Who Guards the Cables? Submarine Cables and International Law

Colleagues, friends.
Colleagues, friends, if I can invite you all to take your seat as we prepare to start.
We have one final panelist who will be joining us in a moment.
But until that happens, I think we will just start because we have a full program and a lot of ground, or I should say maritime zones to cover.
Welcome to this wonderful event that is hosted and co sponsored by the permanent missions of Thailand, Ireland, Latvia, Australia, In addition to the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, UDR, it's a pleasure and a privilege to be moderating this panel.
I was asked to prepare opening remarks.
They make profound points of law and policy, but I will not read those comments simply because we have a grand total of nine speakers.
So we're going to proceed directly to our three opening remarks followed by two keynote addresses, followed by a panel discussion of four participants.
So I'm going to start off by introducing our distinguished ambassadors who will be delivering opening remarks, and then I will later introduce our keynote speakers and panelists.
So we have three distinguished ambassadors who will be delivering opening remarks.
We will start off with Her Excellency, the Deputy permanent representative of Thailand.
Her Excellency Ambassador Pay Chai Payout, who I'm told just started.
Congratulations and welcome to New York.
After that, we will hear opening remarks by His Excellency Ambassador Fergol Nathan, the permanent representative of the Republic of Ireland to the United Nations.
Finally, opening remarks by Her Excellency, Ambassador Sanita Pavluta Des Landis, the permanent representative of Latvia.
I turn over the floor to the distinguished Deputy Perentpsentative of Thailand.
Thank you very much and good afternoon to all.
Please allow me these few minutes to deliver this message on behalf of my permanent representative who had very much wanted to be here, but is unfortunately fighting a fever.
So first of all, I have to express my sincere appreciation, of course, to the permanent missions of Ireland, of Latvia, and Australia, as well as Unidir for co organizing this event with us.
Um, I would also like to recognize the International Telecommunication Union for its active participation and contribution to the event.
Excellency's, distinguished colleagues, we gather today around a question that appears simple at first glance, who guides the cables? And yet behind this question lies a complex challenge with significant legal, strategic, economic, and human dimensions.
Beneath the surface of our oceans lies a web of fiber optic cables that carry over 95% of all international data traffic, enabling real time communications, financial transactions, and cloud computing.
This is the invisible backbone of our modern interconnected world.
As a maritime nation that is located at the crossroads of the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, Thailand, of course, relies heavily on submarine cable connectivity to support our digital economy, to facilitate our trade, and to maintain our integration in the regional and global community.
The cables that land on our shores connect our people, our businesses, and institutions with partners in Asia, Europe, and beyond.
When these connections are disrupted, the consequences are felt not only by governments, of course, but also by people.
Interrupted communications, frozen transactions, compromised services.
So we are all familiar, I think, with the recent events that have caused such vulnerabilities, whether it be from a volcanic eruption of Tonga in 2022 or from incidents in the Baltic and the Red Seas, reminding us that geopolitical tensions regrettably, do not stop at the water's edge, but they reach all the way to the ocean floor, underscoring concerns about the security and resilience of this critical infrastructure.
At the same time, the legal questions surrounding submarine cables are becoming increasingly complex.
The principal international instruments governing cables, whether it be the 18 84 Convention for the protection of submarine telegraph cables or the 1982 UNCLOS, were developed in a very different technological and geopolitical context.
They provide an important foundation, but they did not anticipate any of the challenges that we face today, such as hybrid threats and cyber enabled operations.
Today, when a cable is cut in international waters, questions of attribution, jurisdiction, and enforcement are deeply contested.
This raises important questions for the international community.
Are existing legal frameworks sufficient to address emerging risks and how can states cooperate more effectively to prevent, to investigate, and respond to incidents affecting submarine cables? What role can international law, including the law of the sea, international humanitarian law, and the law of state responsibility play in safeguarding this infrastructure and where gaps exist, how might they be closed? Thailand believes that the security and resilience of submarine cables is a shared responsibility.
No single country can protect this global network alone.
The cables that connect our world across multiple jurisdictions traverse vast stretches of ocean that serve the interests of billions.
Their protection, therefore, requires dialogue, cooperation, and a continued commitment to the rule of law.
Distinguished colleagues, it is in this spirit that we have come together here today.
We are fortunate to be joined by an outstanding panel of experts whose diverse perspectives will help us to better understand both the challenges and the opportunities ahead.
Thailand looks forward, of course, to engaging constructively in this important conversation, and we wish you all a rich and insightful discussion.
Thank you.
Thank you so much, Ambassador.
Our next speaker, Excellency Ambassador Nathan, the permanent Retative of Ireland.
You have the floor, sir.
Thank you very much, doctor Halal.
Thank you to Latvia, Australia, and Thailand for organizing this event to Judge Kitty Chai and to Deputy Secretary-General Lamski excuse me for mispronunciation there.
I think this is a really important moment and this event builds on our previous event in March, looking at who guards the cables.
Just maybe a little bit of history to show the context.
It's worth recalling that subsea cables were laid over 100 years before the UN, 100 years before the UN charter, 100 years before international law to anchor and structure international cooperation.
And a little bit of history first, one of the first layers of subsidy cables was a man called Captain Robert Halpin, an Irishman who laid the first subsidy cables between the Island of Ireland and Canada in 18 65.
First attempt failed, second attempt was more successful.
And at that point, it was a hugely physically dangerous endeavor, resource intensive.
It just showed that, you know, those challenges were there, they're still there today.
We put some structure and some legal framework on that 100 years later.
But the question is, are those laws, conventions structures, do they speak to the needs of our moment with such strong challenges, particularly in the geopolitical sphere? I think our previous colleague, Deputy ambassador of Thailand has spoken about the importance of subsidy cables, that's a given.
I think over 97% of international data, including critical financial transactions traveled by fiberor cable.
And the stakes are vastly higher therefore than 18 65.
But the question is, how do we ensure that we are dealing with security stewardship of cables in this era? For Ireland, this is an acutely important issue for us.
A huge number of cables pass through our maritime zones.
And in February, our Minister for Defense published Ireland's first national maritime security strategy, which has a focus on emerging threats and how we protect subsea infrastructure.
Mindful of the need to enhance maritime domain awareness and security, our strategy also acknowledges the importance of strengthening international cooperation frameworks.
Our strategy involves cooperating close to our near neighbors, as is obvious on new initiatives and exploring the opportunity for Ireland to host or partner in a regional cable monitoring hub for the European Union in the North Atlantic.
As we set out in our strategy, Ireland will increase the depth and breadth of our cooperation with regional and international partners as well as relevant institutions.
This has obviously included our engagement with the United Nations, in particular, through the global mechanism on IT security and its precursor process in the open ended working group.
Within the global mechanism, we see opportunities to build awareness, capacity, and engagement and mutual cooperation on maintaining critical infrastructure and subsidy cables in particular, and to further address the role of international law, including IHL in this context.
In this century, in addition to voluntary cooperation framework at the UN, we have agreed principles and frameworks to guide our approach to security of critical infrastructure.
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, as has been said previously, set up the legal framework to which all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out and it's of strategic importance for all of us as the basis for national, regional and global action and cooperation in the maritime sector.
Our detailed discussion today on this current legal framework, it's a very useful expansion of that as we seek to fully graph the nature and scale of the challenges of our time and how we can more effectively address them with respect to the challenges faced by the security of subsea cables.
So we're really delighted to be asked to participate, to be involved in this discussion, to hear the discussion, and to take forward these exchanges on such a critical issue at such a critical time.
Thank you.
Thank you, doctor Hab.
Thank you so much, Ambassador.
Wonderful.
Our next opening speaker is Her Ecellncymbassador Sanita Pavuta DeSantis, the permanent representative of Latvia.
You have a forma.
Thank you very much and it is also a great pleasure and honor to be here today and for my country, we are very pleased to be one of the coganizers of this discussion together with Thailand, Ireland, and Australia and Unidu.
I also wish to recognize and thank the distinguished panelists today and all of you for your presence.
It is full house, that also proves how important this issue is.
For maritime countries, but actually for any country because submarine cables lie beneath the sea.
They are outside of the public eye.
But as colleagues already said, they sustain their communications, transactions, global services, and we all as individuals and as societies, depend on those.
This is a critical infrastructure underpinning also the global stability and security.
Now, damage to submarine cables may of course result from accidents or natural causes, but that is probably not the issue.
We must also confront an increasing risk of deliberate interference or sabotage or hybrid operations and cyber activity.
And for my country, as for many other countries, this is not an abstract issue.
We've been facing this for quite some time.
And in our region, the vulnerability of the undersea infrastructure has become a matter of national security as well.
And since Russia's full scale aggression against Ukraine, we've seen trends in the Baltic Sea and patterns of incidents that affect power, energy links, and telemunications cables.
Um, there are also the issue of shadow fleet, Russian shadow fleet vessels that present additional risks because there are suspected anchor dragging incidents that happen and link to those vessels, and they not only damage critical industry infrastructure, but raise very serious legal questions such as attribution and accountability.
So that is something that we probably also need to discuss today.
And we do welcome this event as part of a broader effort to build a common understanding and also a practical cooperation amongst states.
So submarine cables are directly targeted, states must be able to investigate, to preserve evidence, cooperate across jurisdictions in order to support accountability and prevent impunity, and the stakes are, um, There's no need to explain once again the stakes, but that is a matter for all of us and, as I said, individuals and societies and our economies.
For my country, this is also a broader question of international order.
Um, because the same actors who tend to violate international law, violate the sovereignty or territorial integrity of states are also the ones testing our resilience below the threshold of open conflict.
Um.
They probe for weaknesses, they exploit legal and operational gaps.
So that's something that we also need to discuss and identify.
And they also seek to normalize uncertainty.
Uncertainty where these actions thrive, and that is our common endeavor to clarify.
Um, what can be done and how to best approach that.
Obviously, there's no one single state that can address these challenges alone and, the submarine cable submarine infrastructure is transboundary by nature.
It is really global.
Also, the protection requires cooperation among coastal states, flag states, operators, private industry, international organizations, legal experts, and also the technical communities.
So today we have a very valuable expertise in this room and on the screen.
So we very much hope that this will be a step, one of many steps to take to tackle this growing challenge, and I hope we have a very useful outcome of a building upon this discussion and thank you very much again for being here.
You're right, not only is it a full room, it's a full room on the first game of the World Cup.
That's quite an achievement.
We'll now move to our two keynote addresses.
Really, our two keynote speakers require no introduction.
Our first speaker is Judge Kiransan itishasari.
I would invite everyone to go to Delegates Lounge and to witness for yourselves how much of a prolific scholar and jurist he is.
His scholarship ranges virtually every field of international law, human rights, humanitarian law, cyberspace, Law of the Sea, and intersection of law and policy.
If I've missed any field that the judge has not written on, I apologize.
I've also been told he will be speaking in his non judicial capacity, but I think it's a real privilege that we have such an esteemed jurist with us and then we'll move on to our second speaker effort.
Judge, you have the floor.
Thank you very much, Herald.
I'm speaking in extra judicial capacity, so not s.
I'm sitting judge, but I'm not speaking as in my capacity as sitting judge.
But you see this is continuation of dialogue we had at the end of March when it caused a lot of sensation by saying that there is no gap, there is no gap in the law regulating protection of submarine cables and online debates.
They keep on saying, No, this is very new position.
And this is indeed very complex issue.
I look at it from perspective at a draftsmen of Talt manual 2.0.
So when we were drafting the Taln manual, we proceed on assumption that if we see there's a gap in law in terms of dealing with production of cyber and new technologies, you are in deep trouble.
Because if you wait for domains of treaty laws, it takes maybe years or even decades.
So let's look at what we have and then whether custom international law exists.
And in terms of the Laws Convention itself, Article 293 paragraph one says, the court of tribunals that have jurisdiction to interpret to settle dispute under this convention shall apply this convention and other rules of international law not incompatible with this convention.
So let's look at the things My core argument here is that the legal framework exists, but it is still underutilized.
We don't need a new treaty.
We need a modern systemic interpretation of existing laws.
You look at the log C, legal rights are fractures across three cables categories.
Firstly, cable link to hostal state sovereign rights that is in connection to ES and continental.
Secondly, cables landing in the hostal state territory, but not linked to EST or continental rights.
And then thirdly, transit cables passing entirely through maritime zones without falling into definition of the first two categories.
In the territorial sea, coastal state has exclusive sovereign rights, but in E and the high seas, where most subage happens, enforcement is strictly limited to the flag state of the offending vessels.
That's according to Article 113 of Un Clause.
Here we have a very bad precedent, the so called egoist precedent decided by the Helsinki District Court, which dismissed charges because proving intent or culpable negligence in standard navigation incidents is incredibly difficult.
The International Law Association's report of the year 2024 made it clear that Interpreter C coastal state sovereignty means that unauthorized cable monitoring by foreigners sales in this zone directly infringes the regime of incent passage, that is not exercise of the right of innocent passage.
Then the ILA says that coastal states are legally prohibited from setting up say zone around cables and byflies in inside condition because according to the driving history of EAC, they are not legally defined as installations or structures.
And then tensions are rising over whether underwater sensors used to protect cables count as freedom navigation, in which case no consent is needed from the coastal state, or is it marine scientific research or intelligence collection, in which case coastal states consent is required? My suggestion is that you have to balance the so called freedom of navigation and the rise in the high seas, which also apply to with the so called due regard principle.
Article 871 of one clause protects the freedom of navigation.
Paragraph two of that articles impose obligations of due regard.
Peace time cable protection is grounded in the duty of all states to exercise high se freedoms with due regard for other states interests.
Sage and international damage are inherently disrespectful of interests of the states and represent bad faith violations of the recognized global commodity rights, so it fails to fulfill the due regard principle.
Now look at custom international law.
On the right hand side of the PowerPoint, you will see the so called state of necessity, which is qualified in Article 25 of ILC articles on state responsibilities, based on the SCJ judgment in the Gap Google Numos case in 1997, So it means that broadening suspect ships on the high seas without fed state consent is legally justifiable, but only if an essential interest of the state face imminent period and it is the only means available, and it does not seriously impair other state interests.
My point here is that you have to frame the legal basis of your interdiction or intervention at sea in the IC to fit in the so called division of state of necessity as enunciated by the ICCA and codified by the ILC.
In the same case, the ICG also allowed the so called lawful counter emissions short of the use of force.
What it means is that actions short of use of force must be strictly responsive to a wrongful act aimed at forcing compliance preceded by a call for reparations and strictly proportional.
I think we need to look, as I mentioned earlier, that I used to be a draftsman of Tallinn 2.0.
Look again at the so called Hami international law because the debate about protection of submarine cables spend a lot of time on whether that is so called state practice to support the rights of the costal state.
But one thing to look at is look at the so called instant custom pronounced by the Polish lodges in the North Sea cases.
So he was saying that Rapid technologies threat can justify instant custom at the time he referred to the so called sending outer space treaties.
So you have now at the time in 1969, if a few states have the technology to send satellites into space and there is no protest from other states, that could become instant custom.
This is the so called I know my colleagues from the IOC you know very well that meaning of intense uniform state practice, such as coordinate security protocols to inspect vessels with international protests.
Can rapidly build new handsomely police powers.
But then the question, what if they are protesting and now we have diplomatic situations.
Why are you protesting? Do you have some kind of ulterior motives to protect the so called sabotage? And this is something not just the international in my past life, used to be ambassadors.
So I know that you have to combine only the law, but also the diplomacy to ensure that, you know, okay, just like playing cards, call that b Show your cards.
Why are you protesting? The next thing is that I Attribution gaps.
How do you prove that the act in question is attributed to a certain state or not? Look at it carefully, and then I think you have to look at the so called totality of circumstances and digital fingerprints.
There must be some rebuttable presumptions if a vessels disabled or spooks is automatic identification system near a cable brake without navigational reason, the burden of proof shifts to the flag state.
Then the digital fingerprint framework, blending cable embedded, acoustic vibration logs with satellite telemetry, and dark shape tracking makes deniability legally impossible.
I'll leave that to the expert to discuss on that point.
The next one is enhance port state control.
And Article 25, Gap two and port state Can run forensic examinations of the how locks and anchors of vessels voluntarily present at this port if national laws categorize subsidy cables as critical infrastructure and then evidence can then be handed over to the flag state for prosecution unless the cable damage happens in the internal waters or territorial sea or the port state, or the damage impair the c rights of the port state it is inside or controversial, in which case, the fourth state has jurisdiction to prosecute and punish the ssels and its crew.
Here, back to diplomacy, look carefully at Kufu Channel and Tehran hostage cases.
Every state has obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rise of the state.
Territory here I mean the ship the ship that caused damage to the cables.
Then the Tran hostages case, a state is liable for omission if it should have known of a malicious maritime operation within its capacity to prevent yet it turned a blind eye.
So we have solid international law to support the so called action on this one.
Now I go into another regime of the so called the law of armed conflict that is under UN Charter.
What sub cable lies within the right of use of force on armed attack under UN Charter.
This depends on the so called scale and effect test under international law.
So this is a question of facts.
And then look also at the so called athletic Sunrise president.
The award in 2015, in that case, the arbitral tribunal indicates that coastal state may carry out preventive action in the ES If there is reasonable belief of an impending terrorist threat on offshore structures.
Here we have precedent for you to look at preventive action.
We are not at a loss and then what about IHL International Comm Law? When I was one of the 19 draftsmen of Tallinn 20, we spent a lot of time on this so called rule 2054 because subsea cables carry both civil and commercial data and military communications.
Severing a single cable can often results in indiscriminate attacks effects, violating ISL principles of proportionality.
Then we also noted that during armed conflicts, cables are often targeted because they carry military command data.
However, they also carried 99% of civilian banking, hospital, and Internet data, that is civilian objects.
Under the Oslo manual, we have here ambassador Norway with us, he should be more knowledgeable about Oslo than I do.
An attack is illegal if the collateral cl harm is excessive, cutting a modern fiber optic cables cause cascading effects across neutral countries, effectively raising the proportionary bar so high that physical destruction is almost always an indiscriminate attack.
My last point is that we have to look at some of very solid resilient future national legislation.
State must implement strict domestic criminal penalties.
Failure to do so can trigger state on state claims under the Part 15 of ARN Clause, that is, you failed to criminalize the conduct as required under Article 113 of ARN Clause that requires the flag state to criminalize about destruction of submarine cables and pipeline, then you are also liable to be subject to litigation under dispute settlement part of UN Clause.
The second thing is regional corporation Maybe we could have some standardized investigation, surveillance, and joint maritime policing the original customary international law among specially fixed state, especially, for example, in the Baltic Sea.
My point here is not I would suggest that you're not saying that we are trying to build some kind of a new treaty regime, but just some manual, modus open ended to enforce the rights that you already have with you.
I think I better stop now.
Otherwise, my standard lecture is 3 hours nonstop, so I better stop.
Thank you so much.
Thank you so much, Judge.
Thank you very much for that.
Sir next keynote address will be delivered by Mr.
Thomas Lemanowkis, the Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations and Deputy Secretary-General of the International Telecommunication Union.
You have the floor.
So thank you very much, Dear moderator, Excellency distinguished colleagues, ladies and gentlemen it's really a pleasure to join you today, and I would really like to thank Thailand, Ireland, Latvia, Australia, and UDU for convening this discussion.
Indeed, as I think already some speakers mentioned, submarine cables have always been international.
The first submarine telegraph cable was laid actually between England and France in 18 50, but it function only briefly because a fishing vessel accidentally cut it, thus from the start marking importance of cable protection.
A durable transatlantic cable was indeed laid in 18 66, and by 18 84 states had adopted the convention for the protection of submarine telegraph cables.
So this is not a new issue, what is new is the scale of our dependence.
Today, cyber interlogation cables have a backbone of the global digital economy.
They carry more than 99% of the national data traffic, is all financial transactions, cloud services, government communications, scientific operation, emergency services, and everyday connectivity.
There are now more than 500 commercial submarine cables worldwide, and late and turn this network will stretch around 1.7 million kilometers.
Demand keeps growing.
Global Internet bandwidth rose by 23% in 2025 and has more than tripled since 2020.
With cloud computing, artificial intelligence, and data intensive services expanding, our dependence on resilient cable infrastructure will only grow.
For small island developing states and geographically remote economies, a limited number of routes or landing points can mean that one outage has national or regional consequences.
Serving cable resilience is therefore not only a communications issue, it is a development, economic continuity, and societal resilience issue.
Recent incidents have drawn attention to vulnerabilities in sensitive corridors, including the Baltic Sea, the Red Sea, and the Strait of Hormuz.
But cable breaks occur all around the world.
A 200 submarine cable falls globally occur each year.
In 2024, damage to cables of West Africa affected connectivity across 13 countries.
Critical cables cut of South Africa affected several East African countries.
Tonga disruptions in 2019, 2022 and 2024 show the acute risks for SIDS.
The vast majority result from such activities as fishing and anchoring, which account for more than 80% of the main causes of cable damage.
Natural hazards, equipment failure, and aging infrastructure also important risks and add another 10% of cable breaks.
This doesn't mean we should ignore security risks.
It means we must build systems that can withstand disruption, accidental, natural, technical, or even deliberate and recover rapidly.
The objective is clear.
Connectivity should be maintained where possible, restored quickly where necessary, and designed with redundancy from the start.
That requires better routing, faster repairs, clear permitting, coordination between regulators, maritime authorities, cable owners, repair providers and governments, and trusted information share.
Repair is especially important.
Fixing a severing cable requires a specialized vessel to be mobilized, loaded with the right cable and equipment, and sent to a fall zone, often a hundreds of meters below sea level.
The global fleet is small and aging.
Only around 60 to 80 specialized cable ships globally, many of them decades old.
Repair capacity can quickly become a bottleneck when multiple incidents occur when permits, weather, customs, capitals rules or security conditions relax.
Resilience is not only about repairing cables after the break, it's about route diversity, fast track maintenance permits, pre agreed procedures and planning before disruption occurs.
Indeed, as was said with some speakers, no single government company or international organization can do this alone.
Sermon cable systems are international by design, yet many procedures remain national.
Public private cooperation is essential because most of the cable infrastructure is privately owned, financed, operated, while the public interest is enormous.
This is where ITU especially can add value.
ITU is the United Nations Specialized Agency for digital technologies and for 160 years we have helped governments, industry, and technical experts build and sustain global connectivity.
Through our standardization work, especial ITT study group 15, we've developed the core standards for optical transport networks, enabling submarine cable systems to grow their capacity by 40% annually for 40 years.
Standards like ITG 979 provide guidance on reliability and monitoring to strengthen resilience.
ITU also provides a neutral platform for cooperation and supports countries to strengthen digital infrastructure and close the digital divide.
In 2024, together with the International Cable Protection Committee and industry body, I launched the International Asy Body on submarine cable resilience.
It is shared by Nigeria and Portugal and supported by three working groups with more than 160 experts focused on timely deployment and repair, risk identification, monitoring and mitigation, as well as connectivity and geographic diversity.
This work took shape through the first International submarine cable resilience summit held in Abuji in 2025.
The second summit held in Portal on second and third February this year consolidated that moment.
Therefore, would like to thank Nigeria and Portugal for hosting these important summits.
The Porto summit indeed brought together more than 350 participants from over 70 countries and the advisory body approved practical recommendations to streamline permitting and repair, designate a clear national focal point, accelerate repairs, improve emergency response planning, and strengthen data sharing and risk informed decision making.
Looking ahead, the next milestone will be a pool of the three working group reports during the wishes forum organized by here in Geneva in July.
Later this year at AU Potential Conference, member states will consider the future of this work.
The central challenge now is implementation.
Investment in new capacity is welcome and necessary, but investment capacity must be matched by investment and resilience.
We need to move from principles to practice, from awareness to concrete national, regional and international arrangements.
This is where the legal discussion matters, and of course, it was a really pleasure to hear very in depth presentation on this matter.
The 18 84 Convention was an early recognition that submarine cables require international rules, and year to date, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides a broader foundation for cable protection, laying a repeal.
Also the General Assembly's annual omnibus resolution on oces in the Law of the Sea recognizes the vital importance of submarine cables and power plans to the global economy and national security and calls on states to protect this infrastructure in accordance with international law.
The latest resolution also notes the work of the International advisory body established by UNIC and advised states to share their views of the advisory body and its three working groups.
This matters because submarine cable resilience is no longer only technical matters.
It is a part of wider conversation on international cooperation, maritime security, visual infrastructure, and sustainable development.
From a use perspective, the keys to ensure that legal, regulatory, technical, and operational communities speak to each other.
La such rights and duties, regulation creates enabling procedures, technical standards improve predictability, industry brings operational expertise, international organizations help align these efforts.
Who cuts the cables as the topic of this conversation asks? The answer is, at least from our side, all of us, but in different ways.
Governments must create clear frameworks.
Industry must invest in resilient design, maintenance, repair.
Maritime authorities, regulators and emergency responders must coordinate before incidents occur.
International organizations must provide platforms cooperation, standards, and capacity building, and the legal community must help clarify how existing rules apply in a changing technological and geopolitical environment.
Termine cables may lie beneath the ocean, but the responsibility to protect and strengthen them sits very clearly with us.
Let us move from analysis to action, from concern to coordination, and from resilience as an inspiration to resilience as a daily operational practice.
MTU remains committed to supporting all of you in this collective effort.
Thank you very much and back to you, moderator.
Thank you.
Thank you very much.
This is absolutely wonderful.
I thank you all for at least sticking to the time limits.
Colleagues, we'll now turn to the panel discussion segment of today's event.
We have four phenomenal panelists who I'm going to introduce very quickly.
I have two pages worth of bios, which I will not read, particularly that many of them need no introduction.
First, we have Ambassador Rofin A Fife, member of the International Law Commission, Ambassador designnate to Vienna of the Kingdom of Norway.
Congratulations.
As I said, current member of the International Law Commission, also a the Nordic candidate to re election to the ILC.
In my personal capacity, I say I don't think of anyone better to be nominated.
We have my dear friend Dominique Steinbeck, who is joining us, I believe, from Geneva.
I'm not sure, but she is a researcher with Unres Security and Technology program.
She works on cybersecurity.
Check out her scholarship.
It's absolutely wonderful publications that she has with expertise international law, international humanitarian law, human rights, and disarmament issues.
We also have my dear friend Harry Aitken, the counselor and legal advisor from the Mission of Australia, Um, Harry is an expert on everything really, international security, digital issues and international law.
He was previously the Director of the International Law Branch at Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
Finally, but definitely not least at all, dear friend Calina Pafido Miranda, first Secretary of the Permanent Mission of Portugal, who was a Portuguese diplomat since 2021 and is currently posted with the mission covering digital and climate issues.
So what we have is two rounds of questions or two rounds of conversation between our panelists.
The first question or the first issue that I invite our panelists to discuss is whether the existing frameworks are fit for purpose.
Specifically, I think what our opening remarks and our keynote speakers have given us is the following.
It seems to me that we have a normative issue and a policy issue.
On the normative side, I think one way to think about the normative landscape that has been described is we have several areas of international law that are applicable and relevant.
But the question really is, are these areas of law sufficient and are we sufficiently able to disentangle when specific rules apply and in which contexts, particularly because many of these rules were designed separately to regulate separate forms of conduct while now we're talking about infrastructure that is actually deeply integrated.
To clarify, think of space law, that's separate, the law of the sea, that's a separate field.
Use of bellum or the law governing the resort to force is a separate field, use in below is a separate field, and yet the conduct, the practice, the activities that are regulated by these fields are integrated are seamless.
My first question to the panel is, From a normative perspective, do we need new law or do we need to figure out how existing law ought to be reconfigured or maybe reinterpreted to be fit for purpose? I'll leave that to you.
I can call on you, but I'll wait for volunteers, Ambassador.
Thank you so much for having me.
If I could just say that in my own countries as many others totally dependent in terms of security and welfare, economics, and connectivity on cables, but also pipelines and the fundamentals relating to submarine cables and pipelines are basically the same.
I'd like to mention with respect to Thailand that calculated the length of all the Norwegian gas pipelines one after the other.
That's the distance off Bangkok.
The issue of protecting the pipelines has been huge for a long time.
Then you have the issue of cables where we have men and I fully support all the views expressed by dire.
But we have a distinction between cables that pertain to the running of platforms and pipelines, which have a special status, and then there are others.
But I would add electricity cables are absolutely key to energy security in addition to the transportation of gas today for pipelines, et cetera.
Then you have, of course, the cables you've been referring to, which are digital.
I was not party to the manuals, but I was a draftsman of the Norwegian Coast Guard Act of 1997.
And for reasons explained, we have a special provision there for protection.
I mean, making it clear the Norwegian Coast Guard that was in 1997, had a huge amount of authority with regard to detection and deterrence and if necessary, taking certain action with regard to protection of pipelines and cables.
And of course, this is within certain limits and the requirements of necessity and proportionality.
But that was an early case of stating to those who might be interested or not benevolent, that we have under Norwegian law, a feeling that we can satisfy requirements of legality in terms of being able to prosecute if necessary.
The key interesting norm that I don't think has been mentioned yet is that in the 18 84 Telegraph convention, there is a Section ten, which basically says that if there are reasonable grounds to suspect something nasty, Then warship or other vessel may board and start asking a few questions.
That has been used once in a case outside of Newfoundland by the US Coast Guard with regard to a Russian trawler in the 1950s.
I would bemis if I didn't say that in my country and I think many other countries, the question is not only as to whether you would be able to provide enough evidence, attribution, be able to prosecute, things are extremely complex, particularly with regard to those matters.
But deterrence, prevention, credibility are absolutely key.
So I would say that to reduce the thing as to whether you will be able to succeed by prosecuting in court of law many months maybe after the facts, has to be considered in conjunction with what represents credible deterrence in terms of possibility of starting asking questions and possibly boarding if something looks very threatening.
And the question there, in my view is very practical.
You ask the question as to whether it's law, politics, or policy.
In my view, the key factor that we have encountered in practice, and I've been also connected to legal advice in one of those cases, is getting in real time, the necessary information gathered.
This trawler is going back and forth with its trawl over a particular cable.
Claiming to be fishing fish stocks and claiming that it's been doing that for ages over the years.
It's very important to be able to quite quickly master the necessary data to make sure that you can identify former behavior of that vessel, ownership, issues pertaining as to whether it's likely that there are any fish stocks of that kind in the area.
I can make the list pretty lengthy.
But I don't want to prolong the conversation, but just say that my general impression is that on the side of credibility, the key issue is detection.
The key issue is how to be able to respond in time and finding out whether something looks nasty and possibly start asking some questions.
The message is not that there are legal gaps and I agree with the judge who said basically the focus is more on what might be possibly done with the legal tools at our disposal.
He referred to the arbitral tribunal in the case in 2015 of the Arctic Sunrise.
They actually touch upon the subject in a particular context.
But the wording is more general.
It speaks about not only the legitimacy, but also the legality of preventive measures that have to be, of course, necessary and proportionate and reasonable, et cetera But considering the threats we are facing here, I think we should not err on the side of caution terms of saying that in doubt we wouldn't.
If there is a doubt, we would get on board, we would ask questions.
Now, AI may be a part of the solution on how to integrate in real time a huge amount of data which would make, and I think the judge referred also to the question as to how you can mount the relevant evidence.
Evidence as to how to win in a court of law in a criminal trial is one thing, but another is enough of evidence to be able to say whether there is a presumption as you referred to or not, if there is a very strange navigational pattern or other things, reasonable grounds under Article 10 of the 18 84 Convention in order to start looking into EAC.
Of course, some would say not all states are parties to the 18 84 Convention.
However, my view is that that particular convention is pretty much reflective of customer international law and I would like to see if anyone would fundamentally disagree with me on that.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Gary.
Thanks very much, Mohammed.
Thank you to Thailand for all of the efforts to Ireland and Latvia and Unir.
It's really an honor to partner with you and be part of a distinguished panel like this.
But between being invited to give these remarks and today, my Deputy Prime Minister actually gave a big foreign policy address on which he covered subsidy cables.
I won't go through all of that, but I just thought it was relevant.
I think he made one point which I just want to quote because I think it brings to bear the importance of this issue for Australia and for the Pacific region.
For Australia, we have 15 subsidy cables and they come in only in a couple of different entry points.
We have 99% of our Internet traffic come through those.
My Deputy Prime Minister said, and paraphrase here, but our financial systems, our health systems, our communications, our ability to operate as a modern economy and a functioning state.
All of it is critically dependent on infrastructure that is exposed, that cannot move, and as we have now seen demonstrated in the Baltic, can be cut with an anchor in the middle of the night.
I think that's just in terms of also how Australia is seeing the importance of this issue from a national security perspective, but obviously also from an economic and a resilience perspective.
Just to make three sort of broad points in response to your question, Mohammed.
I think it's good to see a convergence here that a sense of no need for new law or amending existing law at the time being, and I think Australia would be in that position as well.
For us, I think we really want to look at how we can implement unclos and existing international law before we start calling for opening up new treaties or creating new legal instruments.
And also, I think I think we've heard that this is really, we've got a system of old international law, but quite a new phenomenon in terms of hybrid threats.
There's a range of different potential legal solutions, a range of quite recent instances of practice of judicial engagement, and I think we should pause and look at how that's being utilized and how the law is being developed through practice before jumping into the law reform space.
I think the other thing which we should really look at in this space given just the geopolitical realities of creating new law at the time.
We've heard references to the cyber, the cyber processes, the OWG and the permanent mechanism and out of space forums is to look at, can we be talking about responsible behaviors, about documenting what expectations are, but at least initially in a non legal way.
And the ambassador from Latvia talked about you talked about, sorry, you're no longer here.
Your ambassador talked about this problem of normalizing uncertainty.
I think talking about standards and responsible behaviors would help push back on that in a way that's more readily achievable.
I think as well is that some of the solutions, and I think what we've heard today, not all of the solutions need to be legal solutions.
I think we've heard about how some of the gaps in attribution and other problems we're facing can be perhaps resolved by uses of technology, by different regional partnerships, by different forms of collaboration that enhance maritime awareness that lead to deterrence in ways that are consistent with UCLs.
Um, Obviously, we've seen Baltic Century.
I think the Indo Pacific, my region, and other regions can look at those examples, can learn from those in terms of other approaches to maritime awareness.
If you'll permit me just I want to make a quick couple of points on unclos specifically.
So really agree with what the judge said around the need for states to be implementing Article 113.
I think we need to acknowledge, obviously there are limitations there in terms of that responsibility sitting with the flag state to prosecute damage to subs in the AA D, but the fact is, and I think it was the ILA report identified, really, many states have not implemented those obligations nationally, and that does have practical consequences, including, for instance, the ability to not be able to enliven international crime cooperation frameworks if there aren't matching significant criminal offense provisions in different jurisdictions.
And the second point I'd make is around how states can look at using their sovereign rights to regulate fishing in their EE eds.
And here I'm coming to the issue of protection zones.
I know there's been quite a lot of commentary about that.
Different states have taken different approaches, different legal bases have been offered, but this is something that Australia has done and has often been used as a case study.
But basically, we have put protection zones around some of the cable landing points into Australia.
So a lot of those are in our territorial seat, but they go out to our EE'sed Um, and within those protection zones which extend 500 meters either side of a cable into a depth of 200 meters, there are preventions on some kind of fishing, anchoring vessels and dredging and penalties for up to ten years imprisonment for engaging in that behavior.
So I'm aware of others who have implemented those sorts of zones, but I think again, that's another way of using unclos in this area to further mitigate against some of the harms.
I'll stop there.
Thank you.
Thank you, Harry.
I'm going to turn over to Carolina and build on something that Harry mentioned about standards for responsible state behavior.
Maybe one thing that would be responsible for more states to do is to engage in building resilient infrastructure networks.
Maybe Carolina, if you could tell us about the International submarine cable resilience Summit that was held in Portugal in 2026 and maybe some of the outcomes of that.
Thank you.
It's actually thinking about that because I'm the one bringing not the legal answer to if the legal framework is enough or not because the International Advisory Board focus on resilient submarine cables.
It's a little bit more broad than security, so it's also climate hazards, it as aging infrastructure.
The issue is more broad, but The fact is the same.
We know that this infrastructure is critical to the maintenance of services, of public services, of payments or digital economy, and we know that these disruptions will cause security issues for many countries.
In fact, what the recommendations of the summit is the second summit during the two years work of the International Advisory Body.
As it was mentioned, and it had three working groups covering three areas and the results were a set of recommendations.
In fact, one of the recommendations was called for the implementation of Article 113 of Uncles, in fact.
But also, I think the perspective that it brings is that Legal principles are there.
What is missing is operationalization, in fact, and this is what the advisory board focused more on what are common standards, what are common practices that can help connect everybody.
This is also one of the defining I think we'd like to bring to this is that the IAB worked is multi stakeholder.
So it brought governments, it brought private sector, operators, regulators.
So these different perspectives, also in a geographical representation, specifically for CDs and for other unserved regions.
It's very important because again, also this infrastructure, as it was said, the majority is not public, in fact, it's also private sector that needs to be involved.
I think the practice as well can be developed, and this is hopefully what we want to keep doing together as the ITU has been doing.
Practice can be developed at the same time as norms if needed.
I don't think one depends on the other, and hopefully you'll find an answer if it's needed more or not legal norms.
But the practice that we have been doing it shows that there's an interest and shows that there's a willingness to develop these rules in this multi stakeholder approach.
The summit held in February also had a political declaration where people reaffirmed that submarine cables is our critical infrastructure that supports connectivity.
Economic development, social inclusion, and digital transformation.
This means that this is a international issue that everybody is concerned and its resiliency is in need for more of a holistic approach to everybody.
I think I will stop here, but I think as well if every documentation you want can be shared and afterwards so you get the recommendations.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr.
Bragado.
I'll turn now to Dominique over in Geneva.
I think the question I have for you is, how does this all apply to cyberspace? Because usually when we think of cyberspace, it's somewhere out there in the ether, while so much of it is under the oceans.
Dominique, how does established international law apply to the protection of submarine cables in cyberspace? Thank you very much, Professor Hill, and I hope you can hear me well in the room.
Thank you as well to all the organizers to the permanent missions of Ireland, Latvia, Australia, and the permanent mission of the Kingdom of Thailand specifically for organizing this timely event, together with Ure as well, and for inviting us to join the organization of this event.
I don't want to repeat what previous speakers have said, so I'm going to focus my remarks specifically on cyber operations targeting subsea communication cables infrastructure.
We have heard already 99% of international data travels through subsidy cables.
This network is absolutely the backbone of Internet access and connectivity, and the security therefore of subsy cables, including the security of its data and the communications is vital for the societal functioning, for the well being of individuals and societies, and of course, for national security and international security as well.
Um, Dam to the cables can have serious impacts, and cascading effects not only within the jurisdiction of a state, affecting multiple services that may depend on this connectivity, but of course, as we have heard already, uh, to other jurisdictions, given the interconnectedness and interdependency of these networks.
And we have heard already, and I wanted to highlight that there are different types of threats against subsy cables.
We have already heard about some of the physical threats such as incidental activities, including anchoring, fishing, natural hazards, or, of course, intentional activities as well, including sabotage, theft of components of the infrastructure and so on and so forth.
However, there is also growing recognition and concern that has been raised regarding cyber threats that can also impact the security of the data infrastructure and operational systems of that underpin the functioning of subsy cables.
And these vectors now, of course, extend beyond the physical and kinetic operations to cyber operations that may also result in the disruption or alteration of services, communications and data that is transferred through submarine communication cables, but also the access of data, of this data that is transferred through the subsy cables, and the implications that that may have in several legal frameworks including human rights.
Uh, in its application online.
I want to highlight two main things.
I'm not going to answer, of course, directly the question on existing international law or new development of new legal rules.
We know this is very sensitive and there are different views when we talk about the implementation or the application of international law in cyberspace, but I wanted to focus on two specific things that I think are relevant for our discussion on how we think about international law when we apply to cyber operations targeting subsy cables.
First is that there are not two, but there are different types of threats that could be stressed today with regards to cyber operations or operations targeting data and therefore impacting, for example, the exercise of rights online.
First, threats or cyber threats that target the infrastructure, hardware and software that supports the operation and management of subs cables, the infrastructure and the operating systems that basically keep the cables functioning.
We can think about network management systems, servers, landing stations, and so on and so forth.
These operations may entail exploiting landing station, for example, a software, accessing cable monitoring systems through different vectors, of course, and through different cyber threats.
This may include supply chain compromise of components and equipment, unauthorized access to the system, exploiting vulnerabilities, and of course, the possibility of deployment of malware.
This may result in the disruption of services, of the communication services, of Internet access, of course, with the potential cascading effects that we have already referred to.
But also, as I mentioned, the interception of data, data that may be, of course, confidential or sensitive data and disabling of monitoring systems that are key for the detection of malicious activity, the response, and the reparation of Sxy cables operations.
Of course, this type of cyber threats may have depending where they happen and where the infrastructure that is targeted is located in may imply different, um, effects that may bring different legal questions or legal regimes into question.
For example, implications of sovereignty and non intervention considerations, implications on use of felon considerations, following what was mentioned before by Judge Klinsk if I may, on the scale and effect approach that many states have proposed in this regard, even using Be or IHL considerations if the cyber threats are occurring in a situation of armed conflict and with a nexus to the conflict, of course.
It may definitely have human rights considerations as well as we may be talking about privacy considerations or the effect on the exercise of rights to which the Internet access is an enabler, as has been highlighted by several human rights bolies.
These are one type of threats that I think allows us to have broader discussions and with less complexity surrounding jurisdictional aspects that are very much tied as well to subsy cables because we know that subs cables go through different maritime zone with different jurisdictional implications, of course.
The other type of threats that I wanted to mention and of course, brings these more jurisdictional complexities are threats to the data and communications that transit through the subs cable.
The threats against the subsy cables in the seabed themselves.
Um, So for example, this can include interception capabilities in the network infrastructure, for example, directly tapping cables or corrupting data or disrupting communications by changing optical power levels.
The type of threats that are sometimes, I mean, it is difficult to think about these cyber threats directly because they will require physical access to the cable, actually, for example, for tapping the cables.
Um Of course, but they may have an implication on security of data and communications and exercise of rights online, for example.
Of course, these type of threats raise many questions and complexities.
In particular, they have been considered by experts to be very difficult to implement type of threats because it would require, as I mentioned before, physical access to the subsidy cables themselves in the CBD.
But also very complex capabilities, basically to materialize these threats.
But these type of threats can also have national security implications in terms of the communications that are intercepted, discussions that may involve, you know, um, how information gathering or espionage is regulated under international law, which we know is a complex conversation with different points of view, discussions on surveillance, discussions on implications potentially as some are starting to propose on sovereigty, for example, over data, and as I mentioned before, of course, on the right to privacy and other implications for the exercise of rights online.
What I wanted to mention finally, I don't want to go into the specificities of some specific aspects of different legal frameworks and I can expand a little bit more in the follow up questions, is that what has been analyzed by many experts is that the greatest cyber threat surface or attack surface as expert referred to in the case of S cable communication infrastructure, is often not the cable on the seabed itself, but the equipment like cable landing stations, amplifiers, power feeding equipment, switches to connected to the cable and also network management systems.
This is important to mention because these considerations may have an impact when we think about the jurisdictional aspects on the application of international law to cyber operations against subsea cables.
Most of the jurisdictional challenges, of course, we know that the cascading effects go, you know, throughout many jurisdictions, but when we think about the specific infrastructure that is targeted, most of the jurisdictional challenges are associated with operations that are, um, conducted from or targeted against infrastructure.
When we talk about subsea cables that go across different maritime zones, and specifically for those that are outside the territorial sovereignty of a state.
So beyond, um, I would say the territorial sea.
However, when we talk about cyber operations, the great majority of the attack surface would be according to experts, more related to the infrastructure that would be, um, more connected to the territorial sovereignty of a state.
This be the landing stations that would be in the territory of a specific state, or some of the related infrastructure that would likely be more connected to the territorial sea because it's more easily accessible, let's say, even when we're talking about, for example, tapping of a subsy cable.
I just wanted to mention those aspects because when we think about subsy cables and cyber operations against subs cables, we usually think about a very complex scenario.
Considering all the jurisdictional zones or spaces that toxic go through, including from the territory of the state, the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf, high sea, of course, the high seas and the seabed beneath the high sea which of course we know that Anglos is very relevant to address and tackle these aspects, but it may not provide all the answers when we're talking about cyber operations that we may find on those provisions for related territorial sea, of course, including in Anglos and you can develop a little bit more in my answer to the next questions.
For questions and engagement on this first round of questions and maybe to get us all started, I was really struck by what Deputy Secretary-General Lemuscs mentioned about that 90% of subsy cables breakage or injury is not actually malicious conduct.
80% is accidents and 10% is natural natural disasters.
I felt most of our panelists were primarily thinking about the malicious conduct and cyber operations or attacks, but 90% of this problem is either accidents or natural causes.
Maybe I want to go back to you for a second, Carolyn.
I know Harry, you have a long engagement and interest in infrastructure redundancy and resilience.
What can we do from a policy perspective? I know that the Porto Summit had one of its conclusions was streamlining repair.
How can we leverage the private sector? What role does the private sector have in this? What can governments and international organizations do to mobilize the private sector to assist in repair quicker? Maybe to Harry, what can we do from a policy perspective to enhance resilience? Again, the floor is open for engagement, and then maybe we'll go to a second round of questions for the panelists.
Carolina, I apologize for putting you on the spot, but go ahead.
Um The recommendations came already for the recommendations from one of the working groups was on timely deployment and repair.
The three working groups that I was mentioning besides this, there was one on risk identification, monitoring, and mitigation, and the third one in fostering connectivity and geographic diversity.
The question of redundancies and making sure that not only one single entry point is required.
Before timely deployment and repair, the private sector participated.
Again, the majority of this infrastructure is also private, so it's also in their interest to have it repaired in conjunction and as quickly and as efficient as possible.
Basically, there's a conjunction of interests, both public and private.
I think what we tried to develop in the International Advisory Board is the space to have this conversation.
How can we do it? What is needed on both parts? Which structures are needed? Are there new structures needed? Because sometimes we have so many forums that we get lost on our cooperation, in fact.
So The recommendations don't give specific, this is what we do because they are also voluntary.
This is also the work that we all agree to was that it should not be binding, recommendations, but it shows that there's interest.
It shows that there's a will and also a space.
Now we should develop further because even when we started the discussions in Abog in Nigeria, which is also our co chair for the IAB, we set the priorities.
Now in oral, we show the recommendations.
Our interest as well is that the work can continue to be developed into actionable or now these recommendations can be actionable.
That's my $0.02 on that.
Thank you.
I completely agree, I completely agree, I think with the point that the hybrid threats is just one element of it.
I think there is a question around, if you look at the percentages, how much is caused maliciously versus not, that's an attribution problem, but I think it's fair to say that a lot of the major disruptions we've heard about in the African continent in the Indo Pacific have been through, you know, natural events or through just accidents.
And I think you know when I was back in Cambra, we were there, you know, dealing with trying to assist Tonga after a natural disaster there which had caused the rupture of its single point of connectivity.
And the fact that it had lost access to the outside world, you know, dramatically affected its ability to respond and manage that disaster over an extended period.
I think what Carolina was saying is absolutely right.
I think looking at different normative initiatives that consider issues like how you're sourcing cables, how you're laying cables, how you're collaborating with the private sector on those is key.
Just wanted to highlight, which we joined and a number of other states joined in 2024 was a New York Declaration on security and resilience of undersea cables.
Just to pull out, it had a a norm on encouraging the importance of spatial and route planning and encouraging where applicable alternative submarine cable routes.
Just looking at concrete things like that.
Just to make it a related point and to perhaps make this exercise even more complicated than it already is, is that we really see that we shouldn't necessarily look at submarine cables in isolation from other infrastructure which we rely upon for connectivity.
So when you think about low earth orbit satellites, when you think about, um, uh, you know, on ground telecommunications infrastructure, when you think about data centers, all of those are vulnerable in different ways, um, and it's not necessarily just about fixing the submarine the subsea cables connectivity issue if you have sort of compounding risks across those other forums.
Um, The ITU UND RR and Sance P just released a really interesting report looking at those different types of infrastructure and how essentially natural hazards could really cause cascading issues across those and how they are actually a lot of commonalities in those resilience issues for those different types of infrastructure.
Something we're interested in having a conversation about and that could happen in New York is, are there behaviors or norms that we could talk about across a number of different types of digital infrastructure, not just limited to cables and also to send a message to the UN system that we might deal with submarine cables and bespoke forums.
We might deal with critical infrastructure in a cyber context.
We might through a process in Geneva, talk about outer space security.
But actually, all of those processes need to be cognizant of each other and the UN system itself needs to step back and think about resilience across that stack of infrastructure.
Thank you.
So maybe anyone in the audience, doctor Patel.
Thank you very much.
I mean, you need no introduction, but Mr.
Bimal Patel, member of the International Law Commission and India's candidate also to Is.
Thank you so much.
I will respectfully identify eight principles for a constructive international legal approach based on La debt of UCL and also 18 84 convention and some software emerging out of submine cable summits which car nonsense.
Number one, legality.
The Smine cable governance must remain anchored in UCLs and also relevant rules of international law, including 18 84 convention, which ambassador Pipe Mason.
Because the freedoms to lay, maintain and repair cables must be protected while coastal state rights and other lawful use of the sea must be expected.
The second principle is due regard.
Cable operations must be harmonized with fisheries, navigation, offshore energy, seabed mining, marine scientific research, environment protection, and coastal states regulatory interests.
Due regard, in my view should become the practical language of coexistence in crowded maim spaces.
The third is a domestic implementation.
In my view also, and it has been mentioned, states should give effect to Article 113 200 foot 15 through appropriate domestic law, which is missing currently, including panel rules, civil liability, repair facilitation, incident reporting, cable awareness, and coordination among competent authorities.
The fourth principle is the prevention and preparedness.
Protection should begin before damage occurs.
Cable route mapping, charting hydrographic information, ma advisories, anchoring controls, phishing awareness campaigns are essential preventive measures, and this is something what Australia mentioned in his intervention.
The FIP principle is repair facilitation.
A cable system is resilient only if repair is timely.
Streamlined permits, pre cleared emergency procedures, customs facilitation, access to repair vessels are central to continuity.
The sixth, the public private partners, which I just also mentioned, states cannot protect cables without industry, and industry cannot ensure resilience without states.
In my view, ITU is well placed to help us in this regard and we heard what DIG has to say.
As a member of the DIB of ITU, I can emphasize this principle because there is a possibility functional cooperation between the Digital Innovation Board of ITU and also the Smital advisory board which ITU has.
The second principle is evidence based responsibility.
Where damage occurs, states should cooperate in investigation.
Evidence preservation and legal assessment.
A Ambassador Fiberati mentioned, responsible attribution and accountability must be based on facts and not conjecture.
Last but not least is the capacity building.
Here, since we are talking about capacity building, developing states, small island developing states, archipelalogic states, they all have limited technical capacity.
They require legal, technical, and capital support.
Cable resilience in my view must not become a privilege of the already connected.
I am ps suspect because which is often missing in the norm and policy decent today.
We are building capacity to prevent reduce and control damages to the submine cable connected world.
These principles are not controversial.
These are constructive principles.
Therefore, I believe that working on these lines can really help us.
And to my colleague Mass Pipe, is this something what ILC can take it up in this long term afford? Thank you very much.
All right.
Thank you.
Any other questions, comments? Yes, please, my dear brother, vi.
Thank you very much.
I would like to thank co organizer of this important roundtable.
I would also like to thank you for moderating this important event.
Actually, I have a comment and one question.
The statistics highlighted by the ITU Deputy Secretary-General are both revealing and very informative and important.
As you rightly mentioned, statistics shows that approximately 90% of disruptions to submarine cables result from accidents or natural causes rather than deliberate actions.
This raises an important question.
If the overwhelming majority of incidents are unintentional, why do discussions in various forums, including this round table, focused predominantly on intentional or malicious threats? There appears to be a significant gap between the issues that account for most real world disruptions and the issues that receive the greatest attention in policy discussions.
In this regard, I would like to hear from the distinguished panelists and also keynote speakers on the reasons for this discrepancy.
What factors explain the imbalance between the actual causes of submarine cable disruptions and the focus of international discussions on this subject.
I thank you.
Would any of the panelists or distinguished keynote speakers wish to engage with the question of this excellent point raised.
I think as was alluded to that we have been living for a long time with natural phenomena such as submarine earthquakes or anchoring or fishing activities that have been disrupted.
What is the major difference and that's where I think the 90 95% or whatever is possibly might misguide us a little, is that the consequences of disruption of fiber optic cables and the like are so much huger You could say the societies most vulnerable to what we're discussing now are the ones who are most digitalized.
That's something which has changed totally.
You could say geoeconomics, geopolitics, security.
The interdependence, the common interests in protecting the system have become more visible than before.
So on the one hand, you could say, yes, the traditional ways of approaching disruption still apply.
It's one swift repairs that's expensive.
You can imagine that if you have several cases at the same time, costs are quite huge and you may imagine pooling among some parties to share expenses and things like that.
You have de risking because when we speak of cyber, it's data packets that might be sent at different points in time and which are assembled at some point.
The point was very validly made that it's not necessarily the cable, that is the problem and you have to take a more holistic approach to understand what the security implies in terms of understanding the infrastructure behind.
I would say the culprits are not necessarily cables.
The answer many states who have resources in terms of protecting their infrastructure would be de risking by thinking of backup route, having more cables, things like that.
There is an international cable Protection Committee, which represents a huge amount of resources in the private sector, which weren't really mentioned, but possibly is an interesting point.
I don't think it's necessarily surprising that we would a priori look at the malicious attempts at sabotaging critical infrastructure because the consequences now are so much huger than 20 years ago, even ten years ago.
We can just imagine in ten or 20 years time what it will look like.
I would certainly be among those who would say, an enormous amount of resilience is required, an enormous amount of sharing resources and being effective in repairing quickly.
Tim factor is key either for repairs or for detection or for analyzing whether behavior is suspicious.
I would say that the idea of identifying standards of behavior is absolutely key if we share those view of what standards are acceptable, it's a kind of due diligence which might be useful.
I'm not surprised that we look at the small percentage because that small percentage actually hides has so much huger series of consequences than we had imagined before.
Thank you.
If I may, I think, just add on, the escalatory potential with malicious conduct is huge.
With a natural disaster or an accident, usually there would be no threat of escalation where a country is the target of a malicious attack against its submarine cables.
Would not respond in the context of an accident or a natural disaster, but with purposeful attacks against submarine cables, there's an escalatory potential, and then the flip side is responsibility.
Again, with accidents, there's responsibility, of course, but it's a different type of responsibility and a different kind of response if the conduct is malicious and purposeful.
I can also see Dominique with her hand up, go ahead.
Thank you very much.
I think is a really interesting question.
I also think that the information shared in this regard was very interesting.
Just bringing a little bit of reflections on you know, cyber operations against the discussion on international city security related to subsidy cables or subsidy communication cables.
I think the framework for responsibility behavior also provides a lot of potential and not just thinking about, you know, specific cyber threats and responses under, for example, international law.
But I remember one of the first mentions, but one of the most prominent mentions to subsidy cables in the discussions in multilateral processes addressing ICT security was via small island state, raising the challenges faced by the state, a state that is strategically located and very key for the linkage of communication between countries.
The challenges facing in ensuring the reliability and the availability of this infrastructure, cable infrastructure that actually links and provide for communication for a range of countries.
I think this brings questions, of course, regarding cyber threats targeting critical infrastructure, infrastructures such as subs communication cables that was raised by other states, but also, um, the questions of, you know, cyber resilience of this infrastructure, the questions on other pillars of the framework, such as, um, you know, confidence building measures, the very specific, um, you know, way, um, that subsidy cables are not only, you know, developed, deployed, and operated, which involves, of course, um, many, uh, the private sector and industry and the need to cooperate between sectors as was mentioned before, potentially developing public private partnerships and so on and so forth, and absolutely questions about capacity building for ensuring resilience of this infrastructure.
So I think the conversation even when we think about the multilateral discussions on international ICT security, that the issue of S Cas was brought prominently in the agenda topic of potential and existing threats have a lot of issues to be discussed on the different pillars of the framework, thinking from resilience, confidence building, measure and capacity building.
Of course, I believe international law is key for this international cooperation that is needed because of the transnational nature of this infrastructure, including, um, development or interpretation on the application of international law to this type of cyber operations, but also other measures that may include cooperation in the sense of mutual legal agreements and so on and so forth.
I just wanted to add that on that point.
Five cover the so called normal incidents, maybe accidental destruction of submarine cables.
So that one will cover but the concerns is intentional malicious destruction or damage of submarine cables.
And there seems to be a general, I would say misunderstanding that Article 113 is the only provision that covers that and that it depends on the flag state.
Willingness to cooperate.
That's the main point we are discussing now.
We are not saying that this is the absolute rule and the flag state refused to cooperate, then we can do nothing.
No.
That's why we are here.
We have been building up some kind of legal reasoning to cope with that.
Then I've been teaching International Maritime IO law institute for years or law enforcement at sea.
I chose maybe now many hundreds of my students how to approach the issue.
You have to look carefully at the zone where the enforcement takes place, then, and then the facts, and then look carefully at the judgment of permanent Court of internal justice in the lotus case.
States can do anything unless it is prohibited.
By international law.
Now look at not only Lord Sea Convention, but other rules of international law, whether there is any kind of prohibition.
Now we are talking about is that is also the high sea for purpose of navigation.
I tell my students look carefully at the law case.
Bungling of oil and gas at sea, in one case, is prohibited for coastal state to arrest bungling ship.
In another case, it's okay and yet in another case, it's not okay.
Why? Because you look at the zone, the Hon, you're saying you're enforcing custom laws in E no.
But the same action, bungling of fishing vessels, but you say you are regulating sovereign rights to protect your fishing interests, yes, you can do that.
We come to submarine cable, how you frame your approach.
This is something.
Then the cyberattack is something that we spend a lot of time doing writing of Talen manual.
We also consider this possibility.
But we have to look at the manual is I think 600 page.
I cannot remember them all, but the point is the focus is on the so called the scale effect.
Scale how serious is this that caused to the affected state.
And then although it may be abstract, but the cyber something is distinguish it from cyber and kinetic attacks.
But cyber or it may have somehow firstly physical damage or just damage on information.
Distortion of data, something like that.
It also depends on scale effects.
I think we can look at it the way in which we can cope with this issue.
But my point is that here we need only not only look at the law, but also diplomacy.
Here it is very clear that called malicious destruction damage of submarine cables is caused by save ship flying the flag of state A, and then according to the so called Ku Fu Channel case I told you now have just calling the blub.
You should have known that your ship had been doing some damage, and if you are coming out to protect, then you ask them, why are you protecting this ship? Are you behind this? It's not only law, but you have to look at the way in which diplomacy also works.
Thank you.
Thank you, Judge.
We have 12 minutes to go.
I'll summarize the second set of questions into one question since we've covered already a lot of issues.
What about attribution? To everyone on the panel and our keynote speakers, short of a new instrument, what are the evidentiary standards, judicial mechanisms, or diplomatic processes that could realistically be used to close the attribution and enforcement gap? Premise is introducing possible answer to this question by saying that I think just going back to the fundamentals, the Los Convention is a fantastic instrument.
If you read the preamble, paragraph four, which states the key priorities, they start by mentioning a legal order that will facilitate international communication.
Quite a few have been reading that as meaning shipping.
I would claim that this includes and that is reflected throughout the convention in the freedoms of the high seas of laying and operating cables and pipelines.
I think if you look at and Val Patel referred to the issue of due regard, there are Article 58, et cetera requirements of due regard, which means that the international community has very valid reasons to think of how best to protect the freedom of the high seas that is so fundamental the international community with regard to those cases we've been talking about.
When that has been said, so I would not downsize or belittle the convention.
I think there's a structure there which is very, very persuasive.
The question then is how to fix the residual problems.
I think primarily they have to do with issues which are eminently practical.
How do you discover a problem? How do you detect a threat? How do you respond in real time? How can you build in terms of attributional evidence or what have you, a set of standardized steps through which you can go, a checklist of what would constitute reasonable behavior or totally maliciously presumptively malicious behavior.
I think with more cases, more cross fertilization and conversations of the kind we have here, I think we can very quickly coalesce around certain standards with regard to different kinds of vessels operating in different modes and forms.
I think this is a practical thing.
At the end of the day, when you refer to questions about attribution, I think they end up before domestic courts.
It's a question of how domestic legislation, how they project in a very concrete manner, a credible response to the practical issues of evidence that may arise.
I don't personally believe that we will fix this problem by adding more treaty language or trying to negotiate the protocol or something like that.
I think we have covered the enormous challenges in terms of time factor, resources, et cetera.
But if you don't have domestic legislation, which is up to it, you can talk about as much international cooperation as you wish, but it won't work.
You see, in my prepared notes, I also mentioned two doctrines that have been raised.
The first is the ethics doctrine of protracted Prins, which is being used by Estonia in this new draft Penal Code amendments.
Estonia is arguing that Submarine cables have substantial effect on national security and critical services.
So under general rule has international law, the so called protected principle, the affected state can exert jurisdiction over the vessel in question.
And the second argument has come up several times and has been discussed in the International Law Association report.
Is the so called passive personality principle when a crime pertains to the property of the coastal states nationals, private companies, then the coastal state has the so called the jurisdiction based on pass person to assert jurisdiction over the offending vessels.
So and then there are also American argument, but I'm not going to do that.
Maybe it's too far.
The so called constructive presence.
But I prefer not to go into that because it will create a lot of maybe you have a question.
Thank you.
You're welcome.
Thank you very much, doctor Hal, for moderating this important event.
Judge, by all means, we are very interested also in engaging further with regard to that case.
But first of all, to express the appreciation of the delegation of El Salvador to the organizers permanent Mission Thai, permanent Mission of Latvia and Ireland for this important event.
I just wanted to make a small remark on a point that doctor Hilal raised as well.
How do we address this diplomatic or multilateral intergovernmental processes.
Within the United Nations, I think there's also a key point to address with regard to synergy between processes.
It has been mentioned, of course, there is existing international law.
One of the main instruments that has been mentioned in this regard has been Us.
But of course, as you may know, I also draw your attention that not only that instrument is applicable, there's also a regime of customary international law that exists, particularly for non parties to that convention.
But drawing expensing more your attention to the political coordination, the policy coordination that is also being involved.
I think negotiations with the omnibus, for example, ocean Law of the Sea resolution should also be carefully in line or say in a very simple term played ear by ear with ongoing processes.
Of course, it has been addressed, the global mechanism that is currently undergoing.
Just to draw your attention that because there is international law.
Are regimes applicable, but what is failing is implementation.
How can we enforce implementation? How can we address, for example, communications through focal points established or how does, for example, the private sector also relate to government authorities in addressing these incidents that are caused not only, for example, for misconducts, but rather also natural disasters? That's the key question and I think it has to bear in mind in the synergy of the processes that within this organization delegates like myself, we are participating in.
But It's just a small comment and also to appreciate the panelists, our dear Dominic as well that U is a key partner as well in technical assistance in international law into cyberspace.
Just to express that small comment.
Thank you very much, doctor Hello once again.
We have 5 minutes and I have a closing question for everyone on the panel to build on what Ambassador Wolfina mentioned because you gave us a very specific concrete practical proposal, which is to have a checklist that assists with detection response, and to also legislate domestically to take effective measures to respond to these kinds of operations.
I'm going to assume that's your concrete solution.
Other colleagues on the panel, you each have 1 minute to come up with one recommendation that we can take before the end of 2026 to strengthen submarine cable security.
Go.
Harry.
I don't know how practical this is, but I think just a related point to what my good friend Lee was just saying is I think perhaps an aspect of the conversation that hasn't been brought out is just how we nest the discussion we're having in the broader discussion the UN is having on bridging digital divides.
There's a huge development and economic piece here, which we've been having for several years in the context of connectivity to the Internet, but now with the AI revolution that's taken on a whole new lens, and the UN obviously is now starting coming off the back of the Global Digital compact.
We will have the first global dialogue on AI in Geneva in a few weeks.
Um, I think that those of us who are participating in that discussion should just be conscious of talking about the importance of resilient infrastructure in assisting developing countries to reap the benefits that more connected economies already have and as part of that discussion to be thinking about some of these ideas, how can we ensure as You know, new cables are being laid as we're looking at connection points as we're thinking about supplementary capability through satellites.
Let's ensure that that's all done in a way that brings economic benefits, but also ensures, I think, security and resilience for those economies as well.
Thanks.
Super.
Thank you, Carolina.
Proposals.
One is that the IAB work concludes this year.
If we want to keep having a specific forum, maybe the member states should consider renew the mandate or amend it to meet what was discussed, the recommendations.
Of course, we will be very glad to have it renewed, but this is member states decision.
That's quick and easy.
Second one.
I think what you did here is important to keep doing, which is you brought two different areas of discussion.
I'm in between lawyers discussing not normative nor security, but bridging the discussions as well is quite important because we are always talking in silence, we have unclos, we have ITU, and these sometimes feel like different discussions, but they are not and we should keep doing that.
We also be presenting further on the highlights of the IEB next week on the Plus meeting.
I think we should all try and bridge these discussions and actually speak on practicalities.
Thank you.
Perfect Brigado.
Dominique, Thank you very much.
Sorry that I raised my hand, but I cannot see the room, so I didn't know if anyone was already want to take the floor.
On my side, I just wanted to mention that when we talk about the conversation on the application of international law in cyberspace and we can also think about the application of international law to cyber operations targeting subs cables, and one of the main tools that states have developed to share their views on how international in cyberspace and national positions and regional positions in this regard.
Some states have already begun addressing some aspects of submarine cables, international positions in international in cyberspace, some with regards to the law of neutrality, for example, some with regards to international humanitarian law and the notion of attack under IHL, and the importance of the nature of the target, including critical um, infrastructure, in the view of the states such as SC cables, some have raised the challenges identified by cyber operations going across different jurisdictions, and how these can challenge when we think about the implementation of sovereignty in cyberspace.
Some states have already started, including international positions, issues regarding submarine cables.
Thinking about moving forward and maybe not only for 2026 because these processes take a lot of time, usually, but moving forward also for states or regional organizations as well that are thinking on developing national positions of how international law applies in cyberspace to also considering these additional like legal interpretations that may portray submarine cables in their international regional positions.
This as well comes to the question on attribution that they didn't have the chance to answer.
Attribution of cyber operations, as we all know, is quite challenging and states include international positions, their interpretations on unleal attribution in particular and standards and how they standards, for example, that have been um, incorporated into the articles on the law of state responsibility developed by the International Law Commission can apply to, um, you know, uh, in cyberspace, as well.
Through these documents and the national positions, I think it's a good opportunity to address these issues and bring transparency on interpretation that can also, of course, fosters trust and confidence between states in the implementation of international law.
Thanks.
Last word, with the permission of our distinguished representatives of Latvia and Ireland, we'll give the judge the last word.
In this, I think in my presentation, I think there is the need for judicial guidance because you look at the allegations of fact under Article 113 to do so and so and they failed to do it, and now the international community just complained that they have not fulfilled their duties.
Why don't you bring the case to arbitration to it laws and then resettle the issue? In other words, bring the case to its laws and make sure I'm there to solve your problem.
And With that, thank you all for joining us and thank you to our distinguished sponsors, the Permanent Missions of Thailand, Latvia, Ireland, Unedir and Australia for sponsoring this event.
Thank you so much.