Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. against you. and you. Thank you. Thank you. I'm here. I ensure you. Yes, thank you, thank you. reciting a client's narrative is not evidence. And it is certainly not contemporaneous evidence. Where is the contemporaneous evidence from the late 19th century to support the argument that Great Britain and the United States defrauded or structurally coerced Venezuela to sign the 1897 treaty, which is said to have been negotiated behind its back and contrary to its interests. Venezuela had the chance to present it in its written pleadings and did not. They had the chance again on Wednesday and again they did not. In fact, the evidence is entirely to the contrary. On Monday, I took you through it. I did not indulge in mere assertion like Venezuela's counsel did, leaving you to review only the scant footnotes when they were supplied to check for accuracy. I showed the evidence to you, displaying 27 different contemporaneous documents on your screens and including them in your folder so that you could assess them for yourselves. Neither the authenticity nor the accuracy of this evidence has been challenged by Venezuela, neither in its written pleadings nor on Wednesday. Not a word of contradiction. So here are some of the conclusions that can now be drawn from them. Conclusions that Venezuela has not contested with contrary evidence. I will footnote to the evidentiary sources here because I already showed them to you on Monday. By Venezuela's own admission, it wanted to go to arbitration with the British to determine title to the disputed territory and it repeatedly urged the United States to use its influence to compel the British to agree to that arbitration. The United States agreed to assist Venezuela, took up Venezuela's cause, and ultimately forced the British to agree to Venezuela's demand for arbitration, even threatening to go to war if Britain refused. Venezuela, far from complaining about so-called U.S. hegemony, appealed to the U.S. expressly to invoke the Monroe Doctrine against Great Britain, which it did. And Venezuela profusely expressed its gratitude to the U.S. for obtaining Britain's agreement to arbitrate. You will recall the words to that effect by senior Venezuelan officials, including the president of Venezuela, Joaquin Crespo. When it came to negotiating the arbitration agreement, the uncontested evidence showed that Venezuela preferred to have the United States negotiate on its behalf because it believed that the U.S. had more influence with the British and would obtain a better deal for Venezuela than if Venezuela negotiated directly. The U.S. Secretary of State, Richard Olney, liaised closely and frequently with Venezuela's two representatives during the negotiations, received them at his home, consulted with them, consulted with them, shared drafts with them, welcomed their proposals, adopted and made them his own, and persuaded his British counterpart, Lord Poncefut, to accept them, including those that Venezuela regarded as the most critical. The Venezuelan representatives expressed their full satisfaction with the draft agreement that Secretary Olney negotiated, and they recommended that the Venezuelan government accepted it. Venezuela then accepted the agreement freely and without compulsion as serving its best interest. This is fully documented and uncontested. Here again, you will recall the words of President Crespo, affirming that Venezuela accepted the agreement free of coercion. Quote, the settlement plan was presented to Venezuela for its consideration with no coercive intent and in full respect of the sovereignty and independence of the Republic. And he again expressed his profound gratitude to the United States for helping Venezuela accomplish its objectives. How can Venezuela's council in 2026 complain that Venezuela was coerced structurally or otherwise in the face of this declaration by Venezuela's president in 1897 that Venezuela freely signed the treaty in the absence of any coercion? No doubt they are following instructions from their client in advancing Venezuela's current mythology, not the position Venezuela held contemporaneously in 1897. As you know, the myth of invalidity of the treaty was spawned in 1962, some 65 years after the fact, at the time Venezuela first began to denounce the 1899 arbitral award. But this is not the reality that Venezuela recognized in 1897. It is directly opposite and intention with the contemporaneous position of the Venezuelan government, including its president. The best that Professor Azaria could do to support her argument that the 1897 treaty was imposed on Venezuela was to call your attention to a single contemporaneous document, just one. But one from which I had also read on Monday. It was a December 1896 telegram from Secretary Olney to Mr. Storrow, Venezuela's representative, sent after Venezuela had informed the secretary of its acceptance of the draft treaty in November. At the end of this telegram, Mr. Olney referred to Venezuela as, quote, offensive for seeking at that late date to amend the clause on appointment of arbitrators after, in his view, Venezuela had already agreed to sign the treaty. What Professor Azaria did not tell you is that Secretary Olney, at Venezuela's prior request, communicated the new Venezuelan proposal on appointment of arbitrators to Lord Ponsford, who rejected it. And he informed the Venezuelans that if they persisted in seeking this amendment, they would have to deal with Lord Ponsford directly. As I showed you on Monday, that is exactly what Venezuela's minister in Washington, Mr. Andrade, did on 28 December, when he and Lord Ponsford arrived at an agreement on the issue, which Venezuela deemed acceptable. And it then proceeded to sign the treaty on that basis. This is not the smoking gun of America's betrayal of Venezuela that Professor Azaria pretends it to be. There is neither gun nor smoke here, nor anything else to support Venezuela's case. Professor Azaria has no other evidence to show you and nothing else to say about the evidence that we showed you on Monday. Professor Palketti, for his part, energetically embraced the Venezuelan myth that the 1897 treaty was negotiated by Britain and the U.S. behind Venezuela's back. The evidence we showed you on Monday, which stands uncontradicted, exposes the complete falsity of this myth. Professor Palketti's focus was on what he considered evidence of a malicious Anglo-American conspiracy to defeat Venezuela in the arbitration. The evidence, according to Professor Palketti, the evidence, according to Professor Palketti, consisted of an exchange of confidential notes between Secretary Olney and Lord Ponceford, that he falsely told you were kept hidden from Venezuela. When I say falsely, I do not accuse my friend of prevarication, but of not being sufficiently familiar with the evidence or of hiding it from you. It was very noticeable that Professor Palketti did not show you the so-called confidential notes or even quote from them. He showed you the so-called Palketti, he showed you the so-called confidential notes. He showed you only later correspondence referring to them. In contrast, I brought the notes to your attention on Monday. I displayed on our slides PR1.17 and PR1.20 at tab 3 of your folders, the note from Secretary Olney to Lord Ponceford, and referred you to Annex 169 of Venezuela's counter-memorial for Lord Ponceford's report on his communication to Mr. Olney. As I showed and explained, through this exchange, an agreement was reached between the two negotiators and on the length of the prescription period, which was 50 years, as Venezuela wished, and on the preservation of the 1850 agreement, also as Venezuela wished. Significantly, in view of Professor Palketti's false charge that the notes were kept from Venezuela, I had also displayed for you, at slides 1.12 to 1.20, Secretary Olney's correspondence with Mr. Storrow at the time these notes were written, showing that Mr. Olney disclosed Lord Ponceford's proposals and his own to Mr. Storrow and Mr. Andrade, that Mr. Olney consulted with them, including in his own home, prior to writing to Lord Ponceford, and that Mr. Olney's proposals were consistent with those previously submitted to him by Mr. Storrow. The correspondence leaves no doubt that both Mr. Storrow and Mr. Andrade were privy to the so-called confidential notes, and to the agreements on prescription and the 1850 agreement that were reached therein. Professor Palketti referred you to the transcript of the arbitration hearings more than a year later, in which former President Harrison, Venezuela's lead counsel, seems to have been surprised by the existence of these notes. If he was unaware of them, it's Venezuela's fault. Its two representatives in Washington plainly knew of the notes and their contents at the time they were exchanged. Mr. Harrison himself speculated that Mr. Storrow would have known of them. He further speculated that perhaps Mr. Storrow decided not to share them with his client. But that is speculation, not evidence, and it is wrong, because Mr. Andrade, Venezuela's minister in Washington, was made aware of them at the same time as Mr. Storrow. Professor Palketti seems to have contempt for Mr. Storrow. Why sell? What did Mr. Storrow ever do to him? Obviously nothing. But the animus toward him fits well with Professor Palketti's imaginative conspiracy theory about U.S. malevolence. According to Professor Palketti, Mr. Storrow was a double agent, the Kim Philby of his day, who secretly served U.S. interests contrary to Venezuela's. There is no evidence of this. It's another Venezuelan myth, another concoction. Mr. Storrow deserves better. He was one of the most renowned American lawyers of his day. He earned Venezuela's trust by serving as his counsel before President Cleveland's Boundary Commission, leading to their invitation to him to represent their interests in the negotiation of the arbitration agreement with Great Britain. Foreign Minister Rojas initially expressed some hesitation about hiring him. But there is no record of disappointment in his efforts or accomplishments on Venezuela's behalf, or any doubt about his loyalty. Upon Mr. Storrow's sudden and untimely death, he was eulogized by the president of Venezuela. The fact that Mr. Storrow enjoyed Secretary Olney's confidence and had regular access to him, having attended law school together, was a benefit to Venezuela, not a detriment. And this is reflected in the contemporaneous correspondence between them, which you have seen, which resulted in Mr. Olney successfully negotiating for the outcomes proposed by Mr. Storrow and Mr. Andrade on the two issues Venezuela says it regarded as the most critical, the length of the prescription period and the preservation of the 1850 agreement. Mr. President, what this unchallenged contemporaneous evidence shows about the events leading to the negotiation of the 1897 agreement and the actual negotiation of it is that there is no truth in the poor Venezuela narrative, a fledgling republic unjustly robbed of its territory by the superpowers of the day, the nefarious British and treacherous Americans. The narrative that Venezuela and its council are trying so hard to sell to you. In Texas, they would simply say, that dog don't hunt. Mr. President, it is not often in my career that I have stood up and defended the lawfulness of U.S. The United States. I have stood up and defended the 1890s. The United States. I have stood up and defended the 1890s. The United States. I have stood up and defended the 1890s. My country was not then claiming Greenland or Canada as the 51st state. I turn now to 1966 and the Geneva agreement, in which the United States fortunately played no part. Venezuela claims that the Geneva agreement set aside and replaced the 1899 arbitral award so that the validity of the award is not at issue in this case and therefore is not for the court to rule on. They referred to this as a novation. In fact, it is a novelty. Venezuela made the argument for the first time in its rejoinder, filed last August. Apparently, it took them 59 years after signing the agreement and seven years after the initiation of this case to come up with this interpretation. But as the saying goes, there is no one as zealous as a recent convert. And all of Venezuela's counsel, all eight of them who spoke on Wednesday, expressly made or endorsed this argument. It seemed to us, from their rote-like and repetitive incantation of fealty, that this was the price they had to pay for admission to the podium. We say this argument is as off base as it is novel. We base our response to it on the text of the 1966 agreement itself. My friend, my very good friend, Professor Zimmerman, gave you Venezuela's interpretation of the text. But he was not nearly as thorough or as accurate as he was in his indispensable treatise on the statute of the court. Astonishingly, astonishingly, in his article-by-article review of the agreement, he completely skipped over Article 5. Given his customary meticulousness, this was surely not an oversight. So why did he decide to avoid discussion or even mention of Article 5? Let's look at the text. Parath 1 states that Parath 2 states, No acts or activities taking place while this agreement is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting, or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in the territories of Venezuela or British Guyana, or create any rights of sovereignty in those territories, except insofar as such acts or activities result from any agreement reached by the mixed commission and accepted in writing by the government of Guyana and the government of Venezuela. Well, I think we found the answers to our question. Professor Zimmerman told us that the Geneva Agreement has no savings clause. He contrasted it with the Polish Danzig Agreement, where such a clause exists. On this basis, he argued that all rights and obligations claimed by the parties under prior legal instruments, including the 1899 arbitral award, were set aside and replaced by new rights and obligations under this 1966 agreement. But that is directly contradicted by paragraph 1, which bears all the hallmarks of a savings clause. It is undeniable from the text that this preserves all assertions of rights and obligations under the 1899 arbitral award. Professor Zimmerman also told us that the conduct of the parties after the signing of the agreement, in particular their participation in negotiations via the mixed commission, demonstrates their understanding that the rights and obligations under the 1899 award had been set aside and replaced. But that is contradicted by paragraph 2, which expressly provides that no future conduct pursuant to the agreement can be understood to constitute a waiver of pre-existing rights unless the waiver is express and pursuant to an agreement between the parties. There is no evidence of any express waiver or any such agreement. Beyond Professor Zimmerman's remarkable excision of Article 5 from the agreement, there is his tortuous reading of Article 1. The reference in the text to controversy in that article, he tells us, can only refer to the controversy over title to territory rather than any controversy over the validity of the 1899 arbitral award because, he tells us, the same word, controversy, was used in the 1897 treaty, two years before the award was issued. It sounds like a sophisticated analysis, but it's just a piece of sophistry because it ignores the actual text of Article 1, part of which, in my friend's reading, suffers the same ignominious excision from the agreement as the whole of Article 5. It's on your screens now. The controversy between Venezuela and the United Kingdom, which has arisen as a result of the Venezuelan contention that the arbitral award of 1899 about the frontier between British Guyana and Venezuela is null and void. The controversy identified in Article 1 is plainly not the same controversy as the one mentioned in the 1897 treaty. It is the, quote, controversy that has arisen as a result of Venezuela's contention that the arbitral award of 1899 is null and void. This text, especially when read in light of the text of Article 5, thoroughly defeats Venezuela's novation argument. If there is a controversy over Venezuela's contention that the award is null and void, as Article 1 says, it can only mean that the other parties to the agreement, namely Great Britain and British Guyana, ultimately Guyana, disagree with Venezuela's contention. That is, they do not agree that the award is null and void. To the contrary, they maintain, as they always have, that it is valid. So if they maintain that the award is valid and they claim rights under it, as they do, and Article 5 expressly preserves all rights and obligations claimed under instruments that predate the 1966 agreement, how can it possibly be maintained that Great Britain and British Guyana, later Guyana, agreed by signing this agreement to abandon their rights and claims under the 1899 award. The answer is obvious. Their claim is frivolous. Venezuela's argument that the 1966 agreement, somehow set aside and replaced the 1899 award, cannot be reconciled with the text of that agreement, especially if one reads the text that Professor Zimmerman would have you ignore. And I can cite unimpeachable authority for this, Guyana's reading of the Geneva agreement and the rejection of Venezuela's, the court itself. I refer specifically to paragraph 64 of its December 2020 judgment on jurisdiction. The court further notes that in the conclusion and implementation of the Geneva agreement, I apologize for reading the entire quote, but I don't think it would be appropriate for me to skip over any of the court's language. The court further notes that in the conclusion and implementation of the Geneva agreement, the parties have expressed divergent views as to the validity of the 1899 award rendered by the tribunal and the implications of this question for their frontier. Thus, Article 1 of the Geneva agreement defines the mandate of the mixed commission as seeking satisfactory solutions for the practical settlement of, quote, the controversy between Venezuela and the United Kingdom, which has arisen as a result of the Venezuelan contention that the arbitral award of 1899 about the frontier between British Guyana and Venezuela is null and void. That contention by Venezuela was consistently opposed by the United Kingdom in the period from 1962 until the adoption of the Geneva agreement on 17 February 1966 and subsequently by Guyana after it became a party to the Geneva agreement upon its independence in accordance with Article 8 thereof. In regard to Article 5, the court determined in paragraph 65 by referring to the preservation of their respective rights and claims to such territorial sovereignty, the parties appear to have placed particular emphasis on the fact that the controversy referred to in the Geneva agreement primarily relates to the dispute which has arisen as a result of Venezuela's contention that the 1899 award is null and void and its implications for the boundary line between Guyana and Venezuela. In sum, the text of the Geneva agreement as understood and explained by the court cannot be reconciled with Venezuela's novel reinterpretation of the agreement as a novation dispensing with the 1899 arbitral award. Professor Darjean will have more to say about this subject and the effects of the 2020 judgment. Before concluding, Mr. President, I want to respond to Venezuela's presentation of itself as the South American continent's foremost crusader against colonialism and promoter of Guyana's decolonization. This is another Venezuelan myth that cannot be reconciled with the facts. The historical record shows that Venezuela was an obstacle to Guyana's independence, not a facilitator. It strains to link its belated assertion of the invalidity of the 1899 arbitral award to the iconic resolution on decolonization adopted by the General Assembly in 1960. There is no such link. Venezuela has presented no evidence of one. A more historically accurate explanation of the timing of Venezuela's denunciation of the arbitral award in 1962 is that British Guyana was then entering the final stage of its own decolonization process and Venezuela sensed an opportunity to exploit the new republic's weakness after the lowering of the Union Jack and the departure of British troops by resurrecting its bogus claim to the vast majority of Guyana's sovereign territory. Here is what Venezuela itself told the court in its memorandum on jurisdiction submitted on 28 November 2019. The beginning well I had hoped to show it to you but I will read it to you. Quote The beginning of the process of decolonization of British Guyana within the framework of the United Nations prompted the Venezuelan government to formalize a claim in this regard to prevent the independence of the British colony supported by Venezuela from becoming an obstacle for its claim based on historical justice backed by the many causes of nullity of the aforementioned award. Venezuela's interests were not benign they were self-serving and predatory. They were to acquire the esiquibo at a time when newly born Guyana would be powerless to maintain it. Venezuela's counsel speak of asymmetry. The only asymmetry is between Venezuela and Guyana. There was none in the 1890s when Venezuela enjoyed the full support of the United States in its contest with Great Britain as the contemporaneous documents demonstrate I should say the uncontested contemporaneous documents demonstrate balancing the power equation. This historical reality contrasts completely with Venezuela's mythical account of international relations during that period. Mr. President, I have presented Guyana's rebuttal on the 1897 treaty and the 1966 agreement. There is, of course, a third binding agreement that is of great importance in this case, the 1905 boundary treaty between Venezuela and Great Britain. my esteemed colleagues, Professor Sands and Professor Oral, will have more to say on the significance of that treaty. Mr. President, members of the court, I thank you again for your kind courtesy and patient attention this afternoon and during these proceedings, and I ask that you call Professor Darjean to the podium. I thank Mr. Rycler for his statement. I would now like to give the floor to Professor Pierre Darjean. You have the floor. Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, members of the court, following on from Mr. Reichler's presentation, Mr. Reichler has just recalled the true meaning of the Geneva Agreement, and I shall briefly respond to Venezuela's arguments that this agreement affected a legal novation between the parties, and that apparently, as a consequence of this, the real issue in this case, to use the words repeatedly emphasized by my friend and colleague, Professor M. Bengi, the real issue in this case was not identified by the court in its 2020 judgment, such that the jurisdiction that the court declared itself to have is now moot. Mr. President, as Mr. Reichler has already pointed out, the argument of novation put forward by Venezuela in its rejoinder is new. One might even say that this argument amounts to a genuine novation of Venezuela's arguments. play on words is certainly easy, but it is nonetheless accurate. When Venezuela first explained its position on the Geneva agreement, it argued, as the court noted in its 2020 judgment, and I quote, it argues that since Article 1 of the Geneva agreement refers to seeking satisfactory solutions for the practical settlement of the controversy, this excludes according to Venezuela, judicial settlement unless the parties consent to resort to it by special agreement. And indeed, by writing this, the court was in no way mistaken in writing this. Indeed, this is what Venezuela wrote in its memorandum of 28 November 2019. As ultima ratio, once the failure of all political means available have been established by both parties along with the UN Secretary General and his personal representative, Venezuela did indeed add that. The juridical means are not the most adequate to satisfy the object and purpose of the agreement, but he supported that arbitration or judicial settlement can only ensure that the dispute is amicably resolved in a manner acceptable to both parties, preamble of the Geneva agreement, if both parties accept these means and negotiate a special agreement spelling out its purpose and the body or institution entrusted with the mission. off it out. It is well known that the court held that the secretary general's decision to designate the court did not require the parties further consent. However, the position then defended by Venezuela was not that the Geneva Agreement precluded by Novation the controversy as identified in Article 1 from being submitted to judicial settlement on the grounds that it called for a negotiated solution that was mutually acceptable to the parties. According to Venezuela, this element, which had linked to the preamble, would in fact have limited the Secretary-General's power by requiring that the parties confirm by mutual agreement his decision to choose the Court. Furthermore, members of the Court, in 2022, during the incidental proceedings concerning its objection based on the monetary gold principle, the possibility for the Court to rule on the validity of the award was the indispensable premise of that objection. And the Council on Venezuela's side emphasized this. Thus, according to Professor Zimmerman, in 2020, he said that the 2020 judgment... ...healed that in the case at hand, the Court has to necessarily decide upon the validity or invalidity of the award. During 2020 hearings, Professor Tams emphasized on the same day... Three matters are clear and they all point to the central role of the United Kingdom. First, this case is primarily about the validity of a disputed arbitral award because the United Kingdom acted fraudulently. Second, the award whose validity is primarily at stake was rendered on the basis of a disputed arbitration agreement. And the third point... The third point mentioned by Professor Tams was the fact that the dispute concerning the validity of the award had been brought before the Court on the basis of the Geneva Agreement. However, as he rightly pointed out, this agreement was... ...treaty to which the United Kingdom remains a party until today. It was precisely for this reason, as Guyana had argued, that the Court considered that the monetary gold principle does not come into play in this case. During the second round of oral proceedings in 2022, Professor Tams, my friend, again emphasized... ...these claims, to reiterate, go to the validity of the award. Confirmant ainsi... ...thereby confirming that the issue of the nullity of the award lies at the heart of the claims of both parties. Paragraphs 76 and 77 of your 2023 judgment duly reflected and summarized Venezuela's position in this regard. And this position confirmed fully what the Court had already noted in its 2020 judgment, namely... ...and as I already recalled on Monday, that the question of the validity of the 1899 award was central to the controversy... ...which needed to be resolved under Article 4, Paragraph 2 of the agreement... ...in order to reach a definitive settlement of the land boundary between Guyana and Venezuela. Mr. President, not only does Venezuela suffer from amnesia regarding its own legal positions in the present proceedings and contradicts them... ...but it would also like the Court to consider that the remarks made by its Minister of Foreign Affairs... ...before the National Congress in 1966 was a, quote-unquote, political statement... ...that was clearly erroneous and without legal significance. This is what Professor Tufner has argued. I commend my colleague's audacity to support his client... ...but let us pause for a moment to consider the enormity of his claim. Venezuela is saying that its negotiator and the signatory to the Geneva Agreement did not understand it. It is truly astounding to brush aside, with a wave of the hand, essential contemporary contextual documents in this manner. Clearly, as Mr. Reichler has already pointed out, historical criticism is not Venezuela's forte... ...rather, it excels in myth and legend. Minister Irobarum Borgis's very clear remarks obviously make Venezuela's argument untenable. As the Court noted in 2020, in paragraph 134 of its judgment, which I already read out on Monday... ...there is no basis, no basis for Venezuela's assertion that the Geneva Agreement does not cover the question of the validity of the award... ...and that this question is not part of the dispute covered by that agreement. By virtue of it, Venezuela has submitted this claim to the Court. Venezuela has, therefore, as I said already, submitted this claim to the Court... ...and the Court has expressly rejected it. Therefore, this has res judicato effect. As regards the argument concerning novation, which Professor M. Bengay has discussed at length... ...and which Professor Reichler has just recalled concerning the interpretation of the Geneva Agreement... ...in particular, Articles 1 and 5 thereof... ...what I have just pointed and what I said on Monday drawing on your 2020 judgment... ...all this should suffice, according to me. Everything about this argument regarding novation is flawed... ...and not just the fact that it is plagued with an internal contradiction, as I had pointed out. Professor M. Bengay attempts to sidestep the issue. According to him... ...only requires a pre-existing legal framework, whatever its validity. ...pourvu que le nouvel instrument... ...replacing something... ...where the... ...void. Mais quel est ce pre-existing legal... But what is this pre-existing legal framework, this something, that is said to have been replaced? Is it the award? The 1897 Treaty of Washington, which gave it binding force? The 1905 Treaty, which translated the award into a bilateral agreement? Or is it the boundary resulting from the treaty, which enjoys a distinct permanence... ...and constitutes the territorial base and boundaries left to it by the colonial power? My colleague Professor M. Bengay says nothing about this. There is undoubtedly a border regime, a legal framework comprised of all these legal acts... ...and a border controversy arising from the claim that the award is null and void. And as the court quite logically pointed out... ...it is not possible to settle definitively the border controversy between the parties... ...without first ruling on the validity of the award. Whatever Vinusira may say, the question of the validity of the award is therefore part of the dispute to be resolved. Of course, Guyana accepts that at the time of its independence and by virtue of the Geneva Agreement... ...it inherited a territorial controversy created by its neighbour... ...but that agreement in no way altered the terms of that controversy... ...nor set aside the legal acts on which it was founded. Indeed, where does it state in the Geneva Agreement that it supersedes the legal instruments... ...constituting the legal framework governing the boundary? How does this treaty supersede not only the arbitral award, which it does not... ...but also two treaties and a boundary? Is Venezuela going to put forward an argument based on Articles 30 and 59... ...of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties... ...whilst ignoring Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Geneva Agreement... ...that Mr Reichler has just referred to and which is a cornerstone of it? Mr Reichler also demonstrated how Professor Mbenghi's assertion that... ...in five decades, Guyana did not invoke the award. Combien cette affirmation... ...how this assertion was completely lacking in the facts. There is not and there has never been a clean slate between the parties. My friend argued once again that the Geneva Agreement is what now governs the parties... ...in relation to that matter. I am not entirely sure what that matter means in the mind of my opponent and friend... ...but Guyana naturally accepts that the Geneva Agreement governs the parties' relationship... ...with regard to this dispute... ...that we are before the court... ...is null and void and the legal implications of this question are validity for the demarcation of the boundary... ...as well as paragraph 66 of your 2020 judgment... ...which I will not read again... ...as it has held in law. It is precisely because the Geneva Agreement governs the relationship between the parties... ...with regard to this dispute that we are before the court. This too has been held with the force of rest judicata. Furthermore, the court considered that Guyana's right to sovereignty over the territory in question is plausible. Admittedly, this finding contained in an order for provisional measures... ...even if confirmed on this point does not have rest judicata effect... ...but how could the court have made such a finding... ...if the Geneva Agreement had the effect of novation claimed by Venezuela? Mr Reichler also read out to you a moment ago the second paragraph of Article 5 of the Geneva Agreement. It is true that in the absence of such a provision... ...the time that has elapsed since 1966... ...might have a completely different legal significance. However, contrary to what Professor Mbengue has argued... ...this provision in no way amounts to a novation of the legal situation... ...that existed on the day of the Geneva Agreement... ...which, on the contrary, has been fully preserved by paragraph 1 of Article 5. Professor Mbengue stated that... ...and defences that accrued under the old framework... ...cannot survive the transition to the new one... ...unless they are expressly preserved in the new instrument... ...and they were not. Atildi. That's what he said. Is that so? They were not? I invite my friend and his colleagues to re-read Article 5, Paragraph 1 of the Geneva Agreement. This provision renders Venezuela's conduct between 1899 and 1966... ...directly relevant to the definitive settlement of the border controversy. And my colleague Professor Oral will return to this point. According to Venezuela's Council... ...the obligation to seek satisfactory solutions for the practical settlement of the dispute... ...referred to in Article 1 of the Geneva Agreement... ...would mean that a novation... ...was an argument that holds... ...and that had taken place... ...and that the question of the validity of the award had been jointly waived. This is absolutely not the case. This is not the case according to the text of the agreement... ...and we know... ...and we should not need to have to repeat this... ...that your 2020 judgment held... ...that the question of the validity of the award... ...forms part of the controversy... ...whose resolution is governed by the agreement. It was indeed entirely concealable in 1966... ...that following a fresh examination of the case... ...the parties might agree to replace the award and its legal regime... ...with a new territorial delimitation. In this respect... ...the Geneva Agreement offered the possibility... ...of agreeing on a new border regime... ...but this agreement... ...does not in itself... ...effect or constitute... ...any legal novation. To say this... ...is in no way to accept... ...the erroneous assertion... ...that the Geneva Agreement... ...replaced finality... ...with indeterminacy. Indeed... ...as the Court noted... ...since the preamble to the Geneva Agreement states... ...that it was concluded to resolve... ...the dispute... ...arising from the claim that the award was null and void... ...its object and purpose is... ...to ensure... ...a definitive resolution... ...of the dispute between the parties. That is the object and purpose of the Geneva Agreement... ...about which we have been accused of saying nothing... ...but which Venezuela pretends to ignore... ...and that is the reason, once again... ...why we stand before this Court today. The purported novation... ...which opens the door to endless negotiations... ...is a construct... ...that is clearly incompatible... ...with the object and purpose of the Geneva Agreement. And it is precisely because the object and purpose of the Agreement... ...is to ensure the final settlement of the controversy... ...that after nearly 60 years of discussions in vain... ...and having regard to the terms of Article 14... ...the Secretary-General was entitled to decide... ...that the Court would be the next step in settling the matter. Venezuela may now claim that Minister Ereber and Borges... ...did not know what he was talking about... ...when he presented the Geneva Agreement... ...to the National Congress... ...but I recall that he stated in 1966... ...according to the terms of Article 4... ...of the Geneva Agreement... ...in the event that no satisfactory solution... ...for Venezuela is reached... ...the so-called award shall be revised... ...through arbitration or judicial recourse. And that is exactly what the Court has decided... This is exactly what the Court decided... ...not only by stating that it had jurisdiction... ...to rule on the validity of the award... ...but also in the event of nullity... ...that it could hear... ...that it could hear the related question... ...of the definitive settlement... ...of the land-bound rate dispute between the parties. It is therefore incorrect to argue that... ...the Court does not uphold the award... ...and Guyana refuses to come back to the negotiation table... ...neither state advances... ...and the controversy is left to fester. My dear colleagues... ...it is no longer just the Geneva Agreement... ...that must be read... ...but also the 2020 judgment... ...which is so despised by Venezuela. Finally... ...did that judgment fail to identify the real issue in this case? Absolutely not. As is evident particular from the 2024 judgment... ...in the Azerbaijan versus Armenia case... ...which Venezuela relies upon... ...to determine on an objective basis... ...the subject matter of the dispute between the parties... ...by isolating the real issue in the case... ...and identifying the object of the applicant's claims... ...concerns... ...this concerns the Court's jurisdiction... ...Rationae Materiae... ...and the Court ruled in 2020... ...with Res Judicata effect... ...not only on the subject matter of the dispute... ...but also on the scope of its jurisdiction... ...both substantive and temporal. But... ...members of the Court... ...you are all aware of this... ...and... ...I think that I have taken up enough of your time... ...and I'm very grateful for your kind attention... ...may I ask you Mr. President... ...to call my dear colleague Professor Pelé to the stand. Thank you. Thank you. I thank Professor Darjean... ...and I now call on Professor Alain Pelé... ...to address the Court. Sir, you have the floor. Mr. President... ...members of the Court... ...as Professor Pierre Darjean... ...has just eloquently recalled... ...in quoting your own decisions... ...the subject matter of this case... ...is to ascertain... ...whether the 1899 award was valid or not. The controversy that the parties agreed to settle... ...through the mechanism established... ...under the Geneva Agreement... ...concerns the question... ...the question of the validity of the 1899 award. ...as well as its legal implications... ...for the boundary line between Guyana and Venezuela. This, Mr. President... ...seems very much sufficient... ...in order to revert to the subject of our hearing... ...without needing to dwell any further... ...on Venezuela's fifth attempt... ...to dissuade you from that. The list of faults... ...which Venezuela attributes to Guyana is long. It is allegedly unjust. It fails to state reasons... ...judges are said to have ruled... ...infra-petita... ...negative abuse of power... ...and at the same time... ...ultra-petita... ...the means by which the award was adopted constitute fraud... ...and it is based on... ...dull or errors. Therefore, six capital sins. In view of this impressive list... ...was the 1899 award valid? The short answer is yes... ...but I shall nonetheless provide... ...a slightly more detailed... ...albeit brief reply... ...distinguishing... ...between the intrinsic complaints... ...Venezuela raises with regard to the award... ...and the extrinsic ones... ...which concern the way in which it was adopted. Mr President, amongst the complaints... ...I have just listed... ...three relate directly to the very content... ...of the award. Venezuela considers it to be unjust... ...of the court. However, it fails to state reasons... ...this assuredly is a key point... ...and the tribunal allegedly... ...failed to comply with its mandate... ...going both too far and falling short. Although this seems to be at the heart... ...of Venezuela's complaints... ...I am not going to dwell on the unjust... ...or inequitable nature it attributes to the award. This is what the case is about... ...whether to validate an unjust decision... ...was said by Professor Palchetti. In a way, this criticism... ...partly overshadows all the others. The award allegedly deprived Venezuela... ...of a large portion of its... ...between inverted commas... ...territory. But this is putting the cart before the horse. It's postulating that what had to be proven... ...is a given fact. In 1897, Great Britain and Venezuela... ...sorry, I've lost a page, says the Speaker... ...had a border dispute. ... ...border dispute. ... ...border dispute. ... ...border dispute. ... The award lifted the uncertainty... ...and it was only after the tribunal's intervention... ...that each party was able to assert... ...its territorial or border claims. And I'll revert to that. The award did not deprive anyone's territory. It determined the boundaries of both... ...restoring the good relations between the parties... ...and removed the threats of armed conflict... ...which hung over the region... ...and which had given Venezuela great cause for concern. Mr. President, it is said that one has 24 hours... ...to curse one's judges. Well, Venezuela has taken its time. Not only it didn't curse Martin's and his colleagues... ...during the period following the reading of the award... ...but moreover largely welcomed it... ...as Professor Oral amply explained on Monday afternoon. The 60-odd years it took it to realise... ...that the award, in the absence of any new facts... ...as Professor Sands will show in a minute... ...was grossly unjust... ...puts paid to this allegation. And indeed it's worth adding... ...that we may well... ...and no doubt should... ...share the anti-colonialist feelings... ...which seem to have driven... ...the righteous indignations of our opponents... ...without, however... ...falling into the revisionist... ...tendencies... ...which undermine international legal order. But it is wise in this matter... ...to always bear in mind... ...the far-sighted remarks... ...made by the Court's Chamber... ...in Burkina Faso Mali. In fact... ...however, the maintenance... ...of the territorial status quo in Africa... ...is often seen as the wisest course... ...to preserve what has been achieved... ...by peoples who have struggled... ...for their independence... ...and to avoid a disruption... ...which would deprive the continent... ...of the gains gained... ...by much sacrifice. The essential requirements... ...of stability... ...in order to survive... ...to develop and gradually... ...to consolidate their independence... ...in all fields... ...has induced African states... ...judicially... ...to consent to... ...the respecting of colonial frontiers... ...and to take account of it... ...in the interpretation... ...of the principle of self-determination... ...of peoples. End of quotation. What holds true for Africa... ...seems to me... ...to apply... ...and even more so... ...for Latin America... ...which in fact... ...had served as an example... ...in that respect. In any event... ...even if I must admit... ...that I am still not entirely clear... ...as to Venezuela's conclusions... ...it should be noted... ...that if it requests... ...that the award be declared invalid... ...on the ground that it is unjust... ...this is an appeal... ...in equity... ...on which you cannot rule... ...as the parties... ...have not agreed... ...to request the court... ...to rule... ...ex eco et bono. That wasn't the case. As regards the lack of reasons... ...there's nothing particularly new... ...in this matter... ...and for good reason... ...on Wednesday... ...Venezuela's lawyers... ...essentially refer to their previous... ...submissions... ...and are reluctant... ...to accept the principle... ...that... ...be it for the statement of... ...reasons... ...or for all the other... ...grounds of invalidity... ...they allege... ...the law which shall be taken... ...into consideration... ...is that... ...which was enforced... ...at the relevant critical date... ...i.e. in 1897... ...or 1899... ...as regards the rules... ...applicable to the adoption of the award. This is the effect... ...of inter-temporal law... ...a principle... ...which doesn't seem to inspire... ...our opponents much... ...only one... ...Professor Palketti... ...mentioned it in passing... ...and all he had to say... ...on the matter... ...boils down... ...to something like this... ...and I quote him... ...Guyana's emphasis... ...on inter-temporal law... ...is only an attempt... ...to mask the grave irregularities... ...committed by the arbitral tribunal... ...it is primarily... ...defensive... ...and fails at that task... ...end of quote... ...in the 1906... ...award of the King of Spain case... ...accepted... ...that lack of reasons... ...was a ground of invalidity... ...at the relevant time... ...and Professor Palketti... ...went on to repeat... ...and I quote him... ...in the arbitral award... ...made by the King of Spain case... ...Honduras and Nicaragua... ...accepted... ...that lack of reasons... ...was a ground of invalidity... ...at the relevant time... ...the court... ...Jura Novit Coria... ...decided the issue... ...of lack of reason... ...on that very basis... ...end of quote... ...in reality... ...the court... ...accepted... ...nothing of the sort... ...in the 1906... ...judgment... ...it did not examine... ...the question from that angle... ...and merely noted... ...that the complaint... ...relating to the lack of reasons... ...was... ...and I quote... ...without foundation... ...Professor Oral... ...shall revert to this shortly... ...and... ...as for the rest... ...the way in which... ...Professor Tams dealt... ...with the lack of reasons... ...was extremely revealing... ...he did so by way... ...of... ...pretarition... ...and mentioned it... ...as an example... ...of abuse of power... ...only to forget it... ...immediately... ...that being said... ...Mr. President... ...I wish to state... ...that we... ...by no way... ...by no means... ...are unaware... ...of the merits... ...of the obligation... ...to state reasons... ...and... ...indeed... ...as Venezuela... ...wrote... ...in its counter-memorial... ...and I quote... ...the fact that... ...an award... ...is accompanied... ...by adequate motivation... ...is the best guarantee... ...that the award... ...has been rendered... ...in accordance... ...with the instructions... ...provided by the parties... ...in the compromis... ...yet... ...it should be noted... ...that these advantages... ...struggle to establish... ...themselves... ...as general principle... ...of substantive law... ...with regard to... ...a lack of reasons... ...although the concept... ...emerged in 1899... ...it was not until... ...the Hague conventions... ...were concluded... ...and applied... ...in practice... ...that... ...it became... ...a generally accepted... ...practice... ...recognized as law... ...and to cite... ...the International Law Commission... ...whether a general practice... ...that is accepted... ...as law... ...accompanied by... ...opinion jurist... ...exists... ...must be carefully... ...investigated... ...in each case... ...in the light... ...of the relevant circumstances... ...Mr. President... ...I agree with... ...Professor Tams... ...at least on one point... ...I quote... ...It is clear... ...how... ...excessive power... ...is to be assessed... ...it needs to be asked... ...whether a tribunal... ...respected... ...the terms... ...of its mandate... ...and as the court... ...underscored itself... ...the tribunal... ...must conform... ...to the terms... ...by which the parties... ...have defined... ...this task... ...it is... ...nevertheless... ...necessary... ...to make... ...a careful... ...comparison... ...of the award... ...or other contested action... ...by the tribunal... ...with the relevant provisions... ...of the compromis... ...a departure... ...from... ...the terms... ...of submission... ...or excess... ...of jurisdiction... ...should be clear... ...and substantial... ...and not doubtful... ...and frivolous... ...and this is true... ...whether the tribunal... ...is accused of ruling... ...within... ...or beyond... ...its jurisdiction... ...two accusations... ...which... ...Velizuela... ...does not hesitate... ...to make... ...cumulatively... ...in our case... ...referring to the text... ...of article 3... ...of the compromis... ...Professor Tam... ...Professor Tam stated... ...and I quote... ...that there is no doubt... ...that the tribunal... ...determined the boundary line... ...it complied... ...with the second task... ...but not the first... ...the award is silent... ...on titles... ...the tribunal... ...does not tell the parties... ...what it had investigated... ...and ascertained... ...and on the face of it... ...this seems... ...a fairly glaring... ...negative excess of power... ...as with most... ...of the complaints... ...raised by Venezuela... ...once again... ...we encounter... ...the question... ...of... ...the statement... ...of reasons... ...and whilst... ...they do not... ...expressly state... ...which titles... ...they took into consideration... ...the arbitrators... ...specified... ...that... ...they investigated... ...and ascertained... ...the extent... ...of the territories... ...belonging to... ...or that might lawfully... ...be claimed... ...by the United... ...Netherlands... ...or... ...by the Kingdom... ...of Spain... ...respectively... ...at the time... ...of the acquisition... ...of... ...by Great Britain... ...of the colony... ...of... ...Guyana... ...end of quote... ...this... ...is moreover... ...clearly... ...what they did... ...as is evident... ...from the written... ...pleadings... ...and the pleadings... ...during the hearings... ...and... ...in particular... ...parties... ...by the arbitrators... ...in... ...1988... ...and... ...99... ...however... ...above all... ...as I said... ...on Monday... ...this... ...argument... ...is artificial... ...to say the least... ...Venezuela... ...recognized... ...that the tribunal... ...fixed... ...the boundary... ...between... ...British... ...Guyana... ...and... ...itself... ...in so doing... ...determined... ...the extent... ...of both territories... ...the effect... ...of any... ...judicial... ...decision... ...rendered... ...either... ...in a dispute... ...as to... ...attribution... ...of territory... ...or... ...in a delimitation... ...dispute... ...is necessarily... ...to establish... ...a frontier... ...I quote... ...Burkino... ...Fasso... ...Mali... ...I admit... ...that the... ...opposite... ...would not be... ...a convincing... ...if... ...indicate... ...the titles... ...it relied on... ...it would... ...have ruled... ...Infra... ...Petita... ...but that is... ...not the case... ...having decided... ...on... ...the respective... ...boundaries... ...of both territories... ...at the same time... ...it implicitly... ...but necessarily... ...ruled... ...on the titles... ...belonging to... ...each... ...of the parties... ...Mr President... ...the... ...complaint... ...of... ...the... ...ultra... ...petita... ...in fact... ...halved... ...has been halved... ...between the rejoinder... ...and the Wednesday hearing... ...which goes to show... ...the seriousness... ...with which... ...it was raised... ...gone then... ...is the criticism... ...that the award... ...ruled... ...on... ...Brazil's... ...rights... ...so be it... ...we still have the assertion... ...however... ...according to which... ...I quote... ...while the tribunal... ...ignored the first of its two tasks... ...it decided a further issue... ...which was never submitted to it... ...in the final section of the award... ...the tribunal... ...set out a regime... ...for free navigation... ...on two rivers... ...the rivers... ...Amakuru... ...and Barima... ...end of quote... ...professor Tams... ...who... ...valiately made this assertion... ...before yesterday... ...offered an analysis... ...of Article 4... ...of the Treaty of Washington... ...which seeks... ...to... ...confine itself... ...to a mere... ...provision... ...concerning the applicable law... ...what it is... ...in part... ...but not exclusively... ...the text of Article 4... ...is projected in full... ...on your screens... ...the introductory paragraph... ...extends Article 3... ...by specifying... ...the tribunal's task... ...which is... ...both to establish... ...the facts... ...and to apply... ...the rules... ...which were agreed on... ...those are then... ...set out... ...in three... ...subparagraphs... ...the first of which... ...is mixed... ...if I may say so... ...it sets out... ...a rule... ...relating to prescription... ...and then specifies... ...the tribunal's function... ...subparagraph B... ...focusing primarily... ...on the applicable law... ...while leaving... ...a certain margin... ...of appreciation... ...to the arbitrators... ...and as for... ...subparagraph C... ...I explained... ...at length... ...on Monday... ...that this is... ...a substantive rule... ...primary... ...if you will... ...and explained... ...that I fully... ...concurred... ...with the interpretation... ...which... ...Venezuela's... ...representatives... ...themselves... ...had given of it... ...during their pleading... ...in 1898... ...whilst it is true... ...that the parties... ...did not expressly... ...refer to the modification... ...of the regime... ...governing the two... ...rivers... ...the strongly... ...argued... ...interpretation... ...made by... ...Benjamin Harris... ...former President... ...of the United States... ...and... ...lead... ...council... ...of Venezuela... ...convincingly... ...leads... ...to the conclusion... ...that such... ...modification... ...did... ...indeed... ...fall within the scope... ...of Article C... ...consequently... ...in fact... ...the arbitrators... ...certainly... ...did not exceed... ...their powers... ...in holding... ...that... ...reasoned justice... ...the principle of... ...international law... ...and considerations... ...of equity... ...relevant to the case... ...required... ...that the... ...subjects and citizens... ...of both parties... ...be permitted... ...to freely... ...navigate... ...on both watercourses... ...which are the main... ...routes... ...of direct access... ...to the sea... ...via... ...in the river... ...and to my knowledge... ...this regime... ...has continued... ...to function... ...satisfactorily... ...to this day... ...without giving rise... ...to any complaints... ...from either party... ...members of the court... ...the 1899 award... ...admittedly... ...failed to state... ...reasons... ...but... ...with a slight... ...exception... ...the arbitrators... ...unanimously... ...signed a text... ...indicating... ...they had... ...faithfully... ...adhered... ...to... ...the text... ...of the... ...compromis... ...the text... ...of which... ...is reproduced... ...verbatim... ...in... ...the award... ...hence... ...all five of them... ...acknowledged... ...that they had... ...and I so... ...quote... ...partially... ...and carefully... ...examined... ...the questions... ...laid before them... ...and that they had... ...and I quote again... ...investigated... ...and ascertained... ...the extent... ...or that might... ...lawfully... ...be claimed... ...by the United... ...Netherlands... ...or by the... ...Kingdom of Spain... ...respectively... ...at the time... ...of the... ...acquisition... ...by Great Britain... ...of... ...British... ...Guyana... ...end of quote... ...of the... ...award itself... ...five signatures... ...therefore... ...from... ...amongst... ...the most... ...renowned... ...jurists... ...are... ...of what they... ...were doing... ...five acts... ...of perjury... ...that is the question... ...and all these... ...eminent... ...qualified... ...and... ...respected... ...jurists... ...would have... ...crafted... ...an award... ...which was... ...allegedly... ...discredited... ...infalid... ...unjust... ...fraudulent... ...not... ...frequently... ...shocking... ...also called... ...a... ...farse... ...in bad taste... ...a... ...hoax... ...a... ...a... ...colonial... ...fruit... ...of... ...British... ...empiralism... ...in collusion... ...with the United States... ...in itself... ...the... ...implausibility... ...of this collusion... ...between... ...the members... ...of the tribunal... ...somewhat... ...discredits... ...the conspiracy... ...theory... ...fuelled... ...indignation... ...of our... ...opponents... ...and their... ...allegations... ...of fraud... ...and... ...error... ...and... ...besides... ...they find it... ...somewhat... ...difficult... ...to distinguish... ...he had previously... ...laid against... ...the Treaty of Washington... ...which... ...Maitre Reichler... ...dealt with... ...therefore... ...Professor... ...Tams... ...stated... ...on Wednesday... ...that... ...he... ...had relied... ...and I quote... ...on... ...accounts... ...that come from... ...key... ...protagonists... ...from the arbitrators... ...in council... ...their diaries... ...their letters... ...and these accounts... ...of which... ...Venezuela became... ...after the publication... ...of the Mali... ...Pévost... ...memorandum... ...converged... ...on the central point... ...the boundary line... ...described... ...in the award... ...was put forward... ...by President... ...Martins... ...without... ...any legal basis... ...end of quote... ...the Library... ...intro useful... ... Mediter Britannia... ...in the New York... ...its words... ...let it say, as Paul Reichler demonstrated in introducing our pleadings, that Venezuela only became aware of the alleged scheme attributed to Martins once the Maliprevo memorandum had been published. The circumstances surrounding the adoption of the award were well known as soon as it was adopted. And I would also like to point out in passing that the article by La Chanonie presented as a contemporaneous observer who had taken part in the Paris debates, in fact gave an account of these circumstances, which are quite similar to that of Maliprevo. But I understand why Venezuela decided to maintain the utmost discretion regarding it, despite having introduced it, included it in its case file last week. Because by its very existence, it discredits the fable or fairy tale it's trying to sell you. Only Professor Parquetty ventured to allude to it, and only to indicate that it denounces the 1899 arbitration for having contributed to the dispossession of small states. Secondly, whilst it's exact that Martins did indeed play a major role in the final adoption of the award, in so doing, he was merely exercising his function as president of the tribunal fully and in good conscience. In detail, there may well be differences of opinion as to how events unfolded, possibly because advanced age clouds one's judgment, which would sadden me, but no doubt also because the memory of the witnesses, in particular when they were also party to the events of the case, was selective. But I would say it's especially the interpretation of these events, which were reasonably established in the instant case, which divided the parties. And according to Venezuela, I quote, President Martins threatened the British and American arbitrators to accept his line in separate meetings outside the tribunal's formal deliberations, because he made clear that unless the two groups he approached, the British and American arbitrators, came round to his view, he would endorse the respective other side's claims in full. Well, this is one way of writing history. If we accept the idea that by seeking to save an arbitral award, which had to be adopted by the majority, and on which two groups of arbitrators held opposite and irreconcilable views, the president of the tribunal overstepped his role and threatened his colleagues. Now, in order to understand how and in which spirit things occurred, it seems legitimate to me to read what the main protagonist, Martins himself, wrote about this. During my first intervention on Monday afternoon, I took the liberty, members of the court, to invite you to read the passage of his diary, which we included in the judges' folders. Visibly, our colleagues, and often friends on the other side of the bar, did not take the trouble to do so. And the brief extract projected onto the screen does not make up for this omission, but it is highly instructive. I quote, When the disputes between the four arbitrators on the general basis of the forthcoming award ended last Friday, I had to deliver my speech. I explained my point of view on all the main issues, denied the horrible right of discovery and occupation of the Spanish and the Americans, proved that there was no definition of those borders in the Treaty of Versailles and said that the territory between Esequibo and Orinoco can most likely be recognised as a condominium of the Spanish and the Dutch. While presenting my main point of view, I frankly said that I could not acknowledge that the British have the right, in respect of Barima Point, BP, at the mouth of the Orinoco River. This is what Lord Russell and Collins took note of. End of quote. Mr. President, this is only a very small part of Martin's account of the circumstances in which the award was adopted. It is nonetheless very revealing. First of all, it leaves no doubt whatsoever as to the fact that the president of the tribunal at the beginning formed his own opinion regarding the matters which divided his co-arbitrators. It also highlights that this opinion was based on exclusively legal grounds relating to the original title and that resulting from practice with the idea, which one might find somewhat peculiar, of a possible Spanish-Dutch condominium as well as the absence of any British rights over the mouth of the Orinoco River. In procedural or methodological terms, Martin's account attests to his concern to be transparent vis-à-vis his colleagues. He set out his convictions and, as his notes show, he did so after having sought out theirs. The beginning of the extract of his diary, which is still on the screen, also puts paid to the assertion, according to which, Martin's allegedly orchestrated the outcome of the arbitration not in tribunal deliberations but in a series of meetings, private meetings, insisting that the other arbitrators accept his deal. This was indeed a plenary meeting which followed several other plenaries during which the four arbitrators had expressed irreconcilable views, as can be inferred very precisely from the beginning of the extract on the screen. I quote, when the disputes between the four arbitrators on the general basis of the forthcoming award ended last Friday, I had to deliver my speech. In the next paragraph of his diary, which isn't projected but which you will find in your folders, Martin's wrote, And I quote him once again, That was the end of the Friday session. There was another session on Saturday, but to no avail, and the relationship between the British and American arbitrators became increasingly strained. On Sunday morning, there was another session, and again in vain. Then I decided to get down to this issue in a diplomatic manner. End of quote. This, by no way, reflects the threatening attitude of a tribunal president anxious to see his preconceived view prevail, but indeed that of an open-minded person keen to reach a solution, preferably by consensus. This resulted in a series of meetings between Martins and other members of his tribunal, either one-to-one or with groups of arbitrators. The existence of a deadlock described, this deadlock described by Martins was confirmed by Judge Brewer, who was appointed as arbitrator by Venezuela. And as he explained in the interview which he gave to the New York Times, which you find in your folders, the discussions between the arbitrators had led them to dig in their heels so that if they had each had to draw the boundary, they would all have been different. The new method made it possible to break this deadlock, no doubt at the cost of great discretion as regards the reasons. But the experienced tourists who made up the tribunal knew full well that no matter how desirable it might be, a statement of reasons was not yet mandatory. That the consensus might have been reached otherwise through private meetings amongst the arbitrators with a view to discussing the case is no more reprehensible and doesn't serve in any way to prove the existence of a great conspiracy of which Martins would have been the instigator. Referring to the colourful description given by President Bejawi of the fabrication of the judgments of the International Court of Justice, I imagine, members of the court, that you're not entirely unfamiliar with such practices, although the circumstances in which you're deliberating are very different from those of Tribunal of Five members set up over 130 years ago. One thing which our opponents seem to forget and yet which is common both to your court, pursuant to Article 55 of the statute, and the Tribunal created in 1897 under Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington, is the majority rule. It sometimes requires sacrifices and compromises from judges and arbitrators, but which alone can make it possible to reach a decision. And it's thanks to the pedagogical and diplomatic tenacity of Martin's, was he not after all both professor and diplomat, and the goodwill of his colleagues, that the award was ultimately adopted to the immediate satisfaction, more or less enthusiastic, on both sides. a satisfaction that was maintained for a long time, and it was in this way that the award was finally adopted. It is under Article 13 of the Treaty of Washington, res judicata. Our opponents also blame Martins from having, in fact, imposed an agreement on all the arbitrators. But what would have occurred had he not acted in this way? The other arbitrators were divided, two against two. Martins could, in fact, have maintained his opinion, independent view, which, in fact, he changed in order to reach unanimity, without, in fact, defending either side. the upshot of that is that no award would have been delivered for want of a majority, or, indeed, he could have agreed with one of the two camps, which, as our opponents have pointed out, would have been worse for Venezuela than the award delivered. The fact that he ultimately decided to choose a compromise, which was acceptable for the five arbitrators, and to reach a unanimous award, is not a shame. On the contrary, it is to his credit. The satisfaction on the part of the parties, sadly, did not last forever. Venezuela broke the consensus, and my friend and colleague Philip Sands will speak about the conditions in which this break took place. With your permission, Mr. President, can I ask you to call him to the podium? Mr. President, members of the Court, I thank you once again for your patience and your attention. I thank Professor Pellet. The Court will observe a break of ten minutes. The hearing is suspended. how will so it's the Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. There's a lot. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. We submit that the real clue is to be found in the Foreign Minister's speech to the UN General Assembly on 1 October 1962. Mr Briseño invoked Venezuela's supposed, and I quote, inflexible anti-colonialist position, end of quote, and he segued from that directly via a fig leaf to the question of boundaries between Venezuela and the territory of British Guyana. In other words, as Mr Reichler hinted, British Guyana's desire for independence offered a wonderful opportunity to reopen, for the first time after 63 years, the path to resolve a lingering unhappiness about the substantive outcome of the award and the 1905 treaty. 13 years after it is published, the Malay-Prevo memorandum is instrumentalised. It is weaponised. It is used for another purpose, to reopen an issue that has long been settled. And that is why Council for Venezuela have to argue that the memorandum gave them something new, even though it did nothing of the sort. The Malay-Prevo memorandum is used in the service of an anti-colonialist claim to attack what Council called the revolting 1899 awards on the ground that it set in stone a colonial legacy. And this became clear to me, a sort of dropping of the penny, as I listened to my good friend, my brother, Professor Mbenke, on Wednesday morning, as he waxed lyrically and passionately about the evils of colonialism. To be fair, the seeds for his argument were sown in Venezuela's counter-memorial and in its rejoinder. This case, he told you, is an illustration of the unfortunate legacies of colonialism. And he invited you to draw inspiration from the approach taken by this court in the Chagos advisory opinion, which he initially described as a direct precedent. But then there was a modest retreat, as he recognised, as he is bound to do, that, quote, well, it might be said that the 1899 award is different. It might indeed be said that it's different, and I'm going to tell you that it's different. But Chagos offers no assistance whatsoever to Venezuela. It is totally different. Mauritius was not the recipient of an arbitral award. Mauritius did not negotiate a treaty with the United Kingdom, recognising Chagos as part of the United Kingdom, and Mauritius did not wait 63 years to assert a claimed right. Now, Professor Mbenke knows that I am not the kind of person who's going to stand before this court and defend acts of great colonial wrongdoing. He also knows that he and I are both very familiar with the Chagos matter. We both argued it. And he knows, as I know, that it's a totally different story. The Chagos advisory opinion is premised on the court's recognition of a fundamental principle. When a colony achieves independence, its territorial boundaries as an independent state will be the same as those of the former colony, unless the population of that territory has freely given its consent for those boundaries to be changed. And in Chagos, the court, and two distinguished dissenters in another arbitral proceeding, found that the population of Mauritius had not freely consented to the excision of the Chagos archipelago. That principle, relied on by the court in Chagos, is based on UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 of 1960, which you know well. And paragraph 6 of that resolution prohibits the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country. The resolution was adopted in December 1960. Venezuela voted in support of it. Did Venezuela, in exercising that vote, articulate a reservation in relation to the territory of British Guayana or its own territory at that session of the General Assembly in 1960? No, it did not. And that is because that was two years before it concocted the idea of opening the door to an argument. The 1899 award was invalid. At the moment it voted for Resolution 1514, it still accepted its boundaries as they had existed for more than 60 years, as established by the arbitral award and the 1905 treaty. It only changed its position two years after that resolution was adopted. Coincidentally, or maybe not, at the very moment that the independence of Guyana suddenly hoved into view. And as Mr Reichler made clear, in the face of a real fear that Venezuela might act to interfere with the national unity or territorial integrity of a newly independent Guyana, the United Kingdom insisted on what became the 1966 Geneva Agreement being negotiated and adopted. It committed Venezuela to a process to resolve the controversy by peaceful means on the validity of the 1899 award in a manner that in no way undermined the totality of Guyana's territorial integrity. Now, Professor Mbengue, better than anyone, will understand the challenges his argument on Wednesday will pose for this court. He knows far better than I all about the Organisation of African Unity's famous 1964 Cairo Declaration, when the heads of state and government came together of African countries to declare that all member states had pledged to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence. And he will be aware, too, of the powerful statement made by the permanent representative of Kenya to the United Nations in February 2022 on the cusp of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. And I quote, But, he continued, We agreed that we would settle for the borders that we inherited, not because these borders were satisfactory, but because we wanted something greater forged in peace. We must complete our recovery from the embers of dead empires in a way that does not plunge us back into new forms of domination and oppression. And we say those words are especially pertinent now and to these proceedings. Because if this court is to exceed to Professor Mbengue's invitation and find invalid the 1899 Arbitral Award and presumably also the 1905 Treaty, you would rekindle the embers of dead empires. You would plunge Guyana into a new form of domination and oppression in relations with its much larger neighbour. And you would send a signal to the world that the passage of six decades is no bar to setting aside an arbitral award or a boundary treaty. You would rekindle an age of instability and uncertainty, one that would run directly contrary to the wisdom of Africa, one that would threaten to open the gates of challenge to any and every colonial era arbitration award or boundary settlement. Is that really what Professor Mbengue is asking you to do? Is that really what this court is being asked to do by Venezuela? Mr President, it was indeed uncomfortable. Understatement. For Guyana to hear it suggested that as a state it is an inheritor of an act of British colonial wrongdoing. That it seeks to defend a revolting colonial legacy. These are really unfortunate suggestions. Guyana emerged into independence with a strong sense of identity. And that was formed in large part by a sense of its territorial identity. And ever since it came into independence, it has existed under an existential threat of dismemberment. In this way, it is no different from so many African countries or Central and Eastern European countries or other countries of Latin America, which have emerged in their modern form out of the legacies of colonialism. That legacy may indeed be a scourge. But the greater scourge will be to open the gates to the setting aside of an award and a treaty that are more than a century old. And that is what Venezuela is asking you to do. That is what we feel sure you must resist. Mr. President, members of the Court, that concludes my submissions. I end, as I always do, with an expression of thanks to my colleagues, Mr. Edward Craven and Miss Lucy Jones, for their assistance in preparing my words over this week. But if I may, I would also like to just momentarily express my respect to Sir Shridath Ramphal and Miss Liz Harper, who guided us over the years of this case. For many of us, Sir Shridath was truly a mentor. And not long before he left us, he sent me a postcard of a painting that he told me he loved by the renowned Guyanese and British artist Sir Frank Bolling. It is today at the Tate Gallery in London. Who's Afraid of Barney Newman was painted in 1968, just two years after Guyana achieved independence. If you look carefully, you will see in this painting the outlines of two continents, South America and Africa, slipped into the vertical blocks of green, yellow and red, references to Guyana and various African flags and adornments worn by Jamaican Rastafarians. When Bolling was born in Barima in 1934, Venezuela accepted that this small town was in Guyana and that he was Guyanese. But today it does not. And so in this way, it could be said that this painting is emblematic of many of the issues that have been heard in this great hall of justice. matters of history, of connections, of the need for things to be whole, and of the power and the finality of law. And that is why Sonny sent me the postcard. The painting is a whole. And a whole we trust it must remain. I thank you, Mr. President, for your attention and I invite you to call Professor Niloufar Oral to the podium. I thank Professor Sands. I now give the floor to Professor Niloufar Oral. You have the floor, Madam. Mr. President, distinguished members of the Court, it is my great pleasure to appear before you again. Venezuela's Council have relied extensively on vituperative statements and a touch of demagoguery, making every effort to avoid the facts. Today, I will bring us back to the reality of the facts. Now, my distinguished colleagues today have just clearly demonstrated, based on facts and law, that the 1899 award was and is a valid award. However, arguendo, or in plain English, for the sake of argument, let us say Venezuela did have grounds to challenge the validity of the award. Venezuela would still face a formidable obstacle, its own conduct, for more than half a century. In an attempt to overcome this major obstacle, as Professor Sands has just presented, Venezuela relies heavily on the improbable excuse that it was not aware of any of the alleged defects of the 1899 award until the publication of the 1949 Malay Prevo Memorandum, 50 years after the award was issued. For 50 years, they said they had no inkling that any grounds existed to challenge the validity of the award. Really? In 1899, within days after receiving the award, and at all times thereafter, Venezuela was well aware of all the circumstances underlying the award and its purported defects. Every one of the defects alleged by Venezuela in these proceedings, every single one, was known to Venezuela soon after the award was issued, if not immediately upon issuance. Now, Mr. President, I know we're running out of time, so, with your permission, and if the court and the interpreters could please turn to paragraph 8. Now, from what my learned colleagues have just presented today, the following conclusions are inevitable. One, Venezuela was fully aware in 1899, or at least by 1900, of each and every ground it now asserts for invalidating the award. Two, there is no evidence that Venezuela faced any pressure whatsoever, let alone coercion, to refrain from asserting a challenge between 1899 and 1962. Three, under the applicable law, Venezuela acquiesced and lost the right to challenge it long before it first did so in 1962. Venezuela has simply not been able to refute this factual reality. The real farce, to use Venezuela's counsel's word, is that evidence of supposed defects in the award came into Venezuela's possessions, quote, only in the second half of the 20th century. On Monday, we presented an abundance of facts and supporting law demonstrating the consistent, expressed, and complicit conduct of Venezuela, accepting, and strictly implementing the boundary as decided by the 1899 award and demarcated by the 1905 boundary agreement. We showed some 16 maps dating from 1905 until 1962, consistently reflecting the 1899 award and the 1905 agreement to the letter. No indications of any protest to the boundary, even after the publication of the 1949 Malay Prebo Memorandum. There is nothing from Venezuela to refute any of this. This is why the only explanation that Venezuela can offer to counter what they know to be unassailable evidence against them is their lack of awareness until the publication of the 1949 Malay Prebo Memorandum. The reality simply does not support Venezuela's claims of ignorance. Professor Sands has just skillfully deconstructed this argument based on the Malay Prebo Memorandum. However, there was one legal point related to Venezuela's reliance on the Malay Prebo Memorandum. If we accept that the facts took place in the Malay Prebo Memorandum are true, this means Malay Prebo himself, after his meeting with Justice Brewer, had first-hand knowledge of the compromise taking place, and together with Venezuela's lead counsel, Mr. Harrison, agreed to the deal offered. In other words, Venezuelan counsel were instrumental to the political compromise as, according to the memo, Justice Brewer had asked for their approval. How can Venezuela now claim error when its very own counsel participated in the so-called compromise that resulted in the boundary line, which they allegedly told Justice Brewer they would accept? This court said in the Temple of Priya Vihir case, it is an established rule of law that the plea of error cannot be allowed as an element vitiating consent if the party advancing it contributed by its own conduct to the error or could have avoided it or if the circumstances were such as to put that party on notice of a possible error. The most telling proof that Venezuela was well aware of any possible defects in the award and contemplating challenging the award is found in the 4 May 1900 report by Venezuelan jurist and former foreign minister Dr. Rafael Sejas. The reality is that there were no grounds to challenge the award. In this report he advised Venezuela on the following key issues. First, on the lack of reason by the tribunal in the award. He wrote that the 1897 treaty quote, did not stipulate any requirement to give reasons for its, that is the tribunal's, decision end quote, and therefore quote, does not permit any complaint on the score end quote. Plainly, Venezuela knew in 1899 at the moment of issue that the award did not include a statement of reason and as of 1900 it did not consider this a valid ground for challenging the award. No one defrauded, no one coerced it. On the question of the arbitrators, Dr. Sejas also negated this as a reason to challenge the award highlighting that Venezuela had participated in the selection of the arbitrators and could be challenged to have quote, uttered no word in opposition. According to the Sejas report, when Justice Brewer was asked quote, if in his judgment Venezuela had title to more than a judge to it, he hesitated, shrugged his shoulders and said it was better to say nothing on this point and ended by observing that whoever or whatever the two parties thought of the award, Venezuela would receive Punta Barima which gives her full control of the hinterland while England is confirmed in the possession of a territory in the development of which it has dispersed such money and effort. But the main advantage is that the two nations can at last cultivate peacefully side by side the extensive territories which because of previous antagonisms have remained unproductive. After a detailed discussion on the issue of the freedom of navigation, Sejas concludes his report with the following words. Despite the foregoing exposition, I consider that it would not be expedient to reopen the case and appoint other arbitrators or to extend the jurisdiction of those who have served as such since their mandate ended with the pronouncement of the award. What more compelling evidence can we show than the legal advice provided by Venezuela's own expert in international law, Dr. Sejas, a respected jurist, a former foreign minister who in 1900 provided his legal views on all the possible reasons now claimed by Venezuela to challenge the award. But Venezuela took no action before 1962. In his own words, Venezuela cannot have its cake and eat it too. It cannot selectively use the Sejas report as evidence of so-called structural coercion, which, frankly, is a stretched interpretation of his words and then also conveniently omit the parts of his report that show Venezuela was looking at grounds to challenge the legality of the award and found none. This brings me to my second point concerning the so-called structural coercion that Venezuela now claims for the first time after some 120-plus years, that it was because of fear from the powerful naval forces of Great Britain that Venezuela for five years engaged in the demarcation of the 825-kilometer boundary. There is absolutely no evidence before the court that Great Britain in 1900, before the blockade, Venezuela relies on to claim it was structurally coerced, threatened any military action against Venezuela after the 1899 award to force it to engage in the demarcation process. Au contraire, the evidence shows that Great Britain remained loyal to the 1899 boundary and never once attempted to cross it or expanded and never once threatened to do so. The award accomplished Venezuela's objective in seeking arbitration. It halted permanently the westward advance of British settlement. The evidence we showed on Monday from the vigilant and dedicated work of Chief Commissioner Dr. Tirado and the pride he expressed in his work and the insistence of Venezuela to abide strictly to the 1899 award to the letter. Completely refute any claim that Venezuela now makes some 120 plus years later of being quote forced against its will to demarcate the boundary. Words by overzealous counsel alone cannot compensate for objective and established facts for credible and contemporaneous evidence. I will now proceed to the legal issues. Venezuela's post-award conduct goes beyond mere silence. But as we have shown with ample evidence it includes express words amounting to acceptance, recognition, and satisfaction with having received what at the time in 1899 was what Venezuela most desired, the mouth of the Orinoco River. These are not my sentiments but the very words from Venezuela's counsel and its officials, the foreign minister and the president expressed satisfaction. This is in black and white and it is contemporaneous. To be sure Venezuela was disappointed that it did not get more territory as you were told on Wednesday but also by colleagues on Monday but it cannot be the case that a party's disappointment with the substance of an award or a judgment of the court constitutes grounds for its invalidation. Venezuela's attempt to distinguish the King of Spain case also fails on this point. Like the president of Nicaragua, the president of Venezuela, Mr. Ignacio Andrade, also publicly expressed satisfaction with the 1899 award just one week later. And I repeat, the award was a source of satisfaction for the country as international justice had returned a part of its territory that had been usurped and vindicated its right. There is a reason for the satisfaction. In the words of Venezuela's counsel on the importance of the mouth of the Orinoco River, quote, no portion of the entire territory possessed more strategic value than this, both from a commercial and a military standpoint. But the King of Spain case was not the only judgment of this court. We refer to where the conduct of the state was decisive. We discussed the Temple of Priya Viher case to which Venezuela did not respond. In that case, the absolute key factor was the conduct of Siam and later Thailand on the use of maps. We presented 16 official maps between the dates of 1905 and 1962, 1902, all showing the very same boundary, the one determined by the Arbiturial Ward in 1899 and demarcated by Great Britain and Venezuela in 1905. There is no response from Venezuela on this, not one. I take the opportunity, and with the court's indulgence, to quote another very important part of the Temple of Priya Viher case with significance for our case, at least during the 60-plus years between 1899 and 1962, before Venezuela engaged in aggressive conduct against Guyana, threatening the stability of the boundary he had respected beforehand. Even if there were any doubt as to Siam's acceptance of the map in 1908, and hence of the frontier indicated thereon, the court would consider, in the light of the subsequent course, events, that Thailand is now precluded by her conduct from asserting that she did not accept it. She has, for 50 years, enjoyed such benefits as the Treaty of 1904 conferred on her, if only the benefit of a stable frontier. France, and through her Cambodia, relied on Thailand's acceptance of the map. It is not now open to Thailand, while continuing to claim enjoy the benefits of the settlement to deny that she was ever a consenting party. The court's words have much bearing today on the current case. Venezuela also relies on the Costa Rica and Panama case in an attempt to counter 60 plus years of post-award conduct, during which Venezuela not simply recognized but actively implemented the boundary until 1962. The arbitrator in that case did not take into account post-award conduct. It was not at issue. The case is irrelevant, whereas the two cases we have cited, the King of Spain case and the Temple of Priya Viher case turned expressly on the conduct of the parties. As for the DRC versus Uganda case, frankly, Council for Venezuela omitted an important part of the court's decision. The court observed that waivers or renunciations of claims or rights must either be expressed or unequivocally implied from the conduct of the state. Uganda was simply unable to present evidence of the conduct as expressed in the court's views. I'm going to continue. By contrast, Guyana has presented a mountain of evidence, 60-plus years of unequivocal conduct by Venezuela accepting and implementing the award and the 1905 agreement, while fully aware of any possible challenges it could have raised at the time, as it made clear in a detailed report dated 4 May, 1900, by Dr. Sejas. Professor Thavan also attempted to distinguish the King of Spain case from the present case on rather weak reasons, one being that Nicaragua did not assert lack of awareness, but this is not true. Nicaragua, actually, the president of Nicaragua, in dispatching his telegram of 25 December 1906, specifically gave the reason that he was not aware of the actual terms of the award. Mr. President, I come now to my conclusion. We have presented the facts of the law as they are, no more and no less. The reality, as we have highlighted Monday and reinforced today, is that Venezuela had all the information in plain sight 127 years ago and chose not to challenge the award. It is a complete fiction that Venezuela was not able to challenge the award until after the 1949 Malay Prevo Memorandum was published. Venezuela's post-award conduct was not simply passive silence, but one that proactively implemented and complied with the award and the agreement. The narrative of structural coercion to excuse their conduct, which appeared for the first time in their counter-memorial, trial dated 8 April 2025, is simply not tenable and certainly cannot be the basis for depriving Guyana of more than 70% of territory over which it has lawfully exercised sovereignty as an independent state since 1966. I thank the court for its kind attention and ask that Venezuela's attorney general and minister of legal affairs. The Honourable Mohabil Anil Nandal be called to the podium. I thank Professor Hollal. I now invite the Attorney General Guyana, the Honourable Mohabil Anil Nandal to address the court. Sir, you have a vote. Mr. President, members of the court, it is an honour to appear before you and a privilege to deliver this final presentation on behalf of my country, the Cooperative Republic of Guyana. It is difficult to express in words how important this case is to Guyana and its people. As the court knows, this hearing is the culmination of a process which has been decades in the making. For more than 60 years, Venezuela has laid claim to more than 70% of Guyana's sovereign territory. Generations of Guyanese, mine being one of them, have grown up under the long and threatening shadow caused by Venezuela's claim to nearly three-quarters of our country. Venezuela's claim has blighted, bedeviled, and burdened Guyana for the entirety of its life sovereign state. It is hard to overstate the impact that this has had on Guyana, Guyana's development, and on the security, prosperity, and well-being of its people. As our representatives vividly described on Monday, the loss of the territory claimed by Venezuela would eviscerate Guyana. Indeed, the country as we know it would cease to exist. Guyana's foreign minister was not exaggerating when he described this case as having an existential quality for Guyana. For Guyana and its people, the stakes could scarcely be higher. But while the stakes of this dispute could not be higher, nor could Guyana's faith in international law as the means for fairly and finally resolving it. As Attorney General of Guyana, I can personally attest to Guyana's profound commitment to the rule of international law. It is a commitment which runs deep in Guyana's institutions and national culture. It is both an article of faith and a source of national pride. It is founded on a firm conviction that international law is the bedrock of the international order and the indispensable foundation for peaceful relations between all states. From Guyana's perspective, there is no higher value or greater imperative than respect for international law. Mr. President, when Guyana brought its application to the court in 2018, it was confident of three things. First, Guyana had unwavering confidence in the correctness of its decision regarding the validity of the AT99 award and the boundary which it determined. Second, Guyana was equally confident in the wisdom of the decision of the Secretary General of the United Nations that the court should be entrusted with resolving this intractable controversy. Third, Guyana had complete confidence in the independence and impartiality of the court and its ability to deliver a just outcome based on the fair-minded and even-handed application of international law. Since Guyana filed its application eight years ago, these proceedings have vindicated and reinforced Guyana's confidence in each of those things. At every stage, the court has conducted the proceedings with conspicuous care, attentiveness and fairness. The court has carefully considered and confirmed its jurisdiction to entertain Guyana's application. And it has carefully considered and confirmed the admissibility of that application. We have no doubt that the court will now proceed to carefully consider the merits of Guyana's case regarding the validity of the 1899 award and the location of the party's land boundary. Since the start of these proceedings, Venezuela has strained every sinew to avoid the court delivering a judgment on the merits of Guyana's application. These strenuous efforts have even continued throughout this hearing on the merits. Notwithstanding this court's judgment in 2020 and 2023, Venezuela has sought to argue that the terms of the Geneva Agreement mean that the court cannot or should not rule upon the validity of the 1899 award. Guyana's council have demonstrated the lack of merit in those arguments, which find no support in the text or the history of the Geneva Agreement, and which are contradicted by Venezuela's previous statements to the court, and so clearly by the perlusive terms of the court's previous judgments on jurisdiction and admissibility. It is not hard to see why Venezuela is so reluctant for the court to determine the merits of Guyana's application. Venezuela knows that it has no good answer to Guyana's case, and it knows that a judgment on the merits should bring to an end Venezuela's claims to almost 160,000 square kilometers of Guyana's territory. In its written and oral pleadings, Guyana has convincingly demonstrated that Venezuela's attempt to impugn the validity of the 1897 Treaty of Washington has no merit whatsoever. Venezuela was neither deceived nor coerced into signing the treaty. On the contrary, the treaty achieved what for years Venezuela had desired and demanded, the submission of its boundary dispute with Great Britain to international arbitration. Guyana has similarly and axiomatically demonstrated that Venezuela's attack on the validity of the 1899 award itself is misconceived. Neither the absence of written reasons nor the timing of the award's delivery calls into question its validity. The arbitral tribunal faithfully fulfilled the mandate conferred by the 1897 Treaty. Neither the terms of the award nor the way it was reached involved involved any excess of power or impropriety by the eminent members of the tribunal. What is more, Guyana has shown that when the award was delivered in 1899, Venezuela was aware of all the matters which it now alleges vitiated the award. Yet, for more than 60 years after 1899, Venezuela respected, asserted, and affirmed the validity of the award. As Guyana has shown at this hearing, Venezuela has no credible answer to any of this. In short, the award was and remains valid and binding on the parties. In the words of the 1897 Treaty, the award constitutes the full, perfect, and final settlement of the boundary between Venezuela and Guyana. At this juncture, I feel impelled to say a brief word about one of Venezuela's arguments which struck a particularly discordant note in Guyanese areas. As Professor Sanz explained earlier, Venezuela's attempt to invoke the law of decolonization to support its case is legally unfounded. But it is also ironic because Venezuela's sudden repudiation of the 1899 award in the 1960s, just as the process of Guyana's decolonization was underway, impeded and delayed Guyana's progress towards independence by several years. And in the years since Guyana attained independence in 1966, Venezuela has acted in a way that has striking echoes of the imperial colonialists whom it rightly denounces. As Guyana has explained both in its written and oral pleadings, since 1966, Venezuela has repeatedly denied and violated Guyana's sovereignty over its Esequibo region. Venezuela has invaded and illegally occupied Guyana's territory on Ancoco Islands for six decades. It has conducted numerous other military incursions into Guyana's land and maritime territory, incursions which are intended to menace and intimidate Guyana and its people. During the dependency of these proceedings, and in contumacious defiance of this Court's provisional measures orders, Venezuela has enacted legislation which purports to incorporate our Esequibo region as a new Venezuelan state, to subject it to the jurisdiction of Venezuela's legislative, executive and judicial organs, and to depict it in official maps as an integral part of Venezuela. Venezuela has also sought to rename the territory as Guyana Esequiba. It has even falsely claimed at this hearing that the Esequibo River was named after a Spanish explorer. The name of the Esequibo River is in fact derived from an indigenous word, Dishikibo, meaning fireside, which was later adopted by the Dutch and the British. Venezuela's attempts to annex its smaller neighbours' territory, its attempts to erase and rewrite the history of Guyana's Esequibo region, and its innumerable bellicose threats to Guyana's sovereignty and territorial integrity are all redolent of colonialism. Mr. President and members of the Court, the judgment that you deliver in this case will be of exceptional importance to Guyana. It is not simply the outcome of the judgment that will be important. The terms of the judgment will be equally crucial. If the Court accepts Guyana's arguments, as we are confident that it will, then it is essential that the Court's judgment directly, explicitly, and unambiguously affirms the validity of the 1899 award in its integrity and the boundary which it established, and elucidates the ineluctable legal consequences which flow therefrom. Any ambiguity or qualification in the Court's judgment will inevitably be seized upon by Venezuela as a basis for continuing to lay vast swaths of Guyana's sovereign territory. The clarity and specificity of your judgment are vital to the effective resolution of this long-standing dispute. You will have heard, as we did, the suggestion that a judgment in favour of Guyana would not end the dispute. That suggestion underscores the need for a clear and complete judgment. Mr. President and members of the Court, thank you very much indeed for your patient attention, and I now request respectfully that you invite our agent, Mr. Carl Greenidge, to the podium to read Guyana's submissions. I thank you once again. I thank the Attorney General of Guyana. I now give the floor to the agent of Guyana, the Honourable Carl Greenidge, to make Guyana's final submissions. You have the floor, sir. Mr. President, members of the Court, it is an honour to appear before you once again. With your permission, Mr. President, I will now close Guyana's oral pleadings by reading Guyana's submissions. In accordance with Article 49.4 and Article 62 of the Rules of Court, for the reasons explained in our written pleadings and during these hearings, the Cooperative Republic of Guyana respectfully requests the International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare, 1. that the 1899 award is valid and binding upon Guyana and Venezuela, and that the boundary established by that award and the 1905 agreement is the boundary between Guyana and Venezuela. 2. that Guyana enjoys full sovereignty over the territory between the Ezequivo River, and the boundary established by the 1899 award and the 1905 agreement, 3. that Venezuela has failed to comply with the obligations set out in the orders of 1 December 2023 and 1 May 2025. 4. that as a consequence of all the foregoing, Venezuela must a. withdraw from any part of Guyana's territory as defined under the award, including the part of Ancoco Island that the award attributed to Guyana. a. refrain from asserting or purporting to exercise sovereignty over any part of Guyana's territory and from taking any actions that violate Guyana's sovereignty or territorial integrity as defined in the award. c. revoke by means of its own choosing v été inhale from�,iendo fut vين구is apart and to stand out in the award. c. revoke by means of the doctrine, the executive force and the order of Shalom Government will lob him up, and claim your strength in layers of the application and how will이를 And in particular, one, repeal the legislation which purports to incorporate Guiana's sovereign territory within Venezuela and the legislation which purports to extend Venezuela's legislative, executive and judicial jurisdiction to that territory. Two, dissolve any entity to which Venezuela has attributed powers over Guiana's territory, such as the High Commission for the Defence of Guiana, Esikiba, as well as all other executive, legislative and administrative agencies created to exercise such powers. Three, terminate the social care plan for the population of Guiana, Esikiba, and any ongoing census of the population of Guiana's territory, as well as all military activities conducted in furtherance of Venezuela's attempt to exercise sovereignty over, annex, administer, or control any part of Guiana's territory. And, refrain, this is four, from publicly claiming or teaching its people that the award is a nullity or the outcome of a fraudulent process, or that Venezuela was wrongly deprived of the Esikiba region. Three, withdraw from all public institutions and facilities, revoke and destroy any map depicting any part of Guiana's territory as defined by the award as part of Venezuela. Three, Mr. President, allow me in closing to express on Guiana's behalf, President, Dr. Mohamed Erfan Ali, Guiana's government, its delegation, and its people, our profound gratitude to the members of the Court for the care, patience, and attention you have devoted to these proceedings. We also wish to convey our sincere appreciation to the Registrar, and wish to thank him, to wish him well as the end of his time at the Court is approaching. We express, too, our sincere gratitude to the staff of the Court and interpreters for their unfailing professionalism, courtesy, and dedication, which have greatly contributed to the orderly and efficient conduct of this hearing. Finally, I would like to extend our respect and warm regards to all the distinguished members of the Venezuelan delegation. We have greatly appreciated their presence throughout these proceedings in the Great Hall of Justice. Mr. President, members of the Court, this concludes Guiana's second round. I thank you very much indeed. I thank the agent of Guiana for the final submissions presented on behalf of his government. This brings to an end the second round of oral argument of Guyana, as well as this afternoon's sitting. The Court will meet again Monday, the 11th of May, 2026, at 3 p.m. to hear the second round of oral argument of Venezuela. The sitting is closed. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.
THE HAGUE – The International Court of Justice (ICJ) holds public hearings in the case Guyana v. Venezuela
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) holds public hearings on the merits of the case concerning Arbitral Award of 3 October 1899 (Guyana v. Venezuela) on 8 May 2026.
Description
The International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal judicial organ of the UN, holds public hearings on the merits of the case concerning Arbitral Award of 3 October 1899 (Guyana v. Venezuela) from Monday 4 May to Monday 11 May 2026 at the Peace Palace in The Hague, the seat of the Court. Session held under the presidency of Judge Iwasawa Yuji, President of the Court.
Second round of oral argument of Guyana
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