(17th meeting) Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

The 17th plenary meeting of the 2026 Review conference of the parties to the Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is called to order.
I will now turn to the consideration of the substantive part, Part one of the draft final document titled Implementation of the Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons for its 12th review cycle as contained in document NPT slash 2026 slash CRP slash rev four, which was circulated last night.
This document reflects my best effort to capture the range of views expressed across the treaties three pillars, nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, as well as the strengthened review process.
It is the product of weeks of intensive engagement and of a review cycle built on years of preparatory work.
To that end, I want to acknowledge the effort and the constructiveness that all delegations have brought to that process.
In my approach to this document, I have sought to be inclusive, to be available to delegations, and to look forward and pursue new approaches to the drafting and the structure of the text, as well as to its contents.
And I have endeavored throughout to ensure that all perspectives were given due consideration.
I can assure you that the document before you is a genuine attempt to find common ground.
As I said at the start of this conference, my goal was to make everyone equally unhappy.
In that, I think we can all agree that I had made some progress towards that goal.
I have now put forward four versions of the draft outcome document, all of which have been painstakingly revised in line with states parties wishes.
Despite our best efforts, however, it is my understanding that the conference is not in a position to achieve agreement on its substantive work.
Given that this is now apparent, I do not intend to put the document forward for adoption as the conference is not in a position to achieve agreement.
I will not open the floor for statements at this stage.
Delegations have had the full opportunity throughout this conference to present their positions.
If any delegation wishes to speak, I would ask that it do so after the conference has finished its procedural business.
Distinguished delegates, to my deep regret, this conference was not able to reach consensus.
Accordingly, I propose the following language to the section, conclusions and Recommendations of the conference in the document NPT slash 2026 CRP three.
Despite intensive consultations, the conference could not reach agreement on the substantive part part one of the draft final document as contained in document NPT slash 2026 slash CRP two slash rev four.
At its 17th plenary meeting on 22, May 2026, the conference adopted the procedural part of the draft final document on the organization and work of the conference as contained in document NPT slash 2026 slash CRP three as orally amended.
May I take it that the conference wishes to adopt the section entitled Conclusions and Recommendations of the Conference.
It is so decided.
May I now ask if the conference is willing to adopt the procedural report, part two of the draft final document as contained in NPT slash 2026 slash CRP three.
May I take it that the conference wishes to proceed accordingly? It is so decided.
This brings us to the end of the conference.
Distinguished delegates.
It has been my greatest honor to serve you as your president for this review conference.
I have been proud to help steer you all as we attempt as an international community to grapple with some of the most challenging issues of our time.
The threat posed by nuclear weapons is a collective one and it demands a collective response.
Over the course of the last four weeks, I have been privileged to see you seek to achieve that.
I have seen that delegations do share the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, a world in which the threat of nuclear war does not hang over our heads or those of our children, even if we differ on how to reach that goal.
But if we cannot agree on which road to take, we will never arrive at our destination.
I am increasingly convinced that the real threat lies not in continuing to drive in circles, but in reaching a dead end.
Given the current state of the world, one filled with conflicts, growing mistrust, and a lack of dialogue, we were able to come together and speak.
We shared our views frankly and honestly.
We found new areas of common ground and of shared concern.
It may not have been enough, but it was not nothing.
It has been a pleasure to listen to your diverse views, your passionate advocacy, and watch your clear headed diplomacy.
If we did not achieve an outcome, it was not for the lack of trying.
The NPT is an old treaty.
Its mechanics have not been updated in about 26 years.
At that age, even some of the best machines can start to creak.
Perhaps the loudest and the most shared call I hear from states parties in the lead up to the conference was the importance of breathing fresh life into the treaty, of seeking to find ways to blow off the dust and try innovative ways of improving its implementation.
Process is not substance, nor is it political will.
The latter two are essential to the full implementation of states parties obligations under the treaty.
That said, good process enables good dialogue, which leads to better understanding and better results.
That is the approach that I have taken to this review conference to listen to your ideas on how to make this treaty fit for purpose in a rapidly changing world.
I have tried to live up to my promise to create an inclusive, transparent, and efficient conference.
We have held fewer meetings, negotiated text much earlier, and by and large done so in the open.
I have done this because states parties asked for it.
Some measures I have taken have been successful and some experiments might not warrant a successor.
Nevertheless, I'm very proud of the way we have conducted this conference.
I would like to express my sincere appreciation to delegations for their willingness to be flexible, to try new things, and to compromise even on issues they felt were not simply important, but that went to the heart of their national positions.
I am grateful for that spirit of compromise.
The NPT is unique in that it brings together every issue related to nuclear weapons.
It marries national and global security with development and advances in science and technology.
We call it the cornerstone for a reason, but even cornerstones succumb to erosion.
In 2031, when we are expected to meet the next time, we will pass the mark of 20 years without an agreed substantive outcome to this conference.
This treaty cannot be taken for granted without tending, even this all work will eventually come undone.
That is our responsibility as states parties to make sure the NPT endures, at least per Article 6, until it is no longer needed.
Between now and the first meeting of the next review cycle, I hope that states parties will heed my advice and seek to bolster, refresh, and reinvigorate this treaty as a central tool in addressing modern threats.
I thank you for this opportunity, and I need to express my sincerest appreciation to the chairs of the main committees and their subsidiary bodies, Ambassador Samuel Yao Kumar of Ghana, who chairs Main Committee one and subsidiary Body one, Ambassador Khadat Omarov of Kazakhstan, who chairs Main Committee two and subsidiary B two.
Ambassador Peka Businen of Finland, who chaired Main Committee three and substitute B three.
My appreciation also goes to the chair of the Credentials Committee, Ambassador miss Krooto Godoy Calderon of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, and to all those that facilitated various aspects of our consultations.
Finally, I would like to thank the Secretary-General of the Conference, the staff of the Secretariat of the conference and the IAEA, the interpreters, the conference services, conference room officers, the documents officers, the security officers, the translators, and the many more Secretariat staff working behind the scenes to assist us during our work.
Their patience and cooperation were much appreciated.
This concludes the business of the conference.
I shall now invite those states parties wishing to make final statements to do so.
I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States.
Thank you, Mr.
President.
We deeply regret that we could not adopt an outcome today.
Nevertheless, we should try to salvage some small outcome.
We would respectfully move to transfer paragraphs 37 through 43 from the draft outcome document on strengthening the review process into a separate decision.
While we did not think the text therein was perfect, specifically, we believe interactive discussions on nuclear weapon state national reports should be in an open format and not a closed format.
We do think there are things in there worth saving.
Thank you, Mr.
President.
I thank the distinguished representative of the United States for the proposal.
I now give the floor to Indonesia, the distinguished representative of Indonesia.
No.
Mr.
President, I have the honor to speak on behalf of the group of the non aligned state parties to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.
The group wishes to express its appreciation to you and your team for your tireless efforts and dedication in guiding us during the preparation and commencement of the 11th NPT Review Conference.
The group has engaged constructively throughout this process, including through statements and working papers to ensure the conference adopted a balanced outcome.
In this regard, the group regrets that the review conference was unable to reach consensus on an outcome document, despite the concerted efforts and constructive engagement by the group.
The group further regrets that the review conference was unable to reach consensus on the final outcome document due due to the continued lack of flexibility demonstrated by the nuclear weapon states.
The unwillingness to engage constructively on longstanding commitments and core issues of concern to the majority of states parties hindered the possibility of achieving a balanced and forward looking outcome.
This situation is particularly troubling as it undermines confidence in the review process and raises questions regarding the commitment of the nuclear weapon states to the full and effective implementation of the treaty.
The group wishes to underline that the inability of the review conference to reach consensus on an outcome document represents a missed opportunity and risks weakening the full balanced and effective implementation of the treaty.
Group stresses that these consecutive setbacks underscore the urgent need to renewed political will and genuine engagement by all states parties to uphold the integrity and credibility of the review process.
The group would like to emphasize the continued validity of all commitments and the unequivocal undertakings assumed by the nuclear weapon states at the 1995 Review and extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review conferences.
Finally, we continue to underscore the fundamental importance of the full, effective and non discriminatory implementation of the obligations under the treaty, in particular those relating to nuclear disarmament.
In this context, the group calls for the full implementation of all commitments and the unequivocal understakings assumed by the nuclear weapon states from previous review conferences to accomplish the disarmament of their nuclear arsenals leading to the total irreversible and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons.
Mr.
President, allow me now also to make a short statement in my national capacity.
Indonesia had come to this review conference with the positive spirit.
We wanted this conference to succeed and the review process to demonstrate that states parties could still preserve a minimum common ground on nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful uses.
Regrettably, that has not been possible.
Indonesia regrets that this review conference is once again unable to adopt a substantive outcome.
This failure is not for lack of efforts by the president.
Nor is it for lack of flexibility by non nuclear weapon states.
Non nuclear weapon states, the bargain of the NPP is clear.
We have accepted the most far reaching nonproliferation obligations.
In return, we expect the serious, credible and measurable implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations, as well as respect for the inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
This balance cannot be maintained if disarmament commitments are constantly deferred, qualified, or weakened while nonproliferation expectations continue to expand.
Indonesia also stresses that the absence of an agreed outcome today must not be interpreted as the erosion of past commitments, neither to lower the bar of ambition for the treaty.
Indonesia remains committed to the full, effective, non discriminatory and balanced implementation across all three pillars, but commitment also requires honesty.
If the NPP is to remain credible, nuclear weapon states must demonstrate greater flexibility, greater transparency, and greater seriousness in implementing the disarmament obligation.
We thank you once again, Mr.
President, for your leadership, fairness, and perseverance.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Indonesia Before giving the floor to the next speaker, I would like to remind the conference that the time limits for statements by delegations speaking in the national capacity is 5 minutes and 8 minutes on behalf of groups.
I would also invite delegations to respond to the proposal made by the United States to consider a decision on the paragraphs on strengthening the review process.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Brazil.
Mr.
President, Brazil is thankful to you and to your team for your efforts to steer us through challenging times for the NPT.
Brazil deeply regrets that the 11th Review Conference of the treaty was unable to adopt a final document.
This outcome is particularly disappointing at a time when the NPT, the cornerstone of the global disarmament and nonproliferation regime faces mounting pressures.
The treaty durability depends on a carefully constructed balance of rights and obligations.
That balance, however, is increasingly strained by the absence of tangible progress on nuclear disarmament.
The continued modernization and expansion of nuclear arsenals and the growing role assigned to nuclear weapons in security doctrines and arrangements.
Mr.
President, We are concerned that commitments painstakingly negotiated and collectively endorsed in previous review cycles are increasingly treated as optional reference rather than agreed objectives.
Substantive engagement is indispensable, but it cannot be presented as a substitute for implementation.
Dialogue alone cannot replace concrete measurable action.
Brazil regrets that the conference was unable to reaffirm with the necessary clarity, the deep concern at a catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any nuclear weapons.
These consequences are neither theoretical nor contingent.
They are devastating, transboundary, and enduring, any doctrine that continues to rely on nuclear weapons must be assessed against this reality.
We are further concerned that divisions among nuclear weapon states have too often overshadowed the interests of the broader membership and the collective objectives of the treaty.
So long as the security of some continues to be predicated on nuclear weapons, insecurity will persist for the vast majority of states.
Mr.
President, failure to adopt a final document must not be understood as a reason for paralysis.
On the contrary, it should serve as a call to restore credibility to the review process and to the treaty itself.
The NPT entrenches a restriction whereby five states retain nuclear weapons while all others are bounded to renounce them, a distinction that was accepted in the expectation of measurable progress towards disarmament.
The sustainability of the treaty depends on addressing this imbalance with seriousness and urgency.
Brazil remains committed to working with all state parties to strengthen the NPT, uphold its integrity, and advance the shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.
Thank you, Mr.
President.
I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Kazakhstan speaking on behalf of a group of state parties.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr.
President.
Distinguished delegates, I'd like to deliver this statement on behalf of Central Asia states, namely Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and my own country, Kazakhstan.
At the outset, we'd like to express sincere appreciation to you, Ambassador Du Hong Kut for your dedicated leadership, patient, and tireless efforts throughout this complex review conference.
We also thank the chairs of main committees, Ambassador Samuel Yokuma of Ghana, Ambassador Kartama of Kazakhstan, and Ambassador Pekpusin Norf Finland, the Secretariat and all delegation for their constructive engagement and spirit of cooperation.
This review conference took place at a particularly difficult moment for international peace and security.
Deepening geopolitical tensions, growing mistrust, and the continued erosion of arms control architecture have significantly complicated our collective work.
Against this backdrop, preserving integrity, credibility, and functionality of the NPT remains more important than ever.
Our discussions over the past weeks clearly demonstrated both the continued centrality of the NPT and the persistence of serious differences on issues related to nuclear disarmament, global and regional security safeguards and humanitarian concerns.
Central Asia states regret that despite extensive consultations and considerable efforts undertaken before and throughout the conference, state parties were ultimately unable to reach consensus on the outcome documents.
At the same time, we believe it is important to recognize the substantial work carried out during this review cycle and continued collective commitment of state parties to preserving the review process and maintaining the NPT as a cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.
The inability to reach consensus should not be interpreted as a weakening of the treaty itself.
Rather, it reflects the broader challenges facing the international security environment and the growing difficulties confronting multilateral diplomacy in the field of arms control and disarmament.
Mr.
President, Central Asia region remains firmly committed to strengthen the NPT, preserving multilateralism and promoting pragmatic, balanced, and constructive international dialogue.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Kazakhstan.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Philippines speaking on behalf of a group of states parties.
Thank you, Mr.
President.
I have the honor of delivering this statement on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or Asean.
Asean is proud that a member of Asean has stepped up and assumed the important role of president of the 11th NPT Review Conference.
This clearly has not been an easy task, and we extend our sincere gratitude for your leadership, unwavering commitment to the review process and for your steadfast guidance.
We deeply appreciate the tireless and good faith efforts you and your team have devoted to inclusive consultations drafting several iterations of the outcome document and trying to forge common ground with a view to achieving consensus.
While you succeeded in bringing many divergent views together, there were a small number of difficult and divisive issues that were not susceptible of convergence.
Rather than widen these divisions and deepen these disagreements further, and rather than cast doubts on issues where there has been consensus, we believe your decision is the correct course of action.
While Aciandragts that, despite sustained efforts, this review conference was not able to adopt a consensus document, we support your decision and see it as the best that can be done under the circumstances.
Asean therefore expresses its full support for your decision.
We reiterate our deep concern over the growing risks of nuclear danger and conflict, for the expansion and modernization of nuclear arsenals, the increasing salience of nuclear weapons in military and security doctrines, as well as the weakening of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation architecture.
We had hoped that this review conference could pave the way for state parties to produce a clear and balanced roadmap that will enable full and effective implementation of the NPT, particularly Article 6, as well as the commitments and undertakings agreed to during the past review conferences to redouble efforts to protect its credibility and integrity, to implement the 13 practical steps in the 64 point action plan through a much desired, meaningful, consensual outcome document.
Mr.
President, Asean underscores its commitment to the goal of the total and complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
Progress in disarmament and nonproliferation can only be achieved through strengthened multilateral cooperation in the full and effective implementation of obligations under international law.
Importance of multilateral cooperation cannot be overstated and Asean will continue to contribute actively to the evolving discourse and action at the United Nations and other relevant fora.
While I have the floor, Mr.
President, I would like to speak on my national capacity regarding your request to comment on the proposal to keep 37 to 43.
Like the Philippines, would like to support this.
We see efforts at transparency, not as a competition and seeing who is more transparent than the other.
Nor do we see it as creating any traps for anybody.
But we do believe that it is an important step towards realizing Article 6 when you start with transparency, and it's also an important confidence building measure.
We also see that it's very important that we look at this strategically towards the next review cycle, that if we are able to have agreement at least on transparency, this will no longer burden the discussions going into the next review cycle.
In fact, it will be more an implementation of the requirements of the provisions of the part on strengthening the review process.
We would be implementing this in the next review cycle.
For these reasons stated, Mr.
President, we support the proposal to separate 37 to 43 as a distinct and standalone decision.
Thank you very much.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Philippines speaking on behalf of Asean.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of South Africa.
Thank you, Mr.
President.
South Africa associates itself with the statements that has been delivered by the non L movement and that will be delivered by the New Agenda Coalition and the African Group.
We express our appreciation to you and your delegation for the manner in which you steer the 11th Review Conference.
We commend you for your sterling leadership of the process and your willingness to engage all delegations in efforts to have a meaningful outcome.
Your openness and transparency created a conducive opportunity during the conference for us as state parties to engage on the implementation of the treaty and the steps that have to be taken going forward for its full realization.
As you said in your opening remarks, good process means good dialogue, and you indeed facilitated a good process.
Mr.
President, we have unfortunately reached the end of the 11th Review conference with an outcome document that lacks consensus.
We have thus failed to agree to a common approach to advance the purposes and objectives of the treaty.
We support the decision you have taken to approach the lack of consensus on the outcome document.
Notably, this is the third consecutive failure of the review conference to adopt an outcome.
We remain deeply concerned that failure to adopt an outcome document is becoming normalized.
Once again, we find ourselves at an impasse where we are unable to reach agreement on the fundamental issues and concerns consistently raised by the majority of states parties.
The persistent implementation gap between the disarmament and non proliferation obligations continues to erode confidence in the grand bargain of the treaty.
It must be emphasized that the treaty obligations are to be fulfilled by all states parties in accordance with its provisions and without reinterpretation, conditionalities, and reservations.
We regret to note that our deliberations of the cause of the RevCon has revealed an unbalanced expectation by certain states on implementation of some of the pillars of the treaty and not others.
The security concerns of the nuclear weapon states are prioritized as if non nuclear weapon states, in particular, those of us that do not rely on nuclear weapons are less important.
Lack of progress on all pillars, specifically nuclear disarmament by those states possessing nuclear weapons makes the implementation of this treaty unbalanced.
It is worth reflecting that the non nuclear weapon states took the undertaking to join the treaty and made a solemn commitment to the obligations of the treaty on the understanding that the states parties adhere to the implementation of the treaty and advance collective security.
By and large, non nuclear weapon states have abided by our commitments to the treaty, while at the same time, there has not been meaningful progress by nuclear weapon states to fulfill the Article 6 obligations.
Unfortunately, we find ourselves in a situation where the world is moving further away from nuclear disarmament as nuclear weapon states continue to increase their arsenals and modernize their weapons systems.
Mr.
President, it must be understood, as we have repeatedly stated at this, as well as previous review conferences, that the indefinite extension in 1995 did not give nuclear weapon states, as well as umbrella states the right to the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons.
On the contrary, Article 6 requires them to relinquish these weapons as well as the doctrines that underpin their justification.
Efforts to reinterpret, dilute, or retreat from previously agreed commitments pose a serious challenge to the integrity and credibility of the NPT.
We have a moral and legal responsibility to ensure that the commitments undertaken in 1995, 202010, many of which remain unfulfilled are upheld and remain valid until fully implemented.
South Africa further expresses its deep concern at the emerging efforts to legitimize nuclear deterrence doctrines and to normalize the deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of non nuclear weapon states.
Such actions run counter to both the letter and the spirit of the treaty.
As I conclude, Mr.
President, we must reiterate the grave concern about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons.
And this is substantiated by a growing body of scientific evidence.
The use of such weapons transcend natural borders and pose grave implications for human survival as well as well being and it would be incompatible with the right to life.
The catastrophic humanitarian consequences and risks associated with nuclear weapons must underpin the implementation of Article 6 and the urgency of achieving and maintaining a world free from nuclear weapons.
Despite our disappointment, South Africa will continue to advance options for the full.
I thank the distinguished representative of South Africa.
I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Qatar.
Thank you, President.
President, we align ourselves with the statement made by the non aligned movement and the Arab group.
At the outset, we wish to extend our appreciation and thanks for your tireless efforts and your guidance throughout the conference.
We thank you for your acumen in the management of our deliberations and the holding of various consultations on the outcome of the conference.
We wish to extend our thanks to the chairs of the three main committees for the efforts made and for their flexibility and their management of the deliberations of this conference.
President, we stress that the first draft of the outcome document had included a number of very ambitious paragraphs which prompted us to be hopeful in achieving more ambitious language.
On the impact and consequences of the use of nuclear weapons on international peace and stability.
And in this regard and after the drafting of various other versions and after you reached a draft that you considered would be more capable of leading us to consensus, After Tyler's efforts, this has not happened.
Despite the aforementioned, we stress the importance of this conference as a main platform for the implementation of the three pillars of the NPT and its contribution to international peace and security.
In conclusion, President.
The total and full elimination of nuclear weapons and the achievement of the goals and purposes of the NPT, including its three pillars, nonproliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy will strengthen the international disarmament and nonproliferation regime.
This in turn will strengthen international peace and security.
And in this regard, We underlined the importance of concerted international efforts to ensure the strengthening of the nonproliferation treaty and the achievement of its goals.
I thank you, President.
I thank the distinguished representative of Qatar.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Austria.
Mr.
President, we align with the EU statement.
Let me thank you, your team, and the Secretariat, for your dedicated and tireless work.
Many of us came to this conference without illusions.
You took the very difficult cards you were dealt and you navigated this process with great skill.
Austria is sincerely grateful.
Mr.
President, it's a matter of profound regret that this conference has not been able to agree on an outcome.
The NPT urgently needs to be strengthened, not as the Secretary-General underlined, hollowed out.
We recognize just how difficult the conditions for agreement were.
For Austria, multilateralism is and remains the central means by which we can confront the urgent dangers facing humankind.
But let us be candid.
The absence of an outcome document is itself a reflection of the wider problems we face, a lack of willingness to earnestly engage and to confront the issues actually at hand.
Mr.
President, the world outside this room has not stood still.
We've witnessed nuclear exercises, tests of nuclear capable missiles, rapid development of AI systems, implicit nuclear threats, direct threats to our European partners, attacks on civilian nuclear installations and noncompliance.
There is frankly a striking disconnect between the lack of ambition on the challenges facing the treaty and its implementation and the reality unfolding out there.
But those events should also have served as a stark reminder.
They should have demonstrated to all of us the urgency of making progress.
Let me be more specific.
We note the measures on risk reduction and dialogue agreed among the nuclear weapon states.
Those will be welcomed to be implemented.
We will continue to advocate for increased transparency and accountability in the NPT and therefore support the proposal by United States to take the element of strengthening the review process forward.
Mr.
President, 2026 marks the 30th anniversary of the CTBT and the CTBTO.
It was the CTBT's verification system that detected the DPRK's flagrant violations of the global moratorium on nuclear testing, and we pledge to continue to do our utmost to get the treaty into force.
Mr.
President, 80 years after nuclear weapons were first used, and after more than 2000 nuclear tests, the science is clear.
Any use of a nuclear weapon in a populated area, let alone a nuclear war, would have devastating humanitarian and environmental consequences.
We deeply regret that this is still a contentious issue.
Shows that the discussion is tilted heavily towards the security concerns of nuclear weapon states and that it does not sufficiently reflect the concrete and legitimate security concerns of the vast majority of non nuclear weapon states.
We do welcome, however, the progress on recognizing the humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear testing and the urgent need to assist the victims and to undertake environmental remediation, which underlines the complementarity between the NPT and the TPNW.
Mr.
President, we welcome the progress also on expressing concerns over attacks on peaceful nuclear installations.
Austria stands strongly at the side of the IAEA as the guardian of safeguards, nuclear safety and security.
Let me be specific.
Over the past four years, the IAEA has played a central role around the Ukrainian Sarita nuclear power plant, illegally occupied by Russia in its unprovoked illegal war of aggression with its subsequent consequences for Ukraine's national safety and security.
This should be clearly recognized.
Mr.
President, Austria came to this conference to strengthen the NPT.
We convened 12 side events, submitted five joint working papers, and coordinated two joint statements.
We did so because we believe in this treaty and because we believe in multilateralism as the only credible way to address the urgent dangers facing all humankind.
That conviction is undiminished, and so is our resolve to keep working with all partners for the safer world for all that this treaty promises.
I thank you, Mr.
President.
I thank the distinguished representative of Austria.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Libya.
Sad Safirt Ambassador Duhang Vt, President of the Review Conference.
It's my honor to deliver this statement on behalf of the Arab Group.
The Arabic Group at the outset, would like to extend our deepest appreciation to Your Excellency and to the Republic of Vietnam.
We extend our deepest thanks and appreciation for their tireless efforts in steering the work of the Review Conference of the NPT.
As representing the Nam, we are proud of your efforts.
We also extend our deepest appreciation to your keenness to listen to the views of the Arab group, the Nam.
We are also grateful for your constructive and genuine engagement.
We recognize that you have done your best to make a success of the conference.
Mr.
President, the Arab Group has taken part in the 11th Review Conference and has engaged constructively and engaged in different discussions.
We have exerted tireless efforts in order to reach a final outcome document.
We strongly believe in the importance of the NPT.
As a pillar of the global disarmament and nonproliferation regime, as an important instrument to facilitate the inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as an important pillar of international peace and security.
We have taken note regretfully that the conference for the third time in a row had failed to reach consensus on an outcome document that would salvage the Npity the Arab group, like other groups and states parties was aware that the conference is held at a critical juncture and against the backdrop of international complexities, against the backdrop of escalation among nuclear weapon states and against the backdrop of a deteriorating security environment.
But still, we did not lose hope, and we hoped that the international community would bleach a point of balance to preserve the credibility of the Np and to demonstrate responsibility and to realize the cost of a lost opportunity and a third failure in a row.
We regret the unprecedented levels of transitions by nuclear weapon states.
Nuclear weapon states departed from their unequivocal undertakings and disregarded more than half a century of efforts.
Unfortunately, every nuclear weapon state gave precedents to their security interests and to their own perspectives to the detriment of the regime as a whole.
They disregarded the interests and the concerns of non nuclear weapon states.
Non nuclear weapon states continue to uphold their obligations while other parties dishonor their obligations, which undermines what is left of the grand ban of the apie.
Mr.
President.
The Arab G would like to assess the final outcome document.
We commend the president's efforts in reaching this outcome document while maintaining the minimum balance between the three pillars.
Our assessment is as follows.
We would like to shed light on the fact that all commitments continue and remain valid.
We expect nuclear weapon states to uphold their obligations in line with their commitments that do not lapse with time.
First, the Arab Group welcomes the fact that the outcome document reiterated that the 1995 Middle East resolution remains valid.
In addition, the conference acknowledged progress on the establishment acknowledged progress in the UN conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.
In addition, the conference highlighted the critical importance of universalizing the treaty, including by pushing Israel to join the NPT and to place its facilities under the full scope safeguards agreement.
A on the other hand, we regret that the other elements were overlooked, including the need to take specific measures to support implementation.
We regret that we did not reassert the commitment to the universality of the treaty, including in the Middle East.
These wordings were previously agreed upon, but they were not included in the draft outcome documents.
The current wording on the Middle East should take into consideration the other priorities we will continue to push forward in order to support the full and effective implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution.
In this context, the Arab Group underscored the importance of this resolution as a pillar for the indefinite extension of the NPT without vote.
We cannot undermine this fact.
This will undermine our attempt to achieve our objectives and will erode the key pillars of the NPT.
Second, despite the flexibility of non nuclear weapon states, including the Arab group, the outcome document did not meet our expectation mainly with respect to Article 6 obligations.
It did not include practical urgent steps to uphold obligations, and it did not include important elements such as the offer and the human control until the full implementation of nuclear weapons.
In addition to our deception regarding the nuclear deterrence and other similar arrangements.
It did not include any, It did not meet our aspirations about nuclear security assurances and the special responsibilities of nuclear weapon states under action ten of the 2010 action plan.
We regret that paragraph five contained conditionalities on the implementation on nuclear disarmament and non proliferation linking them to other aspects, including reinterpreting obligation.
With respect to non proliferation, we commend the different limited but positive aspect that addressed our concerns, including as an a group.
This document linked the implementation of Article 3 to the inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy under Article 4.
It also highlighted the centrality of the safeguards agreements as the main legal obligation for non nuclear weapon states.
Additional protocol did not undermine the voluntary nature of both instruments, and we must underline the importance of the voluntary nature to join the additional protocol at the same time.
These wording achieved the minimum balance needed and reiterated previous commitments, including in the 2010 draft outcome document.
The Arab Group underscored the importance of export controls, but they must not be used in such a way to restrict the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes beyond the scope of the Np and the obligations and relevant obligations.
This must not undermine the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
We underscored that non compliance issues must be addressed within the framework of the IAEA and without any politicization and double standards.
The Arab group commends the general position regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
We commend commitments in this regard.
The microphone was cut off.
I thank the distinguished representative of Libya speaking on behalf of the Arab group.
I would like to inform the conference that unfortunately, the interpreters must leave us now.
I thank them for their invaluable work to our conference and for granting us additional time.
I note that there are still many delegations that wish to speak.
Therefore, I ask that the indulgence of the conference to continue in English only so that we may hear from all delegations wishing to speak.
I trust that this approach is acceptable.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Malaysia.
Mr.
President, Malaysia aligns itself with the statements delivered by the Philippines on behalf of Asean and by Indonesia on behalf of Nam.
And at the outset, allow me to express Malaysia's deepest appreciation to you for exerting your tireless and best efforts in bridging the divergence of positions of states parties throughout the 11th Review Conference of our treaty and in finding consensus for an outcome document which remains elusive to all of us.
Malaysia joined the conference with the firm hope that states parties would demonstrate the political will required to advance meaningful and balanced progress across all three pillars of the treaty.
My delegation has engaged throughout this conference in good faith and with the degree of flexibility necessary to facilitate consensus.
However, despite extensive deliberations over the past weeks, the conference has again failed to adopt a consensual outcome document.
Malaysia deeply regrets this outcome.
Throughout this review cycle, Malaysia and many states parties consistently emphasize the need for balance across the three pillars of the treaty.
Unfortunately, the continued refusal by nuclear weapon states to undertake concrete and meaningful measures towards the implementation of their Article 6 obligations remains the principal obstacle to achieving such balance.
It is deeply concerning that while the majority of states parties continue to demonstrate commitment towards strengthening the treaty.
There remains persistent reliance on nuclear deterrence doctrines, continued modernization and expansion of nuclear arsenals, and increasing attempts to normalize the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons.
Malaysia further notes with concern the continued imbalance in expectations placed upon states parties.
While additional nonproliferation obligations and restrictions continue to be advanced, insufficient progress has been made on nuclear disarmament commitments and on preserving the legitimate rights of states parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without discrimination.
Mr.
President, the repeated failure to adopt a consensual outcome document further undermines confidence and aggravates frustrctions among states parties.
Maintenance of the current trajectory is neither sustainable nor conducive towards strengthening the broader disarmament and nonproliferation architecture.
Malaysia remains firmly committed to the objectives of the treaty and will continue to work constructively with all state parties to strengthen the review process and uphold the integrity of the treaty.
I thank you, Mr.
President.
I thank the distinguished representative of Malaysia.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Nigeria speaking on behalf of the African group.
Sorry, Mr.
President.
African Alliance met with NAM, I wish to make the following remarks.
The African group expresses its sincere appreciation to you, Mr.
President and your team for your tireless effort, dedication, and stewardship throughout the preparation and conduct of this 11th review conference.
The group has engaged throughout this process in a constructive, principled, and forward looking manner, with the objective of contributing to a balanced, credible, and meaningful outcome that advances the full implementation of the 33 across a three mutually reinforcing pillar.
While the conference has provided a valuable platform for dialogue, the African group notes with regret and dissatisfaction that longstanding concerns, particularly in the area of nuclear disarmament remain insufficiently addressed.
The continued lack of tangible progress in the implementation of Article 6 obligation remain a matter of profound concern.
The group wishes to reaffirm the continued validity of commitment undertaken at previous review conferences, including the 1995 review and extension conference and the 2000 and 2010 review conferences.
These commitments remain essential benchmarks for accountability and progress.
The African group reiterates that nuclear weapon continue to pose an existential threat to humanity and their total elimination remains the only absolute guarantee against their use or threat of use.
At the same time, the group underscores the ineligible right of all state parties to develop and utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, consistent with Article 4 of the treaty and their international obligations.
In this regard, international in this regard, international cooperation, training, technology transfer, and support for peaceful application must be strengthened.
The group called for the provision and mobilization of adequate, affordable, predictable, and accessible financing to bridge the nuclear science and technology gap.
The African group remain firmly committed to preserving the integrity, universality, and balanced implementation of the treaty.
We call on all state parties, particularly the nuclear weapon state to demonstrate renewed political will, genuine flexibility, and concrete action to restore confidence in the review, process, and advance meaningful progress toward a world free of nuclear weapon.
African group remains steadfast in its commitment to constructive engagement in the NAS review cycle.
And thank you, Mr.
President.
I wish to state that on behalf of in my national capacity, I wish to take the floor again.
We thank you, Mr.
Chair, for your effortless and Nigeria participated Nigeria, we wish to stay that we participated in this conference in good faith and with a firm commitment to strengthen the treaty and advancing its full balanced and discriminatory implementation across its three mutually responsive pillars.
While we value the dialogue undertaken during this review conference, Nigeria regrets that the intentional regrets that international community continue to fall short in addressing the most urgent exial threat confronting humanity, nuclear weapons.
The persistent lack of the persistent lack of concrete progress on nuclear disarmament, particularly the implementation of Article C's obligation remain deeply concerning.
Nigeria reiterates that the total elimination of nuclear weapon remains the only absolute guarantee against their use or threat of use.
In this regard, we call for renewed political will, greater accountability, risk reduction measures, reduced reliance on nuclear weapon insecurity doctrines, and progress toward a world free of nuclear weapon.
Nigeria equally reaffirmed the inelible right of all state parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy consistent with the Article 4 of the Treaty.
Peaceful nuclear applications remain indispensable for sustainable development, including in healthcare, agriculture, water resources, management, and energy generation.
International Cooperation, technology transfer and strengthened support for IAEA technical cooperation program remain essential.
Nigeria remain firmly committed to the integrity, universality, and balanced implementation of NPT and will continue to engage constructively in the review process to ensure the treaty remain credible, effective, and responsive to contemporary reality.
Mr.
President, in conclusion, This conference this conference in the year marking the 80th anniversary of atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
We must not allow compey to define our collective legacy.
The urgency of nuclear disarmament cannot be die.
Nigeria remain resilience in working with all partners toward a safer, more secure and nuclear weapon free world.
And thank you, Mr.
President.
I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation.
Thank you, Mr.
President.
First of all, we would like to thank you and your staff and the Secretariat of the conference, as well as the three presidents of main committees for productive efforts to find common ground among the delegations positions whose differences became more evident during the general debate and in the discussions within the three main committees.
Your guidance, the conference participants have succeeded in focusing on reviewing the implementation of all NPT provisions and on developing agreed approaches to the treaties for further implementation.
We note that the draft final documents submitted for consideration.
Is the result of a serious compromise reflecting a delicate and well calibrated balance of interests.
Its adoption would serve as an important signal to the international community of our shared commitment to delivering results even in the current challenging international climate.
Our delegation expresses the deepest regret that the draft final document was not tabled for adoption.
Regrettably, not all NPT state parties participated in the conference in the interests of preserving the treaty, ensuring its sustainability and integrity, and strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
Just as four weeks ago, a large group of delegations arrived in New York for the sole purpose of settling political scores with their cultural and civilizational opponents.
However, despite their attempts to derail the conference, the main event of the current review cycle has fulfilled its mandate to review the implementation of the NPT.
The participants in the conference have come a long way through intense yet substantive discussions, which have ultimately brought us to an important and in every respect, critical juncture for the treaty and for the future of the review process.
We are grateful for those delegations that have responded to our call to make every effort to bridge our differences and work together to find common ground.
Express our appreciation to all those who have chosen the path of diplomacy and dialogue based on mutual respect to ensure an effective review of the implementation of all NPT provisions and to agree on a set of recommendations for strengthening the treaty.
For its part, the delegation of the Russian Federation engaged closely with you, Mr.
President, individual states, and groups of states, as well as with international organizations and civil society representatives.
We held intensive discussions on most pressing issues on the agenda, engaging in an open and trust based exchange of you with the sole aim of finding common ground and reaching mutually acceptable solutions, where these were difficult and at times impossible to achieve.
Mr.
President, as NPT depository and a good faith party to the treaty, we find it extremely important to support the NPT community's shared commitment to taking measures to preserve the treaty and reaffirm its historic mission as well as ensuring the relevance of the review process as a platform for discussing a broad range of issues concerning the implementation of the treaty provisions and the fulfillment by states parties of their obligations.
We call on all the delegations not to make strategy from the absence of the final document of this 11th NPT review conference.
We suppose that those efforts which were taken by the delegations during 34 weeks give us strong hope that these efforts will be twice repeated during the next review cycle.
As to the US proposal to exert from the text some provisions, we are against this proposal because the draft document is the package proposal.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of China.
Thank you, Mr.
President.
The Chinese delegation deeply regrets that the 11th Review Conference of the NPT failed to reach conclusions on a substantive outcome.
Over the past four weeks, the delegates from the state parties exchanged in depth views on the current situation of the international security.
And also comprehensively reviewed the implementation of all provisions of the treaty and try to explore feasible ways and steps to promote nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Though we might have different views on various issues, we share the common objective to safeguard and strengthen the authority of the NPT and promote common security and peace and security of the world.
The result of this review conference further demonstrate that the multilateral arms control mechanism is not operating in vacuum and the international security environment have implications on its operation.
We failed to reach substantive outcome, but the NPT still remains the cornerstone of international nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament.
It is an indispensable pillar of the postwar international security structure.
Against the background of severe international security situation, it is necessary and also serves the interests of all state parties to stick to the purpose and principles of the NPT.
And we call on all state parties to further practice genuine multilateralism, pursue common security concepts, and try to improve international and regional security environment, eliminate the root causes of proliferation of nuclear weapons, and creating more favorable environment to further promote nuclear disarmament.
As well as expanding peaceful use of nuclear energy international cooperation.
Taking this opportunity, the Chinese delegation would like to thank you and your team, as well as the president, chairman and vice chairman of the main committees and subsidiary bodies and the Secretariat for all the contributions and efforts that have been made to this conference.
Especially the resilience demonstrate openness and inclusivity demonstrated by the chair to manage the different disputes and difficult situation, your contribution to the conference will be remembered by all states parties.
Regarding the proposal just submitted by the US Delegation, China supports your methods to address the force revised version of CRP two, as well as the arrangement of this afternoon's plenary session, the last session of this conference.
We also noted that you have already announced that the conclusion of the substantive work of this review conference And we notice that the delegation of the United States just put forward this proposal, and we believe that the relevant proposals for strengthening the review conference as contained in CRP four is an integral part of the outcome draft outcome document.
Therefore, to select a part of the package as a draft decision is not feasible since this will constitute a selective approach dealing with various parts of the draft outcome document.
Thank you, Mr.
President.
I thank the distinguished representative of China.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Egypt.
The president, Egypt aligns itself with the statements made by the representatives of Indonesia, Nigeria, Libya, and Ireland on behalf of the allied movement, the African group, the Arab group, and the New Agenda Coalition.
We wish to express our sincere appreciation for the tireless dedication and unwavering commitment that you demonstrated throughout the 11th Review Conference of the NPT.
You spared no effort in the pursuit of a successful outcome.
You intended to uphold the viability, integrity, and credibility of the NPT.
Your extensive outreach, constructive spirit, impartiality, and remarkable creativity in navigating the complexities of the process is a demonstration of the very best of multilateral diplomacy.
You have most wisely decided to preserve the integrity of the review process and protect what remains of it from further polarization and politicization.
And we thank you for that.
Mr.
President, my delegation was ready to join the consensus on contained in the ref four of that you circulated.
We appreciate the reaffirmation in the document of the commitment to the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the acknowledgment of the progress achieved within the framework of the annual UN Conference on the establishment of the Middle East Zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
We welcome the commitment to the urgency of achieving universality of the treaty.
The final version, however, omitted the commitment to taking concrete measures towards the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the specific commitment to the universality of the treaty in the Middle East.
My delegation expresses disappointed its disappointment at the absence of clear political will among nuclear weapon states to meaningfully advance the implementation of commitments they as nuclear weapon states have undertaken since the aptee's inception.
And across the successive review cycles to implement Article 6 of the treaty.
Mr.
President, while we felt that the Rev four fell short of meeting our expectations as non nuclear weapon states, we were ready to join a consensus that would instill hope and credibility to the NPT review process.
Mr.
President, finally, I wish to reaffirm in the strongest term that the inability to produce a consensus outcome document from the long and intensive deliberation of the review conference, despite its troubling recurrence, is not accepted as a new norm and should not be accepted as the new norm.
The 2026 conference did not lack engagement or commitment on the part of delegations, nor could it have been served by any better leadership.
Yet it once again laid bare a profound and deeply troubling absence of political will.
Indeed, a deliberate unwillingness to recognize and honor the value and potential of the NPT as an indispensable instrument for upholding and advancing international peace and security and for contributing to the broader goals of development was unfortunately lacking.
This should not be repeated.
Thank you, Mr.
President.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Egypt.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Australia.
Thank you, President, for your tireless efforts to lead this process.
President, we are deeply disappointed that no outcome could be reached.
For Australia, the NPT is and always will be central to national and global security.
We want to see progress towards a world without nuclear weapons.
President, it has long been recognized Iran's nuclear program is a threat to global peace and security.
Iran can never be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon.
Iran has consistently failed to comply with its NPT safeguards obligations, undermining the international nonproliferation regime.
Compliance with safeguards obligations is not optional.
Providing access to the IAEA is not optional.
Iran's failure to do so is of the utmost concern.
Australia will work tirelessly with other members of this treaty to ensure Iran can never develop a nuclear weapon.
President, the DPRK cannot have the status of a nuclear weapon state under the NPT.
We reject any attempts to justify or normalize its illegal actions.
President, we remain concerned about nuclear safety and security in Ukraine because of Russia's illegal invasion.
President, the strong demand for transparency and interactive reporting by nuclear weapon states has been a common thread over this review cycle.
We regret that even modest steps could not be taken at this review conference.
Australia recognizes those nuclear weapon states that have shown good faith and fortitude through their genuine engagement on their reports.
Australia will not let this matter rest because transparency will take NPT implementation forward.
President, for these reasons, Australia supports the proposal by the United States to separate the language on strengthening the review process.
Finally, we know that preventing nuclear testing has and always will be a vital step on the pathway to disarmament.
The need to reinforce the CTBT and CTBTO is urgent.
President, states parties are deeply invested in the NPT.
We work to implement it in every day in practical ways.
What matters now is what we do next and how we continue to invest in multilateral solutions to complex problems.
The NPT gives us the best framework we have to work together.
We must keep doing so.
Averting a nuclear war and the spread of nuclear weapons is simply too important.
I thank you, President.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Australia.
I give the floor to the distinguished Representative of New Zealand.
On behalf of the New Zealand delegation, I extend my sincere thanks to you, President, for your Herculean efforts to achieve consensus at this 11th NPT review conference.
While this review conference hasn't ended in the outcome any of us hoped for, we nevertheless wish to commend you and your team for your skill and commitment to listening and to creatively bridging divides over a host of issues.
If review conference outcomes depended solely on the energy and commitment of its chair and his intrepid team, then we would have achieved a resounding consensus.
That we were collectively unable to come to agreement at this review conference is a sobering reflection on the current international environment and the mounting tensions between states and with it, the risk nuclear weapons could be used.
New Zealand came to this conference with the objective of preserving the nuclear nonproliferation regime, including the obligations and commitments made under this treaty and seeking to strengthen these where we can, especially through practical measures such as improved transparency of nuclear weapon state reporting and interactive dialogue under Article 6.
In this regard, we support the proposal by the US to consider paragraphs 37 to 43 of the rev four draft outcome document as a separate decision.
A minimal forward looking outcome for this conference.
It would, of course, have been our preference that a comprehensive outcome had been adopted, but there are some important process improvements tried at this review conference that are detailed in these paragraphs and which are supplemented with enhanced discussion on national reports, which has been a long standing New Zealand priority.
While this is a lower standard of ambition than what we'd hoped to achieve, any improvement in this regard should be regarded as a good thing, and therefore, we support the US proposal.
President, we have tried hard to support you as you built support for an agreed outcome from this conference.
While we return home, significantly disappointed in this outcome, you can count on New Zealand to continue to seek to strengthen international limits on nuclear weapons in view of the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences their use would entail.
One way we will continue to advance this is regionally through the Pacific Islands Forum in terms of addressing nuclear legacies and through supporting our nuclear free zone.
And globally, we will continue to advance this through the Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, which complements our support for the NPT.
We look forward to continue working with you, Mr.
President, but this time as a delegate in that treaty's own review conference later this year.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished Representative of New Zealand.
I give the floor now to the Distinguished Representative of Guatemala.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr.
President.
My delegation wishes to express its profound appreciation for your commitment, balance, and transparent leadership throughout this conference, as well as for the effort of the Secretariat and all delegation that contributed in a particularly complex international context to the conclusion of our work.
Guatemala regrets that despite the effort undertaken throughout the negotiation process, it was not possible to reach consensus on a final document.
This outcome reflects the persistence of substantive divergence among delegation on fundamental subsistence issues, particularly in the field of nuclear disarmament.
It also underscores the need to strengthen collective commitment in a future stage of the treaty review process.
This result reflects continued divergence on a fundamental substantive issues, particularly in the field of nuclear disarmament, which continue to hinder collective progress toward the objectives of the treaty.
Mr.
President, my delegation considered that the absence of consensus should not be interpreted as a lack of relevance of the treaty, but regular as an urgent call to redouble political and diplomatic effort to ensure its full implementation.
Guatemala reiterates that nuclear disarmament is not a political aspiration but as a blinding legal obligation and express concern over the lack of concrete progress in this area.
In this context, we reaffirm our principal position.
The only way to prevent the threat to life as we know, is to throw out the prohibition and a total elimination of nuclear weapon in a transparent, verifiable, and irreversible manner within a clearly defined time frame.
Mr.
President, the inability to reach agreement should also serve as a reminder of the need to preserve the inclusive and a multilateral nature of the process, avoiding approaches that depend divisor or weaken trust among states.
Guatemala will continue promoting the balance among the three pillars of the treaty.
We reiterate the importance of regional instruments such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which demonstrates that real alternatives exist to dependence of nuclear weapons as an element of a security.
Future of the international non proliferation regime will depend on the collective capacity of the states parties to rebuild trust and move forward with the determination toward common objectives.
Thank you very much, Mr.
President.
I thank the distinguished representative of Guatemala.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the European Union.
Thank you, Mr.
President.
Mr.
President, I have the honor to speak on behalf of the European Union and its member states.
First, let me express the European Union's sincere appreciation for the excellent leadership, skills, and efforts that you have displayed at all times throughout the last four weeks.
We also commend the work carried out by Bureau members, the NPT Secretariat, the UN Office for Disarment Affairs, and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The European Union has actively and constructively contributed to this 11th NPT Review Conference across all three pillars of the treaty.
We have repeatedly affirmed our support for upholding and fully implementing the treaty in all its aspects, as well as the commitments made in previous review conferences and for promoting its universalization.
At the same time, we have highlighted the treaty's historic achievements and its crucial role in the maintenance of international peace and security as well as the challenges it currently faces.
We deeply regret that despite your commendable efforts and those of the chairs of all the main committees and subsidiary bodies in the arduous negotiations held in the past few weeks, it has not been possible to achieve consensus on the final outcome document.
Such an agreement would have significantly contributed to strengthening the NPT and international peace and security at the time of great needs and geopolitical tensions.
Mr.
President, we acknowledge your honest attempt at mirroring the current state of affairs regarding the implementation of the treaty and its related commitments, taking into account the wide variety of positions among states parties.
While we remain constructive, let me also be clear that we do not see key concerns reflected in the latest draft outcome document.
Russia's actions in and against Ukraine that undermine all pillars of the treaty, in particular, use of nuclear threats, and Russia's illegal seizure and militarization of Ukraine's sub regional nuclear power plant in the context of its war of aggression against Ukraine, the concerns regarding DPRK's nuclear and missile program in violation of UN Security Council resolutions and this very treaty, or the profound challenges posed by China's rapid and opaque nuclear buildup.
In our view, the language on safeguards and non proliferation could have been strengthened.
Furthermore, references to the essential role of export controls and multi export control regimes could have been strengthened too.
Also, concrete forward looking measures for nuclear disarmament, such as adopting and upholding a moratorium on the production of fissile material should have been included, and language on the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty should have been more precise.
In spite of the absence of consensus on this document, we note there was broad support on the elements put forward in the latest draft final document on strengthening the review process.
The use strongly supports establishing a process within the cycle for reviewing the implementation of NPT obligation and commitments by states parties, especially by all nuclear weapon states across all three pillars, in particular, with regard to Article 6 obligations.
The almost anonymous support to the establishment of such mechanism is evidence that transparency is and must remain a core principle in the implementation of the treaty.
In this regard, we welcome the important proposals made by the United States.
Mr.
President, you can rest assured of the Euroan Union's unequivocal and continuous support to the NPT as the cornerstone of global nuclear operation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament according to its Article 6, and an important element in developing nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes according to its Article 4.
In this new review cycle, we will continue to work with all states parties in order to strengthen the treaty and improve its implementation.
Thank you very much, Mr.
President.
I thank the distinguished representative of the European Union.
I give the floor to the distinguished Representative of Zimbabwe.
Mr.
President, Zimbabwe aligns with the statements delivered by the distinguished representative of Indonesia on behalf of the group of non aligned states parties, and by the distinguished representative of Nigeria, on behalf of the African group, and we add the following remarks in a national capacity.
We commend you, Ambassador Do Hang Viet and your team and the three main committee chairs and other office bearers, as well as the Secretariat, for their dedicated and tireless efforts in ensuring that the 2026 Review Conference fulfilled its mandate of reviewing the operation of the treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the treaty are being realized.
You engaged widely and extensively, including in our regional settings.
While we regret the failure to achieve consensus on an outcome document, Zimbabwe welcomes the extensive discussions held at this review conference, during which we reaffirmed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought and the need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war.
We reiterated the urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the treaty.
We expressed grave concern about the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences of any use of nuclear weapons.
We emphasized that Article 6 progress could be accelerated by the institutional innovation of the nuclear weapon states interactive dialogues, which would have enhanced accountability and ensured the implementation of action 20 of the 2010 action plan.
We discussed specific nuclear risk reduction measures, including crisis prevention and communications, doctrines of restraint, dialogue, non targeting, and de escalation.
We underscored the necessity of human control over nuclear weapon systems pending their total elimination.
We called for the delivery of legally binding and irrevocable security assurances to all non nuclear weapon states.
We pondered over safeguards and reiterated their necessity for nuclear security and the indispensable role of the IAEA in this regard.
We called for the early entry into force of the CTBT and we reiterated our call for the immediate commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Mr.
President, language on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was expanded throughout this review cycle with additional provisions on technology cooperation, capacity building, training for a skilled workforce, and on financing.
In that vein, Zimbabwe reiterates the call for the provision and mobilization of adequate, affordable, predictable, and accessible financing to bridge the nuclear science and technology gap.
Mr.
President, in the road ahead to the 12th NPT Review conference to be held in 2031, Zimbabwe assures states parties of its constructive engagement towards the end goal of the total verifiable and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons, towards safe, secure nuclear science and technology, and towards accelerated access to the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy for all.
I thank you, Mr.
President.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Zimbabwe.
I give the floor now to the distinguished Representative of Mexico.
Thank you, Mr.
President.
We align with the statement to be delivered by the New Agenda Coalition, and we make this intervention in our national capacity.
We wish to place on record our appreciation for your work as president of the Review Conference and also of your team.
My delegation values the way in which you guided our proceedings.
We also understand your intentions and appreciate your efforts to achieve an elusive consensus.
We regret that the conference was unable to reach an agreement.
Regardless of this outcome, my delegation must express its concern regarding trends that run counter to effective multilateralism.
This is reflected in the conduct of delegations that increasingly shy away from negotiation and diplomacy.
Consensus cannot be achieved through formulas that seek to eliminate language without taking into account the positions of all parties, nor can it be built upon previously agreed upon foundations if it relies instead on setbacks, reinterpretations, or alterations to fundamental principles and values.
Furthermore, while we acknowledge once again that you, Mr.
President, kept your word by providing us with a text early on for our consideration, delegations did not strictly speaking, engage in negotiations.
Was no genuine search for common solutions based on a negotiating package that integrated the priorities of all states in a balanced manner.
There's an urgent need to advance the implementation of Article 6 in the face of an unacceptable status quo, one in which nuclear weapons states and their allies reinforced the notion of the importance of nuclear weapons, as noted by the NAC and the vast majority of delegations at this conference, while the final documents failed to adopt concrete measures to reverse this trend.
Regret that no willingness was shown to adopt new disarmament measures or even to reaffirm compliance with past commitments, but rather merely a promise to initiate dialogues amongst nuclear weapon states lacking any clear disarmament objectives.
My delegation will always welcome calls for dialogue as well as efforts to enhance trust and predictability among nuclear powers.
However, such steps do not constitute actual disarmament measures and may even serve to idealize a supposed stability predicated on nuclear weapons, a notion that ultimately erodes the NPT itself.
Find it disconcerting that several parties insist on denying the grave humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, preferring instead to speak solely of nuclear war.
Mexico feels compelled to express its unequivocal rejection of any attempt to trivialize the use of nuclear weapons and to point out as many times as necessary that we cannot support calls to downplay the significance of nuclear detonations, whether intentional or accidental.
Historical record regarding the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons stems from the use of just two such devices, as well as from thousands of nuclear tests, not from a nuclear war.
We also note with concern the request to remove language regarding the norm against nuclear testing and on the entry into force of the CTBT.
If we truly desire a world free of nuclear weapons, we must ensure that there is no resumption whatsoever of nuclear testing.
There was also a chance to bring the NPT up to date with the realities of the 21st century and address the possible risk of integration of artificial intelligence in command and control of nuclear weapons.
A vast majority was insistent on this.
Since the very first prep com of this review cycle, there has been a clear interest in incorporating interactive sessions reports submitted by nuclear weapon states, serving as a confidence building measure and a means to strengthen accountability of those states.
We regret that this initiative has given rise to politicization and mutual mistrust.
We hope that these doubts will be dispelled, thereby enabling us to eventually analyze the reports of the nuclear weapon states within the formal proceedings of the review conferences.
Finally, my delegation wishes to emphasize that the continued validity of the obligations enshrined in the NPT, as well as the various agreements stemming from its review conferences do not depend on whether or not a final consensus document is adopted at any given review conference.
We the parties to the NPT, particularly the non nuclear weapon states fulfill our obligations and commitments, and we will continue to do so.
We demand and will continue to demand that the nuclear weapon states demonstrate the same level of compliance when it comes to disarmament.
In the upcoming review cycle, we need more diplomacy, more negotiations, and more political will.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico.
I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Saudi Arabia.
Mr.
President, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia aligns itself with the statement of the Arab group and the non aligned movement.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would like to express its sincere appreciation to you and your team for the considerable efforts you spent throughout the preparatory process and the proceedings of the 11th NPT Review Conference.
The Kingdom engaged actively in the various consultations and discussions, driven by its commitment to support the treaty, strengthening the credibility of the review process and ensuring the balanced implementation of the treaty three pillars.
In this context, the Kingdom regrets the conference's failure to reach consensus on a final document, despite the intensive efforts spent over the past weeks and the flexibility and genuine willingness demonstrated by many state parties to reach out consensus.
The Kingdom considers that the repeated failure to adopt a final document is concerning especially regarding the future of the review process and negatively affects the credibility of the treaty.
The Kingdom reaffirms the importance of the full implementation of the treaty obligations, including the commitment and undertakings agreed upon at previous review conferences, in particular, those of 1995, 2000 and 2010.
The Kingdom also reaffirms its full support to the right of state parties to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the treaty provisions and the relevant safeguards obligations in manner that contributes to sustainable development and strengthen national capacities in the scientific and technical fields.
With regard to the Middle East, the Kingdom reiterates the importance of the implementing of 1995 Middle East resolution as integral part of the package of decision upon which the indefinite extension of the treaty was based and underscores the necessity of continuing efforts towards the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.
Conclusion, the Kingdom of Sadi Arabia affirms its continued commitment to engage constructively with all state parties in order to preserve the credibility of the treaty and achieve the desired progress towards the world free of nuclear weapons in a manner that promotes security and stability for all.
Thank you, Mr.
President.
I thank the distinguished representative of Saudi Arabia.
I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom.
Mr.
President, the NPT has never been more vital for international peace and security.
Backing for it remains near universal.
Over the past four weeks, countries from around the world have reiterated in this room their strong and enduring support for the treaty.
You have made remarkable efforts to build common ground.
So I regret that this review conference was not able in the end to reach consensus on a credible final outcome document.
There were many positive aspects of the text you put forward, but we share the disappointment of others that this review conference was unable to address itself clearly on the most serious and current proliferation issues we face.
Iran has failed to cooperate fully with the IAEA on safeguards for more than two decades.
In June 2025, the IAEA's board of governors found Iran to be in non compliance with its legally binding NPT related safeguards obligations, following extensive reporting by the IAEA Director General.
We regret that there was no consensus to call this out, despite the wish of a large number of states to do so.
We call on Iran to return to full compliance without delay, to meet all its safeguards obligations, and to address the concerns that the Director General and the board have laid out in so much detail over so many years.
We will continue to work for a diplomatic solution that ensures the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's program.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's continuing development of its nuclear and missile programs is an egregious violation of the NPT and the UN Security Council resolutions.
Previous review conferences have consistently recognised the seriousness of this issue.
Such violations warrant clear and accurate reflection in any outcome document.
We regret, too, that there was no consensus to call out Russia's actions in Ukraine following its illegal invasion, which have jeopardized nuclear safety and security, especially at the Zaarzya nuclear power plant.
These realities should have been reflected clearly.
Mr.
President, I welcome the many positive aspects of the text and the spirit in which states engaged on questions of disarmament, peaceful uses, and transparency.
These are welcome contributions to the fulfillment of the NPT, to which the UK remains fully committed.
Mr.
Chair, the UK supports a decision be taken on strengthening the review process as per the US proposal.
We call for a decision to be taken today by this conference and note that the US sought to table its proposal before the proceedings closed.
The UK has consistently championed SRP agenda because we profoundly believe that a more efficient and effective review process will contribute to delivery of the treaty goals.
The UK has also long recognized the role of transparency across the implementation of all pillars of the treaty.
The vast majority of states parties want to see compulsory reporting from the nuclear weapon states.
The vast majority of state parties want to see compulsory involvement in interactive discussions within the formal proceedings of the review conference by the nuclear weapon states.
Let's take this opportunity to act on that desire today.
Mr.
Chair, lastly, I thank you and your outstanding team and the Secretariat for your tireless efforts throughout this review conference and the many delegations have engaged constructively in serious and substantive discussions in support of this vital treaty.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom.
I give the floor to the distinguished Representative of Thailand.
President, line align itself with the statements of the non aligned movement and advancing, we would like to thank the president and chair of the main committees for your leadership, efforts, and dedication in steering this process and which offer the following observations in our national capacity.
Once again, we regret that this review conference was unable to adopt a consensual outcome document.
This is a setback for the rule of law.
It also carries consequences for global security and humanity.
Let place this on the record.
The absence of a consensual outcome document by no means suspends, qualifies, no diminishes any obligation under the treaty.
All state parties remain legally bound by the NPT, in particular, by Article 6.
The commitments of the 1995, 2000 and 2010 review conferences remain valid.
In contrast, non nuclear weapon states have kept outside of the treaty's grand bargain.
We have not acquired nuclear weapons and foregone options that others continue to retain.
We have undertaken additional comprehensive safeguards and sought to advance trust and confidence in this process.
In return, our expectations remain unfulfilled.
Negative security assurances, grave concerns on humanitarian and environmental consequences and equal access to peaceful nuclear technology for us remain unanswered.
Thailand also places on record the imperative for all five nuclear weapon states to ratify the protocol to the Bangkok treaty without reservation after 30 years since its signing.
While we recognize the ongoing engagement with the Zone, we call on each nuclear weapon states to finalize this process without further delay.
Moving forward into the next review cycle, all nuclear weapon states must prioritize unconditional, legally binding negative security assurances as an essential confidence building measure under this increasingly unpredictable and complex security landscape.
The lack of outcome of this review conference further highlights the continued relevance of the TP&WUS a complementary contribution to the nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regimes.
The 1990 TP NW states representing a majority of this review conference acted with a conviction to advance the full and effective implementation of Article 6.
Mr.
President, the draft before this conference contained a meaningful innovation nuclear weapon states reporting discussions.
As we will conclude this conference without any outcome document, Thailand calls on the nuclear weapon states to voluntarily commit to this mechanism in the next cycle.
The principle that nuclear weapon states must deliver for Article 6 compliance in a structured and interactive setting must not be abandoned.
Nuclear risks are at their highest since the darkest moments of the Cold War.
Three consecutive failures, big structural reflection, not just renewed effort.
Thailand calls for a substantive discussion and continued dialogue in good faith, beginning at the first preparatory committee on how the review process can more effectively operate and deliver meaningful progress under increasingly complex political and security realities, while, of course, preserving the credibility, integrity, and consensus based nature of the NPT review process.
The NPT is 56-years-old.
Its purposes are as urgent today as in 1970.
We cannot walk away and pretend that what happened today is acceptable.
The geopolitic political landscape might not be better in the future, but the next cycle must be different.
Thank you, Mr.
President.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Thailand.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
This Mealy Rahm Rahim, Mr.
President, I deliver my statement today in memory of Reza Bahrai 7-years-old.
Sarah Hossain Pur, 6-years-old, Zahra Bahrami, 7-years-old, and Mah Ahmad Zodeh 12-years-old, who were among 168 students murdered in their classrooms on 28 February 2026, the day that US and Israeli regime began their second war of aggression against Iran in less than eight months.
It was, it was a triple tap attack to ensure maximum casualty.
Yet, it was not the only massacre committed by the aggressors.
Hundreds four young Navy students on board to an educational mission outside Iranian waters were also massacred in cold blood.
Lives of these young lads could be easily saved.
They were all killed, however.
Do you know why their lives were not spared? Because the perpetrators thought killing them was more fun.
These ugly realities in the 21st century represent horrible mindset that bless their wars with the blood of innocent young boys and girls.
Losing your child for the sake of fun of lunatic politicians is the worst agony that a parent can go through.
Their attempts to interpret realities is, however, mind boggling.
These professional liars have the audacity to whitewash and normalize their crimes in a way no one else can do.
They have already normalized attacking safeguarded nuclear facilities by faking non compliance scenarios, abusing reports of the IAEA and its non consensual resolutions.
During the last four weeks, we again witnessed the relentless campaign to legitimize such unlawful attacks by abusing NPT review conference.
Mr.
President, two possessors of nuclear weapons attacked the country which obviously had no nuclear activity in February 2026 with ludicrous excuses.
The war on Iran was the last on a bloody trail of interventions in our region.
An internationally indicted war criminal ruling an apartheid regime in Tel Aviv dragged the US into another never ending criminal war of choice.
Again, They bombed Iran relentlessly.
Their so called precision weapons struck exactly where intended.
Hospitals, universities, research centers, cultural heritage sites, schools, steel, and petrochemical facilities, residential neighborhoods, and industrial zones, in short, the very fabric of our civilization.
Nonetheless, they failed to break the will of the Iranian people.
Now, amid the chaos they themselves have created in the Persian Gulf region, they seek to misuse forums such as the NPT Review Conference to distort reality by repeating the same big lies they have circulated for over 400 months that Iran was only two weeks away from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
In doing so, the United States and its allies attempt to divert international attention from two fundamental realities and threats.
First, the continued failure to fulfill their own obligations under the NPT.
With respect to nuclear disarmament and second, the danger posed by the only nuclear armed regime in the Middle East, Israel, an apartheid regime that has long been a principal source of instability, aggression, and terrorism in the region and beyond.
Group of countries who are responsible for repeated failures of NPT review conferences are the primary and most significant violators of the treaty and the decisions of previous review conferences.
The US, UK, France, and the so called nuclear umbrella states refusal to eliminate their nuclear arsenals is a manifest violation of their obligations.
Their participation in nuclear sharing arrangements and extended deterrence practices, including through NATO and ACS, constitute a clear breach of Article 1 and two of the treaty.
Mr.
President, The Islamic Republic of Iran commends your professional, transparent, and inclusive leadership in presiding over the conference.
It is a matter of profound regret that the Review conference has been unable to reach consensus and adopt its final document.
In fact, in the absence of genuine political will, no one can perform a miracle.
In conclusion, Mr.
Chairman, with regard to the proposal made from the floor, Iran shares the views expressed by the Russian Federation and China.
I thank you very much, Mr.
President.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
I give the floor now to the distinguished representative of the Holy See.
Thank you, Mr.
President.
Allow me at the outset to express my delegation's sincere appreciation for your leadership throughout this review conference.
Your constant engagement and calm stewardship have helped guide our work through a particularly demanding process.
My delegation also wishes to thank your team and the Secretariat for their dedication and professionalism in accompanying and coordinating the work of this conference over these past weeks.
Mr.
President, the inability of this review conference to reach consensus on an outcome document is deeply regrettable.
My delegation regrets not only that states parties were ultimately unable to arrive at a common compromise, but also that in the final stages of the negotiations, important elements of the text had been significantly weakened despite the gravity of the current international environment.
We are living in a time marked by rising nuclear risks, increasingly dangerous rhetoric, the continued modernization and expansion of nuclear arsenals, and the rapid development of emerging technologies like artificial intelligence.
Precisely when humanity is confronted with growing and unprecedented risks, it is deeply concerning that the language on these issues was progressively weakened and could not be adopted.
What is ultimately at stake is not simply a question of strategic doctrines or geopolitical calculations.
What is at stake is human life itself, indeed the very right to life.
For this reason, my delegation deeply regrets that this review conference was enabled to adopt an outcome document and to reaffirm these principles with the clarity and ambition that the present moment demands.
Mr.
President, history has already shown humanity the devastating suffering that nuclear weapons inflict, above all on innocent populations.
For this reason, the Holy Sea continues to insist that authentic and lasting security cannot be founded upon fear, deterrence, or the threat of mutual destruction, but only upon dialogue, trust, responsibility, and a genuine commitment to peace.
The Holy See therefore urgently calls upon all states to recommit fully to nuclear disarmament and to resume in good faith and with renewed political courage, concrete negotiations leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
Humanity cannot continue indefinitely under the shadow of nuclear destruction.
The pursuit of a world free of nuclear weapons remains both an urgent necessity and a profound responsibility towards present and future generations.
Thank you, Mr.
President.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Holy See.
I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Equatorial Guinea.
Thank you, Mr.
President.
President Interveno Plitt anciua National informal conferencia International, U Coctmi del La Treven the Guinea Coral, Stubborn Spano, Ung official, Toti Mino, Camian in English, Cena Presidente, registro, lait Evil de la carta, conferencia I thank the distinguished representative of the Equatorial Guinea.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Singapore.
Mr.
President, my delegation thanks you for your able stewardship of this 11th NPT Review Conference.
We also express our appreciation to the Bureau, the chairs of the main committees, and subsidiary bodies, and the Secretariat for their hard work over the past four weeks.
Singapore aligns itself with the statement delivered by the Philippines on behalf of Asean.
Singapore deeply regrets that despite our collective efforts over the past four weeks, this conference was unable to agree on a text that would have enjoyed consensus.
This is deeply disappointing as this is now the third consecutive review conference without an outcome document.
This conference took place amidst a deteriorating international security environment, a growing trust deficit, and heightened nuclear risks that are placing the NPT regime under unprecedented strain.
The NPT is only as meaningful and effective as the actions that states parties take to implement it.
We regret that states parties were not able to demonstrate the political will and spirit of compromise necessary to bridge longstanding differences and to achieve a consensus outcome.
Sustained confidence in the NPT regime requires states parties to demonstrate through their words and actions that they are taking their disarmament and nonproliferation obligations seriously.
All states parties, particularly the nuclear weapon states, must reaffirm and implement the outcomes and commitments agreed at past review conferences.
Nonetheless, we should not interpret the lack of an outcome document at this conference as diminishing the credibility and integrity of the NPT or its review process.
The NPT is the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime and the essential framework underpinning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Remains indispensable to international peace and security.
Singapore wishes to place on record our deep appreciation to Vietnam for its inclusive and consultative approach during this conference.
The president and his team have worked tirelessly to facilitate dialogue, bridge differences, and bring states parties as close as possible to a consensus outcome.
We respect the president's assessment of the discussions that have taken place over the past four weeks and acknowledge the conclusion reached that there was no version of an outcome document that could command consensus, given the clearly divergent positions that remain.
In the face of this setback, Singapore urges all states parties to redouble their efforts and work together in good faith toward a more positive outcome in the next review cycle.
It is in all our interests to preserve and strengthen the NPT.
Singapore remains committed to this endeavor.
I thank you, Mr.
President.
I thank the distinguished representative of Singapore.
I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Japan.
Thank you, Mr.
President.
On behalf of the government of Japan, let me first express our sincere appreciation to you, Mr.
President, and your team for the truly tireless efforts in seeking a consensus outcome for this conference.
I would also like to commend the work done by the chairs of the main committees and subsidiary bodies, co facilitators of the informal consultations on the strengthening of review process, as well as the Secretariat for facilitating the deliberations of states parties during this conference.
Mr.
President, this NPT review conference has been convened at a time when we are confronted with an increasingly severe international security situation and growing nuclear risks and threats posed by nuclear weapons, while at the same time, witnessing growing momentum for nuclear energy.
Under these circumstances, the Japanese delegation spared no effort, including in close cooperation with both NPDI and DUO members, as well as with other like minded state parties toward the success of this conference.
Through the joint statement on disarmament and nonproliferation education, 116 state parties, including Japan, were able to send a strong message on the importance of conveying the realities of the use of nuclear weapons beyond borders and generations.
This demonstrates that countries from various regions and with diverse views can build common ground through joint efforts.
However, it is extremely regrettable that this conference was not able to adopt a final document by consensus.
We also regret that many issues that are of crucial importance to the treaty were not adequately addressed in the latest draft of the final document.
While Japan understands that the paragraph on non compliance covers also North Korea's nuclear issue, Japan strongly calls for the complete dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile program in accordance with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions.
North Korea's unlawful nuclear and missile development is flagrantly challenging the integrity and credibility of the NPT.
We reiterate once again that North Korea cannot have the status of a nuclear weapon state under the treaty.
We also reiterate the importance of ensuring non proliferation through IAA safeguards, notably the additional protocol.
Furthermore, the latest draft did not address the concerns over the nuclear safety and security in Ukraine caused by Russia's aggression and its seizure of Ukraine's Za Polsa nuclear power plant.
Japan reiterates its call for adherence to the seven indispensable pillars and five concrete principles and continues to support the IAA's activities in Ukraine.
Mr.
President, regarding the proposal by the United States to make a decision on the strengthening of review process, currently paragraphs 37 to 43 of the latest draft.
Although the measures contained therein are not perfect, we support retention of these paragraphs in the form of a separate decision to reflect the efforts by the states parties in the past three years in this important area, in particular, transparency and accountability.
I should have said maybe four years.
So for that.
Mr.
President, the NPT is the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation architecture, the basis for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the foundation of our common efforts to achieve a world without nuclear weapons.
Japan as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during war, is and will continue to be a staunch supporter of the NPT.
We will continue to work together with both nuclear weapon states and non nuclear weapon states to maintain and strengthen the NPT regime.
Thank you, Mr.
President.
I thank the distinguished representative of Japan.
I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Belgium.
Mr.
President, Belgium aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union.
Belgium would like to thank you, your team, and the chairs for your collective efforts that have carried us this far.
We also commend the work carried out by Bureau members, the NPT Secretariat, UNDA and the IAEA.
Mr.
President, Belgium deeply regrets that no consensus could be reached on a final outcome document.
Throughout these past four weeks, Belgium engaged constructively and openly in a spirit of compromise.
The draft outcome document was not perfect.
Far from it.
The text did, in certain domains, fall short of previous commitments, notably those made in the 2010 outcome document.
Major challenges to the integrity of the treaty remained entirely or partially unaddressed, such as the major proliferation crisis of the DPRK, the challenging Iranian file, and the risks to nuclear safety and security caused by Russia's war against Ukraine.
However, the text presented positive elements as well.
Amongst others, the commitment of nuclear weapon states to engage actively and openly on their national reports.
Therefore, we support the proposal tabled by the US to adopt this section separately.
We would request that the decision be taken.
This would signify an important step forward in terms of transparency.
Moving forward, we call on all states parties to do their utmost to adhere to and implement the provisions of the treaty and the commitments that were collectively agreed during previous review cycles.
I thank you, Mr.
President.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Belgium.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States.
President Viet and state's Party colleagues, I want to thank President Viet and his entire team.
I thank the other delegations for their good faith engagement, and I would be remiss if I did not recognize the tireless efforts of my own team.
I wish I could also express gratitude for an outcome document honoring the treaty's foundations and guaranteeing its integrity and credibility.
To be clear, the United States was prepared to join the consensus document that was produced in revision four.
Sadly, that is not possible.
Today, states parties were not even allowed to proceed to the option of a consensus because Iran, a prolific treaty violator, has succeeded in holding treaty members hostage.
That is disgraceful and embarrassing, and it deprives the sovereign states parties of their rights under the treaty that they themselves ratified.
I also believe we may have witnessed the end of the relevancy of the review conference process.
It is hard to consider our month here a success.
Time will tell.
To be clear, Iran refuses to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency access and information required by its safeguards agreement and Security Council resolutions.
Iran has stockpiled uranium enrichment to levels with no civilian purpose, and Iran has spent this review conference shirking accountability for its grotesque violations.
I suspect it shocks no one here that Iran, a treaty violator that has signaled capability to develop and desire for a nuclear weapon, does not want to be called out for its violation.
The embarrassment is that other states parties bowed to a violator's demands.
It is a peace in our time moment that we will regret.
We must reaffirm that full compliance is not optional.
Violation must have consequences.
The time to address violators is now.
Sadly, this is not the first time states parties and the treaty review process failed to stop a country from seeking nuclear weapons.
Over 30 years ago, a treaty state parties sought them.
Today, DPRK's nuclear arsenal cast a shadow over the entire Indo Pacific.
We cannot allow Iran to become DPRK 2.0.
Had this conference had the courage to do the right thing by putting forward an outcome document that identified treaty violators, perhaps we could have produced real achievements.
Also respectfully to several delegations, as a colleague of mine reminded me earlier this week, this is called the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, not the nuclear Disarmament Treaty.
While the United States takes its Article 6 obligations incredibly seriously, it raises concerns about whether some states parties understand the core purpose of this treaty.
The answer seems to be, sadly, no, they do not.
Perhaps greater scrutiny on the part of the IAEA of some of Iran's allies is warranted going forward.
While we are on the topic of disarmament, we saw near universal agreement on risk reduction and transparency through concrete measures.
The United States has led and will continue to lead on both, and we hope our colleagues will join us in these efforts.
Perhaps our clearest achievement at this review conference is that the five nuclear weapon states agreed to substantial engagement, including pursuing constructive dialogue that could facilitate future arms control discussions.
As President Trump has repeatedly said, the United States is ready for the next generation of arms control, though through multilateral strategic stability dialogues, and we are happy with the progress made here on that front.
The NPT review conference ends today, but the P five's real work starts today.
I thank my P five colleagues for their efforts, and we will talk again soon.
While this review conference raises concerns about the nonproliferation regime's health, there is some good news on nonproliferation.
We reaffirmed the importance of the IAEA and safeguards compliance.
Indeed, support for the IAEA and its indispensable role was nearly universal, except for, obviously Iran.
Shortly before this review conference, two of the last three states brought their comprehensive safeguard agreements into force.
To Equatorial Guinea, the United States stands ready to assist in any way we can.
We also reaffirmed the importance of access to peaceful uses, both for power and non power applications and recognize the IAEA's technical cooperation program.
We are on the verge of a nuclear renaissance, and we invite others who are responsible non nuclear weapon states to join us.
While we've made some progress at this review conference, some progress is not enough.
We can pretend the absence of an outcome is a setback, or if we remind ourselves that the treaty remains in effect.
And, Mr.
President, in one final word, I wanted to just say that we are grateful for your consideration of the submitted I thank the distinguished representative of the United States.
I now invite the distinguished representative of Canada.
Thank you, Mr.
President.
Prior to my concluding remarks, I would state for the record that Canada supports the motion submitted before the close of this conference to move paragraphs 37 through 43 of PT slash com dot 2026 slash rp.org as sent at 6:35 A.M.
This morning as a separate decision.
Mr.
President, thank you for your leadership through this conference and to the chairs, Secretariat, and interpreters who make our work possible.
This was not an easy conference.
Divisions are painfully real and trust in the review process has been sorely tested.
Canada regrets that consensus was not possible today.
Canada was prepared to support an outcome document despite its obvious and serious flaws because shared agreement still matters for the treaty.
Colleagues, we have said previously that the agreement to extend the treaty in 1995 was a good faith contract, not a gift.
Yet today's outcome avoids hard realities, favoring instead the narrow preferences of the few.
On Iran, the IAA's Board of Governors finding of its longstanding noncompliance are established fact and unambiguous.
Iran can never be permitted to acquire or develop a nuclear weapon.
Any outcome that does not reflect this reality undermines safeguards and disregards the good faith compliance of other non nuclear weapon states.
In this regard, Canada joins others in opposing as inappropriate Iran's election as vice president to this conference.
Canada reiterates its steadfast support for Ukraine.
It is Russia's war of aggression that has created nuclear safety and security risks that threaten the treaty protection of the inalienable right to peaceful uses.
The omission of the IAEAs Director General's seven indispensable pillars leaves a serious gap in our commitment to peaceful uses.
DPRKs expanding nuclear weapons program represents a fundamental failure of the nonproliferation regime.
This conference's inability to include even a basic reference in its draft outcome document is deeply troubling.
On disarmament, we see backtracking on Article 6 alongside resistance to transparency and accountability.
Even modest proposals to improve national reporting are met with evasion, not engagement.
We appreciate the willingness of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom to engage in interactive dialogue.
Canada has listened carefully to states parties and their national security realities, because we must be willing to explain our positions to one another, not only assert them.
At the outset, Canada promised candor and consistency.
That is why Canada says plainly, the primary weight of responsibility for restoring the treaty's credibility rests with the nuclear weapon states.
But responsibility is not abstract.
It is demonstrated in choices.
Some have engaged seriously, in particular the United States that offered multilateral strategic stability talks supported by the United Kingdom and France, while others have worked to obstruct, avoid accountability, and protect narrow interests.
Russia in particular has made concerted efforts over the course of this conference to systematically remove references to the real and serious challenges facing the NPT.
That distinction must be clear.
For too long, non nuclear weapon states have been expected to accept limited concessions in place of real progress.
This position is neither radical nor naive and does not set Canada against our allies.
It is faithful to the treaty itself.
It is simply asking the nuclear weapon states to honor their word.
Canada will do our part to strengthen and defend safeguards in the IEA, to advance disarmament through verification, risk reduction, and other measures, and to advocate for enhanced transparency and accountability.
Canada is invested in this treaty's success, but we cannot accept the lowest common denominator approach, and we will not treat it as the new normal.
Thank you, Mr.
President.
I thank the distinguished representative of Canada.
I now invite the distinguished representative of Germany.
Itself with the statement made by the European Union.
We thank you, Mr.
President, the chairs of the main committees and your whole team, as well as the Secretariat, for your tireless efforts and for guiding us all this far.
We came to this review conference with a realistic approach, but not without the ambition to strengthen this landmark treaty by agreeing on a substantive and forward looking outcome document.
Together with our partners in the Stockhop Initiative, the NPDI and reducing the risk of nuclear conflict, we worked hard to identify elements that could have served as a basis for consensus.
As we underlined in the general debate, in today's tense international environment, strengthening the NPT is more important and at the same time, more difficult than ever.
We experienced difficulties over the past four weeks and indeed, over the entire review cycle.
But we remain clear about the importance of the treaty.
The NPT may be under increasing pressure, but as a landmark treaty, it has prevented nuclear war and stemmed successfully what could have been the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Contribution to international security is huge.
We should therefore all the more work towards preserving and strengthening the NPT.
Importantly, this is not limited to this forum, the review process that takes place continuously where we can make progress in implementing the three pillars in our engagement in and for the IEA in Vienna in multilateral export control or wherever we try to prevent proliferation.
Mr.
President, unfortunately, the conference was unable to agree on language regarding some of the most pressing challenges for the NPT.
Still, those regional issues continue to pose very real challenges for the international community, most notably Iran.
This NPT review conference fell short to express its concerns about the state's party's continued violation of its safeguards obligations under the NPT.
Getting Iran to return to full compliance with its legal obligations from its comprehensive safeguards agreement remains key for the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the future of the NPT.
In a similar in, clear language on the DPRK would have been warranted.
Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, its coercive nuclear rhetoric and development of novel nuclear systems, the violation of existing security assurances and illegal seizure of S PP, which needs to be returned to its rightful owner, and its disregard of the principles for nuclear safety and security displayed in Ukraine would have equally deserved reference in the outcome document.
Having said that, now is the time to look ahead.
We will not give up on our goals and ambitions that we had hoped to realize here.
We will continue to advocate for a new strategic multilateral arms control agreement between the biggest nuclear weapon states, which would not only significantly reduce nuclear risk, but also pave the way for a return to arms control and nuclear disarmament.
We will continue to push for greater transparency by nuclear weapon states.
We will continue to pressure for the implementation of concrete risk reduction measures by all relevant stakeholders.
We will continue to work on strong and effective verification to explore the opportunities offered by new and emerging technologies, to preserve and strengthen the adherence to the nuclear test sub norm, to safeguard and update the existing multilateral export control regimes.
With regard to greater transparency by nuclear weapon states, we support the US proposal to preserve the important results achieved during this conference for strengthening the review process in a separate decision.
Mr.
President, for decades, the NPT has been a very successful treaty in the interest of all of its states parties, stemming nuclear proliferation, setting the framework for substantive nuclear arms reductions, and contributing largely to international stability and security.
We deeply deplore the failure of this review conference to adopt a consensus outcome.
But we would like to underline that this neither affects its legal status nor the strengths of the nuclear nonproliferation norm, nor the practical relevance of the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency as a fundamental component of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, let alone the peaceful uses of nuclear technology which are so important to us and our citizens.
Thank you, Mr.
President.
I thank the distinguished representative of Germany.
I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Ireland speaking on behalf of the Neogenda Coalition.
President, I'll first deliver a statement on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, followed by a statement in a national capacity.
On behalf of the New Agenda Coalition of Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and my own country, Ireland, allow me to thank you and your team, along with the chairs of the main committees and the subsidiary bodies, the Bureau members, and the Secretariat for their work during the last four weeks and in preparation for this conference.
President, you made clear throughout the process your wish to be as inclusive and transparent as possible to ensure all states parties were adequately heard and fairly represented.
You were true to your word.
President, achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons remains the NAC's primary goal.
Throughout this and previous review cycles, we have sought to ensure the full and effective implementation of Article 6 to realize nuclear disarmament.
The NAC act as a responsible and constructive actor.
We have shown flexibility during this conference and across the review cycle.
We have done so to protect the treaty and meaningfully advance disarmament.
However, it is necessary to put on record our view of the draft final text and the wider situation we find ourselves in.
President, in the run up to this conference, we made renewed, concrete proposals to promote the fulfillment of Article 6 obligations and related commitments and ensure that the grand bargain underpinning the NPT is upheld faithfully and effectively.
As our working paper made clear, the status quo is not viable.
This unsatisfactory state of affairs remains largely due to the continued resistance to concrete disarment measures and accountability by the nuclear weapon states.
Throughout this conference, the NAC has made clear that the baseline of our ambition should be the reaffirmation of obligations and commitments, as a minimum, to do no harm to the existing aquiy on disarmament.
In that regard, we welcomed preamble of paragraph five, as well as paragraph three in the final draft text, and the statement that the unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear weapon states to fully implement their obligations and previous commitments remain valid and are essential to the credibility of the treaty.
President, let us be clear.
Nuclear disarmment is a legal obligation.
At the same time, it is a moral and ethical imperative.
We urge good faith discussions in order to achieve progress and tangible follow on actions.
We will continue to advance treaty implementation to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.
Against the backdrop of elevated nuclear risks, we would have expected to see more flexibility from the nuclear weapon states over the course of this conference, particularly given that many non nuclear weapon states demonstrated considerable flexibility throughout the negotiations.
President, we very much regret the insistence of the nuclear weapon states for weakened language on the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.
States parties affirmed their deep concern at these consequences in 2010.
There's no justifiable reason why we could and should not do so again today.
The level of awareness of the humanitarian and interrelated consequences of nuclear weapons has advanced over the years, including through improved scientific understanding and ongoing studies based on updated data and modeling.
Also, the recasting of the draft outcome document of nuclear risk reduction, which complements, but in no way substitutes for nuclear disarmament, in favor of a speculative approach of strategic risk reduction was problematic and opened the door for more conditionalities at the will of nuclear weapon states.
Voluntary measures among the nuclear weapon states to reduce the prospects of nuclear war while necessary are insufficient.
Similarly, language on the CTBT, negative security assurances and on the Middle East on free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and the novel formulation of the complete and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons were disappointing.
In light of all this, the NAC does not consider disarmment language of the draft 2026 outcome document or any caveats concerning the implementation of Article 6 obligations and commitments contained therein as a new baseline or new normal.
The agreed decisions and commitments of 1995, 2000 and 2010 are unaffected.
They are and will continue to be valid until their full and effective implementation.
President, the overall package in the final draft text on enhancing the strengthened review process, notably on new structured in person discussions and exchange of views on the national reports by the nuclear weapon states at the next review conference was disappointing.
An open process embedded in the review cycle and focused in particular on Article 6 would have been preferable.
President, the 11th NPT Review Conference was an opportunity to build on the decisions and commitments of 1995, 2000 and 2010.
The NAC constructive proposals were aimed at increasing dialogue between the nuclear weapon states and non nuclear weapon states and fostering mutual trust and confidence and aim to continue implementation of the treaty.
Fulfillment of disarmament obligation should not be conditioned by a security context, nor can we wait for a speculative state of so called strategic stability to progress.
Collective, constructive, and bold leadership is required, especially from all nuclear weapon states.
The achievement of concrete and identifiable measures in line with the nuclear weapon states unequivocal undertaking to realize the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals can no longer be deferred.
We will remain resolute in our determination as members of the New Agenda coalition individually and collectively to realize that goal.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Ireland speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition.
I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Norway.
President, I take the floor to express our deep regret at the outcome today.
We regret that this conference is not able to acknowledge serious compliance concern.
Acknowledgment is the first step to resolving a problem.
The fact that DPRK's pursuit of nuclear weapons is not mentioned is appalling.
If we cannot even agree to mention the most serious compliance case in the history of our convention, we are in deep trouble.
Russia's intransigence on this issue is leading us down a very troubled path.
It forms a part of a pattern.
Russia keeps prosecuting its war of aggression in Ukraine, issuing ever more dangerous nuclear threats and signaling, attacking and occupying nuclear power plants, leading to severe risk for nuclear safety and security.
Yet we were not able to mention this in our final draft document either.
The fact of Iran's blatant noncompliance with its safeguard obligations pursuant to Article 3 of the NPT was woefully insufficiently addressed in the draft outcome document.
Yet Iran again shows its reticence to work together to resolve this issue and fuel the very real concern that the NPT community rightfully has.
President, although, the NPT is strong, it's being implemented every day by the IAEA and the state parties who comply with their safeguard agreements, contributing to a world safer for all.
With an agreement on this outcome document, we would have had a basis for progress.
We would have had a commitment to much needed dialogue among the nuclear weapon states to reduce risks and start clearing the way towards arms control.
We would have finally taken a step towards on transparency, albeit a very limited one with a mechanism that could help the non nuclear weapon states better understand the nuclear weapon state, engage, and build confidence.
The last is still possible.
Precedent, we would like to end by taking you and thanking you and your team for your honest and persistent efforts to bring us to a landing zone.
You have been transparent.
You have been listening.
You have provided the space for all to engage.
You have gone above and beyond to clear the path to success.
But ultimately, this outcome is the responsibility of the state parties.
We leave this conference with a sense of deep regret.
This outcome is not up to the challenges we collectively face.
Tomorrow is the beginning of a new review cycle with new opportunities.
We will work hard to contribute to a meaningful outcome at the next review conference.
Finally, let me on behalf of Iceland and my own country, Norway, express our support for the US motion on strengthening the review process as drafted in OP 37 to 43.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Norway.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Ghana.
Mr.
President, Ghana aligns itself with the statement of the non aligned movement and the Africa Group and expresses profound gratitude to you for your steadfast, honest, and stellar leadership of the 12th Review Conference of the NPT.
Our thanks equally go to Ambassador Omar of Kazakhstan and Ambassador Buchen of Finland, chairs of the main committees, two and three respectively, for the great cooperation we enjoyed during the period of our work.
We also wish to register our appreciation to the Secretariat for their professionalism and dedication to duty throughout this review cycle.
Ghana joins other delegations in expressing its deepest disappointment over the failure of the 20 26th Review Conference of the Treaty on the non proliferation of nuclear weapons to achieve consensus on an outcome document.
Having had the honor of serving as chair of the third session of the preparatory committee and as chair of main Committee one during this review cycle, we had hoped that the extensive consultations, constructive engagement, and considerable efforts undertaken throughout the cycle would have produced a consensus outcome.
Whilst we fully recognize the challenging international security environment in which this review conference took place, such circumstances should not serve as reason for paralysis, but rather as a reminder of the agency of collective action.
The treaty itself was negotiated at a time of profound global tensions and nuclear uncertainty.
When the risks of international peace and security were acute.
It was precisely because of those dangers that states choose dialogue over confrontation and cooperation over disagreements.
In the same spirit, we believe that today's challenges should reinforce rather than weaken our shared commitment to the objective of the treaty.
Mr.
President, going to supportse the proposal to adopt the paragraphs on the strengthened review process as a separate decision as this will help preserve important institutional and procedural progress achieved during this review cycle for the next review cycle.
Notwithstanding the challenges facing consensus on the outcome document.
In conclusion, Ghana remains firmly committed to continued engagement with all state parties in advancing dialogue, mutual understanding, and the full implementation of the treaty across these three pillars.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Ghana.
I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Switzerland.
Mr.
President, Switzerland would like to convey its sincere thanks to you for your tireless and genuine efforts in trying to bridge deep differences between state parties over the past four weeks.
You assumed a difficult task in even more difficult times.
Our appreciation extend to your team, to the chairs of the main committees and subsidiary bodies, their teams, and the highly capable Secretariat.
Mr.
President, the purpose of the NPT, as stated in its first preamblear paragraph is clear, avert the devastation of nuclear war.
These are not empty words.
They engage our collective responsibility.
The risk of nuclear weapons being used, again, whether by accident, miscalculation, or by design, has increased in recent years.
A consensus outcome acknowledging these risks and reaffirming our commitment to reduce them was the bare minimum this conference should have achieved.
Mr.
President, Switzerland deeply regrets that a substantive consensus outcome could not be achieved.
The issues we discussed during this conference will not disappear.
Concrete steps are still needed across all three pillars, advancing nuclear disarmament, strengthening nonproliferation, and reinforcing access to peaceful uses.
A third consecutive review conference without a consensus outcome is serious.
It exposes deep political divides, puts pressure on the credibility of the treaty and undermines our ability to strengthen and sustain the review process.
These challenges must be addressed if the treaty is to remain credible.
Mr.
President, in this regard, Switzerland would like to react to the proposal for an SRP only decision.
The preservation of paragraphs 37 to 43 of the latest draft outcome version would allow for constructive private discussions on a trial basis at the next review conference, thus improving transparency and accountability.
At this late stage and despite the lack of a consensus outcome document, Switzerland supports the proposal as a minimal forward looking step.
Mr.
President, let me finish by stating once again and along many other delegations, that the absence of an agreed outcome document does not affect existing obligations.
They remain fully valid and must be honored.
This especially applies in the area of nuclear disarmament, where progress has been insufficient in recent years, and renewed commitments are urgently needed.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Switzerland.
I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea.
Mr.
President, at the outset, I'd like to express my sincere appreciation to you and your team for your tireless endeavor throughout the process.
Looking back on the intense discussions we had the past four weeks, it is regrettable that we were unable to reach consensus on the final documents.
The lack of consensus, however, should not be interpreted as a failure of this review conference itself.
Throughout this conference, state parties engage meaningfully and constructively to uphold and strengthened ampute regime, identify areas of convergence, and make our collective voice heard on issues of common concern.
Through various revision of the draft final documents, meaningful areas of convergence had been painstakingly built through sustained engagement and compromise among state parties.
These hard earned elements of consensus should not be overlooked.
Even without a consensus outcome, this conference provided a meaningful opportunity to reaffirm our shared commitment to NPT and its three mutually reinforcing pillars.
Nevertheless, my delegation remains gravely concerned that the last revised outcome document does not fully reflect the very proposes and the spirit of the NPT.
In particular, we deeply regret that the document was not able to convey even a simple message on the DPRK nuclear issue.
Such a message could have reaffirmed the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
The fact that the DPRK cannot have the status of a nuclear weapon state under the NPT and the importance of resolving this issue through negotiations and diplomacy.
This is especially regrettable, given the direct implications of the issue for the credibility and integrity of the NPT and the international nonproliferation regime.
I once again would like to recall that throughout this review conference, a large number of state parties reaffirmed that the DPRK nuclear issue remains a serious challenge to the integrity and credibility of the ET regime.
It is our common responsibility to consistently send an equivocal message against the DPRK's nuclear program.
The Republic of Korea remains firmly committed to the complete denuclearization and lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula.
Recognizing the realities on the ground, we will continue to pursue a phased approach toward denuclearization.
Mr.
President, in spite of different views and priorities, no one can deny the values and benefits of the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime and as an essential foundation for the post peaceful use of nuclear energy.
The absence of a final document should not diminish our determination to uphold and strengthen the ampay regime.
The treaty does exist, and so does our compliance.
We should take this opportunity to renew our commitment to empate regime and translate our commitment into meaningful action.
Korea holds a firm view that the full and balanced implementation of the treaty is essential to sustain the global nonproliferation regime.
We stand ready to work closely with all it parties to advance our shared goals of international peace, security and a world free of nuclear weapons.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Cambodia.
Mr.
President, Cambodia aligned itself with a statement delivered respectively by Indonesia and the Philippines on behalf of the non aligned movement, and Asean, and I wish to address Cambodian national statement.
My delegation wishes to express our sincere appach and appreciation to you, Mr.
President, to the chairs of Main committee and the dedicated team behind this review conference for the professionalism, patience, and constructive spirit to facilitate dialogues among state parties under challenging circumstances.
As a small and peace loving country, Cambodia touch great importance to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons as not only the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmment and nonproliferation region, but also the essential foundation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
We underscore the cont necessity of advancing nuclear disarment efforts with the ultimate objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
Cabo emphasize the imperative of maintaining dialogue, mutual trust, and constructive engagement among state parties.
In the current international environment, strengthening multilaterlism and preserving open channels of communication are essential for advancing shared security and common understanding.
In conclusion, Cambodia remains committed to working constructively with all state parties to strengthen the regional process and to advance the objectives of treaty in a balanced, inclusive, and forward looking manner.
I thank you, Mr.
President.
I thank the distinguished representative of Cambodia.
I now invite the distinguished representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
Thank you, Mr.
President.
Thank you to you personally and also to your team for your leadership.
I will be brief and not trouble you with previously shared positions which remain valid.
In addition to the statement as delivered by the European Union, I would like to deliver the following remarks in my national capacity.
Mr.
President, we would like to support the motion proposed by the United States to preserve what was negotiated regarding strengthening the review process as reflected in the P 37 to 43.
And we support the decision by this conference today to that effect.
We think this would bring us the much needed enhancement and transparency and accountability.
It's far from perfect, but still worthwhile to be preserved and to be applied during the next review cycle.
Let me conclude by again thanking you and the Secretariat for your tireless efforts to guide us through the last four weeks.
I thank you for giving me the floor.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Netherlands.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Argentina.
Mr.
President, let me express the Art and delegations very candid recognition for all your efforts, your intensive negotiations, your skills, your experience, but more importantly, your transparency in conducting not only the work of the R Conference, but all the months in the preparations for this R conference and to the efforts you put to achieve consensus documents.
We appreciate that and we recognize your leadership.
Also, we would like to recognize the efforts and the work of the three chairs of the main committees as well as the professionalism of the Secretariat.
The other hand, we deeply regret that this review conference was unable to adopt a final document by consensus.
However, this does not diminish the fact that as requested by the treaty, I believe that all member states that we have participated in this review conference during the last four weeks, we have realized the assessment about the status of the implementation of all provisions of the treaty under all three pillars by all member states.
In fact, this is the requirement that the treaty pose on member states to do it on a regular basis.
Because we have done these evaluations, we member states, we have taken note of the situation in which the treaty is as of today, and we have to recognize that the shape and situation of the treaty is not the best and it's not the one that we all wishes.
The diagnostic that we all member states are going to take back to our capitals will reflect and shows the fractured points, the conflicts that we're facing, the lack of progress on the implementation of many of those provisions, but more importantly, who is not compliant with the obligations under the treaty.
That is very clear and some delegations made it also even more clear during these statements, and that is very clear.
But now what lies ahead for all member states is the task to identify how we collectively, we're going to be working during the next review cycle in order to find, if possible, the different processes and actions, concrete actions that we can take to modify this situation because it's clear at least to this delegation that if we continue in this situation, the erosion of the treaty will be upon us.
And with that respect, we believe that we also as a member states, we have to review and even modify the framework and the dynamics of the REO process.
We cannot continue to do our work as business as usual because the circumstances have changed and the global geopolitics have changed.
For example, the Arstan delegations believe that Having only two prepcos will be more than enough to prepare for the review conference and that the work of the review conference itself could be done in three weeks instead of four.
But now obviously this is something that member states need to consider and we hope that we can do it during the next review conference.
But also, we believe that the review process have to be strengthened, but in particular regarding to the submission of the reports and transparency about the information provided in those reports.
And therefore, the Aran delegations support the proposals made by the EU delegations.
To conclude, let me reaffirm the Argentinian government's full commitment with all obligations, its obligations under the treaty, and that the Republic still believes this is a treaty that we have to preserve and we have to strengthen.
Again, I thank the distinguished representative of Argentina.
I give the floor now to the distinguished representative of France.
Mr.
President, I align with the statement of the European Union and wish to deliver the following remarks on behalf of France.
I wish to warmly congratulate you and your team, Mr.
President, as well as the Secretariat and all the committee chairs for your endeavor and all the work done.
France's unwavering commitment to the treaty to reaffirming its authority and centrality to the success of this conference has been demonstrated by the participation for the first time since 1995 of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
France regrets that an agreement could not be reached on the draft final documents.
The latest draft documents that you circulated to member states offered, in our view, a very good basis for building consensus within this conference.
We regret that the conference was therefore unable to take a decision on this text.
Mr.
President, the success of the NPT cannot be measured solely by the adoption of a final text.
The treaty remains the cornerstone of nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament and the only instrument capable of fulfilling these objectives.
Nevertheless, several steps forward were taken during this conference with the five nuclear weapon states expressing a clear commitment to First, to launch a substantive dialogue to build confidence and reduced strategic risks.
Second, to examine risk reduction measures that can contribute directly to disarmament efforts.
On these two points, France will continue to play its full part in this work, particularly through its chairmanship of the P five process, which it will assume starting this summer.
Added to this are the advances made in strengthening the review process and transparency.
We note that there is a strong commitment to continue in this direction.
France will continue to take the initiative on these issues as we have done with the preparation and presentation of our national report during the current cycle.
We support the United States proposal to adopt a targeted decision on strengthening the review cycle.
Mr.
President, France regrets the proliferation crisis have not been sufficiently highlighted.
First, regarding Iran, France calls on Iran to comply without delay with its international obligations arising in particular from the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
In close cooperation with its E three partners, it will continue to support the diplomatic efforts underway to conclude a robust and lasting agreement, ensuring that Iran never acquires nuclear weapons.
Next, regarding North Korea, France issued on behalf of 86 state parties and the European Union, a joint statement on the North Korean nuclear challenge during the review conference.
It is therefore essential that state parties provide full support to the IAEA in the implementation of its mandates.
Finally, France emphasizes its deep concern regarding the maintenance of nuclear safety and security in Ukraine following Russia's war of aggression waged since 2022.
We will continue to fully support the IAEAs work in these regards.
Mr.
President, our conference has demonstrated the full commitment of the state parties to this treaty, despite the difficulties it faces.
I would like to thank you on behalf of France and reiterate my country's full readiness to continue working to strengthen the treaty.
I thank you, Mr.
President.
I thank the distinguished representative of France.
I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the State of Palestine.
Thank you.
We thank you, Mr.
President and your team for all your efforts and for your unflinching commitment to advance and uphold multilateral disarmament commitments.
The state of Palestine remains fully committed to the amptee and to a world free of nuclear weapons.
We regret that once again, no consensus was reached.
However, we continue to affirm that the elimination of nuclear weapons is not only illegal and a moral obligation, but is also long overdue.
No country on Earth, including nuclear weapon states should possess nuclear weapons, no exception and no exceptionalism.
No Israel in the Middle East and not anybody else anywhere else in the world.
As long as existing agreements are not met and obligations are selectively upheld, and as long as some states are not parties to the NPT, as long as nuclear tests continue to be carried out and nuclear weapons modernized and vertical and horizontal proliferation do not cease.
As long as Israel continues to enjoy exception and as long as the 1995 resolution in the Middle East remains unfulfilled and the language is unambiguous, and as long as we are not decisively moving towards total nuclear disarmament, the world will not be safe.
Throughout this conference and the former ones, the non nuclear weapon states have been pleading, appealing, calling, and demanding the bare minimum to advance towards this objective of nuclear disarmament.
We have continually warned that the further we move from consensus, the farthest we become from the guardrails of universality, non proliferation, nuclear disarmament, nuclear weapon free zones, security assurances, safeguards and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
We recall that the strength of the treaty lies in its totality in the commonwealth to move together.
The lack of consensus does not absolve states parties, especially nuclear weapon states of their legal obligations, nor weaken the efficacy of the ampT.
While maintaining and stressing that the amp is the cornerstone of disarmament, the failure to achieve consensus confirms the relevance and the just nature of the TPNW and we call on all states who have not joined the TPNW to do so.
The state of Palestine recalls that nuclear weapons are the most destructive and indiscriminate weapons of all.
Choosing not to eliminate them is placing every civilian on Earth and indeed our planet in harm's way.
There's a growing and powerful sense of urgency to rid the world of nuclear weapons.
We either maintain our course and live on the hope that no nuclear catastrophe will befall us or work for real change.
To those who perceive that possession of nuclear weapons as vital to their security, we say that the biggest security threat we all collectively face is the presence of these nuclear weapons.
Nuclear deterrence is an oxymoron.
Nuclear weapons deter nothing but our collective security and safety.
Finally, despite and in spite of the lack of consensus, our commitment and that of many in this room towards a world free of nuclear weapons remains intact.
It is an integral part to the fundamental objective of promoting peace and security as per the charter, its purpose and principles, and we shall continue to work towards achieving this goal.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of the State of Palestine.
I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Spain.
Thank you very much, Mr.
President.
Spain aligns itself with the European Union statement.
And in our national capacity, Spain would like to extend our deepest appreciation to you and to your team, as well as the chairs of the main committees.
And if you allow, especially the chair of Main Committee one with whom I've had the privilege to work during this conference, as well as the NPT Secretariat for your leadership, inclusive approach, and tireless efforts during the past weeks and months to ensure a successful 11th Review Conference.
Spain regrets that despite efforts deployed by numerous delegations, the conference has not been able to reach consensus on the last revised draft of the final document.
Especially due to cases of noncompliance, which have eloquently been referred to by other delegations and I will not go into.
There is much work to be done in the next review cycle.
Spain will continue to work constructively to attain the much needed progress towards the much needed progress, sorry.
Spain supports the proposal put forward by the US to separate paragraphs 37 to 43 related to strengthening the review process from the ref draft of the final document as a separate decision.
As others have done before us, Spain notes that the US delegation has sought to table this proposal before proceedings closed.
Improvements that lead towards a more efficient review process are very much needed and would contribute to strengthening this treaty.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Shear.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Spain.
I give the floor to the distinguished Representative of Ireland.
President Arland in lines with the statements of the European Union and the New Agenda Coalition.
First, I would like to extend our particular thanks to you and your team for the tireless work that you've done.
Thank you also to the Secretariat, the chairs of the main committees and subsidiary bodies and the Bureau.
It's a matter of regret that we've managed not managed to achieve an outcome document.
It would have been a welcome political signal about the central importance of this treaty if we could have demonstrated the potential of multilateralism in spite of the countervailing geopolitical situation to advance our common peace and security interests.
Let me make three points on the outcome document that did not achieve consensus.
First, we were clear all along that the reaffirmation of existing commitments was the floor of our ambition, not the ceiling.
Put another way, we should do no harm to the treaty's disarmament provisions and its as yet unfilled commitments.
We welcome that the reaffirmation of the validity of previous commitments of the nuclear weapon states was included in the final revision of the text.
It's a shame we couldn't build on this.
We do not consider that the disarment language of the draft 2026 outcome document or any caveats concerning the implementation of Article 6 obligations and commitments contained therein are the new baseline or the new normal.
The norm against nuclear weapons testing must be upheld.
Humanitarian consequences must continue to inform and to give urgency to our work based on the latest information.
The agreed decisions and commitments of 1995, 2000 and 2010 are unaffected.
They are and will continue to be valid until their full and effective implementation.
Second, we note that the review Conference was not able to deal with the real challenges that face us with respect to international law, including proliferation and the safety and security of nuclear facilities in conflict.
In particular, we regret that we could not reflect the findings of the IAEA, one of the treaties organs on Iran's noncompliance with its safeguards agreements, the DPRK's illegal nuclear weapons program and testing, and Russia's nuclear threats in its w of aggressionst Ukraine and the illegal seizure of Ukraine's Zaporiz nuclear power plant.
Third, on transparency and accountability on which we have been pleased to work over this review cycle.
While the final language in the draft outcome document was disappointing, at this late stage and under these circumstances, we would support the proposal made in this session for an SRP related standalone decision.
That would allow for constructive, if private discussions at the next review conference so that we could then build on them for a mechanism to ensure interactive, open discussion on the national reports of all nuclear weapon states on an equal basis in a manner that would be credible and would add value to our deliberations on the implementation of the nuclear weapon states unequivocal undertakings on Article 6.
As you said, President, making the treaty fit for purpose in a rapidly changing world.
President, thank you again for all of your efforts.
I thank the distinguished representative of Ireland.
That was the last speaker on my list.
I have been informed that a state party has requested the floor in exercise of the right of reply.
I give the floor to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Thank you, Mr.
President.
My delegation would like to dedicate its final right of reply at this review conference, not to dignify the observed allegations made by the representative of the United States and a few Western countries with a response.
If international law and the NPT were genuinely upheld, the United States and its allies would today be sitting in this hall as the violators, not portraying themselves as guardians of the NPT.
However, we would like to place certain facts on the record.
Iran was the initiator of the idea of establishing a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East as early as 1968.
Iran was also the state that formally requested on July 15th, 1974, the inclusion of the item entitled, establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in the region of the Middle East in the provisional agenda of the 29th session of the United Nations General Assembly.
Iran has consistently and actively participated in all efforts towards the establishment of such a zone, including the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
Iran is the only a state whose highest religion authority who was martyred in a joint attack carried out by the US and the Israeli regime issued a fatwa explicitly prohibiting nuclear weapons.
Despite the assassination of its nuclear scientists, Iran has continued to pursue peaceful nuclear activities under safeguards.
Iran is subject to the most extensive and rigorous IAEA inspections in the world.
Despite more than two decades of sanctions and pressure, Iran has consistently maintained the peaceful nature of its nuclear program.
Despite two unlawful attacks on its peaceful nuclear facilities, Iran has maintained the peaceful nature of its program.
Iran remains the only country subjected simultaneously to sanctions, assassinations, sabotage, military attacks, and extraordinary political pressure while still maintaining the peaceful nature of its nuclear program.
Iran has paid far higher price for not pursuing nuclear weapons than some others have paid while actually possessing them, and yet, according to the IAA itself, not even 1 gram of Iran's nuclear material has been diverted from peaceful purposes.
Mr.
President, what more must a state do to demonstrate its commitment to the treaty? If all of these does not constitute the highest level of commitment to the treaty, then one must ask, what does commitment mean? Mr.
President, it should be recalled that the United States and its protege, the Israeli regime, used in the past a weak and non consensual resolution of the board of Governor as a pretext for unlawful attacks against Iran and its peaceful safeguarded nuclear facilities.
We could not allow language in a consensus outcome document to be similarly exploited to justify further unlawful attacks and acts of aggression.
Finally, I ask all allegations that raise baseless allegations against Iran.
What answer will you give to your own conscience and to future generations.
When asked why on the eve of the NPT review conference, Iran's peaceful safeguarded nuclear facilities were attacked two s.
Yet instead of condemning those unlawful attacks and holding the perpetrators accountable, you choose instead to condemn the victims.
I thank you, Mr.
President.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Distinguished delegates on the proposal by the United States to transfer paragraphs 37 through 43 from the draft outcome document on strengthening the review process into a separate decision.
Having listened to statements by delegations, it does not seem that we have consensus on this issue.
Therefore, such decision is not adopted.
Before I conclude, I wish to thank the Secretariat, the conference management, facilities management, and the security for providing additional personnel and resources to support the extension of this meeting.
I now declare the 2026 Review conference of the parties to the Trey on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons closed.