
Nuclear sharing arrangements further elevate the role of nuclear weapons in national and collective security problem policies and have become a major obstacle to advancing nuclear disarmament.
Any country involved in nuclear sharing erections faces or varying degrees of nuclear conflict risks potentially triggering a full scale nuclear war.
As long as nuclear sharing erection persist, they will encourage or spare other countries to emulate them, amplify their negative impact.
Second, regarding paragraph 55 on prohibiting nuclear testing.
China believes that in terms of prohibition of nuclear testing, we have well founded provisions in the treaty.
Some countries fabricated false narratives against other countries.
They have come with some low yield testing provisions.
Such narrative would undermine the consensus of the international community multilateral authority rather.
Will undermine the authority of the CTBT.
The review Conference should urge certain countries to stop making irresponsible remarks or statements on nuclear weapon testing and stop the preparations for further nuclear testing while committing not to conduct further nuclear tests.
Thirdly, paragraph 60 on the non for use of nuclear weapons.
The text reflects the positions of most countries including the non aligned movement.
To declare not to use nuclear weapons as a policy is indeed a policy representing nuclear transparency.
If certain countries raise objections, China supports adjusting and strengthening the relevant language, including calling our nuclear weapon states to begin negotiations on a non first use of nuclear weapons treaty as soon as possible.
Ken time restraint, China will continue to share its views in the discussions that are to follow.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of China for his intervention.
I now invite the distinguished representative of El Salvador to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
The colleague from Egypt was trying to get my intention regarding the importance of submitting having a paper copy of one statement, but I'm going to continue anyway.
We were saying previously that we were going to make just preliminary comments now and that we will take the floor again later.
As conversations develop on the various other provisions of the draft, El Salvador welcomes the references contained in the preambular section that acknowledge that the only guarantee against the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons is the total elimination of them.
We're of the view that it is important to preserve such language, particularly in the current international context where nuclear rhetoric, the modernization of arsenals and the dependence on deterrence doctrines continue to increase nuclear risk.
In general terms, we are of the view that the preambula is a good basis for negotiations.
As I was saying at the beginning, we will make more substantive comments when we begin to discuss the other provisions of the draft.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of El Salvador for a statement.
I invite the distinguished representative of Iran to make his intervention.
Iran, you have the floor.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chair.
In addition to our initial remarks the other day on the paragraphs dealing with the preview of main Committee one and subsidiary one.
I'm happy to share our remarks on the preamble or paragraph and we appreciate your focused attention and discussion of the section by section of this purview.
With regard to paragraph one, we see that there are some caveats when it comes to nuclear disarmament as the first and foremost pillar of the treaty and as well as the peaceful uses.
I think that striking out those caveats would be very helpful.
It can streamline the paragraph and in the meantime, it can show that we address all three pillars of the treaty as equal.
Therefore, we want to drop those caveats before nuclear disarmament and fostering the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
And also we can delete their reference to essential to easing global tensions.
Rather, it can be very in a positive language and to keep and promoting international peace and security.
Like all previous outcome documents, we think that there should be a reference to the United Nations Charter, especially its principle of prohibition of the threat or use of force as enshrined in Article 2, paragraph four.
This can be added in paragraph second of the preamble before that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
Similarly, we think that for paragraph three, we should have a direct reference to the ICGA advisory opinion in 1996, and we can quote exactly some sentences and some phrases in the effect of the humanitarian consequences of use of nuclear weapons.
So I think that this is very important and it can help a lot to clarify our positions, collective positions with regard to humanitarian consequences of use of nuclear weapon.
For paragraph four, we think again, we can strengthen the language by replacing the word need with obligations.
It will read reaffirming the obligation of all states at all times.
Under paragraph five, we think that we should exactly use the wording of the treaty, especially by referring to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to secession of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.
I think this is very important because we heard the other day some delegations somehow interpreting this good faith ending with arms control, and this is not consistent with the purpose of the treaty and also it is not consistent with the letter and spirit of the treaty.
We should highlight that good faith negotiations should end with nuclear disarmament.
Again, there is a room to quote from the ICJ advisory opinion on this specific effect that how they have elaborated that the good faith should bring to conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.
For paragraph six, we think we can have some additions on how the treaty should be implemented in non discriminatory and balanced way and special emphasis should be on nuclear disarmament.
And again, lastly, for paragraph ten, also, we should express concern over the lack of progress in implementation of Article 6, and we should remind special party I thank the distinguished Representative of Iran for his intervention.
I now invite the distinguished representative of Suleiman Islands to take the floor.
Sumon Airlines, you have the floor.
We probably may have to skip Solomon Airlines and move to the distinguished representative of Belgium.
Belgium, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
As my delegation has not yet taken the floor under main committee one, let me just first express our gratitude and appreciation for the draft outcome document as prepared by the president and his team and we wish to work in a constructive spirit on the text that provides a very good basis.
As concerns the preamblar paragraphs, we think they're fine.
We would just suggest two additions, one in the first a In the first preamble where we could also point to the historic achievements of the NPT, which have provided security benefits to all states for over 50 years.
The second proposal would be to add a third preamble where we underscore the need to uphold and strengthen the norm against nuclear testing.
Chair, I want to keep with your guidelines of only talking about the preamble.
But since another delegation has spoken about paragraph two, I feel obliged to refer to what we have said before regarding nuclear sharing arrangements.
These nuclear sharing arrangements predate the NPT and to suggest that Western states were negotiating the NPT while having in mind the intention to violated from the start sounds to me like slightly insulting to our intellectual integrity.
Moreover, these sharing arrangements are a necessary response to the existential threat posed by our eastern neighbor, a threat which is very evident by Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and by the irresponsible nuclear rhetoric that has accompanied it.
Finally, also on the insinuation that these arrangements would be somehow hindering nuclear disarmament, the facts prove otherwise.
The most significant reductions in global nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War took place while these arrangements were in place.
I would finally also refer to the fact that many states have underscored how extended turns and sharing arrangements have helped to prevent horizontal proliferation, and we think that this should be reflected in the document.
I thank you Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Belgium for his intervention, and I invite the distinguished representative of Cubas to take the floor.
Okay.
Thank you very much Chair.
I take the floor on behalf of my country, Kitabest and Kazakhstan.
We thank you and the president for the outcome document, and we will focus our intervention on relevant texts under the purview of this committee.
Both Kazakhstan and Kidabest are two states parties which experienced the tragic impact of nuclear testing.
Due to our joint legacy of nuclear weapons, we are focused on addressing the legacy of nuclear weapons.
As a result of our joint conviction, we wish to comment on the following paragraphs in the outcome document.
First, the outcome document should be strengthened on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.
This means that the conference should recognize the impact of nuclear weapons on socioeconomic development, climate, food, security, ecosystems, and the intergenerational harm, especially on women and children.
Second, there should also be a recognition of the transboundary harm of nuclear weapons.
Third, as expressed earlier by colleagues, we support the idea of decoupling the references of victim assistance and environmental remediation with education as contained in paragraph 67.
The language should be modified to reference victim assistance and environmental remediation within the context of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.
Fourth, we are proposing a new paragraph 67 B, which states the conference should also recall the UN CA resolution on the legacy of nuclear weapons and subsequent visions that called for the first ever international meeting on victim assistance and environmental remediation.
We should not ignore the whowhelming support of states parties.
Fifth, there also needs to be strengthened language on the CTBT and six, the conference should also acknowledge the impact of people and communities of past nuclear tests in PP 54.
Finally, regarding the reference to treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the conference should acknowledge its significance, the humanitarian provisions, and its complementarity to the NPT.
We will be submitting our comments in writing as well.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Kiribat on behalf of Kazakhstan for their intervention.
At this stage, whilst I encourage respective delegations to advance their statements or arguments within the broad areas allocated to us, I would once again urge respective delegations to focus their discussions for now on the preambular paragraphs.
Thank you.
I now invite the distinguished representative of Egypt to take the floor.
Egypt, you have the floor.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairperson.
I beg your indulgence.
I'll be speaking on behalf of a group on general reflections on this section of nuclear disarmament.
So it is difficult actually to try to re engineer it according to the structure that you have advised, but I pledge that we will come in actually according to the rest of the sections with specific comments.
Mr.
Chipperson, I have the honor to speak on behalf of the Arab Group.
The Arab Group expresses its appreciation to the president for circulating the zero draft, which it considers as a reasonable point of departure for constructive discussions.
The Arab group reiterates its steadfast support to the president and his endeavors.
We continue to underline our expectations for a balanced and ambitious text that preserves the credibility of the treaty and the disarmament and nonproliferation regime as a whole and matches our steadfast commitment to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
Arab Group welcos and supports that the text paid attention to the following matters, albeit they would require further strengthening.
First, the reaffirmation of existing commitments pursuant to 1995, 2000 and 2010 in PP seven, the importance of the full non discriminatory and balanced implementation of the treaty in PP eight, the determination for achieving the universalization of the treaty in PP nine, the affirmation of the implementation of Article 6 in PP ten.
In paragraph two on nuclear sharing arrangements and extended deterrence as well, this is something that we note positively in the text.
However, it needs to demonstrate more substantive outlook and also to address existing arrangements in addition to potential ones.
Paragraph 49, which asserts that the indefinite extension of the treaty does not imply indefinite possession of nuclear weapons.
Paragraph 51, which regrets the lack of progress in the implementation of Article 6, and that it also addresses the qualitative and quantitative development of nuclear arsenals.
We are keen to also have elements related to increasing incidence of nuclear rhetoric and threats as well as increasing reliance on nuclear weapons and security doctrines and concepts.
We take positive note of paragraphs 55 and 56 on consequences of resumption of nuclear testing as well as retention of a moratorium on all types of nuclear testing by all nuclear weapon states.
Paragraph 57 and the attention it paid to the expiry of new start and the call for a successor treaty on all types of nuclear weapons.
We need to add to that it should include further and deeper cuts.
On paragraph 58, we are of the view that all nuclear weapon states have responsibilities under Article 6.
Further efforts and dialogue are encouraged on basis of equity and shared responsibility towards the treaty and international peace and security.
We welcome also paragraph 61 on no first use policy, as well as paragraph 66 on enhancing transparency by nuclear weapon states on the implementation of their obligations and commitments under Article 6 and pursuant to previous undertakings, including under the 2010 action plan.
We appreciate that paragraph 62 paid attention to the special responsibility of nuclear weapon states towards the entry into force of the CTBT.
However, the language needs to closely track the text of action ten of the 2010 action plan on the responsibility of the nuclear weapon states towards encouraging annex two states, particularly those who are not party to the NPT and operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
Paragraph 63 recognizes the legitimate aspiration of non nuclear weapon states for legally binding negative security assurances that are universal, effective, unconditional, non discriminatory, irrevocable.
Nevertheless, it is missing the action oriented dimension on calling on nuclear weapon states to respond accordingly and to engage in a process to do so as a matter of urgency.
Finally, we underscore the importance of paragraph 80 on universality of the treaty and its call by name on those who are not yet party to do so as non nuclear weapon states as a matter of urgency and to adhere to the provisions of the treaty until this is achieved.
Mr.
Chairperson, on the other hand, the Arab Group stresses that the following paragraphs require further work to ensure that they are communicating a disciplined message and striking the right tone.
PP one on the characterization of the treaty and its pillars needs serious work as the NPT is the cornerstone of both nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime.
Paragraph 61, we appreciate that it captures the growing concern with the risks associated with the integration of emerging technologies into nuclear weapon arsenals and systems.
The paragraph needs to speak openly about the role of artificial intelligence and asserts full and effective human control.
Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, any decision related to nuclear weapons must remain confined to human decision making to ensure accountability and prevent risks resulting from automation and other technological applications.
Paragraph 67 on victims assistance and environmental remediation failed to include elements on compensation, redress, rehabilitation, reconstruction, memorialization, and guarantees of non recurrence.
This armament and non proliferation education and awareness needs to be separated into a standalone paragraph to avoid giving the false impression that this is the response to the needs and sufferings of victims, survivors, and affected communities.
We're also of the view that the text needs further reinforcement in relation to humanitarian consequences and the application of international humanitarian law.
Some work yet less substantial needs to be undertaken vis-à-vis paragraph 46 on the content of Article 6, paragraph 53 on the role of the CTBT and paragraph 70 and 71 on the application of principles of verification and irreversibility pursuant to action 17 and 18 of the 2010 action plan.
I thank you, Mr.
Chairperson.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Egypt on behalf of the Arab group for their statement.
I now invite the distinguished representative of Latvia to make your intervention.
Latvia, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
First of all, Latvia appreciates presidents and his team's efforts to achieve a balanced text and early circulation of the zero outcome document.
As my delegation has not yet taken the floor on the text, please allow me briefly to outline some of Latvia's observations on all elements that concern main Committee one and we promise to follow the proposed script from now on.
First, we welcome important language on risk reduction, which in our view plays a crucial role in preventing nuclear conflict.
One issue that we see with the current wording is the reference to discussion on root causes of international conflicts in paragraph 59.
This element, in our view, lies outside NPT framework and should be therefore deleted.
Second, we support language on CTBT.
This treaty plays a critical role in upholding the norm against nuclear testing, and therefore we should collectively support efforts aimed at facilitating CTPT's entries into force.
That should be reflected also in next revisions of the text.
Third, Latvia does not support language in paragraph two on nuclear sharing and extended deterrence, which does not accurately depict the discussion in which many states, including mine, highlighted that these arrangements have helped prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Even though we joined the NPT several decades after its entry into force, we do not support suggestions by some delegations to retrospectively reinterpret the context in which the treaty was negotiated, including when it comes to extended deterrence arrangements that were well known at the time.
Therefore, we would prefer deletion of the paragraph two or seek alternative wording that would rebalance the paragraph and highlight the positive contribution of extended deterrence.
Fourth, when it comes to strategic stability, Latvia joins those who call for multilateral strategic stability efforts that while taking into account the special responsibility of the nuclear weapon states possessing the largest nuclear arsenals should move beyond the previous bilateral approach.
The same time, we should avoid prejudging the possible formats of future instruments or frameworks or specifying in advance which categories of strategic weaponry should fall under potential limits.
A flexible, open ended approach will facilitate such discussions.
Fifth and finally, we believe that the grave issue of irresponsible and reckless nuclear rhetoric, particularly in the context of Russia's aggression against Ukraine should be properly reflected in the text.
We are committed to work with you, Mr.
Chair, on further strengthening the text.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Latvia for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of Cameroon to take the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
My delegation wishes to give initial comments on one to Roman numeral one to ten in the preambular section in line with what your instructions were.
This preambula recalls the fundamental principles the NPT has affirmed as the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime, the very foundation of the continuation of disarmament and something that is crucial for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
The devastating humanitarian consequences of such a war are recognized the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee we have, as stated in paragraph five, all commitments made in other review conferences are reaffirmed.
Finally, preambbola Section ten underscores that the implementation of Article 6 is essential to the maintenance of the treaty.
My delegation believes that this preambar section takes up the wording 2010-2015.
They here reaffirm timeless principles.
Cameron notes that the preambulla paragraph two was strengthened by the joint declaration issued by the P five in January 2022.
However, no significant progress has been made.
Given that fact, my delegation believes that a number of gaps remain for my delegation, paragraph one deserves more compelling wording and the cornerstone is referred to, but we'd go from cornerstone to undisputed cornerstone.
That would be the English phrase that we'd insert.
Then Pamula paragraph eight emphasizes the need for non discriminatory and balanced implementation and yet operational deterrence, namely what they said in paragraph 91, retain an asymmetry between the obligations of nuclear weapon states that are obligatory and the voluntary commitments of non nuclear weapon states.
There's a gap between theory and practice.
There's no reference made anywhere to emerging technologies, AI cyber threats.
All of these can render more fragile nuclear stability by accelerating That's the reducing decision time and that creates the risks of hacking, piracy, miscalculation and it leads to the evasion of human control.
Without human control, the historic commitments of the NPT lose effectiveness for my delegation, the moratorium on AI systems were being incorporated into nuclear decisions is vital in the same vein.
Preambula paragraph ten affirms the importance of Article 6, but the draft does not learn past lessons by proposing mechanisms for annual surveillance multilateral verification or a definition of irreversibility.
It is absolutely vital to remedy that a gap which weakens what we're saying here.
We note with regret the absence of a reference made to nuclear weapons free zones.
My delegation wishes to emphasize that this preambula section is entirely within the conference mandates and in line with international law.
However, the demand for the implementation, the non discriminatory implementation here I'm quoting the text, could be used to call into question existing asymmetries and we should do that.
We should strengthen preambula paragraph eight by coupling it with concrete operational measures, we should insert a reference to emerging technologies three, we should link the preambula section to other disarmment instruments, peer reviews.
There should be a definition of irreversibility.
We should add a reference to nuclear weapons free zones.
Chair, preambula proposes to elevate the NPT, but all of this will be dead letter if it's not converted into tangible action.
Thank you.
Mercy, I thank the distinguished representative of Cameroon for that statement.
And I invite the distinguished representative of the Russia Federation to take the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
We have already shared our thoughts as regards this zero draft outcome document.
Please allow me to, in addition to that voice, a number of considerations.
In our main statement, we did mention that our country continues being based on the approach, according to which any initiatives and practical steps in disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, cannot be separate from the general military and strategic context.
Such measures and initiatives are to be carried out on the basis of consensus stage by stage in such a way as to strengthen international peace and stability, whilst enhancing the level of security for everyone and not damaging security.
The key elements of such an approach, we have in the joint documents that were outcome previous outcome conferences of NPT review conference fully approved by all member states.
Furthermore, we do not see realistic alternatives to the universal formula according to which it is provided that measures in the area of nuclear disarmament have to be an integral element of a comprehensive process of general and complete disarmament.
That is the algorithm that we have in Article 6 of NPT and relevant provisions of the outcome document of the first special session of UN General Assembly session on Disarmament.
A comprehensive reading of such documents is an absolute must.
Taking all of the above into account, we would like to point out that in the draft we have before us, the following interlinked elements are not reflected.
First of all, I'm referring to the affirmation of member states of their commitment to the ultimate goal of building a world which is free of nuclear weapons and more secure for everyone.
Whilst ensuring peace and security in line with the goals of the treaty.
Reaffirmation of the fact that disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, international deter, and strengthening of international peace and security are directly interconnected.
The expression of conviction that substantive progress in disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, would be facilitated and helped by preliminarily and parallel measures aimed at strengthening the security of states and general improvement of the international situation and stating that in order to create a favorable conditions for additional disarmament measures and reducing international tension, Measures need to be undertaken aimed at enhancing trust and reducing strategic risks, including accompanying measures in the area of nuclear and non nuclear weapons.
The importance and the need to have a contribution by all member states into efforts so as to improve the international situation and the creation of a atmosphere and conditions for disarmament activities.
They need to conduct steps which would lead to nuclear disarmament in such a way as to make sure that they should help strengthen international stability, peace and security and based on the principle of enhancing the level of security for everyone and damaging not undermining security.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Russia, the Russian Federation for intervention.
I now invite the distinguished representative of Denmark to make their statement.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I will join others in thanking the president and all involved for the preparation and the early release of the Sal draft.
There are several things in the pas allotted to MC one we can support and also things we would like, or we would not be able to support, sorry.
Let me here deliver a couple of short preliminary points on the preempto Paris as directed by you, Chair.
First, we should reaffirm that the treaty has contributed to international peace and security and to nonproliferation in line with what Belgium proposed.
Second, we should also recognize the growing concern over the reckless and dangerous nuclear rhetoric and threats as Latvia mentioned.
Third, we should recognize the central role of the AIEA, its mandate, work an impartial, independent and objective role.
It could be three new preamblear paragraphs, very brief, where we underline key strategic elements with the importance for the NPT three pillars and for international peace and security.
I will come back to you and colleagues with more remarks as we move to the main body of the text.
I thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Denmark for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of the Holy See to take the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair and thank you for giving me the floor.
My delegation would like to express its appreciation to the President and to the Secretariat for the text that has been prepared and circulated and for the work carried out in these particularly challenging times.
We see a number of positive elements throughout the draft, while also considering that some aspects could benefit from further strengthening and clarification.
My delegation particularly welcomes the language contained in preambula paragraph two, especially the reaffirmation that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, as well as the recognition of the urgent need to make every effort to avert such a war.
At the same time, with regard to preambula paragraph three, my delegation welcomes the inclusion early in the text of a reference to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.
We would, however, welcome stronger language that more fully reflects the devastating and far reaching nature of these consequences, especially in light of the understandings reached during previous review cycles.
Any use of nuclear weapons would have catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences, affecting peoples across borders and across future generations.
These consequences must remain at the center of our reflections and continue to guide efforts toward nuclear disarmament.
If I may briefly speak with regard to paragraph two, my delegation welcomes the inclusion of this paragraph, especially the references to nuclear weapon sharing and extended deterrence arrangements, which we consider an important element of the text.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Holy See for his intervention, and I invite the distinguished representative of Sengal to take the floor.
Commissioner.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
Good afternoon to all, dear colleagues Chair.
I wish to begin by inviting you or by once again inviting delegations to focus on the ten preambular paragraphs.
That would allow us to hear delegations on these paragraphs and to be able to react to their comments and to have much more focused discussions on these issues.
If we did that, we'd be able to react properly because there's a wealth of information that's shared here so going from the preambular section to other paragraphs and back again, that risks undermining our discussions and stopping us from having more targeted deliberations.
I invite the chair to further structure our work so that we can focus on things stage by stage that would foster much more focused discussion.
I wish to react to a number of proposals that have been made here, beginning with what was said by the to begin, Senegal wishes to focus on preamble of paragraph one here.
We should try to avoid hierarchizing things as is done here.
If a hierarchy were to be established, we should begin by putting disarmament at the top, the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.
That should go first, then we should go to nonproliferation, and then we should conclude this list with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Certain delegations, namely Denmark have said and I agree with this, it is also important to Put nuclear rhetoric in perspective and give it context and we should talk about the geopolitical context in which this work is taking place to recall the need to fight against nuclear threats and to improve things internationally.
Certain delegations refer to this fact.
Puma paragraph three now, we believe that we should add after catastrophic, humanitarian and environmental consequences.
I think it's important to mention the environmental consequences of the use of these weapons.
On paragraph, preambula paragraph five, I echo the Iranian delegation on the need to take up the initial text of the treaty to not reduce the scope of the obligations that we took in the field of disarmament.
Finally, Paragraph ten of the preambular section, I think we can add compliance here, compliance and implementation.
I think the two go hand in hand and that could strengthen our common conviction that disarmament is an obligation and that it would amending the paragraph in that way would make that possible.
I'm not an English speaker natively, but I do think that the chapeau of the preambular section to review the operation is what's said, we should maybe say to review the operationalization.
The speakers speaking English.
It can be considered.
Finally, I'll finish with what I proposed at the beginning.
Please, delegations, I urge you to focus on the prebular section that will allow us to react to what's being said.
Thank you.
Mercy thank the distinguished representative of Cameroon.
Senegal, says the chair, Senegal for that statement.
I thank you.
He said from the start, it will be good for us to focus our discussion at this stage to the preambar paragraphs so we can advance our meeting.
Thank you very much.
I I invite the distinguished representative of Austria to take the floor.
Thank you very much Chair.
We thank again, the president and his team for providing text in a timely basis and have previously shared some preliminary comments.
With regard to the discussion today, reiterate we reiterate the importance of reaffirming all past obligations and commitments in the document and that the conference should acknowledge that the deep concerns over the use of nuclear weapons as a threat to the security of all states are a key factor that should continue to underpin efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament.
With regard to the specific paragraphs that you have put forward to be discussed and in line with your guidance, we have more specific comments.
On paragraph three, we welcome the para on humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, but in line with the 2010 document, we would hear call for reiterating the concerns expressed like in the past.
On Pamla paragraph eight, also in line with the 2010 action plan action one at the end of the PA, we would like to see the addition of the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.
We have said that before and we should keep having that in the preambular.
With regards to some of the proposals made earlier, we would like to express our support to the suggestion by the distinguished delegation from Belgium on having a PP on the norm on nuclear testing here.
And we will have further comments on the paragraphs that you have said we will discuss at a later stage and we will refer back to them when we get there.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Austria for her intervention.
I now invite the distinguished Representative of Canada to take the floor.
Thank you very much, Chair.
Like other states, we are quite satisfied with the language in the preamble of the draft.
There are many elements that we like, but for the purpose of being a bit more brief, I will not focus on those paragraphs and just make a few other comments.
For example, we would agree with Belgium that it might be beneficial to point out the benefits that the NPT has conferred upon us during the past 50 years, including by contributing to our collective security through disarmament, non proliferation and peaceful uses.
We also agree with Belgium and Austria that it would be good to add another preamble paragraph upholding and strengthening the norm against nuclear testing.
Finally, in terms of preamble paragraphs, we also have a comment on preamble paragraph ten.
We believe that the language they're referring to the implementation of Article 6 being essential to the maintenance and strengthening of the treaty is a bit odd to us.
For us, Article 6, of course, is a legal obligation.
For us, there's no question about maintaining the treaty.
Obviously, the treaty for us stands, we have ratified it, and we will abide by its obligations.
And implementing Article 6 doesn't really strengthen the treaty.
The treaty strength stands on its own.
So we would replace the reference to maintenance and strengthening with integrity and credibility.
We would say affirming that the implementation of Article 6 is essential to the integrity and credibility of the treaty.
Then since so many other states commented on OP two referring to extended nuclear deterrence and nuclear sharing.
I refer to our statement yesterday in subsidiary B one and add a few comments here.
First, our delegation would like to note that the term nuclear sharing is widely used, but it is a bit of an unfortunate term in the sense that it suggests that nuclear weapons are being shared, at least in the context of NATO nuclear sharing.
This is not the case.
There is no sharing of nuclear weapons under such NATO arrangements.
These weapons remain under the effective control of nuclear weapon states.
NATO non nuclear weapon states, including those participating in extended nuclear deterrence and in nuclear sharing, cannot start a nuclear war.
Neither does the absence of nuclear sharing arrangements prevent non NATO nuclear weapon states from using nuclear weapons in defense of their allies.
In our view, this discussion about extended nuclear deterrence and nuclear sharing is somewhat of a distraction, diverting us from the focus that our delegation would like to put at the center of our deliberations, which is arms control and disarmament, involving in particular the three states holding the three largest nuclear arsenals and the eventual achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons.
Of course, if we get there, as we noted yesterday, this would automatically resolve the issue of extended nuclear deterrence and nuclear sharing.
In that context, we would actually like to amend operative paragraph two to reflect those benefits of these arrangements as long as nuclear weapons exist.
And we would like the text to refer to these benefits, including strengthening of non proliferation, as many other delegations have pointed out, security and strategic stability.
Then we could also add some reference about in relation to, um, nuclear arms control and disarmament, addressing the concerns of those states that may exist in relation to extended deterrence and nuclear sharing.
Thank you very much, Chair.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Canada for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished Representative of Algeria to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Good afternoon to everyone.
We would like to convey first through you our gratitude to the president of the conference and his team for their tireless efforts and for the zero draft before us, which we believe is a good basis for constructive engagement.
We also thank you for facilitating our work and through your work in this committee that we hope you will gather our comments and submit to the president on your best assessment of what could constitute a consensus.
We, of course, align with the group intervention.
Sure.
Giving the time constraint and as per your guidance on the targeted part, we would like to make some initial comments on this preambar section.
I will start with some general comments and then a few detailed comments.
From our perspective, the preambar part can be structurally better balanced.
We note with concern the absence of well agreed language relevant to such part like good faith, ICG advisory opinion, 13 steps 64 point action plan, transparency, irreversibility, verifiability principles.
We also believe that the preambular part weakens the disarmament dimension.
The agreed 2010 language has been weakened in two ways.
First, integrated paragraphs from past consensus outcomes have been split across two weaker preambar paragraphs, notably in paragraphs 3 and 4, where the catastrophic humanitarian consequences and international humanitarian law obligations have been separated, and in paragraphs 6 and 8, where the principle of non discriminatory and balanced implementation has been detached.
Second, the introductory verbs of these paragraphs have been downgraded compared to previous outcomes from the stronger reaffirming, convinced, and determined in 2010 to weaker recognizing, noting, and recalling using this zero draft.
On PP one, the characterization of the treaty and its pillars needs reformulation as the NPT is the cornerstone of both nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime.
On PP two, we would like to see this power strengthened.
We suggest to add just before and recognizing the urgent need, we propose to add recognizing that the only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons are never used again is their total elimination.
On para three, we would like to see it strengthened.
We propose to use para 80 of the 2010 action plan verbatim, which starts as follows, expressing deep concerns at the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences of any use of nuclear weapons.
Lastly, the Chat and Tutu applicable before international law in paragraph four, qualifier that was not in the 2010 agreed language.
We call for deletion of applicable as I said, it's not an agreed language, but more importantly, international law is or has clear mechanisms for determining who is bound by what.
For instance, we don't say citizens must follow applicable theft laws.
If law is not applicable to treaty, auto party is not the law for them in the first place.
PP four mentions also the charter of the UN since the charter is binding all the member states of the UN and by virtue of the membership, the qualifier applicable is redundant.
That's all from my delegation at this stage, and I thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Algeria for his statement and I invite the distinguished representative of China to make their intervention.
Are.
Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
China is taking the floor again on PP one to ten.
Currently, our capital is studying these languages and at this stage, I'd like to share some preliminary thoughts.
China proposes that we strengthen the language in PP four.
The major elements to be included are the following.
I'll speak in English now.
Reaffirming that in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, states must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
Ng Fan Chin Nan.
Is open to the exact language, and we will provide written comments in this regard.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished Representative of China for his statement, and I now invite the distinguished representative of Mexico to take the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
I'm adding now to the preliminary comments that my delegation made yesterday in the subsidiary body.
Of this main committee.
We're now making a number of additional specific comments.
Regarding preamble paragraph three, that refers to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences.
As we said yesterday, some clarification was still needed specifically, we believe it to be important to take up once again, previously agreed upon language agreed upon in 2010.
That language refers to the deep concern regarding catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons.
Moreover, we wish to place on record now that my delegation on this issue will also propose language to Article 6 so that we reflect the fact that knowledge on humanitarian consequences is not static and therefore that we must recognize the studies that have delved into and increased our understanding of humanitarian, environmental, and cross border consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, as well as the differentiated impact that has on women and girls.
The conference must continue to promote new studies that go deeper into and create greater knowledge of the specific catastrophic consequences of use of these weapons that should be reflected in this text.
We think it's also important to have a new preambula paragraph that states we recognize that for as long as nuclear weapons are viewed as essential for security by some states, pressure in terms of proliferation increases.
As regards paragraph ten, as we said yesterday, and we do agree with Canada here, it's not very clear as it stands.
The current wording is not clear.
So we are of the view that it could be amended in the following way.
We affirm or affirming that the immediate implementation and unconditional implementation of Article 6 is essential for the integrity and effectiveness of the treaty.
That would be our proposed amendment to preambula Paragraph ten.
Finally, we support Austria's proposal to in subpar six, take up language from the 2010 action plan, more specifically subpar one.
My delegation continues to study the text, and we will submit any proposals in writing to the Chair.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Mexico for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished Representative of Cuba to take the floor.
Ma, thank you very much, Chair.
We simply wished to flesh out a number of points of clarification.
To not repeat what others have said, we want to begin by the first two preambular paragraphs.
Algeriia refers, for example, to the second point and said, we need to talk about the elimination of nuclear weapons and not simply preventing a nuclear arms race or a nuclear war.
We could order, we could also add something else in order to give an order and a structure that is even more logical to this section, bearing in mind the purpose of the treaty, we could have the current preamble of paragraph five as actually the second preamble section so that we first of all, have a reference to the elimination of nuclear weapons as the only guarantee of their non use and then we could have the point referring to nuclear war.
That might be an alternative We could also move up the preambular section, the current preambular Section ten.
Wording proposals were made here regarding the importance of Article 6 in reference to that fact this idea of recognizing that we must maintain and strengthen the treaty.
We could recognize the treaty in its entirety as the first point, then have the reference to the elimination of nuclear weapons, then the reference to Article 6, and then refer to the prevention of a nuclear war.
That would be our proposed order.
We agree with what Iran said regarding the preamblear paragraph four, and replacing need by obligations.
We think that would be a relevant substitution.
There is also the important need to strengthen the disarmament dimension of the pre aula section that could be further improved with new language.
We could include the concern regarding the lack of progress.
That is what has been patently clear over recent review cycles, so we need to be pragmatic here and recognize that sufficient progress has not been made.
That concern needs to be reflected.
We should once again use language in its non watered down form so that the disarmament thrust of the preambler section would be reinforced.
Just a few comments.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba for intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of Italy to take the floor.
Thank you.
Thank you, Chair.
Since this is the first time I'm taking the floor to comment on this draft, I would like to thank you and through you, the president of the Review Conference for this zero draft outcome document.
From a general perspective, as others before us, we appreciate the transparent and inclusive approach the president has adopted and welcome the way in which he has endeavored to reflect the complexities of our debates in what appears to be a concise text.
We believe this document is a good basis for further negotiations.
We appreciate the inclusion of a preamble with the reaffirmation of the importance of the treaty and the principle that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, which, as we said in our statements, should be the foundation for any further discussion.
As other delegations have said, namely Belgium and Canada, we would favor the addition of a paragraph mentioning the historical achievements of the NPT and its fundamental role in the overall international security architecture.
We'll now refer to paragraph two as several other delegations have mentioned it.
We are not sure the question of extended deterrence mentioned in paragraph two fits in this part that relates to the application of Articles one and two.
In our view, while we might have different political views on this matter, there should be no question whatsoever that these arrangements are fully compliant with those two articles from a legal point of view.
Secondly, if we mention the relation of these arrangements to the treaty long term effectiveness, then we have to spell out that they have been beneficial to the treaty and to one of its main goals.
As we have underlined time and time again, it is a historical fact that no one can deny that no NATO country has gone nuclear since the NPT has been in force.
As we have frequently explained, these arrangements provide allies with security guarantees that reduce incentives for them To develop their own nuclear capabilities, extended deterrence has prevented nuclear proliferation, so it has contributed and still contributes to one of the treaties main goals.
This must be reflected in this text.
The conference should note ongoing discussion regarding extended deterrence arrangements, including in relation to the treaty long term effectiveness, and we would add to the benefits that these arrangements have brought to the treaty implementation.
As to the next sentence, we're not aware of any new nuclear sharing arrangements, so the sentence should go.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Italy for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of the European Union to take the floor.
Questions for now on the preambular paragraph.
And on the basis of that, may I suggest that we now turn our focus to paragraphs 1 and 2 of the draft outcome document.
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the zero draft outcome document.
The first speaker I have on my list is the distinguished representative of Egypt.
Egypt, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Good afternoon to you and to all those in the room.
Actually, I was intending to raise my arm but Egyptian timing, so it's a bit late.
I wanted to speak about the first preambular paragraphs.
If you don't mind, I'll proceed very shortly.
So what we wanted to reiterate was perhaps those who spoke before us regarding the preambular paragraph one, we believe that perhaps it is best to begin by referring to nuclear disarmament instead of the nuclear nonproliferation.
Um, as that is the end goal or rather the logic of the deal upon which this treaty was founded for nuclear disarmament to be the ultimate goal.
With regards to preamble paragraph VI, we believe that it would be important to add the word balanced after the urgent full and balanced.
And in the second line, we would also we also wish to add the words, as well as achieving its universality.
We believe that this is the treaty efficiency and effectiveness is rather limited by the fact that it has not yet achieved this universality and would be important to add this element.
We would also wish in the ultimate line of paragraph EI to add the following text and have a vital role in promoting international peace and security.
With regards to paragraph V VI.
We also wish to add after and balanced implementation of the treaty and its three pillars, just to denote clearly that we're talking about all three pillars and as well to add a very small segment to the last line to say to preserving the credibility and effectiveness of the treaty and the effectiveness of its operations.
I apologize.
We would also wish in PPXPP nine to add at the end of the second line and not to take any action that impairs the objective of universalization or it can negatively, and then up until the end.
In preamble paragraph ten, we would also wish to add the words and full and effective implementation of Article 6 and the unequivocal undertakings by nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
That is the gist of our remarks and observations.
Of course, we join many of our colleagues who spoke before about strengthening the language on nuclear disarmament and achieving the universalization.
We will also submit these comments in writing to Chair.
Thank you so much.
I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt for his intervention.
As I did indicate, we may now wish to move our focus to paragraphs 1 and 2 of the zero draft outcome document.
I have South Africa on my list.
South Africa, the distinguished representative of South Africa, you have the floor.
Thank you very much Chair.
We would like to reiterate our appreciation to the president for the timely circulation of the zero draft.
We do recognize many positive elements reflected in the draft as well as areas that require further strengthening.
South Africa would like to offer the following observations aimed at strengthening the text on paragraph two.
We welcome the inclusion of nuclear sharing and extended deterrence in paragraph two.
However, we need to be careful not to citally accept current nuclear sharing arrangements which a number of states have explicitly rejected during the discussions.
In this regard, we recommend that the second sentence directly state that the conference expresses concern about the potential nuclear sharing arrangements with regard to the way forward in this paragraph, proposal of a sustained dialogue to address the nuclear sharing and extended deterrence, which in the view of many delegations are directly not in compliance with Article 1 and two of the treaty, maintains the status quo and does not address the concern and implies a long term process.
On the TPNW, we would like to state that we stress that acknowledging the treaty adopted through the United Nations and supported by a majority of member states is the minimum that is being requested.
South Africa will present further comments on other paragraphs that are being addressed by the committee upon direction of the chair.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of South Africa for her intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of Senegal to take the floor.
Commissioner, president.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chair, please allow me to first of all, support the proposal made for the preambular paragraphs when we suggested that the ICJ advisory opinion be added to it.
I think it was a good proposal.
Now, in paragraph two here, my delegation took good note of the positions expressed here in support of nuclear sharing.
For my delegation, this issue is not an ongoing discussion.
It's an ongoing concern.
So the wording in paragraph two for us needs to be reviewed not to take note of ongoing discussions, but other concerns regarding nuclear sharing.
I also support the proposal made by South Africa on the second sentence.
Which needs to be rewarded.
My delegation recalls also the appeal made to ICG as regards to nuclear sharing.
This is something that we very much bear in mind.
Given certain reticence on this, we are flexible here.
In any event, as far as we are concerned, this is not an ongoing discussion.
It's a concern expressed by a number of delegations on the issue of nuclear sharing and extended deterrence.
Thank you.
Mercy.
I thank the distinguished representative of Senecal for his statement.
Thank you very much.
Distinguished Representative of Algeria to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Under your guidance, I will focus on paragraph one, PPI one and Pe two.
PP one chair would like to see the reflection of the Verbatim language from the 2010 principal objective.
The addition would be as follows, declaring that the treaty remains the cornerstone of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmment regime and the essential foundation for pursuit of nuclear disarnment to replace it by the Verbatim language from the 20 2010 principle and objectives.
The rationale behind that the current draft creates ERC.
Non proliferation is a cornerstone, disarmament is a foundation for the pursuit.
And peaceful uses important element in fostering.
This is, in our view, a regulation from the agreed language.
In 2010, we mentioned a single corners formula and we'd like to keep it in this draft.
The second addition would be after the peaceful purposes to add without discrimination.
I think it's in line with the agreed language.
On PP two, we would like to add before and recognizing the urgent need to add the following formula, recognizing that the only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons I'll never use it again in their total elimination.
The rational chair that this political mantra is without its operational corollary.
The 2022 P five joint statement itself pad the formula with disarmment commitment.
And the zero draft retains only the first half without the elimination corollary.
We would like to delete to reattach the counterpart and that to make the detention of nuclear weapon not indefinitely.
This is the point, recognizing that the only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons are never used again is their total elimination.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Algeria for his intervention, and I invite the distinguished representative of Finland to make their intervention.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Comment on Article 2.
My preference would be to have the paragraph deleted, but I understand that this paragraph has of course been discussed here and therefore, I would like to propose a modification.
I think the main issue here is that as we are reviewing a nonproliferation treaty, it would be useful to mention that extended deterrence arrangements have been a key tool in preventing proliferation and contributing to a more stable security environment.
And the arrangements have reduced the incentive for non nuclear states to seek their own nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, as regards the legality of these arrangements or extended deterrence, I would like to see that these arrangements are fully consistent with Articles one and two of the treaty.
So this was basically what I said in the subsidiary body yesterday, but I just wanted to repeat it, and I understand quite many states here are sharing my view.
If I can for the sake of efficiency, say just a couple of words on the preamblar paragraph.
I did not take the floor a moment ago, but I would like to support the states that have been talking about the historic value of the treaty and it is very valuable that we have had this treaty for more than five decades and it has worked well.
I would add my voice to those asking for this addition to the preambular paragraph.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Finland for the intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of Iran to take the floor.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chair.
On paragraph two and due to the gravity of the concern with regard to nuclear sharing and extended deterrence, my delegation has published a standalone working paper on nuclear sharing and extended deterrence and over there, We have proved the legal basis of the argument that these arrangements, meaning nuclear sharing and extended deterrence are illegal and are in clear violation of the sprint and letter of the treaty, specifically the paragraph third and fourth of the preamble and also the paragraphs 1 and second of the treaty.
The symbol allocated for this working paper is pt slash com dot 2026 slash wp dot 69.
So I invite distinguished delegations to study it carefully because we believe that we have proved on the legal basis of our argument that why these arrangements are illegal and what their implications could be.
The more we listen to the repetitive positions of certain delegations, the more we believe that they will be responded properly by proposals and other delegations.
We see that as Senegalue colleague rightly mentioned, this is ongoing concern for a lot of delegations and I don't think that repeating positions will make them right.
Again, we believe that this is illegal with the severe implications in practice because as they say, these have addressed proliferation concern of some countries, if we apply the same logic for others, others also will have the right to access nuclear weapons in any ways and this is wrong.
This is illegal.
So in the interest of time, I think that it suffices that we refer delegations to our working paper and also based on our previous explanations, we have some deletions and additions for paragraph two and in the interest of time, I'm going to read out the modified version for information of distinguished delegations and president to consider.
And hopefully it will be reflected in the final document.
Our proposal reads as following.
The conference declares that nuclear weapons sharing and extended deterrence arrangements under whatever form, including nuclear sharing arrangements of the US with its NATO allies, as well as proliferation arrangement on the as between Australia, the US, and the UK, seriously and substantively contradict the object and purpose of the treaty and gravely violate respective obligations of the states parties involved under Articles one and two, and in the interest of the treaty long term effectiveness and credibility, urges putting an immediate and effective end to all such measures.
The conference decides to consider in its next session and on a priority basis Consider all aspects of nuclear sharing and extended deterrence arrangements in the context of reviewing.
The implications of Articles one and two can contribute to strengthening the treaty, enhancing confidence and advancing its objectives.
I thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Iran for its intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of Cuba to take the floor.
Maja, thank you very much Chair.
Turning to paragraphs 1 and 2 that we are currently considering on the first, I just want to add in addition to comments that have already been made, the reference to the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without discrimination and without conditions.
As is duly reflected in the IAA statute regarding paragraph two, we're grateful for the proposal by Iran and in specific reference to the language in zero in the draft, We like that and we're in agree with what South African Senegal has said, we would add, however, in the last phrase where it stated that enhancing confidence is important and sustained dialogue is important in terms of the implementation of Articles one and two.
We'd also add Article 6 to that list and we would say that that would contribute to strengthening the treaty.
A Article 6 in the last sentence.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba for intervention, and I invite the distinguished representative of Malaysia to make their intervention.
Malisa have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Massa welcomes the inclusion of paragraphs 1 and 2, and we support the clear reaffirmation that the full and effective implementation of Articles one and two remains essential to the treaty's effectiveness and to international peace and security.
In Malis's view, this paragraph could be further strengthened by underscoring that implementation must be non discriminatory and consistent as uneven application undermines confidence in the regime.
On paragraph two, MSA appreciates that the draft acknowledges the ongoing discussions regarding nuclear weapon sharing and a standard deterrence arrangements.
MSSA believes this paragraph should be strengthened to provide greater clarity and normative guidance as Articles one and two are among the treaty's core nonproliferation obligations.
In this regard, MASI would propose that the text go beyond noting discussion and underscore that arrangements involving the transfer, stationing or sharing of nuclear weapons or control over such weapons raise serious concerns regarding compatibility with Articles one and two.
And warrant careful scrutiny in the interest of safeguarding the treaty integrity.
NASA also supports the call for sustained dialogue, but emphasizes that such dialogue should be structured and outcome oriented with a view to preventing new arrangements and avoiding practices that could erode confidence in the treaty over time.
NACA stands ready to engage constructively with all states parties to refine this language in a balanced manner that strengthens implementation, enhances confidence and preserves the long term credibility of the NPT.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Malaysia for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of the United States to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
I didn't come in on the preambular paragraphs in the interest of time since my earlier comments encompass those.
But in some, we'll have concerns and we'll make suggestions about preambular three on humanitarian consequences.
We will, like several in the room, make suggestions to strengthen the references to Article 6, four, five, and ten.
We could support additional language on pursuing in good faith negotiations.
As my statement yesterday reflected, we would love to encourage all nuclear weapon states to engage in multilateral strategic stability dialogues and similarly, we'll make some suggestions on language regarding past commitments.
We appreciate the preambular emphasis on full compliance with the treaty.
Moving to paragraphs 1 and 2.
I really can't say it better than the distinguished ambassador of Belgium, but also the delegations of Canada, Italy, Latvia, Finland, and several others.
I appreciate the sentiment expressed a few moments ago by one delegation that we should not simply restate positions.
In fact, I don't think we've heard that today.
I think the countries I just mentioned um, did very constructively was indicate that while we have heard a number of Dell's delegations expressing one set of views about extended deterrence and nuclear arrangements, we also in the main committee as well as in yesterday's subsidiary body and even today have heard many interventions to point out the contributions that these arrangements have made to global and regional strategic stability, as well as to nuclear nonproliferation.
As a matter of the historical record, Prior to the existence of these arrangements, several of the countries currently covered by them did have nuclear weapons programs and were aiming toward nuclear weapons programs.
Since these arrangements existence, not one country under these arrangements has sought or acquired a nuclear weapon.
It's important to reflect that those views also have been expressed in this plenary multiple times by a plurality of delegations and I think that is intended with all constructiveness in trying to reach a text that everyone in the room could live with.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of the United States for her intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of the European Union to take the floor.
Well, it appears that he has disappeared on the list.
So let me invite the distinguished representative of Egypt to make his intervention.
Egypt.
Thank you once again, Chair and just to be very brief on Article 1 and one and two and OP one, we would suggest the words and preserving international peace and security to add the following text.
It would say, bearing in mind that universal adherence to the treaty and full compliance of all parties with its provisions uh, represent the optimal way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to promote and preserve international peace and security.
I think the logic or rationale is pretty self explanatory, so I will try to save colleagues time by not delving too much into that.
On OP two, we would also wish to make a very small minor editorial change in L three, where it says the conference expresses concerns we would suggest adding the word existing and potential.
Thank you very much.
I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt for his intervention.
As of now, there are no other interventions.
Does any delegation wish to make any intervention respect of paragraphs 1 and 2 at this stage? All right.
And I invite Lithuania to take the floor.
Let me at the outset, thank the presidency and the Secretariat for the preparations of the zero draft since I haven't done so in the main committee one yet.
First, I would like to express general caveat that my capital is still assessing the document and will submit written comments at a later stage.
Nevertheless, I would like to share our initial thoughts on paragraph two in line with your guidance.
Lithuania would like to remind that NATO extended deterrence and nuclear sharing arrangements have always been and continues to be fully consistent with NPT, as many countries already stated.
I would like to highlight that the current strain on the NPT is not the result of NATO nuclear policy.
NATO policy is longstanding, predates the NP and remains fully consistent with Articles one and two, and continues to support the treaty nonproliferation objectives.
Nothing has changed, but what has changed and what placed the Nptee at risk are the actions of certain states, such as Russia's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, attacks affecting civilian nuclear infrastructure, and its efforts to legitimize the DPRK's nuclear program.
China's rapid and opaque expansion of its nuclear arsenal and continued refusal to engage meaningfully in arms control, Iran's persistence in proliferation sensitive nuclear activities alongside destabilizing missile programs, and North Korean going nuclear and ballistic missile programs in violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions.
Therefore, when it comes to paragraph two, we do not support language suggesting otherwise regarding NATO nuclear sharing and extended deterrence and without acknowledging the benefits of NATO arrangements and the contribution to strengthening the NPT, this paragraph lacks balance, does not reflect reality, and therefore adds little value to the document.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Lithuania for her intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of Cameron to take the floor.
Mason.
Thank you, Chair for giving me the floor.
My delegation wishes to make in depth comment on paragraphs 1 and 2 on the draft document that pertain to Article 1 and two of the NPT.
Paragraph one of the zero draft reaffirms that the full effective implementation of Articles one and two is essential to the effectiveness of the treaty.
My delegation fully endorses that reaffirmation.
Paragraph two is a notable step forward.
For the first time in a final document, the conference notes discussions on nuclear weapons sharing and extended deterrence arrangements.
It expresses concerns regarding the establishment of any new nuclear sharing arrangements and emphasizes the importance of sustained dialogue on these issues.
This development heeds a longstanding concern expressed by non nuclear weapon states.
Many colleagues have voiced this concern, Senegal, Egypt, and others.
My delegation also commends the fact that paragraph two explicitly links these issues to the credibility and long term effectiveness of the treaty.
Regarding the previous review conference, this language is a significant innovation compared to previous language.
However, we deplore the fact that there are a number of contradictions and gaps in the text.
First, paragraph two settles for noting discussions and expressing concern.
There's no demand for transparency or verification.
And it's not placed on states participating in these sharing arrangements.
My state believes that new nuclear weapon states must provide in national reports clarification regarding how compatible their sharing arrangements are with Article 1 of the treaty.
My second point, Paragraph two refers to extended deterrence.
Without defining the contours of it, the legal contours that is.
However, Article 1 prohibits any nuclear weapon state from transferring to anybody nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
That's a quote from the treaty, extended deterrence through nuclear sharing arrangements raises an issue of interpretation that the text here does not resolve.
My third point, there is an implicit contradiction between paragraph one that reaffirms the importance of Article 1 and two and paragraph two that normalizes dialogue on nuclear sharing arrangements.
Whose compatibility with Article 1 is called into question by several non nuclear weapon states.
The text does not clarify these nuclear sharing arrangements and doesn't clarify whether they're in accordance with the treaty.
Paragraph two refers to any new nuclear sharing arrangements, but does not say anything about existing nuclear sharing arrangements.
We regret that this text does not recall nuclear weapon states obligation to review their current sharing arrangements in light of Article 1.
In terms of international law, the interpretation of Articles one and two falls under treaty law.
Paragraph two does not affirm that existing sharing arrangements doesn't say whether they're compliant or not.
This careful wording avoids a violation of international law, but means that there is some ambiguity that's not wise and undermines the credibility of NPT.
If we don't clarify the notion of compatibility of these arrangements with the NPT, that's a concern.
My delegation calls for the following.
One, the final document must demand nuclear weapon states that participate in nuclear sharing arrangements, to supply in their national reports clarifications regarding the compatibility of these arrangements with Articles one.
That could be done as part of an annual implementation declaration.
My second point, we should replace the expression deterrence, discussions and notes deterrence with demanding a dialogue on transparency and compatibility with the article.
We should add an explicit reference to the obligation to not transfer indirectly or directly nuclear explosive devices in order to avoid ambiguity on existing arrangements.
We should recognize that the credibility of the NPT depends on the lack of a contradiction between the practice of nuclear sharing and the spirit of Article 1.
It is important in my delegation's view to move beyond this gray area.
Thank you.
Mercy, I thank the distinguished representative of Cameroon for that statement.
Ladies and gentlemen, it appears that my list of speakers on paragraphs 1 and 2 has been exhausted.
And so with your concurrence, we may wish to proceed to focus our discussions on paragraphs 46 to 73 and paragraph 80 of the zero draft outcome document.
El Salvador wishes to take.
You have the floor.
Thank you very much Chair.
To supplement the comments that we already made on the preambular section in general terms, we have a fairly positive assessment of the text.
However, like several delegations that previously took the floor and did so yesterday and today, including Austria, Ireland, South Africa, Mexico, Kurbas, and Kazakhstan, in addition to others, we are of the view that language on the Environmental and humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons should be more unequivocal language.
We should reflect more precisely the concerns expressed by myriad states parties during the general debate and the discussions within this committee.
For my delegation, the consequences of any nuclear detonation, including an accidental or unintentional one would be catastrophic cross border and global in nature.
Scientific evidence that has been accumulated in recent years points to much more severe consequences of those previously believed to be the case, including systemic effects on human health, food security, the environment, and global economic stability.
Consequently, we are of the view that it is important for the document to adequately reflect that reality.
As regards provisions on nuclear tests, we would be grateful to see more robust, unequivocal language.
We think that that would contribute to strengthening the NPT and also to strengthening the international and disarmment nonproliferation architecture as a whole, particularly in the current context in which we are seeing growing concerns around possible backsliding in this field.
Moreover, we should call for the timely entry into force of the CTBT.
Regarding language on emerging risks, specifically paragraph 61, it is positive to include references to emerging technologies.
However, we are of the view that the language remains insufficient in this paragraph.
Both in the general debate and in discussions within this committee, many delegations have specifically referred not only to emerging technologies in the abstract, but also in specific terms to risks linked with the use of AI in communications, command and control systems for nuclear weapons.
Moreover, Switzerland previously referred to cybersecurity risks as well as data security throughout the life cycle and other risks of the digital ecosystem.
That should also be considered in this paragraph.
In my delegation's view, the documents should more precisely reflect these concerns, including risks of automating automation risks, slips in human judgment, miscalculation, and inadvertent mistakes, particularly bearing the increasing degree of technological integration into nuclear strategies.
Thank you, Chair.
El Salvador hopes to continue actively and constructively contributing to these negotiations.
I thank the distinguished representative of El Salvador for her intervention.
I invite the distinguished representative of Burgio to make this intervention.
Thank you, Chair.
We would have a remark concerning paragraph 50, especially the last sentence where the conference expresses concern at statements that are counter to Article 6.
In its current wording, it's rather unclear to what statements this text refers.
So we would propose to make the text more precise by referring to the recent uptick in nuclear coercive messaging.
Regarding paragraph 56, we welcome the call for a successful arrangement to new start.
However, we would be remiss if we didn't launch an appeal to the nuclear weapon states with the fastest growing arsenal increase to also engage in arms control talks.
The proposed multilateral strategic stability talks offer an avenue in this regard.
Chair, we welcome the paragraphs on the CTBT, but we believe an important element is missing, namely the crucial role played by the International monitoring system and the International Data Center.
We will propose some language on that in this regard.
And finally, regarding paragraph 58, we are unclear about the last sentence where there is talk about the role of non nuclear weapon states in preventing any use of nuclear weapons.
We do believe that non nuclear weapon states have a crucial role play in implementing the NPT, but it seems rather tall order for non nuclear weapon states to prevent any use of nuclear weapons.
Those are my main remarks.
Thank you very much.
I thank the distinguished representative of Belgium for his intervention, and I invite the distinguished representative of Iraq to take the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Please allow me to, first of all, thank you.
I thank members of the Bureau for preparing this draft of outcome document, which is an excellent basis for our deliberations.
Mr.
Chair, we take note of the existence of a number of positive elements in paragraphs 46 to 73 overall this draft.
It reiterates the legal commitments under Article 6 and reaffirms the importance of implementing the NPT in a balanced manner without discrimination and recognition that the elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee that they will not be used.
148.
We welcome a clear recognition that the indefinite extension of the treaty does not apply to the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons.
We think that this wording is particularly important.
This principle need to remain clear and not be reinterpreted in any other way.
Continued possession of nuclear weapons, arsenals and their modernization runs counter to the NPT objectives.
With a commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons.
We would like to amend Paragraph 50, which deeply regrets the quantitative measure of nuclear weapons.
We consider that's important here to make sure that the document expresses clearly the concern as regards nuclear weapons and the creation of new generations of weapons.
In 2051, we would like to add in a limited time here to make sure that it's clear that we're talking about the elimination of nuclear weapons.
On 57, we think that the measures to reduce risks should not be proposed as an alternative or precondition to the implementation of Article 6 commitments.
We are also concerned by any approach which legitimizes the possession of nuclear weapon in any way within the framework of risk management, risk reduction.
Such an approach can enshrine the doctrine Of nuclear deterrence.
On Paragraph 660, we support what is stated here about not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and to take measures on this by adding without these things without delay.
64, we propose a clear wording of the obligations of member states to announce the implementation of their disarmament obligations as we have in Article 6 of the NPT.
To strengthen the provisions of this in paragraph 70 and 71 of this document.
Paragraph 67, we underscore the need to separate awareness raising issues in disarmament and nonproliferation on 68.
On CTBT we would like to add here within the clear work of plan within the conference on disarmament.
Finally, we would like to reiterate the great importance of negative safeguards and takes note of paragraph 62 and 63.
And calls for adding what refers to the importance of starting negotiations on an instrument which does not discriminate and is binding within the conference.
We reiterate that the only guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons resides in their elimination, which is irreversible and verifiable and all efforts need to be made under Article 6.
We need to take defined measures which are tangible and done in time and we call for future cooperation within this framework.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Iraq for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of Cameroon to take the floor.
President.
Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
On the second sequence of the paragraphs that you put there for consideration.
Here, my delegation would like to comment on 52, 53, and 55 of the draft outcome document.
My negation, think that CTBT is also something that prevents future development of future nuclear weapons and also gets us closer to the goals of the NPT.
Under Article 6 and provides for practical steps, which was provided in RPC 2000 and CTBT is number one of one of the first disarmament measures.
Darmament is fragile and reversible and the credibility of the NPT regime can thus be affected.
We therefore welcome the reaffirmation in 2052 of the urgeence of making sure that CTBT enters into force as well in the 53, this entry into force is a permanent commitment, non discriminatory, verifiable, and legally binding commitment to end any test explosion.
We also subscribe to what you said in 2055 about strategic political environmental dangers that resume nuclear explosion would represent, which would be a backsliding in international disarmament efforts.
The mention in 55 that nuclear weapon states had to maintain the existing moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions and abstain from any action contrary to the object of the CTBT is a necessary recall.
When it comes to the 2010 and 2015 rev com, well, we think that it's important to reiterate that the CTBT needs to enter into force as quickly as possible.
But we call for greater precision here and accountability.
My delegation would like to have stronger wording on CTBT therefore, as I just explained, and we regret the fact that the 52 only talks about the states which have not ratified without any coordinated measure to incentivize them.
Then We underscore in 54, I 55, we're talking about the moratorium, but does not link this explicitly to test explosions.
Therefore, the binding nature here remains limited.
We call for outcome document to link maintaining a moratorium with obligation not to undertaking activities which undermine the CTBT with a notification and transparency mechanism, that we recognize the role played by the CTBT Prep com and its international monitoring system, which de facto operates as a confidence building systems in the absence of entry into force and that we issue a new appeal to states to those which ratified but continue to modernize their arsenals.
My delegation calls for the Rev com to not limit itself to just deploring the delay, but pass targeted diplomatic measures to bring about the entry into force of CTBT for as long as it hasn't entered into force or universally ratified, The door will remain open to a new arms race, which is obviously contrary to the goals under NPT, even if we undertake wide raging measures for as long as we don't pull out the root, they will not be able to attain them.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Cameroon for his statement.
The distinguished representative of Ukraine to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Our delegation would like to make certain remarks with regard to the nuclear disarmament part of the draft.
First of all, we would like to welcome the language on the CTBT, some of the elements we are supportive of.
At the same time, we think the paragraph on CBT are missing some important parts.
In particular, we would propose to properly reflect the International monitoring system.
I think the IMS deserves to be reflected in this paragraph, given its important role and that it proved to be effective.
Moreover, we of course welcome the ratification and signatures by a number of states of the CTBT which is an important step toward universalization of the CTBT.
At the same time, I think this paragraph is missing another development, namely the revocal of ratification by a nuclear weapon state in 2023, which is deplorable.
As we move towards other parts of this section, we have comments on as already mentioned by a number of delegations, we think that the zero draft should explicitly reflect the developments with regard to the irresponsible nuclear rhetoric of the Russian Federation, which affects regional, international peace and security.
We are flexible regarding placement of this element either in paragraph 50, 58 or even in preamble or part of the zero draft.
Moving to the next paragraphs, we would also suggest in particular in paragraph 63 to make a reference to the importance of implementation of the memorandum on the security assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to the treatment of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, commonly known as Budapest memorandum.
And also, we think that there should be an explicit call for the full implementation of the commitments under the Budapest memorandum.
These are our main comments.
We will indeed submit our written proposals for the consideration of the conference.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Ukraine for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of Algeria to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
On the operative party related to nuclear disarmament.
On OP 46, we fully support this paragraph as it is verbatim from Article 6.
On para 47, we'd like to add a reference to the inequivocal undertaking, the 13 practical steps and 64 action plan.
We think the current paragraph mention numerous measures generically without explicit naming of the 13 steps and the 64 action plan.
The addition would be as follows.
We after Article 6, particularly the implementation of the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states and the 13 practical steps agreed in 2000 and the 64 point action plan agreed in 2010.
P 49.
We'd like to replace underscores the importance of nuclear weapon states, application of this principle with urges the nuclear weapon states to apply these principles.
The rationale that underscores the importance is not to strength, urges is prestrictive, and the 2010 action plan uses the operative formula all states party commit and we think we have to keep this language.
Ompala 51, We would like to replace diminish the role and significance with exclude the law and add to the complete prohibition of qualitative development, modernization, life extension, and all upgrading of nuclear weapons, replace the replace consistent with action five with fulfillment of the inequitical undertaking, the 13 practical steps and the action plan adopted in 2010.
We think that the verb diminish allows indefinite irritation of nuclear weapons insecurity doctrines, the verb exclude requires their removal.
In para 52, we would like to add language on Sitity to refrain from any action contrary to the object and purpose of the Sitity after the special responsibility of nuclear weapon states to take the lead of this regard.
The paragraph correctly cites action ten by name.
Same thing with Nam language.
On Bada, On Pala 58, we'd like to add and recognizing that pending such elimination, all nuclear weapon states shall provide effective universal and conditional non discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding negative security.
The paragraph addresses every effort to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used, but stops short of linking this to the NSAs, adding NSA language reinforces the operational logic and prevents the paragraph from becoming a deterrence friendly statement of restraint.
On Pala, on Para 63, we would like to replace engage in substantive discussion with a view to formulation a recommendation on all aspects of the issue, including the possibility of an international legally binding agreement with immediately commence negotiation on legally binding international instrument on negative security insurance.
Establish a subsidiary body in the conference on disarmament on negative security.
We think this language from the agreed in the NA relevant documents.
Finally, we would like to make some amendment on paragraph 68.
In line with the FMCT and to make it as a znment measure by adding the idea to addressing the past prediction, the existing stock piles, and the future prediction.
On paragraph 69 I thank the distinguished representative of Algeria for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of the Holy See to take the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
With regard to the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, my delegation wishes to express strong support for the references contained in paragraphs 52 through 55.
In our view, the reference to the CTBT and the urgency of its entry into force represents a fundamental element that should be preserved in the text.
While even stronger language would be welcome, we appreciate the inclusion of these references.
Regarding paragraph 61, my delegation welcomes the current language while considering that it could be further strengthened in two respects.
First, by including more explicit language on emerging technologies, in particular, artificial intelligence, and its application in nuclear weapons related command control and decision support systems.
Second, while we welcome the reference to human control, it is important to reaffirm that such control must remain full and meaningful, especially in the context of emerging technologies such as AI.
Decisions of such gravity, which concern the very survival of humanity cannot be delegated to machines or taken through opaque algorithmic processes.
In paragraph 68, we also welcome the reference to commencing the negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty.
Finally, my delegation welcomes the inclusion of a reference to the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons contained in paragraph 73, which remains of particular importance for my delegation.
We would also welcome language more clearly reflecting the complementarity between the TPNW and the implementation of Article 6 obligations under the NPT.
In our view, the TPNW represents an important contribution toward the shared objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Holy See for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of Italy to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
As for the paragraphs 46-73, we strongly support all the references to the CTBT and to maintaining the longstanding testing moratoriums.
In paragraph 55, we should, however, aim for zero yield or any yield, which is preferable to low yield.
I believe it should read supercritical rather than subcritical.
We also think it is worth mentioning the international monitoring system and its essential function of providing reliable and scientific information and therefore, the IMS therefore plays an irreplaceable preventive role against nuclear testing.
We also strongly support the reference to the immediate commencement of negotiations in the conference on disarmament of a fissile material cutoff treaty and to the need to maintain or declare moratoriums on the production of fissile materials.
This is for us a top priority, and we welcome the clear and strong language on this that should not be in any way weakened.
Furthermore, there is a reference to the role of non nuclear weapon states that is not clear to us.
That should be either rephrased anchored on actual positions expressed during the debate or simply removed.
I refer in particular to the second sentence of paragraph 58.
We also have reservations on paragraph 64 and to its reference to legal requirements to report and be subject to inspection as well as to the need for commensurate reporting requirements.
We do not understand what is meant by commensurate in this context.
If we refer to reporting requirements under the treaty, then we should refer to paragraph 91 which we support, according to which reports by non nuclear weapon states will be on a strictly voluntary basis.
In light of the above, we request deletion of paragraph 64.
Finally, in paragraph 59, we do not believe that risk reduction measures should be considered in connection with the root causes of international tensions.
Risk reduction has a practical, urgent and concrete dimension to it that is well rendered by the following examples in the same paragraph when it refers to crisis communications, notifications, and other similar practical measures.
Risk reduction must be in place independently of international intentions.
In fact, those tensions make risk reduction even more urgent and necessary.
We therefore request a deletion of dimensional root causes of international tensions.
Thank you, Chair.
This intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of South Africa to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
We offer initial proposals pertaining to paragraphs 46 to 73 as follows.
South Africa recommends that there be a clear reflection on the lack of progress in the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations by the nuclear weapon states and the urgency to achieve nuclear disarmament, especially in view of the international security context.
In this regard, it would also be essential for this section to reiterate the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all states parties are committed under Article 6, and as included in Step six of 2000 and action three of 2010.
Chair, the humanitarian consequences are not limited to testing as emphasized in paragraph 54.
South Africa stresses that the conference should emphasize the ever growing evidence on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, the cross border nature of their consequences, and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, which should underpin our approaches and efforts towards nuclear disarmament.
On paragraph 46, we suggest that this paragraph follows language of Article 6 very closely to avoid the perception that nuclear disarmament can only happen in the context of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.
South Africa believes that the ICJ opinion that there is an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament should be included in a manner to relate to nuclear disarmament.
In this regard, we will submit a proposal in writing.
On Paris 70, we recommend that the nuclear materials designated by each of the nuclear weapon states as no longer required for military purposes remain permanently outside military programs.
This will bring the sentence in conformity with action 16 of the 2010 action plan.
Pertaining to irreversibility in paragraph 72, we do not see the need to build a common understanding on this principle, and this aspect can be deleted.
The three principles of irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency are decisions of previous review conferences reflected as applicable to nuclear disarmament.
On threat of use, we recommend that the conference expresses deep concern of the threat of nuclear weapons, both explicit and implicit.
South Africa supports paragraphs 52 and 53 and continues to advance that the entry into force of the CTBT will provide a verifiable and legally binding commitment to end any nuclear weapon test explosion.
We see a large number of risk reduction measures included in the document.
Most of these are dependent on nuclear weapon states discussing amongst themselves with the broader membership left to wait for them to create an ideal situation that they think is conducive to nuclear disarmament.
In our view, this only perpetuates an indefinite possession of nuclear weapons.
In this regard, the conference should only consider a minimum number of risk reduction measures as an interim measure to avoid these being used as a distraction from the disarmament obligation.
Finally, Chair, on paragraph 80, we welcome the reflection of the text and the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the treaty and support the text in this regard.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of South Africa for his intervention.
Well, distinguished delegates, with less than 5 minutes to end the session, the time allocated for interpretation services is drawing to a close.
And so if states parties will agree, I want to propose again that delegations who have requested the floor, but who will not be able to do so be given the floor at the start of the next meeting of Main Committee one, which is scheduled for Tuesday, the 12th of May.
Those delegations are Iran, the Netherlands, Austria, and Japan.
May I take it that distinguished delegates are in agreement with my proposal? Thank you very much indeed.
Does the Secretariat have any announcement for us at this stage? No.
Thank you very much indeed.
Distinguished delegates? Well, I would like to thank you once again for the constructive manner in which you have engaged the draft outcome, and I wish you all a wonderful weekend as we regroup again next week.
The meeting is adjourned.
Okay.
Yeah.