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Do Hung Viet (NPT) and Izumi Nakamitsu (UNODA), following the closing of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) - Press Conference

Press conference by Do Hung Viet, President of the Eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, following the closing of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Moderated by Suzanne Oosterwijk, Political Affairs Officer, UNODA.

Concluded · 54m 3 languages

Description

The Eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will be held at United Nations Headquarters in New York, from 27 April to 22 May 2026. The President-designate of the Eleventh Review Conference is Ambassador Do Hung Viet of Viet Nam.

The 2026 NPT Review Conference is expected to consider a range of issues, including the universality of the Treaty; nuclear disarmament, including specific practical measures; nuclear non-proliferation, including the promotion and strengthening of safeguards; measures to advance the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including safety and security; regional disarmament and non-proliferation, including the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East; measures to address withdrawal from the Treaty; and ways to strengthen the review process to improve its effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability, coordination and continuity. In doing so, the Conference will also take into account the evolving international security environment and recent developments affecting the Treaty and the broader nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The NPT entered into force in 1970 and was extended indefinitely in 1995. The Treaty is regarded as the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. It was designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to further nuclear disarmament and to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Conferences to review the operation of the Treaty have been held at five-year intervals since the Treaty went into effect in 1970. While States Parties have consistently sought to achieve consensus on an outcome document, doing so has become increasingly challenging in recent cycles.

Full transcript en transcript

Good evening, everyone.
My name is Suzanne Oosterwijk.
I'm with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.
Good evening.
It's good to see so many of you at this late hour at the United Nations headquarters where just now in the General Assembly Hall, the 11th Review conference of the parties to the Treaty on the non proliferation of nuclear weapons has concluded.
You are joined here today by Ambassador Viet, the president of the 11th Preview Conference, as well as by the Under Secretary-General and the High Representative for Disarnment Affairs, miss Izumi Nakamitsu.
You'll hear from President Viet about his reflections on the 11th Preview Conference and its conclusion and they will both take your questions after that.
Ambassador Viet, you have the floor.
Thank you very much and good evening.
I do apologize for keeping you here at this late hours of a Friday before the long weekend, by the way.
I am very grateful for the opportunity to serve as president of the 11th Review Conference of the NPT I am grateful to Under Secretary-General and High Representative for disarmament Affairs, miss Nakamitsu for joining us here today, but I'm extremely grateful for your and your team's support to me throughout the preparation and the proceedings of the conference.
It has been truly an honor and a great experience for me to work with you and your team, as well as everyone else here at the Secretariat.
And I have to say that I am disappointed that the review conference was unable to reach consensus on an outcome document and really seize this critical opportunity to make our world a safer place.
I at the same time, have to really appreciate the very sincere and meaningful engagement by states parties that they have engaged in the conference over the last four weeks.
We have had very good discussions, very honest reflection on the current situation, the state of the NPT, and what we can do to improve that.
In fact, those discussions have provided us with some very good substantive outcomes that unfortunately could not be adopted, but nevertheless are good outcomes.
The current international environment, which is really marked by deep tensions and an elevated risk posed by nuclear weapons demands very urgent action.
Throughout the conference, I have appealed to all states parties to continue to make full use of the available avenues for dialogue, for diplomacy, for negotiation, to come to an agreement and which I believe would have contributed significantly to reducing tensions, to lowering the nuclear risks, and contribute to the ultimate total elimination of the nuclear threat.
The NPT continues to be such a vehicle for us, and as the past four weeks have demonstrated, there is willingness to continue to engage constructively on these issues, even if there is no ultimate agreement.
But such engagement also highlights the value of NPT and multilaterlism as a whole.
The treaty continues to be the cornerstone of the global disarmament and nonproliferation regime and an essential element in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
A substantive outcome would have strengthened the treaty and advanced its objectives.
But in absence of such an outcome, I am concerned for the future health of the treaty.
To conclude my opening remarks, I would like to thank all of you for your engagement, for your very closely following the proceedings of the review conference.
As I said previously, the engagement of the press plays a very important role in this process because your reporting, your coverage helps inform the public and promotes transparency and accountability in this process.
I thank you very much for your continued engagement.
Thank you.
Thank you very much, Ambassador, for your opening remarks.
I will open up the floor.
I would ask you Excuse me so that we don't have to.
We'll take a step back.
I have a difficult question.
I just the other way around.
Excuse me, please.
Yes.
No, I just wanted to add, obviously, my first word is that of my sincere thank you, Mr.
President.
I think under your leadership and stewardship of these four marathon weeks, Um, I think all states parties really felt that it was a transparent and inclusive process, and everyone's perspectives have been listened to and really respected.
And then you did your incredible efforts and achievement indeed.
To reflect all these concerns and perspectives in a final draft document.
I think, looking at the number of people who came up and thanked you at the end of the conference, it really demonstrated that states parties were truly appreciative of your efforts, really tireless efforts, especially the last two, three days, I mean, the number of conversations, meetings behind the scenes diplomacy that took place.
Is I know it was extremely intense.
Thank you very much for the inclusive, transparent, and fair process that you have created and as a result, really, against the backdrop of extremely difficult tensions, I can still really say that the atmosphere amongst the states parties were that of a real momentum and keen interest to achieve an outcome document.
All these are really, truly, thanks to your efforts.
I just wanted to emphasize that.
Obviously, I am disappointed.
I share Mr.
President's concerns about the health of the regime.
Um, however, I think there are some real lessons that we really need to, meaning states parties and the international community at large, need to, um, learn some lessons.
I mean, number one, we have to really understand the need for, um, acceleration of disarmament commitments, reaffirmation of disarmament commitments.
It is indeed true that the name of the treaty is nonproliferation treaty.
But as we have always been talking about, Um, non proliferation and disarmament are two sides of the same coin, and it is simply wrong for nuclear weapon states to assume that nonproliferation obligations will be just, um, adhered to, without nuclear weapon states commitment and implementation of disarmament commitment under Article 6, obviously.
Um, and so this is a really serious lessons that we all collectively need to learn.
And therefore, there were some very good discussions that have taken place with regard to how to improve the accountability aspect.
We call it a strengthening of review process, and states part is all very actively engaged in putting up some new ideas about, how to enhance the accountability transparency aspects of the implementation of the commitments undertaken under this treaty.
Now, second thing I really wanted to emphasize is that of course, there was no consensus outcome, but we all need to remember that legal commitments or legal obligations under this treaty remain.
So we need to make sure that all states, especially nuclear weapon states, really understand it and then maintain their commitment and then really move to implement their commitments.
Safeguards will also continue.
It will have to be implemented, and of course, the peaceful use is another very important component of this treaty.
The three pillars still remain.
And states parties really need to remember this, that if they want to preserve this regime and prevent a further, um, um, decrease of confidence in this regime, then they need to really visibly make a commitment, take that commitment and then move to, um, um, implementation of those commitments.
So, These are really something that I wanted to add.
Obviously, as a member of the Secretariat, we don't criticize member states or states parties in the deliberations.
I also do believe that they all tried wholeheartedly to arrive at a consensus document.
They were not able to.
But going forward, they need to actually take this third time failure very seriously if they want to preserve this regime, and I really do say that keeping this amputee as a cornerstone of peace and security and nuclear order indeed is in the interest of all states parties, and so they have to get to work.
So the work starts, I think, tomorrow.
Maybe tonight we can rest for you.
Thank you very much.
Now that you have the opening remarks of both Ambassador Bet and the High Representative for Disarmment Affairs, it is time for all those difficult questions that I'm sure you have.
I'll open up the floor.
Again, I will ask you, please, whenever you are given the floor to please state your name and the outlet you're with, and I will start with miss Lederer.
Thank you.
Thank you very much on behalf of the United Nations Correspondence Association for doing this briefing, especially at this very late hour.
Ambassador the United States blamed Iran for blocking consensus.
Did Iran block consensus or did Anybody else block consensus? And to both of you, this is the third review conference in a row where there has been no outcome.
Um, I know Ambassador Viet just said that he's concerned about the future of the treaty.
Where does this leave the whole issue of trying to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and preventing a nuclear explosion.
Thank you.
Well, thank you very much.
But you know that it's past nine and I have not had dinner or anything since the croissant for lunch.
But no, thank you very much for that question.
No one blocked consensus because I understood that there was no consensus and I decided not to put the draft outcome document for a decision to be made.
Now, As a draft outcome document, it can go in many ways.
I had options that I can present a text that country A, I know will block consensus.
I can also present a text that is slightly tweaked, but will make a country B block the adoption.
Of course, there are other ways as well.
So I had to make the difficult decision not to present that document because I maintain my neutrality and I stick to my principle of balance, fairness.
And if anyone is to be blamed, then I would take that responsibility.
On the future of the NPT and of the world, I mean, I have said this from before the start of the conference that a third conference without an outcome would be disastrous for this regime because it will be what 16 years now that we have not seen the NPT community being able to come together and produce another commitment that we will abide by the treaty or we will work additionally to do more to implement the treaty.
We will need to wait at least five more years to see if we are able to reaffirm that commitment or take any further action to strengthen the regime.
In the meantime, a nuclear arms race is, I guess, in the horizon.
If not, we are already seeing it.
We are seeing the modernization of nuclear arsenals.
We are seeing the quantitative increase in some nuclear arsenals as well.
So and then, you know, the level of nuclear rhetoric, the tense international situation are all extremely worrying of risk of the use of nuclear weapons.
So I am concerned and I will continue to be so Um, and even though I jokingly said that the High Representative will start to work tomorrow and with me having now completed my job as the president of the conference.
But I think I will together with everyone else, all the states parties, continue to work with the aim of strengthening this regime because our future really depends on it.
Thank you.
Indeed, our work will need to restart.
Perhaps not tonight, but Monday Monday is a holiday, so Tuesday we will restart.
I know where to find you, so we will definitely pull you in.
But I mean, jokes aside, I think we really need to, um, um, galvanize, if you will, the world public opinion as well.
I think we are really in a trajectory of a very dangerous path.
The United Nations member states outside of the NPT, but some UN member states really understand that we are in a trajectory that could lead to a catastrophic consequences.
Um, and so the General Assembly, for example, have taken some actions just to give you an example, there is a new scientific panel, you know, that is analyzing the impact of potential nuclear war, with updated data, uh, et cetera, U.
So using all avenues inside and outside of MPT processes, we need to really reconstruct um, um, the understanding of what we are really faced with, and really reconstruct, um, uh, voices.
Let's get back to a path that is more sustainable peace rather than creating arms race dynamics.
Um, so we will need to reconstruct such efforts, and I will be definitely counting on all member states.
But in particular, those that have a keen interest in those issues, we will definitely create or recreate and strengthen our partnership with those states, and, of course, members of the media, a very important partner.
Ambassador Viet, a quick follow up.
In the fourth draft, there was one paragraph, paragraph 15 that remained in brackets indicating there was no consensus.
Did since that draft came out early today, was there any movement on that paragraph during the day? That paragraph was bracketed because I, at the time of issuance of that document, believed still that there was an opportunity to find a solution to that paragraph before presenting it for adoption.
So I engaged in consultations throughout the day and you may have noticed that the plenary was postponed until 5:00 P.M.
All that time was used really to try and find a solution.
I am also very grateful for the many efforts that was assisting in the background as well.
But unfortunately, all those efforts did not come to fruition and we still could not achieve consensus.
Now, at the same time, there may have been you know, other difficulties as well.
It may not have been apparent because the brackets were not visible, but there were also at the same time in the background, some other discussions going on as well.
Thank you.
Yes, please.
Thank you for the hard work over the four weeks of meeting.
This is the SG Masoo of on News.
So is it correct to understand the paragraph 15 was the main reason the outcome document could not be put forward for adoption? It was a very important reason.
Thank you.
Yes, please.
Thank you very much for the debriefing.
I am Mun Auri Delco Abi.
My question is for you, Mr.
Ambassador, with no consensus reached here, how does that affect the effort to create a nuclear free zone in the Middle East concretely? Thank you.
Well, the efforts to create a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East is enshrined in the 1995 resolution.
So it will continue to be implemented throughout the review cycles.
I understand at the same time that there are United Nations conferences on the establishment of such a zone and such efforts will also continue.
The draft that was available, as you may have seen, also had some good paragraphs on reaffirming the commitment to the implementation of the 1995 resolution and also acknowledging the progress that had been made in the UN conferences.
Um, so, my understanding that these efforts will continue, um, but when that would come to fruition is a big question for states parties to, uh, uh, continue to discuss and, uh, find a solution to.
Thank you.
Out here in front, please.
Thank you, Ambassador.
Ayo Tanaka from the As chamber.
Thank you very much for this briefing late night.
This is important.
So I want a clarification on the follow up beyond the Kyoto's question.
Let me ask you in a different way.
Did you have a consensus? Was there a consensus in all the other paragraphs other than the OP 15? That's my first question.
And the second question, let me ask you a which state parties that was in dispute over the OP 15? Was it only the US and Iran or any other parties that couldn't agree on? The well, I mean, the document, if it is to be adopted, will have to be seen as a whole, as a package.
So it is not possible to say that paragraph A, D and H had consensus.
And at the same time, The reason for not having consensus may also have been the absence of something in the document.
So I cannot really say that, you know, apart from one paragraph, everything else was agreed.
That I don't think it would be accurate to say.
Secondly, on paragraph 15, it was dependent on how the draft would have been presented.
To know who would be the one that would break the consensus.
Um, during the discussions, someone used this way to express sentiments.
There are things that you don't like, but you can live with.
There are also some things that you cannot live without.
So if you have a particular interest in one issue and you do not see it appear in the document, it may also lead to a decision not to join the consensus.
But on the other hand, there will be countries that would not be able to join consensus if they see a particular issue appear in the document.
That was the situation we were in when it comes to this outcome document.
Thank you, please.
The first question for you after nearly four weeks, how OT assess the level of engagement and political will shown by states parties throughout this review conference? The second is, do you see any area or action that state parties could still further their engagement in order to advance on three key pillars of the NBT? Thank you.
Thank you.
I think there was very active engagement amongst the states parties.
There was a level of constructiveness in that process.
There was a high level of political will, a strong determination to work towards a consensus outcome document.
And there was a real spirit of flexibility and compromise throughout the process, that led us to where we were, I would say last night.
Unfortunately, that political will was not enough to push it crossing the finish line.
Um On your second question, I think if this outcome document could have been adopted, there would have been some very positive concrete actions that SAS parties, especially the nuclear weapon states could take and would take.
For example, if you look at the draft outcome document, there's a paragraph stating that the nuclear weapon states in implementing their Article 6 obligations, would engage substantially in dialogues to ease tension, to build confidence and leading to future arms control discussion.
This is a significant step forward or would have been a significant step forward if the outcome document was adopted.
The second example is also, again, a commitment by the nuclear weapon states that they would be engaging in discussions on measures to reduce the risks of the use of nuclear weapons.
Again, this would have been a major step forward.
My hope is that the nuclear weapon states would still, despite the lack of a consensus outcome document, would still engage with each other to implement these commitments because it is something for the nuclear weapon states to do.
They have agreed to those measures and even without the outcome document of this conference, it is my hope and my expectation that they will still engage in implementing those commitments.
Thank you, A, and then thank you miss Isamit.
My name for your hard work.
My name is a from Kildes.
I have two questions.
One is a follow up question by Ku Tana from As ship.
It's about paragraph 15.
So you didn't mention which country criticized or have complained about 15 countries.
So we understand I and the US how about the other countries which country? That's the first question.
Well, I would refrain from listing all the countries.
I think it would be unfair to do so because there are also many other issues that, you know, have created a lot of difficulties throughout the process as well.
Thank you.
So I have a second question.
So it's about the transparency.
So as I know, so you emphasize the transparency, but how about the final week? So some countries criticize saying it lacked transparency.
So what do you think about that, especially for the final week? Transparency has been one of the important approaches that I have taken for this conference, starting from when I assumed my job as the president designate of the conference, I have engaged in extensive consultations with states parties, with the civil society, and to listen to everyone throughout that process.
During this conference, most of the meetings have been done in an open, um, status with webcast.
In the final week, given the very difficult discussions that was going on, many states parties felt that they would be more comfortable discussing the details which were in many cases relating to their security interests, to have those discussions only amongst states parties.
I thought it would be appropriate to hold the conference in such a manner.
I don't know what other states parties have complained about when they say complain about transparency.
But I mean, I think it can be said that this has been one of the most transparent review conferences that we have had.
The fact that there were not many meetings going on in parallel also, I believe, contributed because people can follow the meetings, much more easily and be able to follow virtually all the conferences, even if you are one person delegation or if there is only one representative from your agency, for example.
Thank you very much.
Also, this is the Kaldo News reporter.
I'm a Massa author from Tokyo.
I have two questions.
One is regarding North Korea.
Rave two has had two sentences for two para hates for a paragraph for North Korea, but Rave three degrees into one paragraph, and then R four is no progress from the North Koreans.
Do you have any concern about this type of dilution might send a wrong message to a North Korean and also Mr.
Putin, who is a coborator of the potential North Korean strengthening of the nuclear powers? That's my first question.
Also second question is a humanitarian consequences issue.
Also from Lab three to Lab four, I could find a huge dilution of the impact caused by the nuclear weapon war or nuclear weapon use, any use or the use of nuclear weapons.
If you can, could you a little bit elaborate about what kind of background negotiation discussion has been going on for past two or three days? Thank you very much, President.
Thank you.
How long are we staying here for? Well, as you said, it was two or three days.
It wasn't only two or three days.
It was 2.5 weeks of negotiation.
I will try to condense that maybe two or 3 minutes.
But again, it's the results of intensive negotiations, and it is the result of trying to find a middle ground for opposing opinions on all these issues.
When you say dilution, dilution is compared to a very ambitious first draft.
I mean, if I started with something that looks like a ref four, I don't think you would complain about dilution.
It is a result of a process of negotiations.
Secondly, Why did an issue like the DPRK not appear in rev four? You may have noticed that rev four was streamlined to be about half the size of the zero draft or the previous versions.
It would not do justice to these extremely complex issues if we would only have a line to talk about that.
Um, these are very, very complex issues.
They require space to be able to, you know, set the context, set the nature of the issue, and then what we or the international community has been doing, what has been the reaction, what has been the result so far, and what challenges remain.
So we cannot do that in one line.
Unfortunately, it was my call to make that these issues, had to be removed for the space of the more general issues that relates to the three pillars of the conference.
It is a very difficult judgment call, but with an attempt to get to consensus, I had to do that.
Sorry, ambassador, I have a question for you.
Cudi Yoshida F Nik, thank you so much to you both for doing this press conference.
I'd like to ask you again about the last couple of hours for the meeting.
You said that there was a potential solution.
Could you speak to us about what that potential solution was, and when did you realize that that was not going to be a feasible option? And then a second question I have is you ultimately decided not to put the document to a decision.
What was your thinking for that? Why did you think that was beneficial for the treaty as a whole to take that stance? The last few hours was an attempt by me to talk to all delegations that were directly involved and related in this particular issue.
I did try to produce some textual changes to the draft outcome document.
It ranges from changing the text to the placement of some of the paragraphs to be more amenable to both sides.
But I think at about 4:00 P.M.
4:30 P.M.
I felt that we were not able to find that consensus.
Now, I think I mentioned earlier, I had several options to put a text out that country A is determined to block consensus or to put a text that I know a country B is determined to block consensus.
I thought that it would be unfair to both A and B to be put in a position that they would have to block the outcome of the conference.
And then be blamed for the failure of the conference.
I decided that the best course of action was, in fact, not to present it so that, again, if there is any blame, it would be on the office holder of the conference rather than any particular state party.
Thank you.
There are still a few more questions in between our distinguished guests dinner.
Please.
Just a short question.
Thank you very much Ambassador.
I'm Desk Pro.
Do you have any idea of the reform of the NPD process and the format to avoid consecutive failure? Have you ever considered it's time to reconsider consensus? Before starting this review conference, I had a lot of discussions, including with the previous chairs, the previous presidents of the review conference, and the Secretariat and many states parties, asking them exactly the question that you were asking.
And from all the discussions that I had, I thought it was important to try and change the way we work.
I did do many of those changes, even though they may seem to be minor, but still quite important.
For example, putting a time limits on statements, allowed more time for interactive discussion.
I also introduced the zero draft of the outcome document much earlier on in the middle of the second week of the conference, which allowed states parties to have 2.5 weeks to discuss, to try and find compromise solutions to the outcome document.
Uh, which unfortunately, we could not find, but still allowed for very in depth discussions on very specific issues, you know, through all three pillars of the NPT.
And, you know, the way the transparent way it was conducted, I think, also helped in terms of creating or informing the public of the process, and getting the public engaged as well in the process.
So I think these, uh, Well, dare I say innovations have created a much more engaging atmosphere, a more constructive atmosphere in the conference, and a more frank discussion in the process.
If I have to choose one thing that I'm most pleased with, I would choose the methods of work that I have been able to introduce.
Um, the outcome document, if adopted, would have institutionalized these changes in the strengthening review process section.
But I at the same time hope that the next president may see that as a good way forward for the review conference to consider.
There are also other proposals by a group of state parties, for example, cutting shorter the review conference or having only two prep coms instead of three.
Um, so it's again, an issue that states parties would discuss in the future review cycle.
Thank you.
This is F.
I'm with Sopa News located in Hiroshima, Japan.
As I came all the way from Hiroshima, could you please allow me to ask a few questions? First, clarify what time did you provided the outcome document, I believe before? Re, I believe, was sent out at midnight.
Yes.
It's yesterday midnight how do I say it? 0 hours of the 22nd of May 2026.
Great.
Thank you for detailed information.
The management of your meeting several few other people already asked those questions.
So I would like to ask, do you have any regret or anything that you do differently if you have if you can go back to one month before? I think I would need some more reflections on that.
At this stage, I do not have any regret in the way that the conference was organized or the way that I have managed the negotiations, the way I have worked on the draft outcome document.
I may have some regrets later.
I will tell you then, but at this stage, I do not.
Some people say underground a private meeting is supposed to be start from the beginning or the middle of the meeting.
But you still think your way of doing that in the last week would be an ideal way.
Well, we didn't have any underground meeting because our conference rooms were all above ground.
Do I think that more private meetings would have helped? I don't think so because, At the stage of, you know, making general statements, I think states parties also wanted an opportunity to express their views to the world, and to their domestic public.
So no, I wouldn't do anything differently, um, I do appreciate your way of thinking.
Thank you.
My final question is that as for PP 15, you mentioned that you thought you think about the solution to solve PP 15 disagreement.
Did you think about avoiding the reference to IN on that part? Yes, I did.
But as I said, you know, all options, risked being blocked anyway.
So yes, I mean, the options was thought of, yes.
Thank you very much.
This is Sosa Husa from the Asahishi European Bureau.
I have one question, both of you.
What would you say to Hibakusha if they were here in front of you both with no outcome, especially for miss Nakamitsu.
I know you have been working really closely with Hiba Kushi.
What I will say is that indeed it is absolutely disappointing.
But I would like to really emphasize that from the United Nations, we would not give up.
The slogans these days at the United Nations is that we just don't give up.
We will continue.
We will, as I said, reconstruct our efforts.
I think we have to really learn the lessons also from those experiences, and then try to think of a way that will really increase the political will and political commitment and engagement of states parties.
I think that's the only way.
I must say, While, of course, NPT is the cornerstone, this is the only instrument that legally binds nuclear weapon states, but there are other nuclear disarmament related processes.
One is also coming up later this year, TPNW's first review conference.
That's just another example, but we need to utilize all other available processes to make sure that we will be able to reconstruct our efforts.
Maybe we should be creating something else.
I mean, I'm already thinking about what should we do at the first committee later this year, given that NPT could not produce consensus outcome, the first committee is able to create mandates.
We need to actually think about those all available means and we would not give up.
That would be my message.
No, I fully share with what miss Nakamitsu mentioned.
For me, I had the opportunity to hear the stories of the Hibkusa for the first time 21 years ago when I was part of the UN disarmament Fellowship program and visited Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and again, had the opportunity to hear from them and to meet with them in person um, last year, when I attended the 80th commemoration of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.
Now, You know, hearing those stories and seeing those images in the museum in Hiroshima was something at the same time, quite personal to me.
You know that I come from a country that has suffered decades of devastating wars, and we are still feeling the consequences 50 years after the war ended from unexploded remnants of war.
To those victims of Agent Orange.
So, you know, I would not dare to compare the level of suffering in any way, but I really felt that I could feel the pain and the agony that they had to go through and still are going through.
That really gave me the determination to work and try to bring some outcome from this conference, which I believe would have been a great tribute to those survivors.
Unfortunately, we could not deliver.
But if you have a look at the draft outcome document, there is a paragraph in there talking about the importance of raising awareness of education so that next generations will remember and will understand, will know the humanitarian consequences of the use of a nuclear weapon.
I think that work will continue despite the absence of an outcome document of this review conference.
I think Japan has been doing a great job in that sense, but it is work to be continued to be done to continue to tell those stories to the world.
Thank you so much.
Thank you very much.
I see no more requests for the floor, which means I would like to sincerely thank our distinguished speakers, Ambassador yet, and the Highpresentative for Disarmment Affairs.
This concludes our press briefing, and I do hope for everyone in the room, this marks the start of your weekend.
Thank you.

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