Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons — Ninth Biennial Meeting of States, (2d Meeting) Open-Ended Technical Expert Group

Good afternoon, colleagues.
Thank you for coming back to the room so promptly.
Whilst I do love you to continue your conversation, we just wanted to make sure that you could get to your seat as we will try to get to our meeting in a timely way.
We do have a Our experts with us so they will be briefing us and then certainly looking forward to another very productive conversation that we've had this morning to continue in the afternoon.
So I'll just give you a moment to finalize your conversations and take your seat.
Thank you so much for coming back.
Good afternoon again.
The meeting of the OETG is now resumed.
This afternoon, we shall turn to the second thematic panel discussion, and this will focus on opportunities presented by development in the manufacturing technology, and design of small arms and light weapons to strengthen national implementation in line with the relevant provisions of the program of action and the International Tracing Instrument.
I refer you to guiding questions four to six.
Indeed, just like this morning to set the scene, we have a distinguished panel of expert briefers.
Their bios have been made available in the meeting space.
I shall open the floor for views for member states after we've had the same set in via briefers.
I continue to encourage getting inputs and statements which should be submitted to etment at unn.org with a copy to conventional arms slash UDR unn.org.
Your written statement would also help us in developing the summary of our meeting, so please I ask you to submit to the relevant email addresses.
With that, I'll turn to our briefers.
To start with the presentation, we have miss Paola Sumaya Di Associate researcher, conventional weapons program, Unity, and she's joining us from online.
You have the floor.
The Chair for giving me the floor.
I'll be sharing a presentation.
Are you able to see my slides properly? Yes, we can see the slides.
Please.
Wonderful.
Thank you.
Distinguished delegates, it's a great honor to join you today for this important discussion.
As mentioned, I'll be walking through some possible approaches for the integration of technology into arms control systems, but specifically oriented toward the prevention of diversion.
As we know, technologies can serve as a tool to strengthen POA and ITI implementation generally, but especially for preventing, detecting, and countering diversion.
There are already mature technologies which could serve these purposes, both in the arms control realm as well as in other sectors which require technology to perform similar functions.
For instance, this could be the commercial industries that may suffer from supply chain security risks.
Despite the existence and availability of these technologies, we've seen that their uptake by states has been relatively slow.
At Unidair in collaboration with the Flemish Peace Institute, we set out to study what these technologies are and how states could go about integrating them into their counterdiverst systems.
We developed this very simplified three step framework.
The first step is to identify the functions which we would want technology to perform.
Diversion, as we know, can occur at any stage of a weapon's life cycle.
Accordingly, counterdiversion implies different actions and functions throughout each step of the key chain of custody.
A good first step in integrating technology is to identify which functions one would want the technology to perform and which step in the chain the state would like to strengthen with technology.
Identifying needs or gaps first is a good start.
Once the desired functions have been identified, we can continue by identifying the technologies which could have performed those functions.
For instance, a state may decide that they would like to strengthen their tracing capabilities.
Then the next step, once this has been determined, would be to see which technologies already exist that can perform these tracing functions.
With a list of those possible technologies in hand, one can then assess the requirements of each to determine which is best suited for their context.
Some technologies may have infrastructural requirements or may incur costs which are prohibitive.
So it's not until you look back at the context in which you want to implement that a state can make an informed decision on which technology they want to integrate and how.
It's important to note when going through this framework that the most appropriate technologies may not be sophisticated, and in fact, when you do the initial needs assessment, it's possible that the correct solution may not be technological at all.
Through this framework, we really want to encourage a needs driven and context sensitive approach to technology integration.
To give an example of how to use this framework, I'd like us to look at this table.
I hope it's not too difficult to read, but I'll walk through it anyway in case it is.
Across the top along the X axis, we can see the possible functions that we may want technologies to perform for counterdiversion.
This is step one of the framework, identifying what we would want a technology to do.
In this case, for example, we have item identification, anti tampering, and use monitoring.
All of these are functions we may want out of a technology in our arms control system.
That's step one.
Once we have these functions, we can generate a list of possible technologies which can fit those needs.
We have that along the left hand side on the Y axis.
We've listed out some of the technologies which could do this.
One can see in this table that there may be a variety of technologies which could perform a given counterdiversn function.
For instance, tracking and tracing, we have seven different technologies that could be used for tracking and tracing.
This takes us to step three of the framework.
Assessing the context is the essential next step because by looking back at one's context, one can identify which, for instance, those seven technologies would be the most appropriate for their needs.
To give a more concrete example of how to walk through this process, I'm going to zoom in on two technologies.
For the functions of tracking and tracing item identification and accountability, one possible technology are two decodes.
These are small images such as the QR code to the right that can store information.
They can be applied on packaging or directly onto items such as firearms, components, or ammunition through laser marking.
These QR codes or two decodes can be used to identify items throughout the different stages of their life cycle by having a unique code associated to that item.
So now, knowing the function that this technology could play in an arms control context, we can see what would this require in the context itself.
So two decodes require a coding system and equipment that can generate and subsequently mark the code onto the item.
And then afterwards, in order to trace that item, we would also need equipment to read the code.
So once the country has identified their need to strengthen this part of their system, has seen what this technology can do and can see the barriers and the possible requirements of this technology, they can determine if this is a good fit.
Another example is GNSS or satellite tracking.
GNSS tracking technology is added, let's say, to an item or to a package or a container, and it can track them using satellites.
The tool can help detect diversion attempts, increase accountability, and give alerts in case a package or a shipment is diverted.
This is most relevant specifically in the transfer stage.
So hypothetically, if a state wanted to strengthen its counterdiversion efforts, specifically in the transfer stage and we're thinking of using this technology, they should check if it's appropriate to their context.
GNSS tracking requires both a device and software to gather tracking data, and if there's poor signal or none at some point in that transfer, then the transmissions will stop in certain areas.
So if a state is cognizant that the transfer routes through their territory generally pass through areas with poor or no signal, they might determine that this is not an appropriate solution for them.
This is all to show once more the importance of context sensitivity.
Given this, our research doesn't necessarily recommend one technology for all states to integrate for counterdiversion.
However, if we were to recommend one thing, which seems to be universally beneficial, it would be digital record keeping.
Record keeping is a fundamental building block for all arms control initiatives, and it's a requirement of the ITI.
Record keeping practices don't need to be highly technical or sophisticated, but a digitized, centralized data repository, as was mentioned in several of the presentations and interventions earlier, can be an effective tool for counterdiversion.
Most of the technologies assessed by Unidir require digital recordkeeping to be in place.
This is clear, for instance, if we look at the example of QR codes.
For QR codes to be usable and traceable as unique item identifiers, one should have a centralized database of what items each QR code is associated with.
Otherwise, it's not very useful.
Without digital record keeping, integrating other existing technologies for counter diversion becomes either more difficult or less helpful.
With this, Mr.
Chair, I'd like to thank you once more for giving me the floor and thank the delegates for their kind attention.
I wish you all a productive remainder of this OETEG session.
Thank you very much.
Thank you so much, miss Domit for your very helpful and valuable briefing focusing on the framework for identifying technologies to counter diversion and allow me to also express thanks for the work of Unit on this important issue.
And I'll turn over to Mr.
Ley Su DeSantos, Federal Criminal Police expert from the Brazilian Federal Criminal Police Expert.
Mr.
DeSantos, you have the floor, please.
Thank you so much, Mr.
Michael Ku, ambassador, chair of this meeting.
I appreciate the invitation and I compliment all my friends in the panel, all distinguished delegates here.
Thank you very much for this opportunity to contribute to this important discussion.
I represent the Brazilian Federal Police where we work directly with firearm tracing investigation related to illicit trafficking firearms.
Today, I will briefly share Brazil experience and tracing and recovered illicit firearms.
Focus on practical approaches and key lessons learns that may be relevant in other contexts.
All right.
So you keep your camera on.
Colleagues, we experiencing a bit of a challenge with the technology.
We'll get that to resolve quickly.
Thank you for that.
In Brazil, addressing of firearms involve complex and interconnect challenges.
In alignment with POA and ITI, Brazil has taken important steps since 2003, establishing a comprehensive legal framework to regulate firearm manufacturer, registration, and possession.
One of the laws create this CN arm and centralized national database designed to track the life cycle of firearms manufacturer or importer into the country.
Before this, each state maintained its own register.
This fragmentation significantly hinder effective tracing.
The centralization of data with responsibilities shared between the arm and the federal police was essential to improve traceability.
However, a key operational challenges remain ensuring the accuracy and continuous update of the records, especially when firearms are seized across thousands of different precincts responsible for criminal investigations.
Additionally, a substantial number of firearms seized in Brazil were never registered in this database, and many others are recovered with obliterate serial numbers.
To address this, two fundamental prove essential.
First, investment in forensic capacity, including laboratory infrastructure and the training of specialized firearm examiners.
Second, the development of regulatory policies targeting specific stakeholders such as manufacturers, importer, and civilian users.
Was mentioned in the first session today, subordinate legislation requires in Brazil that serial numbers be marked by mechanical deformation on the btrel slide, and receiver or framer with a minimum depth of 0.1 millimeters.
This helps a lot in the recover of obliterate marks.
Together, these measures strengthen the role of forensic science as a critical partner to investigate this type of a crime.
But the scale of the challenge is significant.
I Brazil is seized over 100,000 firearms per year, and many of them are not recorded in the official database.
And this map is a BI panel based on forensic reports and is shared with investigators showing the firearms country of origin.
Over time, this has revealed increasingly complex trafficking networks, often operating across multiple jurisdictions.
This reality highlights the need to move beyond isolate tracing efforts and to integrate intelligence driven approach.
This initiative of the Federal Police has strength the integration between forensic analysis and investigative units, allowing data generating laboratories to be systematically consolidated and use strategically by specialized investigative teams.
A Practical exemplar may illustrate this approach.
In a given period, we identify a significant increase in firearms of a specific brand manufacturer in Croatia appearing across multiple Brazilian states.
This pattern was detected through the systematic aggregation of forensic data.
Serial number restoration very well discussed this morning, was conducted in different laboratories by multiple examiners.
Individually, this case seems isolated.
However, once consolidated into a shared system, the data reveal a clear trafficking pattern.
Investigators were then able to contact the manufacturer, identify the import in Paraguay, and in cooperation with Paraguayan authorities, identify both the Brazilian traffickers and their counterparts facilitating the flow.
This case was selected to demonstrate several key points.
The importance of investing forensic capacity, the value of integrated data systems, the need for dedicated investigative units, and the essential role of international cooperation.
Despite these successful challenges remains.
Widely specialized forensic and investigative teams exist at both federal and state levels.
The systematic integration of sharing the data is still more fully developed in federal case than in state level investigation.
Another more recently and relevant development relates to ballistic intelligence.
Brazilian legislation, that one that I mentioned in 2003 that created the scenarim originally envisionate a database of ballistic profiles for all manufacture firearms, although this was not implemented until today.
Balistic profiles are the signature that firearms parts leave on spent ammunitioned components.
However, in 2020 19, the law was amended to establish a national Balisk database focused on crime related firearms.
So it was a small set of the previously envision a database.
This initiative has proven highly effective.
Today, 40 labs were trained and equipped with IBS system that communicates daily with the central serve maintained by the Minister of Justice in the capital, forming the National Balis analysis systems in Portuguese Synab.
Synab allows us to link bullets and cartridge cases across different crime scenes, jurisdictions, connect federal with state crimes, or link specific firearms to previous crimes.
On average, we obtain ten leads per day from the system.
Three of these connect seize firearms to previous criminal activities, strengthening both investigations and prosecutions.
Brazil experiences show that effective tracing requires strong legal frameworks, investment in forensic capacity, integrate information systems, dedicate investigative structure, and sustain international cooperation.
In this context, tracing should not be understood not only as a technical procedure, but as a strategic tool.
Firearm tracing is not only about identifying individual weapons, but also about understanding, mapping, and ultimately disrupting illicit marks.
Sharing this experience with this 40 K contribute restraint collective responses under the POA and the ITI.
Thank you very much.
I take this opportunity to really thank Mr.
DeSantos for his briefing, but also for sharing Brazil's experience when it comes to the strategic element, I should say, of tracing to looking at Brazil framework that has been put in place.
I will now turn to doctor Billy Henwood who is assistant professor at Trent University, and also forensic science consultant with Conflict armament research.
You have the floor, Doctor.
Thank you, Mr.
Ambassador and to all the distinguished delegates with us today.
I will be speaking about the forensic recovery of serial numbers and their approaches to tracing.
This QR code on your screen will take you to a recently produced report in collaboration with UN ODA, Conflict armament Research, and myself with some colleagues from CAR.
I'd like to give a brief reminder of the ITI language that's in paragraph seven.
We know that the choice of method for marking is a national prerogative and states should ensure that whatever method is used, all marks are required to be easily recognizable, readable, durable, and as far as technically possible, recoverable.
When we talk about forensic science and what we mean about what is recoverable, we're looking at the criminal or the conflict obliteration of the serial numbers primarily.
We found through our previous study that the serial numbers are the primary marks that are removed, and in some cases, we see a complete removal of all marks, although this is quite rare.
The recovery of these marks is something that's long been established in forensic science and is used on a global level across almost all states.
Paragraph eight is equally as important where Section E discusses the encouragement of manufacturers of small arms and light weapons to develop measures against the removal or alteration of marks.
The most effective way to ensure that marks are not removable in a permanent fashion is through stamping and dot painting, which I will go through a little bit more of the material science behind this for greater understanding.
This, if you can imagine, is the cross section of a piece of steel or aluminum, where the atoms are formed in a fairly regular crystalline structure.
What that means is that they're very well organized in straight lines.
When we apply a mark with a stamp or a dot pen, we're compressing that microstructure, which is where the red circle is highlighting in B and C.
That compressed microstructure, I've been calling the effective depth of the marking.
This is what actually allows us to conduct the recovery as we're exposing that material using either chemical or non destructive methods.
What we actually see on the surface of a serial number is that gap in the actual microstructure, where it looks like a hole or a stamp, that's your visual depth.
What we then see in the criminal and context obliteration, we're looking at where in the image on the left of the screen, it has been removed, whether it's with a file or a power tool, some drill.
They're removing the visible depth of the marking.
In many cases, the effective depth or that compressed microstructure remains.
In forensically aware regions, especially, we see this material completely removed because the actors are aware that we can recover using forensic means.
On the image on the right hand side of the screen, what we see at the top where the atoms have been faded is traditionally what we see in most regions, where the serial number has visibly been removed.
However, the material remains that we can recover it.
We are seeing an increased use of laser engraving for marks on firearms.
We know that lasers are faster, cheaper and easier to maintain than stamping and dot and pain equipment.
The issue we're facing is that they do not create that region of compressed microstructure, so we're not able to successfully recover these marks.
The chances of forensic recovery are significantly reduced.
Many forensic agencies have reported during our research that the serial numbers that are laser engraved are not even being attempted to be recovered because they know that there's such a low opportunity to recover these marks.
Some of the work that we've been doing through CAR and UNODA is looking at a hybrid marking intervention.
Our proposal is that we keep any marks that aren't unique identifiers to be laser engraved if the manufacturer and the national prerogative dictates.
However, we need that serial number to conduct any tracing efforts.
We don't necessarily need the logos and the caliber and the manufacturer and the model in order to identify a firearm because there are other visual identifiers we can use.
However, that serial number is the only mark that allows us to trace a firearm through its life cycle.
Our second proposed intervention is using nondestructive recovery techniques in forensic capacities as a complement to the currently established and often used chemical etching.
The chemical etchins are essentially hydrochloric acid or similar and what we're doing is physically removing layers of the steel or the aluminum to recover that microstructure.
This leads to rust and corrosion and increased damage over time.
If the forensic agencies aren't applying oils and preserving their forensic evidence, when the cases go to trial, often a year or more later, the firearms are completely damaged.
This does not allow for the re examination of forensic evidence, which causes problems in our criminal justice system.
The nondestructive techniques, the bottom image that you see is a magneto optical image scan.
We also use magnetic particle inspection.
These methods should be used to complement those chemical etch in.
Because the SOPs in many forensically aware regions still use chemical etching, we should be using these nondestructive techniques first and if we get a positive result and a positive recovery, we don't need to then destroy the forensic integrity of the evidence.
Finally, what we're looking at is the guidelines on the marking depth.
We know historically that the microstructure compression has been reported to be six times as deep as the mark itself.
This unfortunately does not translate to the materials used in modern firearms.
The materials we're using are so much different in their properties.
We're using aluminum and different alloys, including zinc.
These, these materials don't respond in the same way to the same depth that steel that we traditionally use woo.
We're also seeing the need for polymer and modular weapons to be marked properly and each of these materials responds to the dot painting, the stamping, and the laser engraving in a different way.
One umbrella depth for all of these materials may not be the most appropriate.
We need to re evaluate the depth requirements as there's such a disparity across different jurisdictions.
Some academic research that's ongoing is establishing that effective depth for small arms and light weapons marking.
It's just trying to put everyone on the same page in terms of effective marketing depth, not only for commercial manufacturers, but also for organizations that have remarking programs.
Once this effective depth is established, a global guideline can be consolidated and solidified.
Thank you very much.
Thank you so much, doctor Henwood.
Thank you for your very informative and valuable presentation that focused on the obliterated marking tracing publication, which is also one additional work for which we should thank you and the other authors.
Now, I shall give the floor to miss Solidar Ella, which is Director of United Nations Regional Center for Peace Disarmment and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean and thank you for the regional work that was done.
You have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Good afternoon.
Excellencies, colleagues, fellow panelists.
It's my pleasure to join you today.
Technological innovation is reshaping how firearms are manufactured, trafficked, and detected, creating both new risks and new opportunities for control.
Across Latin America and the Caribbean, technologies such as CNC machining, three D printing, and modular assembly alongside the circulation of components and kits are becoming increasingly present.
These trends are driving the need for innovation, including in regulation, forensic practices and law enforcement, while accelerating the need to modernize systems and policies in line with evolving risks.
Increased exposure through parcel flows, component trafficking, and hybrid assembly is pushing states, particularly in the Caribbean to enhance border control and intelligence led interdiction.
This creates an opportunity to adopt integrated technology enabled detection and border management systems aligned with POA commitments on transfer controls.
In response to these evolving technological dynamics, UNIC is supporting states across the region to turn these challenges into opportunities by strengthening detection, marking, tracing, and investigative capacities in line with the program of action and the International Tracing Instrument.
I'd like to speak briefly on the assistance provided by UNIC and just to mention that a key entry point is detection.
Al NRC developed the interdicting Small arms ammunition parts and components course or ISAP to strengthen frontline capacities at borders.
This course is specifically designed for extra scanner operators, customs officers, and border control personnel and focuses on improving the identification of firearms, their components, and explosives in luggage, cargo, and postal shipments.
This is particularly important in a context where trafficking is becoming increasingly fragmented and modular, with weapons often transported as part of or concealed within everyday goods.
The course also equips participants not only with theoretical knowledge, but also with practical skills in image interpretation and risk identification, enabling more effective inspection at entry, exit, and transit points.
Importantly, this training is complemented by technology deployment.
For example, UNREC is supporting Haiti through the provision of advanced Xray scanners that integrate AI assisted detection and higher resolution imaging, combined with tailored training.
The key opportunity here is clear.
By combining modern technology with trained personnel, states can significantly enhance their ability to detect illicit weapons firearms flows, directly strengthening implementation of POA commitments on border control and transfer regulation.
Beyond detection, AN NOC is also working with states to address the evolving nature of illicit manufacturing.
Through the course on combating trafficking in arms and ammunition or CTAM, the center supports states in building comprehensive capacities to prevent and combat illicit arms trafficking in line with international commitments.
A key component of this course is its module on illicit manufacturing, which directly addresses emerging technologies such as three D printing, CNC machining, and conversion methods.
As you can see here from some of the images and video from this course.
The module examines how firearms can be assembled or produced outside regulated environments using trafficked parts or unregulated techniques and how this creates new challenges for law enforcement.
At the same time, it equips states with the knowledge needed to adapt investigative approaches and legal frameworks, ensuring they remain fit for purpose in a rapidly evolving technological landscape.
This reflects a broader opportunity to move from reactive responses to forward looking technology informed capacity building that anticipates future risks.
A third key area of support relates to marking and tracing, which are central pillars of the International Tracing Instrument.
Al NRA continues to support states in strengthening marking practices in line with international standards while respecting that the choice of method remains a national prerogative.
And here technological advances are opening new possibilities.
Laser marking, for example, offers increased precision, efficiency and flexibility, including the ability to mark assembled firearms or hard to access areas without physical contact.
To support informed decision making, UNIC has developed guidance and research on the use of laser technology helping states understand both its advantages and its limitations, which we heard from our previous panelists, particularly in terms of recoverability of markings.
In a region where most countries are importers of firearms, strengthening import and secondary markings is especially important for ensuring traceability throughout the life cycle.
To this end, Al NRC provides equipment, training and technical advice.
This work is complemented by support to forensic capacities, including training on serial number restoration and the provision of equipment such as electromagnetic inspection tools and chemical etching methods.
A cross cutting element of UNIC assistance is technology transfer.
The center supports states in accessing and deploying relevant technologies to strengthen arms control systems, including advanced detection tools, laser marking equipment, and forensic and ballistic technologies.
This is particularly important in a context where technological gaps can hinder effective implementation of the program of action and the International Tracing instrument.
As an example, the center has supported Caribbean states with ballistic imaging systems and comparison microscopes, enabling forensic experts to link weapons, ammunition, and criminal incidents more effectively.
On the ARC's approach ensures that the provision of equipment is systematically combined with specialized training, technical guidance, and operational support.
This enables national authorities to not only adopt new tools, but also to integrate them effectively into existing procedures and institutional frameworks.
Technology transfer also supports the alignment of national practices with international standards while taking into account specific regional and operational realities.
The key opportunity here is clear.
By combining access to technology with capacity building and technical expertise, states can bridge capacity gaps and strengthen sustainable implementation of detection, marking, tracing, and investigative functions.
Across all of these areas, New York's approach is to help states harness technological advances not only to respond to new threats, but to strengthen core arms control functions, namely detection, traceability, and investigation in line with both the POA and the ITI.
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
I thank Director a for also very valuable briefing, particularly in the work of On Rick and certainly, as I said at the beginning, for the work that was done whilst I was engaging as chair designate in the region.
Colleagues, we've heard from our expert briefers in setting the scene.
I shall now open the floor for interventions and comments or questions.
By member state.
We do have our briefs here with us if there are questions for them to respond.
Directed this morning, please, you could indicate your interest in taking the floor by pressing the speaker button in front of you.
Also to advise that the 3 minutes time limit will apply.
We've been able to manage the time in the first session.
I look forward to same in this afternoon session.
With that, I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Dominican Republic.
You have the floor, please? Thank you very much Chair.
I'd like to congratulate the briefers for the clarity with which they have expressed these concepts.
These are concepts that are fundamental for arms control and tracing.
The question that I have is linked to the consequences that arise when the serial number cannot be recovered.
I know each country is working in a different context, but I'd be interested in hearing from the experts in the Dominican Republic.
Our legislation requires that when weapons cannot be identified using the serial numbers, they must be destroyed.
For that reason, on some occasions users who are using the weapons, we keep track of civilian use of weapons at the Ministry of the Interior and the police department.
When Users have used the weapons for 20 or 30 years and the serial number has been erased or if a weapon is lost or misplaced and then it reappears, very often those who find or use or steal the weapons will try to erase the serial number.
We have a forensic science institute where we can use chemical reagents to try to recover or restore the serial number.
But ultimately, in many cases, users will lose ownership of this because the weapon would have been captured and then marked for destruction.
I think on Monday we heard that in the Dominican Relic, we have destroyed 6,213 firearms in the last six months.
Our question is in relation to this issue, how should we address and how should we tackle this problem and what is the experience of other countries when these identify serial numbers are erased over time or have been robbed out in some way.
So I want to ask both about this issue and also about the tracing instrument like QR codes that require technologies that are rather difficult to implement, certainly not easy to implement.
All right.
So these frequency identifiers, they also require specialized teams.
This tends to be quite invasive.
I believe it was stated that it's very useful for tracing lots of weapons or batches of weapons.
But this is introducing RFID or a QR code has to be done very far upstream.
If this can in some ways degrade the quality of the met and the weapon, QR would do the same.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Dominican Republic for the intervention on the question.
On the list of speakers, I have the European Union to be followed by Croatia and then Australia, European Union, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I have the honor to speak on behalf of the EU and its member states with North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Bosnia, Herzegvina, Georgia, and Iceland aligning.
Allow me first to commend the inclusive and transparent preparatory process which you carried out over the course of the past months.
We'd like to contribute collectively to over question five.
We are convinced that we are convinced of the critical need to find new solutions to the evolving challenges, and this must include leveraging new and emerging technologies.
In pursuit of this, the EU places great importance on supporting research and analysis on the applicability of such technologies.
And in this regard, the EU submitted a working paper drawing on the research published this year on the automatic detection of firearms and their parts and components in AI enhanced Xray scanner systems in airports and fast parcel post shipping sorting centers.
Research report was developed under the project Automated Arms and ammunition Mapping two, an initiative of the EU global Threats Program.
The underlying technology is a potentially significant advancement in the detection of some forms of illicit firearms trafficking and it is already being deployed in airports in Europe, but it is not without its challenges and limitations as this research shows.
Allow me to summarize the main points of our working paper, which we also request to see reflected in the chair summary.
First, the rapid evolution of illicit firearms trafficking driven by the explosion of online commerce and the proliferation of privately manufactured firearms and evolution of three D printed weapons threatens to outpace traditional law enforcement interdiction capabilities.
Second, high volume logistics hubs, particularly postal sorting centers and border crossings are critical ch points where manual inspection of luggage and packages is no longer feasible and where automation and machine learning solutions are now necessary.
Third, commercial AI computer vision enhanced X ray scanners, known as automated prohibited items detection systems, APIDS in short, are reaching high levels of technological readiness and are being deployed in aviation luggage and parcel screening and thus represent a critical tool for firearm trafficking interdiction.
Fourth, in the EU, these systems are subject to certification by aviation safety authorities and performance testing is conducted by authorized national testing facilities, but very few systems have been certified to date.
The applicability of approved systems and in particular standards and performance metrics for other border control and fast parcel post settings also needs exploration.
Fifth, while AI enhanced APIDS continue to advance in sophistication, research has highlighted that their full potential remains constrained by the scarcity of diverse, high quality training data for firearm parts, components, and accessories that are subject to trafficking.
In particular, the non traditional shapes, designs, and material properties of three D printed weapons and kits continue to evolve and may not be fully represented in training data.
In light of these considerations, the EU proposes that.
First, AI enhanced API DCs are growing in sophistication and will be an essential component in illicit self trafficking interdiction efforts, diversion detection and investigations.
Second, given that effective deployment of these systems requires fit of purpose training data and all group certification standards, member states have an interest in contributing to these prerequisites.
Third, efforts to support improving AI enhanced APIDS to keep up with the evolving self trafficking threat could include initiatives to coordinate, to share and build a diversity of high quality training data.
Initiatives that bring together research and testing institutes, industry, and commercial providers should be closely aligned with regional self control policy roadmaps, national firearms focal points, and similar coordination bodies.
Fourth, in particular, it is critical that national and regional self trafficking experts are involved and consulted in the development of commercial APIDS detection capabilities and certification for the evolving threat.
The sharing of anonymized real world seizure data among member states and international bodies such as Interpol, UNODC, and the World Customs Organization also remains critical to this objective.
And finally, these steps would not only contribute to tangibly enhancing the detection, identification, and tracing capabilities, but also chart an effective path for leveraging the positive opportunities of AI for the effective implementation of the POA and of the ITI.
Thank you so much, Mr.
Chairman.
I thank the distinguished representative of the European Union for the intervention and certainly many thanks to the European Union for the working paper that was submitted.
On the list, I have Croatia to be followed by Australia and then Switzerland, Croatia, please.
Mr.
Chair, Croatia welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the discussion under panel two on opportunities presented by developments in manufacturing technology and design to strengthen the implementation of the program of action and the International Tracing Instrument.
Effective regulation, traceability, and control of SALW remain essential elements in preventing illicit manufacturing, diversion, and trafficking.
All firearms manufactured and first placed on the Croatian market are subject to strict marking and traceability requirements, ensuring accountability throughout their life cycle.
In this regard, Croatia recognizes the growing challenges posed by emerging technologies, including additive manufacturing.
Unauthorized manufacturer possession, transfer, sale, and modification of firearms and their essential components are criminal offenses regardless of the production method used.
This technology neutral approach ensures that illicitly manufactured firearms, including those produced through three D printing and other advanced manufacturing techniques are subject to the same legal controls and enforcement measures as conventionally produced weapons.
Technological innovation can further strengthen the detection, identification, and tracing of illicit CSLLVW.
Croatia sees significant potential in advanced marking system, digital firearms registers, integrated ballistic information databases, artificial intelligence assisted data analysis, and enhanced screening technologies deployed at borders, ports, and postal distribution centers.
Measuring forensic capabilities related to additive manufacturing, including the analysis of three printed materials and the identification of manufacturing signatures by specific production devices can further support criminal investigation and tracing efforts.
Croatia also emphasizes the importance of digital forensics, international information sharing, and cooperation among law enforcement agencies in addressing increasingly sophisticated forms of illicit firearms trafficking, including those facilitated through online platforms and emerging financial technologies.
In addition, Croatia recognizes the essential role of forensic science in preventing the removal of firearm serial numbers and recovering obliterated markings.
Specialized forensic methods including chemical, magnetic, optical magnetic, magnetographic examination, enable the restoration of removed identifiers and support criminal investigations.
Experience demonstrate that the robust and deeply embedded markings significantly improve the likelihood of successful restoration and tracing.
Through a combination of effective legislation, advanced marking and tracing systems, modern forensic capabilities, technological innovations, and international cooperation, Croatia remains committed to strengthen the implementation of the UN program of action and preventing the illicit manufacture, diversion, and trafficking of small arms and light weapons.
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Croatia for the intervention.
I will now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Australia to be followed by Switzerland and AAC.
Thank you, Chair.
Australia also welcomes the opportunity to contribute on the opportunities presented by the development of manufacturing, technology, and design of small arms and light weapons.
We're excited by what these opportunities present.
As conventional firearm design technology continues to evolve, our law enforcement and tracing capabilities must outpace the methods utilized by illicit trafficking networks.
As such, we must not view technological innovation as an obstacle, but rather as a critical operational asset to secure small arms and light weapons across their lifecycle from manufacture to destruction, or as we say in Australia, from cradle to grave.
Chair, preventing the diversion of legally owned firearms into the illicit market is primarily achieved through accurate, timely keeping of higher quality firearm records, moving away from fragmented paper based systems which require high levels of maintenance and diligent staffing towards integrated electronic record keeping that guides law enforcement through the process, ensures that newly entered records are of the highest possible quality.
Chair, to address these vulnerabilities, Australia is actively modernizing its domestic infrastructure through the implementation of our National Firearms Register.
This framework tracks firearm data across jurisdictions through a centralized near real time intelligence system allowing for local and national authorities to achieve an unbroken cradle to grave view of illicit firearms, further avoiding the potential for diversion.
Chair, modern manufacturing developments offer concrete solutions to current tracing vulnerabilities.
Utilizing hybrid marking, retaining highly rechrievable individual record marking through methods such as dot painting, whilst not unduly burdening industry and limiting their ability to utilize laser marking technologies for ancillary marking purposes presents a best of both worlds approach.
Furthermore, the tracking of official police, military, or other large stockpiles of small arms and light weapons can benefit significantly from RFID tagging infrastructure, enabling for near instantaneous mass inventory audits, as we know that global stockpiles present the biggest threat to regions affected by conflict.
Chair, these technologies present the opportunity to drastically improve our ability to remove human error, flag unauthorized access, and track firearm movements in near real time across jurisdictions or states where possible.
Chair, when illicit firearms are intercepted, the speed and accuracy of physical identification directly correlates with our ability to trace firearm origins and potentially further intercept associated illicit small arms and light weapons.
Australia is proudly attacking this challenge head on by mandating a strict compliance to the standardization amongst firearm recordkeeping, accomplishing this through its use of the National Firearm Identification Database overseen by the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission.
Chair, we see the increased accessibility and technology, which supports high quality and ongoing continuous electronic record keeping as the greatest opportunity to combat the trade in illicit small arms and light weapons rather than an attempt to institute a system which would aim to remark hundreds of millions of firearms produced over the last 500 plus years.
Chair, with respect to time, I will make the full intervention available in writing.
I thank the distinguished representative of Australia for your intervention and of course, look forward to receiving the full intervention.
If there's opportunity for further statement to be made, I'm sure colleagues will be happy to hear from me as well.
Now, I will give the floor to Switzerland to be followed by Iraq and Mexico.
Switzerland, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I would also like to thank our briefers today this afternoon, especially for their valuable inputs to this discussion.
If the first panel showed the challenges of new manufacturing technologies, this one reminds us of the fact that there are new tools at our disposal to strengthen the implementation.
We identify four areas under one common principle.
First on digital record keeping, which in our view is the foundation most counterdiversion technologies depend on.
A centralized searchable national repository do not need to be sophisticated to be effective.
The Rexa tracing system provided free to member states shows what regional shared tools can do, tracking weapons through the whole life cycle.
This expert group could identify the minimum data architecture needed while remaining neutral with regards to the exact technology used.
Second, on marketing and identification.
Technologies from other sectors such as decodes, chemical encoding, RFID, and the like are mature enough to assess for small arms and light weapons, according to recent research and offer in our view crucial opportunities.
Third, tracing and forensics.
Advances in ballistic image analysis, marking recognition, and recovery of obliterated markings expand what authorities can do with a recovered weapon.
Interpols yearms, firearms reference table, and ballistic information network exist already, as does conflict armed research eye trace.
Their value grows as states connect and contribute.
High quality photographs and tracing requests noticeably improve success.
Fourth on detection.
Dual energy X ray paired with automated algorithms can identify concealed or disassembled arms in partial flows, which are promising but early stage developments for polymer and printed components.
We identify one common principle here.
No technology is one size fits all.
Opportunities strengthen implementation only if needs driven and adapted to national contexts.
This expert group can draw on industry where these tools originate and on specialized research organizations such as UDR, GSHD, the Small Arms Survey, Conflict Armed Research, and the Flemish Peace Institute.
I thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
I thank the distinguished representative of Switzerland for the intervention.
I'll now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Iraq to be followed by Mexico and Nigeria.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair for giving us this opportunity.
All crimes are dangerous and crimes committed using arms are even more dangerous than others.
This danger is compounded by arms being stolen specifically, government owned arms.
This further exacerbates the dangers.
These arms were initially produced legally and then diverted illegitimately.
I have not read the seven points presented by Unidir I believe, because my site is somewhat weakened.
But is it possible to add a paragraph as a recommendation.
There is a manual provided by the UN and there are international standards for arms control.
That tackle the issue of national ingravings or markings.
There can be national markings in addition to manufacturer markings.
If this is followed, arms theft and diversion will be reduced.
Arms that are marked nationally can be prevented from being diverted a second time.
Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
I thank the distinguished representative of Iraq for the intervention and for the suggestion.
I'll give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico to be followed by Nigeria and Colombia, who is so far the last speaker on my list, Mexico, please.
Thank you very much Chair.
We're also grateful to the panelists for the information that they have shared.
I will make some general points and I have some questions on the basis of the information that we've heard this afternoon.
Mexico considers that the opportunities should be evaluated on the basis of their capacity to strengthen the practical implementation of the plan of action in the ITI.
Our national experience shows that even digital tools that are relatively simple can generate major improvements in the area of traceability.
For example, the transition from fragmented paper based systems into digital ones has strengthened the quality of registers and record keeping.
It has reduced human error and increased availability of information during criminal investigations, taking into account the major challenge continues to be the diversion of manufactured weapons.
We're interested in knowing what emerging technologies could help to further strengthen supervision of the transfers and movements of weapons throughout their entire life cycle.
For example, on the basis of the information shared by Somaya, there are viable and economically sustainable applications of geolocation technologies, logistical monitoring, or a follow up that can enable the early detection of possible diversion during transport or storage of weapons.
Do these exist? Also, taking into account the progress that has been made in technologies such as AI and adding on to what was just mentioned by the EU, we'd like to know whether there are any good practices for the use of automated recognition technology that could assist with rapid identification of weapons in the field and how this could be linked to existing databases.
This morning, for instance, we heard about the database of the ARMS platform of Interpol and we were wondering whether this is used or whether this can be used for these ends.
Finally, I'd like to thank the panelists for highlighting how capacity building on the digitization of records and databases can help not only with traceability, but also in an approach in terms of preventing weapons diversion in the early stages.
Mexico believes that it is indispensable to ensure that international cooperation and assistance is aimed at ensuring that technological tools are sustained over time or sustainable over time and have the necessary institutional support in order to produce sustained results.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished Rest of Mexico for the intervention and the questions.
I'll now give the floor to the Distinguished representative of Nigeria to be followed by Colombia.
Thank you, Chair.
As regards opportunities presented by technological development in diversion prevention, this Nigeria considers to be one of the most critical aspects of the POA.
Technological innovations such as digital inventory management systems, electronic record keeping, secure stockpile management platforms, and enhanced end user verification mechanisms can significantly strengthen accountability across the entire life cycle of SAL.
These tools can assist states in identifying vulnerabilities, preventing unauthorized transfers, and improving transparency in national control systems.
Regarding detection, identification and tracing, emerging technologies can substantially improve the detection and tracing of illicit weapons.
Advances in forensic science, ballistic identification systems, digital system databases, and marketing recovery techniques offer practical opportunities to strengthen implementation of the ITI.
Nigeria encourages greater international cooperation, and sharing expertise and technologies capable of restoring obliterated markings and improving the identification of trafficked weapons recovered from criminal and terrorist networks.
It is not enough to embark on destruction of illicit weapons.
Identification is important in understanding the supply chain.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria for the intervention.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Colombia to be followed by France.
Good afternoon to our panelists.
Thank you for joining us for this discussion and for adding so much of the general elements that we heard this morning.
For Colombia, we also see challenges, but also significant opportunities for strengthening implementation of the program of action and the International traceability instrument, the ITI.
Firstly, progress in electronic traceability allows us to improve the tracking of arms and munitions through the different stages of their life cycle tools such as QR codes and data matrix and other automated codes can strengthen the control of inventories, reduce human error, and contribute to preventing diversion to the markets.
The significant improvements in ballistic and forensic analysis offers new opportunities for improving detection and traceability of illicit weapons, Balistic is particularly important and in probability of databases is also important together with the use of automated comparison systems.
These can all significantly speed up the identification process.
This has been demonstrated and this can also support criminal investigations in a more effective way.
We also note significant progress in the marking and recoverable methodologies.
There are high precision or a Microts and other systems can facilitate recovery of critical information during investigations.
In Colombia, we also want to humbly place one of our experiences since 2024.
Before this date, we needed to have exchange of information with other countries with thanks to the capacity of our institutions.
We have a modular traceability instrument that allows us since 2025, 2026 to have databases of more than 30,000 captured arms.
But these firearms, of these 30,000, only 6,000 are about industrial, some 7,000 are not only 16,000 approximately of them have allowed us to it has been possible to trace some 12,000 thousands of 73% of them are industrial weapons and 4,335 have been etched.
This leads us to this wrong assessment that only industrial weapons allows us to trace them.
But as we heard this morning, We have heard from the experts this morning that it was possible to track non industrial weapons and this is an important development.
This module, as I said, Mora has allowed us to centralize all of these specialized and data from the police and criminal investigations including a number of investigations supported by the judicial police services.
Having developed this mechanism, we have a new concern which is generating interoperability not only for the databases of our national police services, but institutions and entities that for us include the domain and they have the monopoly over management of firearms, Department of Firearms Control and other institutions such as the oversight bodies, and they provide information.
They have access to information and they could share this and having robust databases would contribute to analysis and identifying structures.
It also allowed us to identify the countries of origin and to identify the routes traveled by the firearms and where they came from.
We were able to identify some 500 weapons that came into the market that were later on modified to become lethal firearms capable of detonating seven cartridges.
We believe that exchanges of experience and information could help to improve best practices, strengthen national implementation of the commitments undertaken in the framework of the program of action in the ITI.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Colombia for the intervention.
I'll give the floor to the distinguished representative of France, who's the last speak on the list.
France, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
France, thanks the panelists for their outstanding briefings and their contributions.
Turning to the improvement of the detection, identification, and tracing of SALWs which are illicit, France recognizes, like other speakers, the central role of ensuring a digital database.
In that regard, France's law enforcement has a digital database.
It's called traffic.
It stands for the traffic of fraudulently manufactured, imported, and sold weapons, and this database records the serial number with the year, the make, and the model, and a description of any modifications made to the weapon and photographs of Fium.
What's more, the French law enforcement authorities use the National Ballistics Identification database, which we call FNIB.
This is a tool for ballistics analysis of weapons and it allows for several cases to be brought together.
These two tools can be exported.
For example, our ballistics and criminology tools have been given to several Balkan states and one solution here also could be to integrate into the frame the slide or the slide or to engrave in a polymer in non visible fashion and a placing it in a random place, putting in either a QR code or a coded chip or a second metal plaque with the number of the weapon.
This might pose some problems with durability due to some firing and unfortunately, some aspects incompatible with the life cycle.
This method would have to supplement traditional marking methods.
In terms of the obliteration of serial numbers and the recovery of obliterated markings, modern markings with lasers should be mentioned.
This type of marking doesn't change the deeper structure of the metal and when it's changed, You can't reconstitute that number using acids as you can do with a stamped marking.
The technique of modern laser marking cannot be reconstructed by a laboratory using a chemical means.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of France for the intervention.
I do not see no further requests for the floor at this point.
What I intend to do is to go back to our briefers so that they could respond to the questions that have been posed by member states, but also to react to some of the intervention.
Perhaps you could do it in reverse order if you don't mind, Director Ula, and then we come to doctor Anwood and then of course, to Mr.
DeSantos.
I'm not so sure.
Dummy is online.
And even though I said I will start with D a, if we do have Madame Dummy online.
Can I check if you're still with us? Yes, I'm still here.
Never mind.
Since you're online, do you want to respond to some of the questions and comment as you may like, and then I'll come to the panelists here in the room.
Sure.
Please I'll be happy to.
Thank you, Mr..
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Thank you to the delegates for the questions and the remarks, all the thoughtful interventions.
I'd like to start by addressing the comment made by the distinguished delegate from the Dominican Republic on the barriers to implementing something like QR technologies.
Yes, I agree.
I think this is an excellent consideration of the specialized teams that may be required in order to implement well the use of QR codes.
When we did this analysis of technologies, we factored in a number of elements when we think about a contextual analysis.
When we think about analyzing the context and seeing, is it suitable or not suitable, some of the things we looked at were the affordability of the technology.
The second was the embeddedness.
So If you have existing systems, it was great to hear about the different record keeping systems of the different delegations.
It's important to think of, if we wanted to use something like QR codes, not only do we have the specialized tools, can we afford it, et cetera, but will it fit into our existing records? Another is the ease of use.
You mentioned needing specialized teams.
I think that's an essential consideration of whether or not you have the right teams for this.
Another is the robustness of the technology, which you mentioned, if you were to laser engrave a QR code onto something, what conditions will this pass through different technologies may not hold up well to different environmental factors.
Let's say in the transfer stage, it will pass through extreme heat or extreme cold and this technology is not fit for purpose then, it's something to think about.
But all of these are factors that we looked at.
I'm happy to circulate the report with all of these factors if it's helpful.
But yeah, I think it's an essential consideration when thinking about these technologies.
The other comment I wanted to respond to was from the distinguished Delegate of Mexico.
Thank you very much for your intervention.
On the idea of using AI for rapid identification of weapons specifically in the field, the only applications I've seen of this have been industrial, certain private sector actors who are developing this type of tool, and I'm happy to talk more about their tools specifically.
But this is all to say that it is possible, technically speaking.
However, I think there are coming back to the obstacles I just mentioned, there are several obstacles for states to do this by themselves and to have a national system for this.
Namely, any AI tool that we analyzed in our research requires a massive amount of data.
Unless unless the state already has all of this data compiled and clean, the burden on the state would be massive.
However, if we were to do a project like this collaboratively with an information sharing scheme, I think it would certainly be of use to many countries and it would certainly be more feasible.
I think and the use of AI for rapid identification of weapons in the field and linking to available databases is a promising path forward, but one that I think would be most fruitful in collaboration.
I think you'll hear tomorrow from miss Len Haidar, from Interpol.
Interpol has massive databases which we've heard from many states about how they contribute certain data points to them.
I think this would be a fruitful point of discussion to take into tomorrow's panel, specifically with Interpol to see if this is something that states desire to take forward, are there existing international cooperation mechanisms that we could use to that effect.
With that, I think those were the comments directed at me.
I hand you back the chair.
Thank you.
Many thanks to you, Tommy, for staying with us and for responding to some of the questions were posed by member state.
Now we can go to the reverse order, and I would like to give the floor to Dora please if you have a response to some of the questions.
Thank you, Chair V I am going to allow my colleagues to respond to the more scientific questions, but I do want to thank Colombia, the Dominican Republic of Mexico for sharing the progress made in their respective countries.
As regards to the Dominican Republic's question, as I mentioned in my presentation, one of the crucial aspects is informing countries about the options of the different methods that exist and their respective advantages and disadvantages so that they can then make informed decisions on the basis of that information.
It's also useful, I think, to share good practices that exist both outside the region, but especially within the region as these can be shared.
This is a major point.
Finally, I just wanted also to highlight how important international cooperation is for everything related to capacity building.
I'd like to echo what was mentioned by the distinguished representative of Mexico.
It's absolutely essential and it must go hand in hand with national ownership by the member states.
Thank you.
Thank you so much, doctor Aa, for the responses to some of the questions.
Again, as I said, thank you for the work of R on this issue in the region of Latin America and the Caribbean.
Now, I'll go to doctor Henwood.
Thank you all for your valuable interventions.
I would like to thank the delegate, especially from Dominican Republic, on their questions about the technologies and tracing efforts.
I would like to reinforce the use of non specialist but critical forensic technologies such as non destructive recovery systems and the implementation of a hybrid marking system for small arms and light weapons.
Disposal of illicit and sanitized weapons is certainly a responsible action by states when they no longer have investigative value.
But these weapons are sources of critical intelligence, not just for tracing and criminal conviction.
We should continue to exploit them using forensic technologies to increase the intelligence value of the evidence we are seeing.
Thank you.
Many thanks to you, doctor Billy Henwood.
Really thank you for the scientific expertise that you bring to this discussion.
Now we go to specific country level expertise we've had from Mr.
DeSantos.
Please, if you could respond to some of the question as you shared experienced in your intervention previously.
You have the floor, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair for this opportunity.
I took some notes and before I answer any of the questions, I would say that this morning I was very glad at the level of the questions and the interactions.
It's a diverse group here.
I was thinking about the diversity of the counts that the face and they are knowing pretty much what they are suggesting in this field.
So thank you so much for all these contributions.
I take notes from Dominic Nikan, Republic, France, Iraqi, Croatian, about the traceability, marking, and even the loss of identification.
So we talk about a lot about three deep printed parts, which is something that we are concerned.
But also, there is a problem about counterfeit firearms.
So they are metal parts, They are never being registered in any database and they are there.
They can be used and directly answer Republic Dominican.
If you are not able to track to know where his arm is coming from, so we are in danger.
Our society is exposed to that.
And generally, when you have a large numbers of firearms seized, you're going to just solve that case and you will not know how that firearm came or how criminals get access to the firearm.
So that's what we are facing here.
That's why I think the suggestions about marking other parts, not only the frame, it's very important.
All the suggestions about looking for technologies.
You don't need to have just one serial number in one place.
You may have many other things hidden and many other ways.
Of course, there is a commercial interest on that because it can become very expensive a firearm, so you need to balance that.
You may implement some measures that are going to help to trace that firearm.
But there are a lot of things that can be done.
The importance is to bring the manufacturer on the table and to suggest that in ITI, but especially in internal rules and regulations, how that going to work.
Forensic must be in the table because they can share with the authorities well that technology is useful or not.
It's easy to circumvent that law or not.
I think many of the questions was about that.
In terms of forensic ballistics, there was some intervention from Colombia, very useful about database, Mexico, Australia also, and of course, we look for combat crimes between countries.
But some countries are so far from others that it's a global and incredible large database may not efficient.
So with the help of Interpol, what I have envisioned for South America, for instance, is an Bam.
IBN is a database for Interpol that replicates the profiles of all the ball databases in the world that use their system.
But for us is important the countries that we have connections, that we have transactions.
Mainly South American for this type of Balisk database.
So it's possible to have integration between systems is another commercial issue.
They don't want that, but you can as law enforcement, request that when you're going to adopt any system.
So when you decide to adopt a technology that came from Canada and the US, we request them.
So you need to implement that possibility that if I go to talk, for instance, with Colombia, that is another system, I may share in a common data that I can talk to them if I have many crimes between these two countries.
A general rule about interoperability would just be helpful for in the future, these systems could communicate.
There are some technical hypothesis being tested, being implemented, but not adopted or worldwide.
It's something that we should keep our mind open.
I think that's it, Mr.
Chair.
Thank you so much.
I also want to take this opportunity to thank you, Mr.
DeSantos for your responses to the questions that were asked and also for your reflection on the conversation that took place earlier on this morning.
I think that was really a helpful reflection so far, at least for the chair.
To assess the discussions that already have taken place.
Colleagues, I don't know if there are any further reactions to the responses that have been given by our panelists or any other requests for additional comment.
Okay.
Because what I think I can do now, of course, we have enough time, but we've structured the program in a way in which you cannot immediately go into the third thematic discussion.
But I should give you a reflection of the key takeaways for this morning and this afternoon.
I'm sure that will elicit some form of conversation and engagement to get your first reaction to some of the key takeaway points.
So I firstly want to thank our panelists for really helpful intervention in the second panel to Doma is online to Mr.
DeSantos, doctor Ken Henwood.
And today, doctora, thank you so much for your interventions and your briefings and responses.
And what now I will do is to suspend our meeting for about 5 minutes.
Of course, with the help of colleagues in the Secretariat and Those who have been assisting the chair to put together our thoughts, I think we can do that and then come back with a key takeaways in 5 minutes.
Please stay around in the room.
Of course, we can sketch a bit and then in 5 minutes we reconvene, so our meeting is adjourned suspended, sorry I Thank you, colleagues.
I think that's the U in 5 minutes.
So if I could kindly ask that we resume our seats.
I want you to be seated because I'm sure you may want to hear every bit of the key takeaways so that you can also have the opportunity for some immediate feedback already this evening.
So our meeting is resumed and I would like to present my key takeaways for today's discussion and also inform that this will be part of or form the basis of the chair summary which will be delivered tomorrow.
What I will do at the end of the presentation of the key takeaways is to open the floor for your comment or any additions that you may have had after my presentation.
You should note as well that some of the submissions have been made in writing and will be included in meeting place and forms basis of what I refer to as our discussion.
Starting with takeaways from panel one on challenges.
As a general comment, we discussed the lack of formal definitions for modular, polymer, and three D printed weapons in the ITI, which can complicate regulatory efforts and requires further discussion.
First, on polymer frames, states are using embedded metal insert or visual windows exposing underlying metal markings to ensure ITI compliance.
That is a key takeaway 0.1.
These inserts need to be integrated so that removal disables the weapon.
But we also heard of cases where removal occurred and the firearm still function, pointing to a need for further technical discussions on this point.
States also suggested refining voluntary reference tools and interpretative guidance document.
Second, on modularity and record keeping.
I took note that the swapping of modular weapons component across multiple calibers can lead to mismatch serial numbers, complicated tracing and record keeping.
To mitigate this without overmaing pressure bearing part, it was proposed to designate a single primary control component for each firearm.
There was also discussion on the utility of markings on secondary components with some contrasting views shared.
This topic will benefit from further technical discussions.
Third, on illicit three D printing.
There is rising concern over growing sophistication and spread of three D printed small arms, components and conversion devices.
A discussion followed on the reliability and efficiency of different categories of such weapons.
To respond to this, some states have updated regulatory framework to criminalize illicit manufacture, including using TD printing and the online distribution and possession of weapons, CAD files, and blueprints.
Other solutions discussed include using blocking software to prevent the TD printing of firearms, updating seizure procedures, prioritizing customs and police training, including in online monitoring and forensics, and establishing online community platforms for reporting on illicit arms related activity.
State emphasize the balanced approach to protect license activities and ensure that resources are not diverted away from countering conventional weapons diversion.
Calls were made for covering not only small arms, but also their component while involving the arms and additive manufacturing industries, technology firms, shipping carriers, and online platforms.
For panel two on opportunities.
First, regarding counter diversion and stockpile management.
The discussion emphasized the value of integrated digital record keeping systems to replace paper based archives to prevent diversion during transport and stockpiling.
Technologies such as the two decodes, GNSS tracking, AFI also enable automated inventory uploads and monitoring of moving containers.
Second, on detection.
Training in small arms detection, including with the use of AI is provided by UN regional centers, among other actors.
Automated prohibited items detection systems, which leverage computer vision and AI offer value in automatically flagging concealed weapons at busy transit and postal hubs.
Their development requires establishing and regularly updating large image screening datasets and certification processes to optimize detection and minimize false positives.
State expressed interest in automated weapons identification technologies for field officers.
Lastly, states have emphasized the role of research organizations in detecting and monitoring emerging threats.
I think I should also note that on the third part on forensic analysis and obliterated recovery, to come to a serial number obliteration, a hybrid approach was discussed involving the use of mechanical marking techniques for the serial number on the core component, while other marks may be applied using laser or other technology.
As research is also available on ways to increase the recoverability of laser markings, further technical discussions would be helpful on this topic.
We also had calls for more agreement on the effective minimal depth, depth of the core component serial marking.
Forensic examiners highlighted non destructive techniques, for example, the magneto optical imaging, that these techniques are available to recover obliterated marks while preserving evidence for court.
Fourth, on international cooperation and integration.
Successful tracing depends heavily on international information exchange and maximizing existing global platforms.
This includes, for instance, the eRMs and eye trace.
Some states also offer to donate their seizure and ballistics database system to other interested states.
Operational success rates can be drastically improved, and manual entry errors minimized by simply embedding high resolution digital photographs into tracing requests.
We also heard about the need to unify data standards for automated ballistic information systems to enable more systematic information exchange.
One of my takeaways from this session is the need to promote a greater awareness of and access to information on existing technology related tools and assistance and how these systems respond to the needs of state and specific contexts.
I've taken time to read my takeaways very slowly so that you can get it.
I'll now open the floor for comments, questions or any additions that you may have.
And the floor is open.
We have about 15 minutes if we have requests to go through this process.
Remember, this is not negotiations, but I just want to hear for you a bit more if you have any comment at this stage.
I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Australia, and to follow Australia will be Islavic Republic of Iran.
You have the floor, please.
Thank you, chair.
It's probably more of a question, particularly around the use of two D codes.
Whilst we've heard from a number of states as well as the expert panel on the potential implementation of two D codes, it's something that we still see as not offering a robust application and a huge burden for management.
It would be something we would want to have significant conversation around how they can be managed and implemented um, specifically considering the outlay to apply those two decodes to all existing firearms, which would be needed to make any effort around that tracing technique worthwhile.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Australia for making that point on to the codes.
I think the point is well noted.
Generally in the takeaway, there was this reference to how do we deal with optimizing marking and detection, but also ensuring that we are not over regulating the system.
Thank you.
Islamic Republic of Iran, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
As this was the first meeting of the open ended group and not all delegations were in a position to bring their technical experts.
Formulations such as estates believed or any other wording suggesting a common or collective view should be avoided.
Instead, references should be made to some delegations or some estates as appropriate.
We think it should also be clearly reflected in the chair summary.
That this document is issued under the sole responsibility of the chair and does not constitute an agreed outcome, nor does it prejudge the position of states.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Islamic people of Iran for those important points.
Indeed, the optimal position would have been for all states to bring their technical experts here in New York, given the technical nature of the discussion.
Of course, meetings have been made available via web TV, but it's not the same as having the experts in the room.
So we hope that as we continue to engage, that this could be made possible for the experts to engage.
The point on how we described the intervention is also well noted.
Certainly, the point about the summary being the reflection of the chair is something which during the period of being chair designated had already made known to all of the delegations to engage in that process.
Thank you so much.
So we might have two reasons why we don't have additional comment for the floor, but we have a request, so I will go into the two reasons.
I will save that for later.
I give the floor to the distinguished represents of Mexico.
Thank you very much Chair.
I'll be very brief.
I just wanted to thank you for presenting this informal summary of the chairs summary.
I think Mexico fully grasped what you have said.
It is not an official negotiated summary.
This is a chair's summary subject to your discretion and authorship.
We would also like to submit to your consideration that you might include some reference to the mandate of the group with reference to paragraph 74 of Rev com four stating that this meeting was aimed at eventually drafting some recommendations that see the full and effective implementation of the POA of the ITI, and then that would be followed by what you've already mentioned.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for the intervention.
Yes, indeed.
I think what I presented as key takeaways was basically to look at the substantive discussion.
Well, thank you for the point in reference to the mandate in the report eventually.
I see no further requests for the floor.
The two point was that either the key takeaway was just so good that you don't have any further comments or you want an early dinner, but I see Australia has requested for the floor.
I give you the floor to Australia, please.
Thank you, Chair.
Sorry, Mexico just reminded me of something to say.
It might be a consideration for you to note in your comments that whilst we've heard from many states and experts that have managed to attend, as well as the expert panel, that we haven't actually heard from the private firearm industry and their experts.
The expert panel that did attend was mainly a from academia, which was very valuable, hasn't actually provided the perspective of the entities that are developing these new technologies and perhaps to inform a more robust discussion and provide strong recommendations that at some point the OETG could hear from industry.
I'm not sure exactly how, but thank you.
Thanks to Australia for raising the important point of the breadth of our engagement in terms of the substantive discussions.
In the period leading to this since I was chair designate in the informal consultations, there was a view that we encourage delegations to as far as possible or practicable, that include um, experts in your delegation, including, I suppose, if possible, for some experts from industry.
That's one part.
I also, as I said in the opening this morning, I also had the opportunity to engage with some representative of industry before the opening of the session this morning.
The hope is to continue that engagement to get a views from them, and of course, delegations are still within the sovereign will to add expert from various fields as much as possible.
But thank you for making that point.
The takeaway points were good and we also need early dinner.
Thank you so much for what has been a very productive day in the morning and this afternoon.
Before moving on to close our meeting, perhaps you just check if I see that we do not have any requests for the floor from my Secretariat colleagues that have been really very excellent in providing the necessary assistance to the chair.
All right.
I see also there are no further announcements for me to make this evening and thank you for your active engagement today.
I look forward to the same engagement tomorrow when we focus on panel three, also looking forward to your intervention.
We might need to look at the time tomorrow in our intervention given of course, the importance of the topic and perhaps the many delegation that want to intervene.
I encourage you to please be active and also work on your interventions now in terms of the time with no further requests for the floor.
This meeting is adjourned with thanks.