Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons — Ninth Biennial Meeting of States, (1st Meeting) Open-Ended Technical Expert Group

I think we should be starting now.
Excellencies, Deputy to the High Representative for disarmament affairs, delegates and experts, ladies and gentlemen.
It is my pleasure to declare open the first meeting of the open ended technical expert Group on development in the manufacturing, technology, and design of small arms and light weapons established under the UN Program of action and the International Tracing Instrument.
At the outset, let me thank all delegations for electing me as chair on first June and for the trust placed in me to lead this important process.
Over the past month in my role as chair designate, I have become familiar with how developments in manufacturing, technology, and design of small arms and light weapons are impacting the effective implementation of the program of action and the International addressing Instrument.
This week, in the course of the BMS, under the leadership of the Chair Ambassador James Larsen of Australia, my good friend, we've heard from delegations from all regions about how technologies are shaping, how weapons can be produced, marked and trafficked.
Combating illicit small arms and light weapons is a matter of profound importance to my country C Leon, a nation that has seen first and the devastating consequence of the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons.
During our Security Council tenure and our presidency last year, we made small arms a priority issue.
Distinguished delegate.
The establishment of this open ended technical expert group represents an important step forward.
Over the past month, I've held several informal consultations with state, as well as with intergovernmental organizations, civil society, and industry representatives.
As mandated by the General Assembly through the fourth Review Conference of the POA, our task is clear to develop agreed recommendations by consensus, to ensure the full and effective implementation of the POA and the ITI in light of developments in the manufacturing technology, and design of small arms and light weapons.
I want to underline that this session of the OETG is the beginning of a longer process.
The group will meet again in 2028 with a view to formulating recommendations by consensus for the consideration by the tenth Biannual meeting of State and at least by the fifth review conference in 2030.
Accordingly, we are not expected to negotiate recommendations this week.
Instead, our objective over these two days is to engage in substantive technical discussions that will help us identify key issues, imagine priorities and areas where further work is required.
Over the next two days, our work will be structured around three thematic panels.
This morning, we will begin our thematic panels with a focus on challenges, in particular, challenges posed by developments in the manufacturing, technology, and design of small arms and light weapons, in particular, polymers, modular, and illicit TD printing.
This development raised complex questions for marking, record keeping, and tracing.
In the afternoon, we'll turn to opportunities.
Technological developments are not only a source of concern, they can also be harnessed to implement the ITI and improve marking, tracing, record keeping, and other national control systems.
Tomorrow morning, our discussions will focus on international cooperation and assistance.
Adré both the challenges and opportunities before us, we require strengthened capacities, knowledge sharing, and technical support.
Tomorrow, we also discuss the way forward.
I welcome ideas for the intersectional program, how we can structure the continued work of the OETG towards the development of recommendations.
I encourage us to think creatively, collaboratively, and pragmatically.
The delegates at the conclusion of both today's and tomorrow's meeting, I intend to introduce to you the main elements from the discussion that will be included in the chairs summary.
I will aim to be as close to the final text as possible.
Tomorrow afternoon, I will present the entire chair summary to BMS nine.
The summary will not capture the entirety of our discussion, but rather reflect my assessment of the main point of our discussions.
In line with the modalities set out in the outcome document of the fourth review conference, I invite briefings by relevant subject matter experts.
I invited briefings by relevant subject matter experts.
Members, we recall that in advance of the meeting, I circulated a list of such experts which took place in which took into account technical expertise, regional representation, and gender balance.
Following expert briefings, there will be opportunities for interventions.
I urge allegations to be concise and focus.
I recall the guiding questions for a session which have been issued in the six languages as document a slash.129 slash BMS slash 2026 slash L five.
We are also benefiting from interpretation for all our meetings.
I take the opportunity to thank our interpreters for their support over the next sessions.
While I am aware that it was not possible for all states to include subject matter technical experts in their delegations, I am encouraged to see that many delegations have included subject matter experts.
Please note that the meeting is being webcast on UN web TV for those following from outside New York.
For organizational and procedural matters related to this meeting, I refer to the information notes circulated before the meeting.
In preparation for the meeting, I welcome delegations to serve in the facilitator role during the OETG as a friends of the chair.
I am already engaging interested delegations and I thank them for their interest in the role and supporting me in leading a successful OETAG process.
I note the importance of the expert group being able to continue to work during the intersectional period.
I propose that the group consider the role of supporters, champions, off friends of chairs, and provide their views thereon during our discussion tomorrow.
Distinguished delegate, as chair, I will strive to conduct our work in a manner that is transparent, inclusive, and pragmatic.
I remain open to your ideas and suggestions.
I encourage all delegations to approach this meeting in the speed of openness and collaboration.
The issues before us are undeniably complex.
But they are also critically important.
Ensuring that the program of action and the international tracing instrument remain effective in a changing technological landscape is essential to our collective efforts to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.
I'm confident that working together, we can lay a strong foundation over these two days for the important work that lies ahead.
Having heard from me for too long, and I have the pleasure to request the Director of the UN Office for Disarment Affairs Adré to deliver opening remarks.
You have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Mr.
Chair, Ambassador Michael Imran Canu, Excellency, distinguished delegates, experts, ladies and gentlemen, it is my pleasure to welcome you all to the inaugural meeting of the Open ended Technical Expert Group or OETEG as it begins its work.
I want to begin by thanking Ambassador Ku for taking on the role as chair and for his excellent leadership in bringing us this far.
I would also like to thank all the delegates, all the experts, and all the briefers who will contribute to the discussion over the coming days.
The OETG mandate originates from the fourth review conference of the POA in 2024, following discussions dating back to 2018 at the third review conference.
However, the PUA has addressed technology's impact on small arms control for nearly two decades.
In 2011, the first meeting of government experts examined challenges from modular and polymer weapons.
In 2014, the Secretary-General warned that emerging technologies could affect international trading instrument implementation.
The second meeting of governmental experts in 2015 further discussed polymer, modular, and three D weapons.
The chair summary noted that three D printers had been shown to be capable of producing working firearms, although the cost of three D printers made them out of reach for ordinary individuals.
Back then, the first fully three D printed pistol had been produced, and the company, Saw released its P 320, marking a significant shift in modular firearms.
But the challenges that this development could pose had not yet materialized on the ground.
Well, that has since changed.
By 2026, illicit three D printed weapons exist worldwide, are increasingly capable and are sought after by criminal and terrorist groups.
Modular weapons like the P 320 are now widespread in civilian and military markets.
Excellencies, dear delegates, against this backdrop and as you begin your deliberations, allow me to highlight three points.
First, the POA processes have advanced slower than the pace of technological change.
Your mandate requires the OETEG to put forward consensus recommendations by 2028 and no later than 2030.
I urge you to ensure that the OETEG can advance recommendations before BMS ten in 2018.
This will require intersectional work between now and then.
UN ODA is ready to support that work.
Second, technological development, as with all development, is not evenly distributed across the world.
I encourage you to use this week's meeting as an opportunity to exchange, share national experiences, and identify both needs and offers of assistance.
Third, I urge you to approach the task of the OETEG with the intention of bringing together technical experts and policymakers to put forward actionable recommendations.
This means ensuring that you actively engage experts, including from industry, where relevant.
It also means taking into account gender perspectives and the voices of young people, which are essential to developing effective and inclusive responses.
Mr.
Chair, I wish you every success in guiding this meeting over the coming day and a half, and I wish you all a rich and constructive exchange.
Many thanks to the deputy to the High Representative and Director, Sir Abel.
Thank you for your statement and well wishes.
I take this opportunity to also thank colleagues in the Secretariat, particularly in UNODA in providing NSA support in preparation for this meeting and during this meeting.
Colleagues, distinguished delegates, we now turn to the first thematic panel discussion on challenges posed by development in the manufacturing technology and design of smaller arms and light weapons, in particular polymer, modular, and illicit DDD printing.
As we get to that, certainly we will ask the briefer to join us at the podium to set the scene.
We've established a panel of expert briefers.
I shall then open the floor for views from state.
Thank you.
I got to get I As we get through the changes in the podium, I will get to the scene setting.
As I just said, to set the scene, we have a distinguished panel of expert briefers.
I should then open the floor for views from states after they have set the scene.
There is no established list of speakers for those discussions.
Experts and delegates are reminded to request the floor by pressing the speaker's button in front of you.
While this is intended to be an interactive discussion, delegations intending to take the floor should bear in mind that we have limited time and asked to limit interventions to 3 minutes when speaking on behalf of your delegation and would certainly expect the 5 minutes for interventions on behalf of group of state.
The input or statements should be submitted to Statement at un.org with a copy to conventional arms n.org.
I thank member states, international and regional organizations, non governmental organizations for the working papers, and other submissions that have been received thus far.
We shall now move on to our briefers.
The bios have been made available on Milton Place.
In the interest of time, I shall go through the bios, and it gives me great pleasure to give the floor to doctor Rachel Bolton Keen, Associate Professor of Forensic Science at Nottingham Trent University.
You have the floor, please.
Thank you.
Good morning, everybody and thank you for inviting me and providing me the opportunity to start this important discussion with you all.
The focus of my briefing is on the challenges and the potential interventions for consideration with respect to the program of action, the International Tracing instrument, and potentially their connectivity to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.
In recent years, there's been a growth in the use of manufacturers to produce and use polymer predominantly plastic parts in their weapons.
Also to create modular weapons that are designed to be reconfigured to reduce the number of weapons an individual might need to carry to make shooting more efficient and economical.
Further, in the use of what we call additive manufacturing, also referred to as three D printing, to both legally and illegally manufacture firearms and ammunition.
All these innovations and new applications of technology are leading to a rise in violent and organized crime and increased challenges for law enforcement and our ability to create a safe and secure society, both domestically and internationally.
The gaps that currently exist in our policies are also creating challenges for us in tackling small arms and light weapons manufacture, trafficking and our ability to effectively combat this.
My briefing focuses on sharing the challenges that are being created by polymer, modular and three D printed weapons.
Broadly, we define these as follows.
On the left you can see a polymer weapon.
The frame, in this case of a Glock pistol is what is made of the plastic, the polymer.
A polymer weapon, by definition, is a firearm with at least one part that is made of plastic or polymer.
Typically this part is the frame or the receiver, which is shown in the pink box.
In this particular example, these polymer parts have a metal tag that's inserted into the frame with the serial number as you can see beneath it.
And this currently complies with the ITI.
However, not all of the manufacturers across member states are currently meeting the requirements stipulated in the ITI because some of these metal tags are quite easily removed and they don't destroy part of the firearm if they're removed as they're required or should do.
The middle image shows a modular weapon.
This is a firearm that's deliberately designed by the manufacturer to be altered or adapted to the desire and need of the shooter by changing specific parts or modules.
By example, one of the most common is to switch the barrel so you can shoot different types of ammunition to shoot different targets, for example, maybe big animals or small animals.
For some modular pistols, for example, they might have what we call this firearm control unit or a chassis and that's what is considered to be an essential part and therefore houses the serial number.
In this case, in the middle image, you can see the pink box shows the serial number through the window of the plastic polymer frame.
However, a modular rifle instead of this pistol may have what we call a split receiver with an upper and a lower part, and the lower part might house the trigger, the hammer, the safety, whereas the upper might manage the mechanism of firing and the pressure.
In some countries, this lower receiver is the only p that's controlled and it's the only part that requires to have a serial number.
Whereas the upper receiver might have the barrel, for example, which can be changed.
This may not be regulated and therefore is often unsalized.
But in some states, for example, Brazil, the UK, all of these parts are essential.
They bear the pressure of the firearm and they are therefore legally required to be marked with a serial number, not just that one primary or essential part.
The final is an example of the three D printed weapon, and this is where either a part of that weapon or the whole weapon might be made by printing in layers, which is why we call it additive manufacturing to form the object.
The material is often a plastic polymer, but these printers can be designed to print metals.
I've even seen three D printers that print houses and cement.
There are lots of different types of additive manufacturing and types of printer.
So as Ruben will explain further, these three D models used to illegally and legally produce firearms are widely accessible, and they're now very cheap to buy and being exploited by criminals and terrorists to make weapons and now even ammunition at home.
So one of these challenges that at the moment, the International Tracing Instrument doesn't define terms polymer, modular, or additively manufactured or freely printed weapons, to support member states to make domestic policy changes and improve our ability to meet the requirements and implementation of the ITI and the program of action, potentially could the ITI itself or an annex of it be created to provide better understanding, consistency, and clarity to all parties on what these weapons and these terms mean in the context of the ITI and what we're trying to achieve through the program of action.
The second challenge and intervention I want to focus on respect to tracing firearms and combating trafficking of small arms and light weapons.
These are challenges that are being caused in the different markings requirements between member states.
Firearms and parts that are manufactured in different countries have different legislation regarding the marks that are required to be put on parts and there is not necessarily clarity on which is the most effective method to produce these serial numbers or these marks and to help us improve the recovery of alited serial numbers and to support us in tracing these weapons and parts across borders.
In addition, actors are finding it challenging to identify the primary core and essential part of the firearm.
Due to these different legal manufacturing requirements.
Again, this is impacting our efforts to accurately record and therefore trace these firearms.
A number of interventions could therefore be considered by the United Nations and member states to provide clarity and again, promote consistency.
These include mandating firearm producers and manufacturers to specify which primary or core essential part of the firearm should be serialized.
In the case of modular firearms, the parts may have different serial numbers, which is actually shown in this bottom image.
You may not be able to see it, but one of the parts, the slide has a different serial number to the frame and the barrel of that particular firearm.
Therefore, when you seize this weapon, which serial number do you recover and record? Do you record all of them? How do you go about tracing these? That challenge could be rectified and made easier for everyone to understand.
We could also ask those manufacturers for firearms being made in our state to provide us with information to decode and interpret the marks that they are putting on their firearms, not just the serial number, things like import marks, export marks, even codes that help them in tracking and quality control process of these firearms.
This would then help law enforcement and forensic scientists to analyze and trace firearms when the serial numbers themselves cannot be recovered.
We could also advocate for consistency of the essential part across firearm types and ask member states to legislate for those manufacturers and producers to mark serial numbers on all of those important component parts that are required for the firearm to function, including the barrel, the slide, or the cylinder, the frame, the upper and the lower receiver.
Not just that one part as being essential.
Firearm manufacturers could also provide a list of which is the core essential part for each model of firearm they produce and which they deem to be those secondary parts or accessories.
Again, this is about consistently understanding and applying to our recording practice across all states and across borders.
The information from manufacturers could then be collected by states and supplied to the United Nations, for example, to collate and distribute across all member states to provide an improved consistency in that recording practice and the ability to trace the movement of those firearms.
The ITI or an anneCS could also specify that metal tags are made of stainless steel specifically so that manufacturers aren't using less dense or cheaper thinner materials like aluminum that again, make it more difficult to recover those serial numbers and those marks for tracing purposes.
It could specify a minimum tag metal tag thickness and dimensions to create space on the tag for those additional marks such as proof marks, import and export marks to be added because you can't easily add those to the polymer framed weapons in particular.
Finally, the methods to create serial numbers should involve material compression, stamping methods, dot peening, for example, rather than laser engraving for those serial numbers to improve potential recovery of the serial numbers that do try to be changed and obliterated.
All of these potential interventions could help us improve our consistency of recording, ability to track and trace firearm movement and detect emerging threats across the world much more effectively than we currently can.
The final challenge I'd like to raise is associated with the different practices and policies that we have in our states and between our states for recovering those obliterated serial numbers and the technologies that we use to compare fired ammunition components to link criminal firearm discharges across borders.
For example, some states use only destructive chemical methods like acids to recover these serial numbers, whereas others have started to use nondestructive methods like the Ed current, which you'll hear about later this afternoon, which is preferable for retaining the integrity of the weapon, enabling replication by others, and increasing its potential use in criminal procedures.
These destructive non chemical approaches are also more sustainable and provide opportunities for states to also meet some of the UN sustainable development goals.
Different in ballistic imaging systems that we use in our states to investigate and link firearm discharges across borders is challenging at the moment.
Where one country might use one technology like IVIS, another might use Evo Finder.
In the past this data has not previously been able to be shared and correlated to help law enforcement in connecting crime and tackling particularly organized crime.
However, this is changing.
The manufacturers are now working more effectively together to provide some capability to export and import the three D data of these fired ammunition components to help us to compare and identify crimes operating across and criminals operating across borders.
Member states should and could therefore continue to push technology providers to develop these consistent approaches and develop their software and their technology to foster forensic comparison and data sharing between systems and between our states.
So some of the interventions and challenges I've posed this morning will also be raised in more depth in the subsequent briefings this morning, as well as the briefings this afternoon and will further add to our discussions over the next two days.
So thank you all for your time and your consideration, and I look forward to hearing your perspectives after the remaining briefings this morning.
Thank you.
Thank you very much, doctor King, for your briefing, certainly for the clarity of your presentation and for being here.
I'll now turn to Mr.
Obin Das, who is an Associate research fellow at the S Anthm School of International Studies, Singapore, who is joining us online.
You have the floor, Mr.
Das.
Thank you very much, Ambassador.
Very good morning, your Excellencies.
My name is Ruben Das, and today I'll be giving you a brief overview of the state of play of three D pre firearms from a global perspective.
Next slide, please.
So three D print firearms have really come a long way since the first fully three D print firearm was released in 2013 called the liberator.
In 2020, we saw the release of the FGC nine, which is a hybrid pistol caliber carbine that consists of three D printed components and commercially available unregulated parts that one can source from a hardware store.
This firearm does not depend on any regulated components and is currently the most frequently encountered three D print firearm in seizures globally.
The FGC nine really was a game changer within the three dependent firearm space.
Since then, we've seen a shift in designs that are becoming increasingly independent of regulated components, increasingly do it yourself or DIY, and also increasingly easier to manufacture, like the auto Glock, for example, and also the Rope nine.
In 2024, In August of 2024, we saw the release of the Uto, which is also a hybrid pistol caliber combine.
Like the FTC nine, it does not require any regulated components, and it's notably easier to manufacture than the FTC nine.
Apart from hybrid weapons, we've also seen the proliferation of part kit completions or kit builts.
Now, these are mostly clock type handguns, which have a three depted lower receiver, which are then completed with commercially available components like the barrel and slides.
These types of firearms are prevalent, particularly in the North American region.
Next slide, please.
The efficacy of a three D pointed firearm is highly dependent on the skill of the individual who's making it.
If it is made well, they are lethal and relatively durable.
Of course, it requires a certain amount of skill, practice, time, and experience, but it's definitely not impossible.
There have been several reported cases of shootings and assassination attempts worldwide involving these weapons, and there's a video in the slide which will demonstrate the workings of FGC nine.
So as you can see, it's, you know, if made well, it's definitely lethal and durable.
So firearms can even last 500-1 thousand rounds.
Next slide, please.
So if we look at the impact on the POE, these weapons definitely have posed several challenges to the POE.
First would be the decentralized and unregulated production of these weapons stemming from the commercial availability of three D printers.
Definitely regulatory challenge.
Secondly, these weapons are also unmarked, so they lack any form of serial number or tracing mechanism, which again, poses several challenges to tracing identification and detection.
Um, Finally, the proliferation of digital firearm blueprints, remains a serious challenge, and, you know, the flows of knowledge online has really shifted the um challenge from the physical to the virtual realm.
Next slide, please.
So these are examples of online platforms where digital blueprints are very readily available.
So, as you can see, they're available on open websites, on social media platforms like Reddit, X, Odyssey, Facebook, Disco, Telegram.
Many of the online communities that are responsible for the development of these blueprints, and, um, decentralized.
They function as peer to peer networks where designers are able to share new designs, interact with each other and also provide information and technical support, to each other.
These online communities and online platforms really are the lifeblood of the three D wounded firearm movement.
Next slide, please.
If you look at global seizure trends, we've seen a high increase in the number of three firearm incidents post 2021, with North America facing the highest number of cases, followed by Europe, especially western European countries.
Australia and New Zealand have seen several large seizures over the last two years.
Latin America and particularly Brazil has seen a few cases over the last year.
Asia comparatively has the lowest number of cases.
But overall, While three depended firearms are still on the periphery of the illicit arms spectrum, we are definitely seeing a growth in the number of incidents worldwide.
Next slide, please.
These weapons at present, primarily linked to criminal actors and criminal activity.
These include organized crime actors, individuals associated with narcotics and illicit manufacturing and trafficking networks.
These weapons have also been used as protection weapons and also offensive weapons in several shootings, uh, in attempted assassinations and also extortion.
Next slide, please.
While most of the cases have been linked to criminal activity, there have been at least 52 cases of terrorist engagement with these weapons.
Most of the cases have been linked to the far right, but individuals associated with other ideologies have also exist and have also been arrested for their attempted use and manufacture of these weapons.
Next slide, please.
Um, Another important issue that I'd like to highlight is also the involvement of youth with these weapons.
And we've seen an increase in the number of youths attempting to either manufacture, use, or traffic these weapons post 2021.
Um, Most of them have been linked to criminal activity.
However, there have been at least 21 cases of youth linked to terrorism as well.
There have been at least eight cases where youths below the age of 15 were detected for either attempting to manufacture traffic or use these firearms and youths are a highly vulnerable subset of individuals moving to the intersection between online and gaming subcultures with the three D printed firearm community.
Next slide, please.
So some trends to look out for in the future.
I think we should be looking out for designs that are increasingly DIY, that are increasingly independent of regulated components.
Many of these designs are also concealable and made to evade detection, and we've also seen a rise in print in place designs, which are designs that require minimal assembly and are relatively easy to put together.
Slide, please.
Also another two trends that I'd like to highlight also the proliferation of conversion devices.
These are small, benign looking devices that can be three D printed and that function to convert semi automatic firearms to fully automatic firearms.
These devices have been used in several lethal shootings and as you can see, they've been sold on ecommerce platforms as benign objects and these really pose a lethal threat.
Another issue would be ammunition.
Ammunition is, um, being heavily researched and experimented within the three D printed firearm community.
At present, the lethality and range is limited owing to the weight, but this could potentially be a game changer if significant breakthroughs are made.
Next slide, please.
My final point, I think if you look at countermeasures, the issue of three dependent firearms requires a holistic multi pronged approach.
International frameworks like the UN POE and the ITI remain key control mechanisms that need to be updated to account for the technological developments within the sphere.
These frameworks are you know, will only be effective if national level legislation is also updated, reviewed, and enforced.
Intelligence sharing and regional cooperation between states and also with the additive manufacturing community is key.
Um, we also should be looking at integrating new technologies like new forensic techniques, and also the incorporation of AI, which really has the potential to disrupt illicit manufacture and also be used in detecting new designs.
Finally, I think capacity building, training, and awareness raising, particularly that of first responding officers and law enforcement personnel of utmost importance.
Thank you very much.
Many thanks to Mr.
Das for a very valuable briefing on the particular evolution of um feeder printed small arms and light weapons.
I will now turn to our next briefer.
Also, it should be online.
I see most of you doing it already.
But to help with hearing briefers online, I recommend that you use your earshells so you can hear from them clearly.
I will now turn to miss Samantha Allen, who is Senior Policy Director, Protective Security and Small Arms at the Ministry of National Security of Jamaica.
You have the floor, miss Allen.
Thank you so much.
Excellencies, distinguished delegates.
Ladies and gentlemen, good morning.
I'd like to begin by thanking the chair designate for this invitation to Jamaica to share some inputs on this very important topic at the open ended technical expert group.
So I will just begin by recognizing the inputs that would have been shared before by doctor Bolton King as well as Mr.
Das, and to just reiterate that we in the Caribbean and the region are very much confronted by the realities surrounding these technological advancements.
From mico's perspective, we would have undertaken a comprehensive review of our firearms legislation, and in fact, that took us quite a while to ensure that we looked at all of the various areas.
The limitations based on the operational capacity of the persons would be used in the legislation to ensure that their respective duties are undertaken.
And I'm referring to our director of prosecution or our national licensing authority, as well as our security forces.
So during that comprehensive review, we saw the need to ensure that the legislation was modernized and that it actually takes into consideration or recognizing the technological advancements that would have basically been a emerging over the past years, and we saw the need to ensure that as a part of that process, those advancements were properly reflected in our legislation.
So in 2022, we would have passed our new Firearms Act, and that is the Firearms Prohibition Restriction and Regulation Act.
And in that act, notably, we saw the need to introduce some critical provisions that would put the state in a position to arrest persons and prosecute persons for the possession of certain items that basically would reflect an intent for the illicit manufacturing of firearms.
So the possession of digital blueprint of a prohibited weapon as well as the digital blueprint of any device with intent to manufacture TD printed firearm, those in fact were some prohibitions that were reflected in the new legislation when passed.
Some of the key definitions that we introduced were reference to the term treaty printed weapons, and that would be in the definition of a firearm.
And we also went beyond that to make general reference to any weapons that are used or that are created, I should say, through the use of electronic technology.
So we saw the need to ensure that those critical terms were now introduced in our domestic legislation in order to enable the state to be able to properly recognize those things.
The Act also introduces a broad definition for the term digital blueprint, and this actually means any type of digital or electronic reproduction of a technical drawing of the design of an object.
Next slide, please.
So we also would have criminalized the possession of digital blueprints of what we have defined as a prohibited weapon, as well as the digital blueprint of any device with the intent to manufacture a three D printed firearm that is a prohibited weapon.
And the penalty for an offense under that section of the Act is actually a sentence of imprisonment for life with a mandatory term of imprisonment of not less than ten years before being eligible for parole.
So we saw the need to ensure that these critical provisions were included and the penalty was strong enough to discourage persons from trying to acquire these items in order to produce weapons illicitly.
And we would have recognized the need to ensure that our legislation actually reflect the current realities in terms of the advancement in these technological manufacturing practices.
Next slide, please.
So in our new legislation, there's also a mandatory requirement for all weapons to be marked, and this include weapons that are seized or recovered by members of the security forces.
And of course, this would include treaty printed firearms.
These weapons will be marked in accordance with our national firearms marking standards.
And those standards actually provide flexibility for the state marking agents or entities to adjust the intensity of the marks that are placed on the various parts of weapons made of various types of polymers, materials to ensure the durability of the mark.
So while I reflect this as a legislative advancement, this will also be a significant operational advancement as it pertains to our ability to mark and trace firearms.
Next slide, please.
So operationally to, while at the onset, we did not see the need to regulate treaty printing technology.
When we looked back and when we also looked at some recent activities that would suggest that there is a potential for those printing technology to be used, you know, illitally, we recognized the need to implement some kind of a framework to regulate the importation and the use of these three D printed devices.
So that framework is currently being developed, and the intention is to ensure that the importation and use of threeD printers is basically in keeping with some strict guidelines and regulations to ensure that those items are only used for legitimate business purpose or recreational purposes.
Next slide, please.
Operational tool, we have ongoing interagency cooperation, and this includes collaboration constant ongoing collaboration between our law enforcement and security personnel, or the officials in terms of the information sharing and allowing those persons.
Miss Allen, could you check to see if you can hear us from the I'm hearing you, but the screen went blank, but I will still continue.
So we would have also placed focus on ensuring that our border security as well as our law enforcement personnel have continued dialogue and ongoing information sharing to ensure that from a border security perspective, those mechanisms are strengthened in order to allow us to be in a better position to detect and these weapons when attempts are being made to illicitly import them into the island.
Next.
That's my short presentation.
Thank you so much.
I welcome any questions.
I want to thank you, miss Allen, for your very helpful briefing, focusing on Jamaica's response to technological advancement in manufacturing and design of small arms and light weapons and also for your reaction to the screen going blank.
Thank you so much to all of our briefings for setting the scene.
Um, Colleagues, we are now going to our speaker's list, going to open the floor to hear from state.
Experts and delegates are reminded to request the floor by pressing the speaker's button in front of you.
So please, if you do have interest to speak on this thematic issue, I will invite you to do so now having heard from our briefs I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Saudi Arabia.
Thank you, Chair.
At the outset, I wish to express our gratitude to you and to the Secretariat for organizing this first meeting of the open ended technical experts group.
We also thank the briefers for their interesting briefings.
Chairman, recent progress in the manufacturing, the technology and the design of small arms and light weapons bring about many practical and operational challenges and also regulatory challenges for our national efforts, in particular, the increasing use of polymer components and parts and the use of three D printing for illicit purposes.
Is bound to complicate marking and stock management and tracing efforts as well as holding registers and upholding the law.
Polymer parts can pose difficulties where traditional marking methods are not easily applicable or where they are not sufficiently durable.
Furthermore, modular weapons can make identifying certain weapons and tracing certain weapons more difficult when parts can be replaced or assembled differently.
On three D printing.
This brings about particular concerns, especially when components or weapons are produced outside of the authorized manufacturing chains which makes their authorization, control, and tracing more difficult.
In this context, the Kingdom and Saudi Arabia believe that it's important for discussions within this group to remain practical and technical, focused on research and looking for a common understanding of these issues and implementation issues and without creating any new regulatory obligations that could go beyond the frameworks agreed on in the program of action in the ITI.
My delegation believes that any approach that would deal with these emerging issues must be focused on the following.
First of all, states must preserve the primary responsibility when it comes to regulating the transfer, manufacturing, and tracing of weapons on their territory and this is in line with domestic legislation.
Secondly, responses to new technological evolutions must be in line with the framework of existing obligations, in particular, the program of action and the International Tracing Instrument.
All responses and measures, none of them should replace these programs or instruments.
Thirdly, international cooperation and assistance to states remains essential in particular when it comes to capacity building, technical training, and boosting the legal capacities and information exchange, border control, et cetera.
Fourth, the group must avoid any uniform approach that does not take account of differing national realities between countries.
Chair, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia calls for a balanced discussion that would recognize the risks that could stem from an abusive use of this technology for illicit purposes, whilst at the same time underscoring that technical progress in itself is not necessarily negative.
Indeed, certain tools and new technologies can help states to improve marking, tracing, and the security of stocks and the detection and management of registers whilst respecting domestic legislation and international obligations.
By way of conclusion, Saudi Arabia wishes to commit constructively to the work of this group.
We encourage the implementation of an exchange center to exchange technical know how and to draw on the practical experience of different countries to help states to implement their national programs and the ITI whilst respecting national sovereignty and intellectual property rights and the legal frameworks of states.
Thank you very much, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Sadi Arabia for the intervention.
On the list of speakers, I have for the next three speakers, Belgium, Colombia, and Ghana.
I continue to remind of the 3 minutes time limit, and I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Belgium, please.
Thank you very much, chair.
I don't know if my intervention will be more of a question and an input.
So we produced a working paper for the OETG and this working paper is also based first on the work we've done in the fellowship, which I'm very grateful to Ida and also to doctor Richard Boking and also to discussion we had with the industry, in particular, F&S style and engineers at FNS style.
I had a comment on the issue of the methods of engraving for the marking of the serial number.
Um, particularly the issue of laser engraving.
For example, for some pistols that are made of a polymer frame, we of course have this metal tag which is made of stainless steel.
But then, of course, this tag is quite small because I mean, every hole we made in the structure of the pistol could also make it more fragile when shooting Um, so, of course, this metal tag is relatively small, which which make the other methods laser engraving difficult for marking.
So like stamping is not possible either because the pistol is actually marked at the end of the assembly line.
So basically, first, the metal tag is embedded into the polymer, and then all the components from the pistol are assembled.
They're also marked internal marking, of course, that that have to be matching with the um with the last final serial number.
And when all those components are assembled together, then the serial number, Is engraved through laser at the end of the process.
But we can't do stamping at the end of the process because, of course, the polymer that would produce some shock on the polymer that would make it more fragile.
It's more of we are bit in a conundrum here in terms of the method, which is laser engraving, which is less durable than dot pinning or stamping.
But at the same time, this is a bit the issue we cannot make a metal would be too big because that would fragilize the structure of the pistol.
Also if it's possible to have question and answer with the expert, but that's the comment from our side.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Belgium for, of course, the intervention in the form of a question.
The plan would be to give our expert briefers the floor at the end of the interventions for response to the questions and interventions that will be made, particularly for doctor King who is here with us.
We may not be able to get the other briefs online to respond.
That is also encouraged and thanks to Belgium for the working paper.
I I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Colombia to be followed by Ghana in South Africa, Colombia, please.
Chairman, a very good morning, my fraternal and respectful regards to you and everyone here in the room this morning.
I just wanted to put a proposal on the table that would enable us like we've heard from the briefs and by the way, we're grateful to them for their briefings that would enable us to comprehensively use these meetings to deal with important inputs from all of the people that work on the tracing and control of weapons, researchers, judges, prosecutors, et cetera We are grateful for your answers to these concerns that require us to engage, first of all, in a comprehensive global diagnostic.
Each country has its own experiences and lessons learned.
However, we cannot be fully aware of them As individual countries, the first issue is engaging in a diagnosis based on all of the knowledge that countries have.
First of all, starting with manufacturing, what skills we have in weapons manufacturing.
We're seeing that and also we heard from you, chair, in your statement that thus far, we are responding mainly to traditionally manufactured weapons and not dealing with issues like three D printing modular weapons, and also the use of technology and criminal dynamics.
That is evolving rapidly.
So it's necessary to implement general recommendations, control on replacement of parts, et cetera.
Then the second thing is trafficking.
If we have this diagnosis from manufacturing countries, it's important to know about transit and destination countries also.
Generally, the trafficking of weapons is addressed on an individual basis.
We look at drug trafficking, for example, but we don't really address them fundamentally as structures.
How they're moving through transit countries to destination countries, platform countries, and of course, when it comes to transnational organized crime groups that send weapons to our country.
But there's also the legal deviation of weapons and also the use of technology by organizations without legal elements, a lot of illegal elements to avoid traceability of crimes, using weapons with different parts, mixed parts, or that are manufactured within the country.
Then the next thing that's important is exchange of information, these mechanisms.
With Interpol, with 96 member states, for example, they have a mechanism that enables us to have a platform to receive information, but we're wondering whether this is the right mechanism and also if it could be a feedback channel for different trends.
There's the orange and purple warnings and it's necessary to look at this mechanism.
Then the fifth thing is the regulatory aspect.
Each country has legislation that researchers, judges, prosecutors need to grapple with.
However, there's also crossing of information with other countries.
In my country, this requires control.
We need to look at what the voids are, the loopholes, try and close those and look at the possibility of having special groups.
Working where police and prosecutors can work to close these gaps and look at how they can incorporate them in the information processes.
And use that as guidance for us to be able to anticipate.
Now, does the structural prosecution of these groups, of course, drug trafficking and armed trafficking are linked and training is essential for researchers, judges, prosecutors, investigators, they need the right tools.
The last thing based on these five initial elements is the need to engage in adjustments to adopt comprehensively and look at the time frames because looking towards 2028, we could see new trends emerge, and so we need to ensure that we have follow up and constant feedback, and of course, feedback on what is working well and what needs to be corrected.
The last thing is financing.
Organizations have good economic capacities to invest in technology.
The question here is whether the capacities that we have as states with our investigators, judges, prosecutors, whether we have the information and the right economic investment for technology to be a counterweight to that and anticipate new and emerging trends.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Colombia for the intervention.
Certainly, thank you for the consideration you've raised.
I will remind us that we also have to think about this within the framework of the mandate that we have as OEC.
Thank you so much.
I'll now give the floor to Ghana to be followed by South Africa and the United States.
Ghana, please.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
Mine is in the form of a question.
The data that was presented, it looks like the African region with regards to seizures in relation to this type of firearms, there was no data on seizures.
I want to know whether those who collected, I mean, the delegation from Ghana wants to know.
Because we belong to a sub region that is being eaten up by terrorists.
We belong to a sub region that is being beaten by terrorists every day, every night.
But unfortunately, it looks like the data that has been collected, that the entire continent is excluded.
I want to know whether three D weapons or these type of weapons, we haven't found none of it has been seized in the region.
Thank you very much.
This is in the form of a question.
Thank you.
Many thanks to the distinguished representative of Ghana for the question.
We hope that Mr.
Das will be online or we can try to get a response to the question.
I'll now give the floor to South Africa to be followed by United States and Canada.
Thank you, Chair.
Similar to Ghana, we also noted, first of all, let me thank the panelists for their presentations.
Very insightful indeed.
As I indicated, similar to Ghana, we also noted in the presentation by Mr.
Das that there is mention of other regions with the exception of Africa and the Caribbean, especially when it comes to the number of incidents, when it comes to three D printed weapons, as well as youth involvement in that So I'm not sure whether we should interpret that as Africa and the Caribbean not having those challenges.
However, we would want to have an elaboration of the trends on the African continent and other regions that were not covered specifically when it comes to the incidences, as well as youth involvement in three D printing.
Secondly, we also wanted to just comment to say that we would want to also just if the panelists are able to do so to hear more on the lessons learned on the role of industry in addressing the challenges related to the emerging technologies, obviously, as it relates to three D printing, modular, and polymer.
If if they are in a position to do so just share some of the lessons learned with specific reference to the role of industry.
Thanks.
I thank the distinguished representative of South Africa.
I'll give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States to be followed by Canada and the United Kingdom.
Thank you, Chair and good morning, colleagues.
Thank you, ambassador for steering our work and leading us through this process today.
I have a comment first and then a question, if I may.
Just from the United States perspective, it would be helpful if we could share the presentations on you know a meeting place to inform particularly our intersessional work.
Thank you to the panelists.
I want to reflect, I think, primarily on a comment made by doctor Bolton King regarding the definition of polymer weapons being where the firearm has at least one component that is made of plastic.
Since this includes a significant number of firearms, a growing number of firearms, the United States notes that the program of action does not have a distinct explicit standalone definition of firearms, though the UN firearms protocol does, not all parties here are parties to that framework.
Doctor Bolton King and other panelists, the United States would be interested to know what aspects or elements of polymer weapons in particular, would you have us focus on in defining our work in particular to ensure that our practice includes polymer weapons along with other firearms? Just how would you guide us at least in that preliminary question.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of the United States.
I think Mr.
Keita have had you on the comment.
I'll now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Canada to be followed by the United Kingdom and Republic of Korea.
Thank you, Chair, and congratulations on your election earlier this week and thank you, of course, to our panelists and expert briefers are excellent and very informative presentations.
I'll also take the opportunity on behalf of Canada to reiterate our strong support for the OETG and the work that we'll be doing over the next few days to address emerging technologies, and of course, over the next few years as well.
I just wanted to take a brief moment to highlight a success that Canada has had in our national context, not dissimilar to the success that our expert briefer from Jamaica highlighted in our national context earlier this morning.
So perhaps I'll just be somewhat underlining her presentation.
Um, I Canada, we're taking action to curb the rise in illicit firearm manufacturing, including three D printing.
Unlawfully manufactured firearms, known as ghost guns as well are classified as prohibited firearms in Canada, and similar to Jamaica, criminal offenses exist for possessing or distributing computer data for use in a three D printer or any other computer system for the purpose of manufacturing or trafficking a firearm or prohibited device.
A firearms license is also required to purchase, transfer, or import firearm barrels, handguns lies, magazines and ammunition to reduce access to these key firearm parts for those seeking to unlawfully manufacture firearms.
By criminalizing the possession and distribution of computer data for the three D printing of firearms and not only the manufacture of these weapons, these policies have enabled Canadian law enforcement to better address the threat of unlawfully manufactured firearms.
In this vein, we encourage all states to consider methods to address the rise of new technologies relating to the use of three D printing to unlawfully manufacture firearms.
And Canada looks forward to the further deliberations of this expert group on additional means and methods to strengthen our collective approach to combat anngalssa.
Thank you.
I thank the Distinguished Representative of Canada for the intervention.
I'll give the floor to the distinguished Resative United Kingdom to be followed by Republic of Korea, and then Argentina, United Kingdom, please.
Thank you, Chair.
I'd also like to thank the briefers for their excellent presentations, which are highly informative.
The United Kingdom recognizes that developments in firearms manufacturing, particularly polymer frames, modular designs, and three D printing, presents challenges for the durability, integrity, and recoverability of markings required under the ITI.
Under UK firearms law, markings must be clear, permanent, visible, and unique.
The framework is outcomes based, relying on permanence and traceability rather than a fixed manufacturing specification.
UK legislation already captures privately manufactured firearms and components, including three D printed weapons, treating them the same as conventionally manufactured weapons.
UK evidence indicates that the primary risk currently arises from hybrid designs which combined three D printed and metal components rather than fully printed weapons.
Thank you very much for your time and I look forward to hearing the interventions of other delegations.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished Representative of the United Kingdom for the intervention.
I'll now give the floor to the Republic of Korea to be followed by Arntina in Switzerland.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair for giving me the floor.
I would like to thank the briefers for their insightful presentations which provide a valuable basis for the work of the OTG.
At the outset, the Republic of Korea welcomes the convening of the first meeting of the OTG.
We believe that this process will help ensure that the POA and the ITI remain effective and responsive in the face of rapid developments in the manufacturing, technology, and design of small arms and light weapons.
The Republic of Korea recognized that emerging technologies present both opportunities and challenges for the implementation of the POA and the ITI.
AI enabled data systems and enhanced marketing and tracking tools can strengthen diversion prevention and supply chain monitoring while additive manufacturing and modular weapon designs complicate enforcement.
In this context, I'd like to briefly share some national practices of the ROK in addressing both the challenges and opportunities arising from technological developments.
First, we have similar to Jamaica and Canada, we have strengthened its legal and regulatory framework to address the dissemination of information related to the and manufacture of weapons including through three D printing technologies.
Under our domestic legislation, the online posting or distribution of instructions, designs, or methods for manufacturing weapons constitute a criminal offense.
In case involving online content hosted outside our jurisdiction, we also employ measures to restrict domestic access to such content.
Second, we have established a community based reporting mechanism through close cooperation with citizens.
Thousands of volunteer cyber monitors support efforts to identify and report online content related to illicit weapons trafficking, weapons manufacturing, and other unlawful activities.
In addition, incentive schemes are also in place to encourage reporting.
These measures contribute to the early detection of emerging risk and facilitate timely responses by relevant authorities.
Additionally, we continue to strengthen international information sharing and analytical cooperation through Interpol.
In this regard, we will host the Stonefish regional meeting in July this year to strengthen regional cooperation aimed at reducing the risk of weapons proliferation, diversion, trafficking, and illicit acquisition, particularly in the Southeast Asia and in the Pacific region.
Also, we recently joined Interpol's Arsenal Criminal Analysis file, CAF initiative to support international efforts to secure sharing and analysis of intelligence related to three D printed firearms trafficking.
The Republic of Korea reaffirms its strong support for the work of the OETG and stands ready to contribute constructively to these discussions.
We look forward to the chair summary and the recommendations that will emerge from this process.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea for the intervention.
I'll now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Argentina to be followed by Switzerland and Australia.
Thank you very much, Chair.
First of all, I'd like to thank you for taking up the chairmanship of this group and also for your efforts.
We wish you every success and you can certainly count on Argentina.
We'd also like to thank the panelists for their briefings.
Unfortunately, I arrived a bit late to the presentations.
We have a small mission, we have lots of meetings going on.
However, this is a very important issue that Argentina is very much interested in and I'd like to ask a few questions and make some comments.
We observe the growing modularity of firearms and also polymer and three D printed weapons that pose challenges for the marking, tracing, and, um tracing criminal activities.
While firearms have legitimate uses, can make it very difficult to trace the different components and weapons.
I'd like to know what practical measures have been the most effective to guarantee the traceability of weapons and parts manufactured and assembled using this new technology and what type of international cooperation do you think is necessary in order to strengthen the capacities of states here.
Our second question is to do with the program of action.
I'm wondering whether in light of this new open ended technical working group in the framework of the POA, whether we can make any specific contribution here, I'm Thinking about the example of triangular cooperation with the UN with cooperating and receiving countries and the UN about triangular cooperation.
I'm wondering what frameworks you think could be useful for everyone here.
Thank you very much.
I thank the distinguished representative of Argentina.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Switzerland to be followed by Australia and Iraq.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Switzerland, thanks you for convening this first session of the OETG and we would also like to thank our briefers today for their valuable inputs to this discussion.
Mr.
Chair, these technical questions have now been on our agenda for over a decade and this group now can translate that work into concrete recommendations.
On polymer frames and receivers, the core challenge is well documented.
Surface markings on polymer cannot meet ITI durability requirements.
We see two emerging approaches, embedded metal tacks and windows exposing underlying metal components.
Recent technical research reinforces this concern, finding that laser engraving, now the most widespread marking method, produces minimal surface deformation, which is limiting recovery prospects.
Switzerland believes that these gaps could be addressed through interpretive guidance under the existing ITI without amendments, including on minimum marking depth and underlying material.
On modular weapons, the RevC outcome document already commits us to a shared understanding of essential structural and control components.
Practical guidance should cover consistent designation of a primary marking component, the serialization of other essential modular parts with clear visual distinction, and the common marking protocol across the industry.
Without that third element, the mix and match of differently marked components creates exactly the loophole that ghost guns exploit and evidence confirms that the serial numbers are consistently the primary target of obliteration efforts.
On three D printed weapons, the key enabler is now the digital blueprint.
We see two potential tracks, regulatory measures, including criminalization of weapons specific digital files and technical controls on the regulated metal components that hybrid printed weapons still require.
The task of this expert group is to produce guidance that states, industry, and law enforcement can apply.
This could also include endorsing the systematic recording and imaging of obliteration methods on seized weapons as good practice to enable pattern analysis across seizures and national jurisdictions.
We would also like to refer the chair to our written statements as submitted for further detail on the positions outlined today, including research by Unidir, the Small arm Survey, the Institute of Spas, and Conflict Armon Research.
I thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Switzerland for the intervention and the written statement.
If, I'll now give the floor to Australia to be followed by Iraq and Germany.
Thank you, Chair.
And on the outset, Australia congratulates you on your election as chair to the first open ended technical expert group.
Chair, as we've heard from other states and noted in your opening statement, the OETG aims to address highly technical topics and we stress the importance in embracing the jargon and minutia, which is inherent when discussing firearms in all their aspects.
Australia, like the rest of the world faces serious challenges regarding illicit small arms and light weapons, the evolving landscape of modern firearm design, particularly due to the rapid advancement in many forms of manufacturing and technology.
To effectively combat the illicit use of these developments requires that the international community share a robust, technically accurate and evergreen set of standards which lay the framework for discussing these topics.
Share a holistic common language on firearms in all their aspects as needed.
This would set the standard for all technical firearm definitions and naming conventions for firearms, firearm parts, firearm accessories, and their universally used components.
Only then can an informed discussion take place on the topics like universal standards of manufacturing, processes, serilization, transportation and storage.
Establishing these clear definitions is the first essential step towards creating a harmonized global policy.
Determining exactly what structural components must be identified to allow for effective technical discussion on the implementation of tracking and tracing of small arms and light weapons.
While states can impose regulation on manufacturer and marketing standards domestically, if these are developed in isolation from industry, it is historically evident that the regulations will always be behind the curve and the gap is only widening in the age of AI.
Share, to address the challenges domestically, Australia relies on the National Firearm Identification database and our national Firearm Register, known as the NFID and NFR respectively.
Working hand in hand, these systems establish a nationally agreed standard to accurately identify, characterize, and trace firearms in their essential components.
By continuously upgrading these capabilities, we're ensuring our data quality keeps pace with the rapid advancements in technology.
An established data model such as the National Firearm Register can be used to inform practical global models for tracing of illicit firearms and illicit firearms and light weapons.
Chair, looking internationally, we must address the unique challenges around material permanent.
With hybridized polymer materials now frequently being used, we need to ensure that identification markings maintain a high level of permanence and recoverability.
Fortunately, the advancements in three D printing technology will make it increasingly viable to integrate these unique markings directly into components during the manufacturing phase.
Chair, Australia notes that tracing modular and polymer firearms is more effectively achieved by focusing on the point of export rather than import, establishing robust data collection at the export level and linking it directly to reciprocal systems at the import level, ensuring all states can benefit from clear manufacturer and origin markings.
This would avoid the need for any secondary markings.
Chair, in the past 20 plus years that Australia has been actively tracing recovered firearms, we have found little to no benefit in the secondary markings and see it only as a hurdle which inhibits our ability to engage with possibly the most important stakeholder for achieving sustained long term success in combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.
This chair is the private firearm industry and community.
Firearm manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and owners play the most critical role in avoiding firearm diversion and we must engage with them proactively.
Chair, as we look to align our national frameworks, we must remain practical.
Non firearm specific parts such as pipes, bolts, screws, and springs are easily repurposed from other commercial sectors.
Regulators cannot control everyday multipurpose construction items and any effort to do so will be in vain.
We must carefully consider the impact on legitimate industry before attempting to regulate such items.
Furthermore, we recognize that serious organized criminal groups possess resources and and the capacity to actively circumvent legislation, regulatory, and technical environments.
Our international efforts must remain sharply targeted to disrupt the illicit networks without placing undue burden on the functioning of illicit markets.
Chair, thank you for your time and attention.
I thank the distinguished representative of Australia for the intervention.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Iraq to be followed by Germany and Mexico.
A Cedar Rees.
Good morning, Chair and congratulations on your election.
I'd like to thank all the panelists for their presentations.
I have a few suggestions that I'd like to make.
For the OETEG as an expert from my own country.
The SALW small arms and like weapons doesn't only cover firearms, but there are other types of weapons covered by small arms like weapons and states in line with Article 51 and Article 2 of the UN Charter, states have the right to manufacture weapons for their own defense.
There are quite advanced types of weapons such as laser weapons.
That's why the international instrument and the program of action are enjoys to enjoy consensus and the UN and also the Arms Trade Treaty is the reference for this because this is a major challenge that we should take into account.
I'd also like to draw your attention to the fact that It's important to encourage states to work in line with the end user certification.
Then thirdly, I wish to say that Interpol registers are vast.
They contain millions of weapons and that could be used, and that was the case in Iraq.
We presented more than 142,000 entries into this register to Interpol.
In our experience in Iraq, and using that, I'd like to insist that there should be controls on arms owned by the government because sometimes hunting weapons are used to commit crimes.
In conclusion, I'd like to thank you and I'm sorry to have taken the floor for so long.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Iraq for the intervention and I think your intervention was right in time, so thank you for the suggestion.
I'll now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Germany to be followed by Mexico and France.
Let me join previous speakers in congratulating you, Ambassador Ku, upon your appointment as chair of this first meeting of the OETEG.
Thank you and your team for the excellent preparation of this meeting and also to the speakers of the preceding briefings.
Let me assure your Germany's full support and constructive engagement for this OETG to fulfill its mandate.
Germany stands ready to develop agreed recommendations in order to address challenges and harness opportunities and best practices for self control to strengthen the United Nations POA and ITI and their full and effective implementation.
Mr.
Chair, From our experience, supporting implementation in the field suggests that integrated and internationally harmonized approach to the control of illicit additive, subtractive manufactured small arms unlike weapons, their parts and components and related technologies will be the most effective.
Such an approach may recognize that addressing only one dimension, including the unlawful production, sharing, or use of digital blueprints will be not sufficient to effectively mitigate associated risks.
Instead, measures may cover the full life cycle of relevant files and technologies, including the design, distribution, access, and end use.
Besides the production of illicitly manufactured firearms through additive and subjective manufacturing techniques, the production of parts and components designed to modify or enhance the characteristics of legally owned firearms poses a significant and emerging risk.
Against this background and in line with the OP 95 of the fourth outcome document of RC four, consideration may be given to including additive and subtractive manufactured part and components, particularly those that enhance or modify the characteristics of a firearm more systematically in the discussions of the OETEG.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Germany for the intervention.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico to be followed by France and the Dominican Republic.
Thank you very much, Chairman.
Mexico reiterates its congratulations to you upon your election to head up this group.
We also thank the panelists for their briefings this morning.
Mexico would like to make two general comments on the work of the group and we have some thoughts and questions we'd like to share as well.
Mexico recognizes that while polymer, modular, and three D printed weapons do pose real challenges for the marketing, registration, and tracing of these weapons within the framework of the ITI, the main source of armed violence in Latin America and the Caribbean remains the diversion of conventionally manufactured weapons, and this is a reality that we really hope will be reflected in the work of the OETG.
In a balanced manner.
From our perspective, the gender dimensions of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons must guide the work of the open ended technical experts group from the very beginning.
Only RAC and GSAC data confirm that firearms in domestic and conflict situations have a disproportionate effect on women and girls.
They represent 95% of the victims of conflict related sexual violence.
In this regard, the group must ensure that its future recommendations reflect these differential impacts and that we support the compilation of data disaggregated bisex, age, and disability in order to strengthen the establishment of evidence based public policies.
Now, as for the information that we heard this morning, something that Metzgo has been thinking about is how we can ensure that discussions on new technologies and the development of weapons by individuals are properly in line.
With the real magnitude of the challenge that these phenomena currently represent.
We'd like to know whether the panelists have any proposals on how we can strike a balance between addressing the risks of emerging technologies, but at the same time, continuing to focus our efforts on the diversion of traditionally manufactured weapons and legally manufactured weapons that remains the majn source of weapons.
Something that we have seen with some initiatives is how to explore the possibility of moving from a arms control logic to control of digital manufacturing capacities logic, including software restrictions, design archives and production technologies.
In this, and we heard about this this morning, by the way, and in this regard, we'd like to know what practical lessons we can learn from these experiences and most importantly, how can we ensure that this type of approach complements and does not displace the ultimate goal of the POA and the ITI, which remains to prevent and detect the diversion of small arms and light weapons throughout the whole life cycle.
Thank you very much, Chairman.
I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for the intervention in question.
I'll now give the floor to the representative, distinguished representative of France to be followed by Dominican Republic and Brazil.
Thank you, Chair.
Allow me, first of all, to congratulate you on your election to chair this group and for organizing this first meeting.
France would also like to thank the panelists for their presentations.
Today, I'd like to share some national practices from France to address the challenges posed by developments in the manufacture, technology, and the creation of small arms and light weapons, particularly polymer weapons, modular weapons, and also illegal three D printing.
On polymer weapons, the decree for the 10th of April 2020 on marking firearms, which reflects the EU Directive 2019 slash 68 stipulates for frames or receiver housings made by a non metallic material from a non metallic material.
The marking should be on a metallic plate which is durably included in the material of the housings or frames so that the plate cannot be easily taken off.
Nor should it destroy part of the frames or receiver housings.
The minimum depth of the marking should be 0.076 2 millimeters or 3 ".
This is applicable to all types of marking, including those that are done in polymer.
On a metallic plaque.
The metallic plaque should be solidly integrated into the polymer and visible in a window, which would be a hole in the polymer, which means that the plaque with the marking on it is clearly visible.
Other marking techniques for receiver housings and frames can be used as a manufacturer's choice as long as these techniques have been demonstrated to show an equivalent level to show that the marking is long lasting and clear and it also respects the minimum depth standards.
On modular, firearms in line with the provisions of our internal security code in France, the marking is applied to each weapon or component of the weapon, so the barrel, the frame, all the housing, including, if necessary, on the upper and lower parts of it.
The housing, including, if necessary, the additional mobile set of components as well as cylinders, bolts, and conversion systems.
Finally, In terms of regulatory and technical measures that states could apply to prevent the illicit manufacture of small arms and weapons, including those produced illicitly with additional manufacturing, as long as there is authorization for the weapons manufacturer to create, retain or use these files, that can be then penalizing.
Indeed, this is to covers virtually or holding one or several arms.
Thank you very much, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of France for the intervention.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Dominican Republic to be followed by Brazil and Republic of Moldova, who is so far the last speaker on my list.
Thank you very much, Chair and thank you to the experts for sharing your experiences.
In line with what the delegation of Saudi Arabia said on the challenge that this issue poses, these challenges require us to work together to share experiences, data, and to establish collaboration and interoperability strategies where protocols can be created that are accessible to all states.
Since 2014, the Dominican Republic has been implementing our national armed system, the CSNP system.
We are capturing the ballistic fingerprint of weapons in our laboratories and a biometric register of weapons holders to link each weapon to its owner.
These technological registers Um, other delegations have said this.
There's asymmetry between states in terms of the level of development.
Cuba said that, and so we require collaboration between all of us so that we can share experience and better share the information frameworks on software development.
This, for us, really is a challenge.
The Dominican Republic is not an arms manufacturer.
We currently, um, import weapons for civilian use only when the president decides that we can import weapons for a specific period of time.
We also have some antique old weapons in our country.
It's been almost 20 years since 2006 that we've been working on that.
Prohibition, of course, has advantages and disadvantages.
We've had prohibition since 2006, but prohibition also can encourage illicit trafficking.
So Last month, in terms of collaboration, we had a workshop on trafficking online, looking at the different challenges that we face, and we benefited from cooperation from Germany, the police from Spain and other actors.
This is fundamental to help us to gather experience for us to be able to tackle this issue.
Our regulations from 2016 are also currently being reviewed in order to bring them in line with the current moment.
There are lots of new elements on new weapons.
There's sentences for five to ten years for anyone who modifies structurally or attempts to manufacture any firearm.
We also have interoperability between states and just like we said previously, we have the IT frameworks that exist to this end and It's important for different systems to be interoperable and I trace the databases that we have, the I 24.
But for a lot of countries, getting licenses is costly and maintaining these licenses is often not possible.
However, we know and doctor King mentioned this, that we can create a common framework for cooperation capturing the ballistic footprint, for example.
There are ways of having an open format like the CPL, for example.
That's all for now that I wanted to share with you.
Thank you very much, Chairman.
I thank the distinguished representative of Dominican Republic for the intervention.
Of course, after indicating that Republic of Moldova was the last speaker on the list, we've had further requests for the floor.
I just wanted to remind distinguished delegate if you don't want to take the floor, please press the speaker button in front of you.
Next, I'll give the floor to Brazil to be followed by Republic Moldova and then Pakistan.
Thank you, Chair.
First, allow us to congratulate you on your election to chair this open end working group.
I count on the support of Brazil throughout your tenure.
We also thank the three panelists for their very valuable inputs.
My delegation would like to make points in specific issues and ask the panelists perhaps to comment a little bit on those.
First of all, is regarding the scope of regulation and ghost guns.
We highlight the relevance to extend legal controls beyond the concept of the firearm itself as it is ultimately an assembly of parts.
And as was mentioned by doctor Buda King, the Brazilian legislation do foresee the marking registration and control of firearms and their parts.
Also, earlier in the afternoon we will have a chance to share a little bit more on the Brazilian, experience in the next panel.
We highlight the growing problem of unregulated manufacture of firearms, that they can be hybrid in nature and unnecessarily three D printed.
Our core concern is that they are produced outside legal frameworks, commonly referred to as ghost guns because they cannot be traced.
Then we like to ask the panelists to comment on the challenges involved in the possibility of commercializing manufacture of firearm components before they are fully completed.
And the second issue is regarding the control of intangible digital files and intent of use.
We know that in some jurisdictions, possession alone is unlawful.
In others, intent is also a key component.
This creates a broader legal debate, particularly whether it is intent to obstruct or incentivize the unlawful production of firearms or specific components.
And then we would like to hear the panelists on lessons learned related to the challenges of law enforcement in this regard.
Thank you so much, sir.
I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil for the intervention and the question.
I'll give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Republic of Moldova, to be followed by Pakistan and Nigeria.
Mr.
Chair, the Republic of Moldova welcomes the launch of the open ended technical expert group and we thank you, Chair Ambassador Michael Imran Canu for guiding this important process.
We consider the TEG a valuable platform for technical dialogue and practical cooperation on emerging challenges related to developments in the manufacturing technology and design of small arms and light weapons.
The rapid evolution of technologies, including modular weapon systems, polymer components, and illicit additive manufacturing creates new risks for tracing, identification, and law enforcement activities.
At the same time, technological innovation can also strengthen prevention, detection and tracing capacities when supported by adequate legal frameworks, operational tools, and international cooperation.
For the Republic of Moldova, ensuring traceability remains a central priority.
Our national authorities continue to strengthen mechanisms related to marketing registration and information exchange concerning firearms and essential components.
The State register of weapons serves as the principal electronic platform for maintaining records related to civilian firearms, authorizations and transfers, thereby contributing to accountability and oversight.
The Republic of Moldova also continues to strengthen institutional coordination through the National Firearms focal point within the General Police Inspectorate.
The focal point supports operational cooperation, risks, analysis, and international information exchange, including through the systematic introduction of identified lost and stolen firearms into the Interpolse i arms database.
In our view, discussions within the OUTEG should focus on preserving the effectiveness of international tracing standards despite evolving manufacturing methods and materials.
This includes consideration of durable and recoverable markings applicable to polymer based and modular firearms, as well as improved methods for recovering obliterated markings and identifying illicitly manufactured weapons.
We also attach great importance to preventive measures addressing illicit manufacturing, including illicit three D printing.
Such efforts require strengthened oversight of essential components, updated regulatory approaches, enhanced online monitoring capabilities, and specialized technical expertise for law enforcement and forensic services.
Given the increasingly complex regional security environment, the Republic of Moldova attaches great importance to the effective international cooperation, information sharing, and technical assistance.
In this regard, we believe that capacity building remains essential, particularly for states seeking to modernize tracing systems, strengthen stockpile management, improve forensic capacities, and respond to emerging technological threats.
The Republic of Moldova highly values the support provided through regional and international cooperation frameworks and remains committed to sharing relevant experiences, experiences, and good practices.
For instance, the Sau Fellowship Program has provided an important platform for the development of the international cooperation and dialogue.
For this reason, the Republic of Moldova sees great merit in continuing it so that all countries could benefit on this important initiative.
We look forward to constructive technical discussions during this meeting and to contributing to the development of practical recommendations that will strengthen the implementation of the POA and the ITI.
I thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Republic of Moldova for the intervention.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Pakistan to be followed by Nigeria and then Morocco.
Thank you, Chair.
We congratulate you on assuming this important position and we wish to extend our support.
Chair Pakson once again underlines the close nexus between illicit trade of small arms and light weapons and terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking.
We reiterate our call for a comprehensive approach to addressing these interconnected threats.
These unauthorized users, including non state actors, use sophisticated weapons and are increasingly using emerging technologies Our primary concern remains the acquisition and use of modern and sophisticated small arms and light weapons by non state actors and UN listed terrorist organizations.
There is a need to strengthen international cooperation to effectively address disrupting accumulation of small arms and light weapons and their diversion.
Efforts must be enhanced to prevent the diversion of arms to unauthorized users and to ensure strict adherence to arms embargoes.
We should also increase international efforts to investigate and disrupt how terrorist groups and criminal organizations acquire sophisticated weapons which are often sourced from illicit markets or entities seeking to destabilize our region.
We also wish to highlight challenges posed by new technologies in small arms and light weapons, manufacturing such as three D printing, ghost guns, and UAVs.
In this spec, we believe that there is need to share national experience in implementing robust legislative, regulatory and enforcement mechanisms in marking, tracing, and record keeping.
We would like to get more insights from panelists on the potential for best practices and international instruments on this important issue.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Pakistan for the intervention.
I will give the floor to the distinguished representative of Nigeria to be followed by Morocco and then India.
Mr.
Chair, allow me to congratulate you on your election and make the following remarks.
Nigeria believes that developments in weapon design must not undermine the core obligations of the international tracing instrument.
Regardless of whether weapons are manufactured with polymer components or modular designs, markings must remain durable, unique, recoverable, and capable of supporting effective tracing throughout the life cycle of the weapon.
States should therefore explore technical standards requiring permanent markings on essential components, including those components that determine the legal identity of the weapon.
For modular systems, marking should remain linked to all critical components to prevent substitution, concealment, or diversion.
Nigeria supports strengthened national regulatory frameworks governing the manufacture of firearms and critical components, enhanced monitoring of sensitive equipment and materials, and closer cooperation among law enforcement, customs, and forensic authorities.
Preventive measures should focus on disrupting illicit production while preserving the legitimate civilian, industrial, and research uses of emerging technologies.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria for the intervention.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Morocco to be followed by India, the last speak on the list.
Thank you, Chair.
Allow me, first of all, to warmly congratulate you, as well as Sierra Leone on your election to chair this technical group.
Morocco would like to assure you, Your Excellency, that you have our full support and full cooperation throughout our work.
I would also like to thank the panelists for their extremely rich presentations.
Current developments pose concrete challenges for traceability and control of small arms and light weapons and it's in this context that national legislation requires the imposition of serial numbers and standardized marking for manufacturers to guarantee strict traceability for firearms.
I'd also like to pick up on polymer weapons and discussion of that.
The growing use of this makes legible marking more difficult as well as detection and it can weaken the traceability chain if it is not well adapted.
In terms of modular weapons, the possibility to interchange components is very difficult to have, therefore, the single marking to identify and trace each weapon.
This raises the question of how to deal with the different components.
Finally, in terms of illicit manufacturing with three D printers, This opens the way to decentralized production without any marking and avoiding registers, unless there's a risk of diversion here.
When faced with these real and ever changing quickly changing challenges, Ambassador, I'd like to raise a couple of questions for the panelists.
First, the majority of the challenge is in tutorials or in files that are available online on the manufacture of weapons.
These are widely available.
We would like to ask what proportion of concrete measures could be taken to limit the spread of this information and how can international cooperation play its role for that.
My second question Is it not time perhaps to look at the opportunity for implementing complementary measures on marking of weapons and strengthened measures.
The aim, of course, is to make this task as difficult as possible for criminal organizations to face tracing marks and it allows the governments to restore this marking and be able to then trace the weapons themselves.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Morocco for the intervention and certainly for the questions that have been posed.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of India.
At the very outset, we thank the panelists for their enlightening views on the subject, and we also respect and appreciate the views of all the representatives who've given us their concerns as well as their perceptions of the good practices which are being followed.
From the technical point of view, we look at three or four issues which pertain to this session as such.
That would be polymer frames and modular weapons, three D printing of weapons, and blueprint proliferation.
Coming to the first, that is polymer frames and modular weapons.
These have been initiated by the security forces and police forces for reasons well known of making the weapon light and interchangeability.
I think they are here to stay.
We need to cement this by making sure that the methodologies of markings are strict and they are permanent.
I'm sure we have subsequent sessions which are dealing with this particular topic also.
Coming to the three D printing of the weapons, I would request Rubin to enlighten us more subsequently on the efficacy of these weapons as such.
As technical experts, many of us would agree that the weapon would always require certain metallic aspects to make sure that it is efficient and lethal.
However, the threat remains.
We would look forward to the panel clarifying the certain aspects.
That goes same for the ammunition in which we have seen that case less ammunition has been under trial under various phases for a couple of years.
The entire dynamics requires more thought about it.
Blueprint proliferation is very serious business and we would again like to understand what would be the electronic measures in which such proliferation could be stopped or banned.
To put it in a gist, we need to focus on marking techniques and effective record keeping, which would help in tracing of sensitive parts, which would be the basic building block of a weapon around them.
We would need strong national regulations and most importantly, as brought out earlier, sharing of information and the advancements in technology would need to be shared at regional, sub regional and global level effectively.
India has on its part, adopted the Arms Act as recently as 2019.
We have ensured very strict licensing procedures now and we have increased our digitization in our nation.
India maintains a national database of arms and ammunition, arms licensing issuance system, the NDL AIS, and a computerized inventory control system for information management.
Salient features of this effective data management system are the unique ID number, electronic licensing, and effective tracing.
All of these lead to more visibility and transparency that achieves our security and state.
To conclude, we look forward to more info sharing amongst member states to counter this imminent threat.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of India for the intervention and I believe some questions as well in the intervention.
Distinguished delegates colleagues, I see no further requests for the floor.
Firstly, let me take this opportunity to thank you for your very kind words directed to me as chair in my election and to my count in terms of a prioritization of this issue.
And certainly to the panel for their contributions this morning.
I am informed that we have Mr.
Das online because some questions have been directed to him and certainly we have doctor King here with us in the panel.
And since we have not yet exhausted our time, I will go to our panelists to respond to the questions and hopefully we'll have time for further interaction.
But there were many questions I think doctor King will have a lot to respond to, and then I'll go to Mr.
Das for the specific questions and data from India as well, doctor King.
Thank you very much for all of your interventions and also your questions.
I've tried to take note of the questions that came down.
If the chair has any or that I've missed, then hopefully I will address as many as I can.
Not necessarily being an expert in policy or some of the panel members this afternoon may also be able to elaborate in much more detail about some of the questions and their evidence and experiences for some of the questions raised that can further add to these discussions.
In terms of the first question that I made note of was for Belgium and in particularly associated with, the method of producing marks on the metal tags for polymer frames in particular.
There are a number of manufacturers, particularly in the US, who has done an awful lot of work to look at their manufacturing process and has enabled a stamping method or a compression method to be applied to their tags before they actually embed them into the polymer.
This could be a mechanism that could be explored rather than providing the serial numbers on the tags after they've been put in the polymer frame.
There are also manufacturers who have created hidden marks, either fully duplicated serial numbers or partial serial numbers that have again been produced and placed into the internal areas, which again, can provide good opportunities for marks and tracing because if criminals don't know their location, then they can actually utilize those alternative marks or those hidden locations because again, they're less likely to have been obliterated and so can further help with that traceability.
I know it's not an easy or a cheap thing for manufacturers to do to change their manufacturing processes.
I've been to these factories.
I know how well the factories are designed and laid out to make things as effective and efficient for factory production as possible.
And But through those conversations that are being had, there could be some good opportunity to see how those options could be applied.
They may not be the only ones, but, they're one of the solutions that could be considered moving forward.
I think that was the question that you raised primarily.
But likewise, I'm also happy to support and continue discussions after today and tomorrow's meetings if there's things I can assist with or anything I didn't cover.
I'd move on to the next.
So I know that Garner had raised some questions in South Africa around the data that was shared by Ruben.
I'll defer those questions to Ruben because I know he's able to answer in more detail.
For the USA, you asked the question, sorry, I was trying to find you.
You asked the question around the definitions of a polymer weapon and I really appreciate those comments.
I As you say, there are a number of parts that are made of plastic and that aren't necessarily essential to the functioning of that particular firearm.
Therefore, perhaps in part of that definition, we need to specify those parts that are essential to the function of the firearm, which are similarly those that are used to house serial numbers and marks for marks and tracing purposes.
So understandably, we don't want all of the unnecessary parts to define something as being a polymer weapon.
So it would be one of those major components or major parts.
I think that almost your main question.
In terms of Argentina, I think you are asking questions around the practical methods to increase tracing and mechanisms to support cooperation and information sharing, as well as any of the particular frameworks for triangulation and I'm sure many will agree and myself included, we want to make use of the things that are already in existence and develop those where appropriate and practical to do so.
The practical methods to improve that tracing potential, I know Some of those we shared earlier in terms of providing that ability to recover those marks, but also having that better understanding about the marks that manufacturers are making and trying to ensure that all of our stakeholders and both states, the forensic providers, forensic scientists, researchers, those that are on the front line seizing and investigating are understanding what these marks mean and enabling us to make better use of the data and the information that's available to us to help with those tracing efforts.
And In terms of that international cooperation, again, using the United Nations, the particular offices, Interpol, Euroopol, as many of those existing organizations and structures as possible and improving our data sharing agreements maybe between member states so that whether it's ballistics data, whether it's, information and data we have on three D printed weapons, our emerging threats, the best practices, the ways in which we are implementing and changing our policies, not only when they're done, but those discussions of what we're considering doing and sharing those maybe more earlier on might also really help with that discussion and what we can do moving forward.
Thank you all for those questions so far.
The next question I had note of was from Mexico and how new technologies and how do we balance the risks and focus our efforts on not only the new and emerging technologies such as additive and subtractive manufacturing methods, but also on those traditional manufactured and conventionally manufactured firearms, as well as thinking about how do we regulate against the digital side as opposed to just the firearm side? Again, I know Robin can cover this potentially in more depth, but um the technology providers are definitely able to put blockers into the software, a little bit like when photocopiers try to print either scan in and print money and banknotes.
Exactly the same thing can be done by the printer software and the software providers.
But they do need legislation to be able to put that into practice.
We understand in some states there might be privacy laws that might prevent that from happening, but in other countries, other states, they are willing to have that legislation in place and the technology providers are willing to put those kinds of blockages in place within their software.
And The challenge around those blockers that we've been discussing is primarily because these objects can change so quickly over time in a very short amount of time and we can use computer vision, we can use object classification and machine learning to help us to identify what objects might be being printed.
So there are definitely new technologies and ways where we could look to implement those kind of things, but they are so rapidly changing that might create a barrier in its own right in terms of how successful we're able to block the printing of these parts.
So whilst we've talked a lot about firearms as complete units, obviously there are certain objects that are being printed.
These are known as Glock switches or autoCs and what they are doing is they are being inserted into what would normally be a semi automatic firearm.
Every time you put your finger on the trigger and pull it, a new round of ammunition is fired.
They're changing it from that single shot into a fully automatic firearm.
So and it literally blocks the capability of disengaging that trigger.
These little parts, they're tiny.
You can produce thousands very rapidly.
Whereas a whole firearm it's often printed overnight, so it's a lot slower process.
But it's these accessories as well that are very easy to conceal, they're easy to print, they're quick to print.
They're very cheap.
To purchase.
But so it's not just around the three D printing of the whole firearms, it's around these accessories that are being used to modify the firearms as well, which we also need to consider and be aware of.
So When we think about the sharing of digital information and the freedoms that people have to share that, a lot of the blueprints are being created and the research and development that's been done is a lot of it being done legally? We have to remember this.
That dissemination is happening legally.
And it's being done by those legally able to do so, but being exploited by those who should not be in places where it's being prohibited.
But we know that social media platforms, for example, and the sheer amount of information that's being shared digitally now is challenging to, um, to put those blockers in and for them to monitor and stop that proliferation.
But it's definitely something that we could all collaboratively discuss and look at efforts to try to work with these providers.
So obviously being more supportive than others, and And so, yes, it's absolutely about in a little bit, as I said earlier, a lot of this work is being done by those legally able to do so.
And so we need to make sure that our policies or the legislation that we put in place don't further penalize that legitimate community.
Absolutely, as Australia mentioned earlier, putting a legislation to prevent pipes and screws and things like that, is too much in comparison to the risk.
But the manuals that are being created and shared, if we were to prevent the manuals from being as openly and easily shared.
This is what I believe, in my opinion, is really what's enabling others who really don't have any knowledge of how to do three D printing or how to produce homemade or privately manufactured firearms.
If we were to focus on stopping those manuals from being disseminated, I think that could be a really valuable way of reducing the harm globally because then they're not educating and giving all the technical knowledge and experience to anybody who wants it.
Having a three D printer and being able to take a three D digital file, it's not as easy as it sounds, and actually getting those parts to fit together and to function.
That's what these manuals are trying to make a lot easier.
If we maybe focus on the manual themselves, this might be a more manageable and solution or something that may have more success in being able to reduce illicit production of arms and ammunition.
Hopefully, I've responded to that question.
Brazil, I know raised a question around, Sorry, I'm trying to interpret my notes now lessons that have been learned for law enforcement and you raised the point around commercial parts that are being produced and sold and distributed before they're completed.
I think this links to what I raised earlier around those Glock switches or those autoCs and I Absolutely, we need to think about those items individually, particularly where companies are making aftermarket barrels or parts or things that can be put onto a the original genuine factory produced firearm.
I think this is also linking in with that concept of modularity because whilst there's not as many manufacturers of deliberately designed modular weapons at the moment, there is a lot of modularity and interchangeability of parts generally, and there has been for a long time.
So that when we think about that definition of modularity, is it just the weapons that are being designed by a specific manufacturer that we designate as being modular or should we consider that wider concept of modularity in terms of the parts that are being sold by other companies and made to fit whatever platform, the user might want? This is where, again, having those the other parts of the firearm with the serial number and marks on them, I think will be important moving forward.
Whilst the data and the evidence from some states indicates that those secondary marks haven't been useful in the past, that may not be the case moving forward because If you receive a firearm.
We had a case recently, so I can't say a lot about it, but we had a hunter who used a firearm illegally and it wasn't designed to be a modular rifle, but they had one receiver and three barrels in their possession and not all of those barrels needed to be listed, I And if you think about the forensic context of those three different barrels, if you have a shooting and you recover a firearm and that firearm has only one of those barrels in it, and it's not the barrel that was actually used in the shooting, the projectiles at that crime scene are not going to match the barrel in the firearm that was recovered.
And so if we in our recording practices only put in the serial number of the receiver or the frame, There is no way that we can trace and track where each of those barrels came from.
If we don't write the serial numbers and if we don't put serial numbers on those barrels, how do we know which manufacturer they've come from? How do we know when they were made? How do we know when they were bought? How do we know when they came into the country or a lot of this, again, is legal.
How do we now trace at what point it went from a legitimate owner to a illegitimate user or illegitimate owner? That point of diversion, we need to understand when that point of diversion happens.
At the moment, there are big gaps because even when we trace a firearm, are we actually recording all of the data and the information at more points of the chain than just when the firearm was produced in the first place? We're not.
Countries like the United States do, for example, where you've got a pawnbroker or someone who purchases the firearm in the UK, we have the registered firearms dealer who will record what gets sold.
But that could be 20 years between the time a crime is committed or a time that firearm gets used criminally.
We have no idea what has happened in that 20 year period.
Has it gone through lots of different owners we don't know.
So it's a short period and sometimes it's quite a long period.
Having more information and more points of where we're recording and retaining that information, I think, can really help us as well.
Apologies now if I haven't fully answered your question, but hopefully that responds to that a little bit as well.
I know Morocco was asking also about the digital files and trying to limit the spread of those.
I'll let Ruben expand on that a little bit further.
I and likewise with India.
I believe that was all of the questions, but apologies if I didn't quite capture all of them in my note taking.
Okay.
Thank you so much, doctor Bolton Kin, really for your excellent note taking and for your comprehensive responses to the questions that were posed by our distinguished delegates.
I understand that Das is online with us and I'll certainly invite him to respond to the questions from distinguished delegates of Ghana and South Africa on the data and some of the issues which doctor Bolton Kin have asked you to respond to, including from Morocco in there as well.
Thank you, and you have the floor, Mr.
Das.
Thank you very much, Chair.
Also, thank you very much to doctor Rachel for covering quite a lot of questions.
So the question regarding the data on Africa, so the data presented was based on 430 reported incidents, and by incidents, I mean, seizures, arrests, or discoveries of three D printed firearms and its associated components between April 2013 and April 2026.
Uh, the data was primarily sourced from open source media reports, um, press releases, and certain academic reports, and, you know, I have to, um, note here that it does not, uh, represent absolute values, due to the open source nature of of the data.
Um, so the absence of data from Africa, you know, may be due to, you know, the lack of, um, um, uh, media reports, um, uh, on cases that may have happened, or, um, it could also be due to the lack of cases, um, uh, in the region.
However, there were cases, uh, reported in Antigua, in Haiti, and also in Trinidad and Tobago.
So that was on the data.
With regards to the question on blueprints, you know, I think, doctor Rachel has covered that quite extensively as well just to and I would agree with her views that we should try and make the process a little difficult because I think it's also important to understand that, you know, with three D printing, it's not as easy as, you know, click print and shoot, you know, there is it takes quite a lot of effort.
It takes quite a lot of time and also practice and, you know, experience to actually develop one firearm and develop a firearm that is efficient enough to carry out some sort of harm.
And so, you know, targeting the process, making it a little difficult, I think, would definitely help to mitigate the risks associated with it.
So blueprints remain a big, big challenge just due to the open source nature of the whole issue, I think, you know, legal measures, you know, such as criminalization of blueprints is a good start.
But, you know, it's not the whole solution.
I think, um, uh, you know, we also have to look at, you know, bringing these social media platforms and providers to the table, um, having discussions with them, and, you know, trying to work together with them to mitigate the use of their platforms for the spread of this knowledge and this information.
Um, doctor also mentioned, blocking softwares.
Now, these blocking softwares have, um, um, been in discussion, um, recently, and, you know, these are basically, you know, softwares that are able to detect these blueprints, and block them from being printed, you know, from both the software and the firmware level.
Now, the main challenge with that is that, you know, as doctor Rchll very rightly mentioned is that, you know, these components and the designs for these firearms are evolving, you know, really, very rapidly, so rapidly that, you know, it would take these softwares, con constant updating.
So that is a challenge them.
However, there are researchers and also companies out there who are experimenting with artificial intelligence and also machine learning.
AI and machine learning could possibly bridge the gap.
It's still a bit early to say, but this is definitely an avenue with some potential to mitigate the risks.
Um, and on the question of the efficacy of pre dependent firearms, um, so, owing to its composition, you know, that's primarily, um, uh, made out of, um, uh, thermoplastic or polymers, it definitely is suffers, um, um, some durability issues.
And the efficacy of the firearm is highly dependent on how good or how skilled and how experienced the maker of the firearm is.
And so if you have someone with a lot of experience, you know, the firearm can be quite lethal, quite durable.
Hybrid firearms are still not, you know, up to definitely not up to industrial firearms yet, but they're somewhere in the middle.
It bus or, you know, part kit completions are slightly more durable, owing to the fact that, you know, the pressure bearing components are industrially produced and commercially sourced components.
Um, so, you know, but but they still, you know, do suffer, uh, issues.
So, um, with regards to efficacy, I would say that it's it's, you know, um, again, very much dependent on on, you know, how how experienced, um, the person is, you know, however, you know, in some cases, you know, you know, if it's used for localized sort of cases like assassinations and things like that, I think it's it's still a cause for concern because, you know, it only takes 11 shot one lethal shot to cause some harm.
Um, So yeah, I think that was all the questions that were directed to me.
I I I hope I didn't miss out on anything.
I'm happy to address anything else that I missed out there.
Thank you so much, Mr.
Das, for your also comprehensive responses to the questions that were directed to you.
I believe that we've covered the range of questions according to my note that have been asked by distinguished delegate.
I'm looking at the clock.
We still have about 15 minutes, so I'm still opportunity to have some reactions if possible, but it will be very limited reactions.
Otherwise, we go over the clock from the responses that you may have had or if indeed there is a boning question which was not responded to.
I'll look around to see if I as well, no further reaction from distinguished panel member here, doctor Bolton Kin.
Colleagues, it appears to be the case that we have no further request for the floor.
I know that we also have some engagement in terms of side events during lunch, perhaps this gives you some little time for some corridor conversation on this important discussion we've had on the first panel whilst we look forward to the second panel in the afternoon.
Now look at opportunities.
In some of your intervention, we already see the linkages to this bridge and then a lot was said about, of course, international cooperation and assistance, which would be the third panel tomorrow.
Allow me to recall that side event will be taking place today.
We have Interpol, the European Union, and the League of Arab States event from prevention to investigation, centering cooperation across small arms and light weapons life cycle, and this will be in conference room 11, Also, we have Unity, UNIC, the African Union and Switzerland's event armed violence prevention, West African Insights 224 Words into action, and this will take place in conference room six, as well as online.
Then finally, we have the UNIC event on preventing and addressing the presence of firearms in schools, and this will take place in conference room one.
This gives you time to locate your conference room, have a quick a launch and conversation and we'll see you back in the afternoon for Panel two, which starts at 3:00 P.M.
In this very conference room.
If there is no further requests for the floor, many thanks to our panelists, doctor Rachel Bolton King, Mr.
Das, and then miss Samantha Allen, and of course to colleagues in the Secretariat.
This meeting is adjourned.