(Main Committee II) Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, the meeting is called to order.
I declare open the force meeting of main Committee two of the 2026 Review conference of the parties to the treaty on the non proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Excellencies, distinguished delegates, you have received a draft final document from the president contained in document pt slash dot 2026 slash CRP dot two, allocating the following paragraphs for discussion to main Committee two and subsidiary B two, Preambula paragraphs Rome 11 14, and this 15, paragraph one and three, paragraphs 4 to 22, paragraphs 74 to 79, and paragraphs 83 to 85.
Subsidiary body will consider elements of this paragraphs relevant to the original issues, including with respect to the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution.
Delegations are reminded that our task in this meeting is to discuss the specific paragraphs allocated to this committee by the president.
To avoid a duplication of work, I would ask delegations to remain focused on the paragraphs assigned to this committee and to avoid discussing paragraphs assigned to other committees or subsidiary bodies.
I now invite delegations to provide their views on the draft final outcome document relevant for the main committee and to put forward any proposals they may have.
Please send your written statements and comments on the draft to the email address PT at un.org.
Emails sent to this address should clearly state in the subject line that the email contains written comments on the zero draft outcome document and identify that your comments relate to main committee two.
As a reminder, the time limit for group statements is 8 minutes and 5 minutes for national statements.
There will be a timer shown on the screen indicating 1 minute before the microphone will be cut off.
I kindly ask delegations to inform the Secretariat in advance if they are speaking on behalf of a group so that we can be sure to allocate sufficient time.
Delegations are also asked to provide statements in case they have them available for the interpretation services by sending them to the email address, etments at un.org.
The email should clearly indicate in the subject line, NPT review conference, main Committee to and delegation name.
Finally, delegations are requested to please inform the Secretariat as soon as possible if they wish to exercise their right of reply.
Rights of reply will be heard at the end of this meeting.
Those delegations that wish to take the floor are requested to press the button in front of you at this time.
We will proceed in the order in which requests for the floor are received with priority given to the groups.
The first speaker I have on my list Let me see.
The first speaker on my list is the representative of Kazakhstan on behalf of the Central Asia nuclear weapon free zone, followed by France on behalf of a group of states.
Kazakhstan, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
I'm speaking on behalf of the Central Asia state parties, namely Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
We would like to appreciate you and the Secretariat for preparing the first draft As it has already been admitted, regional cooperation remains an essential dimension of the nonproliferation regime.
Nuclear weapon free zones constitute effective instruments for strengthening confidence and regional stability.
Their effectiveness depends on the ratification of relevant protocols.
Stronger interzonal cooperation and establishment of new zones.
Our delegations have expressed the importance of this document.
At the general debate last week, we have also mentioned that in our deliberations during this committee.
Since the protocol on the Simipolatins Treaty has not entered into force, we would kindly request that the following paragraph be included in the draft outcome report.
The conference calls the ratification by nuclear weapon states of the protocol to the treaty on a nuclear weapon free zone in Central Asia.
We will also submit these texts to the Secretariat shortly.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Kazakhstan for the statement.
The next speaker I have on my list is the representative of France, on behalf of the group of states.
Followed by Belgium.
France, you have the floor.
President Mr.
Chair, I have the honor of delivering the speech about the North Korean nuclear file on behalf of 82 countries and the European Union, the full list is available on the relevant webage.
We state parties to the Trey on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and PT express our grave concern over The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's DPRK continues buildup of its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs, including continued ballistic missile launches, as well as recent ballistic missile launches that the DPRK claims involved hypersponic systems, the DPRKs nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, and ballistic missile programs pose a grave and urgent threat to regional and international peace and security and undermine the global nonproliferation regime.
They are in clear violation of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions which decide that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons existing programs and any other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs in a complete verifiable and irreparible manner.
This challenge remains central to the NPT and the work of this review conference.
We strongly condemn the DPRKs continued nuclear activities in defiance of its international obligations as outlined, in the International Atomic Energy Agency's Director General's most recent safeguards report and statements and call on the DPRK to immediately stop all nuclear related activities and any efforts to expand or modify its nuclear facilities.
We express serious concerns over the ongoing fissile material production activities in the DPRK, which comprise both plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment.
Hello.
These programs are dedicated to the stated objective of exponentially increasing the DPRKs nuclear weapons.
We also express serious concerns over the DPRK's continued irresponsible and destabilizing nuclear rhetoric which accompanies its nuclear buildup.
We condemn the continued escalatory actions taken by the DPRK in accelerating its unlawful ballistic missile program that poses a threat to neighboring countries and undermines regional and international peace and security.
We urge the DPRK to reverse course and to take concrete steps towards completely abandoning all nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and related programs, and to immediately cease all related activities in accordance with all relevant UNSC resolutions.
We urge the DPRK not to conduct any additional nuclear tests and to immediately cease taking further destabilizing steps in violation of relevant UNSC resolutions.
We reiterate our steadfast commitment to the objective of the DPRKs return at an early date to in full compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards as well as its international obligations under UNSC resolutions.
Only these concrete steps will ensure the preservation of regional and international peace and security and that the international nuclear nonproliferation regime of which the NPT is the cornerstone is upheld.
Expressing our firm conviction on the maintenance of the international regime on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, we reaffirm that the DPRK cannot have the status of a nuclear weapon state in accordance with the NPT as stated in UNSC resolution 17 18 and 18 74 and the final document of the 2010 review conference of the parties to the NPT.
We remain concerned by statements or actions by others that support, accept or refer to the DPRK's nuclear weapons program as a closed issue.
We reaffirm our commitment to the international nonproliferation regime, and we urge all UN member states to exercise strict vigilance over potential proliferation to and from the DPRK We regret that the UN Security Council did not agree to renew the mandate of the UN DPRK Panel of Experts on the 28th of March 2024, making our ability to hold the DPRK to account even more difficult.
We reiterate that we will, nonetheless, continue to fully implement relevant UNSC resolutions and call on all UN member states to uphold their nonproliferation commitments and fully implement all UNSC sanctions.
We encourage and support all efforts to facilitate the full implementation of relevant UNSC resolutions.
To this end, we commit to further strengthening international cooperation.
We continue to support all efforts to resume dialogue through proactive de escalation and confidence building measures aiming to achieve sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula and call on the DPRK to accept the repeated offers of dialogue put forward by all parties concerned, including the United States, the Republic of Korea and Japan for meaningful diplomacy and negotiations.
We are committed to working with all relevant partners toward sustainable peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.
Mr.
Chair, I thank you.
I thank Ambassador of France for the statement on behalf of the Group of States.
Next on my list is Belgium, followed by China.
Belgium, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Let me express through you our gratitude to the president for providing us with this draft outcome document which contains many good elements and is certainly a very good basis for further discussion and adaptation where necessary.
Of course, these are some preliminary views.
We are still studying the text in detail.
Let me first refer to a couple of positive elements that we like to underscore.
The text is quite good on the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
I would also note the encouragement to adhere to the additional protocol.
These additional protocols are indeed a crucial tool to control possible undeclared nuclear materials.
We also welcome the inclusion of the important proliferation issues of Iran and DPRK nuclear files.
Going into the text, more specifically paragraph four on the IAA, we think this paragraph can be strengthened by also expressing consideration of the importance of the impartial, independent and objective role of the IAEA.
Chair, it is important that the conference does not skewer over non compliance issues.
In this regard, we welcome the attention given to the Iran nuclear file in paragraph seven.
However, we feel that this paragraph needs some strengthening.
There is, for instance, no reference to the Security Council resolutions that creates obligations for all member states.
Iran is in breach of these resolutions.
We also would like to include reference to the fact that Iran must never be allowed to seek or acquire a nuclear weapon.
Chair, regarding paragraph 22, last sentence, we believe the language could be turned around to express the positive role that supplier arrangements and export guidelines play in safeguarding legitimate trade in nuclear goods and technology.
We also note that this paragraph does not deal with the severe implications of illegal war on the implementation of safeguards.
Language will be provided in this regard.
Now, turning to paragraph 78 in the North Korean nuclear file.
We also think that this paragraph provides a very good basis, but should be further strengthened.
Given the expansion of the nuclear and ballistic missile program of DPRK, it appears to be a bit of an understatement to simply express concern.
The conference should send a stronger message that DPRK must abandon its illegal programs.
Moreover, the crucial issue of nuclear testing seems to be missing from this paragraph.
DPRK should be called upon to refrain from further testing and to undertake to undertake steps to sign and ratify the CTBT.
I thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
I thank distinguished representative of Belgium for the statement and for kind words addressed to the president.
The next speaker I have on my list is the representative of China, followed by South Africa.
China, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Through also wish to thank the President, Ambassador John Hong Yan for draft through outcome documents circulated yesterday, China is carefully studying this document.
From the preliminary point of view, the test is the basis of further discussion by all parties and its overall structure achieves a balanced consideration of the three pillars of nuclear disarm nuclear nopliferation, and peaceful use of nuclear energy.
However, there are still shortcomings in this test.
One, it does not adequately reflect the profound impact that certain super nuclear power strengthening of nuclear alliances, expansion of military and security cooperation, and undermining of strategic stability have on three pillars of the NPT.
Two, it does not send a sufficiently strong signal regarding the safeguarding the authority of the NPT, nor does it explicitly correct the erroneous words and actions of certain countries seeking to independently acquire nuclear weapons or threatening to use of force against nuclear facilities.
Three, it does not reflect consensus upholding the principle, maintain global strategic stability, advancing nuclear disarmment in a step by step manner, nor does it emphasize the special and primary responsibility of countries possessing the larges nuclear arsenals for nuclear disarmment.
Today, in the light of the divisional work of Main Committee two, I wish to forward China's views and proposals on paragraph relating to nuclear nonproliferation, including but not limited to the following points.
Regarding paragraph three, the draft test only makes a principled statement on non compliance does not reflect the new challenges posed to the NPT and international nuclear nonproliferation regime by remarks from politicians and other figures in certain non nuclear states advocating the possession of nuclear weapons.
It is recommended that IEA and NPT review process assess the risk of nuclear weapon acquisition by the countries concerned and urge those countries with such remarks have been made to provide clarification and explanation.
Countries facing a serious imbalance between the supply and demand of nuclear materials, the IEA should also promptly strengthen its safeguards and oversight arrangement, establish risk early warning mechanism, and deter potential noncompliance.
Regarding paraing on the issue of increasing cooperation involving naval nuclear reactors, P is particularly concerned about the serious nuclear proliferation risk arising from the transfer highly enriched Iranion under the submarine cooperation among the US, UK, and Australia, as well as the ability of existing safeguard system of IEA to effectively implement oversight.
It is recommended that within the framework, the NPT review process and IEA, the safeguards and oversight issues related to such cooperation be discussed through a transparent, open, inclusive intergovernmental process with decision to be made by consensus regarding paragraph 21st, the statement states on taken not to transfer source material.
It is insufficient to fully reflect the need for strict control.
It is recommended to explicitly require that states refrain from transferring weapon grades.
Nuclear materials, technologies and equipment intended for military purposes to non nuclear weapons so as to close potential loopholes for nuclear proliferation.
Regarding paragraph 76 and 85, another related paragraph is recommended for consideration be given to reasonable concerns of Arab countries and 1995 resolution on the Middle East.
Relevant nuclear states and countries in the region should should actively participate in the process on the conference and establishment Middle East Zone nuclear weapons and other weapon of mass destruction.
We urge Israel to accede to the treaty NPT as a non nuclear weapon states and early date and place all its nuclear facilities on the safeguard of IEA.
Regarding P two, in view of the we believe that it's better to be discussed on this main committee.
Just like we've heard this morning, many state parties, have deep concerns over nuclear sharing.
It is recommended that we further strengthen the language on Part two and urge the relevant states to abolish nuclear sharing and extended deterrence arrangements and to withdraw all nuclear weapons deployed abroad back to their national territories.
Nuclear weapons should not be deployed in non nuclear weapon states, nor should nuclear weapons related infrastructure be established in such states.
States participating in nuclear sharing and standard deterrence arrangement should reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national and collective security policies, including refraining from further upgrading existing arrangements and from conducting nuclear related military exercises or nuclear information exchanges.
Mr.
Chair, China will further elaborate on its views and proposed amendments in subsequent discussions in the main committees and subsidiary bodies so as to play a constructive role in promoting consultations on outcome documents.
Thank you very much.
I thank distinguished representative of China for the statement and warm words addressed to the president.
Next speaker is South Africa, followed by Canada, South Africa, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
My delegation wishes to express its appreciation to the president and his team for the timely presentation of the zero draft outcome document, as well as for the extensive efforts undertaken to provide a substantive basis for our deliberations at this early stage of the conference.
We fully recognize the complexity of this undertaking, particularly in the current international security environment, where considerable care and balance are required to reflect the diverse perspectives, priorities, and concerns of state parties.
South Africa is currently undertaking a careful review of the zero draft document.
Nevertheless, we remain fully committed to engaging constructively pragmatically and in good faith throughout the negotiation process.
In the current geopolitical environment, it is particularly important that this conference delivers a meaningful outcome that contributes to the maintenance of international peace and security, upholds the credibility of the treaty and strengthens the broader nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime.
We look forward to working closely with all delegations on the substantive elements in this regard.
Thank you.
I thank distinguished representative of South Africa for the statement.
Next on my list is the representative of Canada, followed by Republic of Korea, Canada, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Canada, thanks you Chair and through you, the president and Secretariat for the draft.
We believe it is a constructive basis for our negotiations to come and stand ready to engage productively in our discussions moving forward.
We are still reviewing the document in detail, but want to highlight a few initial reactions.
We broadly support the draft language which reinforces the core role of IA safeguards to the effective implementation of the NPT's nonproliferation obligations.
We would see value in additional language highlighting the need to respect the mandate, technical authority, and independence of the agency.
The draft text effectively recognizes the challenges to the treaty posed by cases of non compliance with nonproliferation obligations.
We support references to the CSA and AP in line with previously agreed language and would encourage additional language highlighting progress towards CSA universalization and greater AP adherence.
The language could also be strengthened to reinforce support for IA efforts to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards, including through concrete initiatives such as the IA member state Support Program.
Canada supports references to the need for a diplomatic solution to Iran's nuclear program.
It is imperative that the outcome document underscore the urgent need for Iran to resume substantive cooperation with the IAA to address outstanding safeguards issues as identified by the Board of Governors, including with respect to its declared stockpile of highly enriched uranium.
Language on the DPRK reflects the nonproliferation challenges posed by the DPRKs increasing nuclear activities.
It is critical that an outcome document not stay silent on these challenges would strike at the heart of the treaty's credibility.
Canada is still studying the proposed language on armed attacks against nuclear facilities in paragraph eight and also in the sections assigned to main Committee three.
It's important that an outcome document referenced the nuclear safety and security risks posed by such attacks wherever they occur, including both Ukraine and Iran and stresses the need for maximum restraint.
We support the balance and factual language on nuclear weapons free zones, including in the Middle East.
We believe that language on export controls lacks balance and fails to underscore how these regimes and their guidelines facilitate nuclear trade.
In particular, paragraph 22 of the draft needs to be balanced to reference the fact that export control regimes such as the Nuclear Suppers Group and Zenger committee contribute to nonproliferation and in our view act as enablers of nuclear trade.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank Distinguished representative of Canada for his statement.
Next on my list is Republic of Korea, followed by Poland.
Republic of Korea, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
First of all, we align ourselves with the statements delivered by France addressing North Korea's nuclear challenge.
We also convey our deep appreciation for the participation of more than 80 countries following last year's statement as well.
Mr.
Chair, as clearly demonstrated through the joint statement delivered earlier, the DPRKs nuclear activities are in clear violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions.
The international community has consistently urged the DPRK to completely abandon its nuclear and missile programs.
I would also like to remind delegations that this position had been repeatedly reaffirmed through relevant UNSC resolutions, as well as previous API review conferences.
Reflecting these unified international positions, we welcome the inclusion of elements related to the DPRK nuclear issues in the draft outcome documents.
While we are still awaiting Solos instructions regarding the draft, as emphasized by our delegation and many others, the DPRK nuclear issue is directly linked to the credibility and integrity of the AP regime and therefore must be included in the outcome documents of this review conference.
Despite this unified position of the international community yesterday, the DPRK once again repeated its unfounded claims arguing that it exercised its right to withdraw from the nu treaty under Article 10 of the NPT in a transparent manner and became a nuclear weapon state through a lawful process.
This is nothing more than a disingenuous attempt to justify the unjustifiable.
The undeniable reality is that the DPRK is the only case that benefited from the NPT, subsequently announced its withdrawal and has continued to develop nuclear weapons in open defiance of its obligations.
If the DPRK genuinely seeks to contribute to the international community's efforts to ensure international peace and stability, you should not threaten the international community by claiming a nuclear weapon state status that no one in this room can accept.
Rather, you should return to the ampae regime and work together with the international community toward our shared goals.
Thank you.
I thank the distinct representative of the Republic of Korea for the statement.
Next speaker is Representative of Poland, followed by Switzerland.
Poland, you have the floor.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
Poland, likewise, the other delegation would like to congratulate the NPT secretaria and the president of the review conference in preparing the zero draft and special credit would go to the representative of the IA in preparing the part regarding the role of the agency in this particular section, namely the paragraphs 4-22.
We consider from the very beginning because we are still studying the text both here and also within the capital, and we consider this particular part of the text as a good one regarding the role of the IEA in the NPT context.
However, likewise, my distinguished colleagues from Belgium and Canada We believe that a particular language concerning the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program should be to some extent strengthened.
In particular paragraph seven, we believe that we have to reflect the role of the resolutions adopted by the Board of Governors, not one or twice.
However, it's going to be taken very carefully with regard to the role of the IA and role of the Director General in fulfilling his task stemming from the NPT safeguards agreement.
As we've said, we are open for the discussion and we will provide our We provide our remarks in a written form to the address given by the NPT Secretariat.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinct representative of Poland for the statement.
Next speaker is the representative of Switzerland, followed by France.
Switzerland, you have the floor.
Mr.
President.
Mr.
Chair, we would like to thank you for your work and the approach you've been following in drafting this draft outcome document.
We also welcome the inclusive and transparent and effective manner and the way this document was announced, finalized, and shared.
Overall, this is a constructive and positive starting point.
On the point under main Committee two, let me just issue some initial comments.
We welcome the fact that the text accords an important place to systems of safeguards, which is a major achievement in the area of nonproliferation.
The conference has to reaffirm the centrality of safeguard system and the indsociable nature between that and the inalaglable right of member states to make peaceful use of nuclear technology.
However, we would like to see strengthening of the actual text as regards the importance of updating the safeguards by an additional protocol, for example, to the CSA, so as to meet the current needs.
It also would seem to us to be very opportune for the conference to address the issue of regional proliferation, given that the impact they have on the nonproliferation regime on the Iranian nuclear program.
We shared several times during this conference and within IAA our concerns as regards some aspects of the programs as well as many other member states.
It would seem to us appropriate then for the conference to voice its opinion on this.
In this context, we repeat once again that nuclear installation should not be attacked and that any doubt on the peaceful nature of specific nuclear facility has to be resolved diplomatically through verification measures and with full cooperation with IA.
Switzerland is aware of the difficulties of dealing with these issues in a consensual manner, but we have to try to do that and we stand ready to work with all of the parties for that purpose.
Now, on the North Korean nuclear program, we also are in favor of recalling that conference cannot accept the normalization of a military program by DPRK, generally speaking, and on the issue of the challenges or questions when it comes to compliance with obligations of the nonproliferation regime.
We think that the conference has to limit its comments to questions based on IAA reports.
Mr.
Chair, These are our first preliminary reactions, mostly in support of the approach we have here.
We'll study the text in more detail and we'll forward our specific concerns in writing.
Thank you.
I thank the Sent Representative of Switzerland for the statement.
Next speaker is France, followed by Australia.
France, you have the floor.
President.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
The delegation would like to, first of all, thank you, sir, and also thank the president for the draft outcome document we have in front of us.
Pairs on the nonproliferation here, I would like to say the following.
First of all, I would like to welcome the acknowledgment in the preamble of the need for member states to uphold their nonproliferation obligations under the treaty and the importance of resolving all of the non compliance cases so as to preserve the integrity of the treaty.
Furthermore, it seems to me important to reaffirm in a new separate paragraph that the full, complete and effective implementation of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and all its aspects plays an essential role in promotion of international peace and security.
On the operative paragraphs now, I would like to welcome the reaffirmation paragraph five of the IA authority to verify and assure by member states of the safeguards agreements which were concluded in fulfillment of the obligations under the treaty.
In this regard, it seems important to me to underscore that nothing can be done that could undermine the authority of the IAA I would like to welcome the mention of the proliferation crisis in Iran and the expression of concern by this conference having to do with the statement there is non compliance by Iran with the obligations it undertook under the safeguards agreements.
All of the member states of the NPT are to fully abide with the legal obligations and the implementation of obligations cannot be done as items on a menu or unilaterally suspended.
In this regard, the conference has to recall to Iran that they have to re establish the full and effective compliance with the safeguards, including their full and complete cooperation with IA, which is a must in order to meet the concerns having to do with the peaceful nature of its nuclear program.
Now, on the DPRK, the paragraphs in the draft, we have faithfully reflect the alarms we will share DPRK cannot under the NPAT, obtain the status of a non nuclear weapon state.
In and we join the declaration made by that on behalf of the 82 states.
Mr.
Chairman, to conclude the paragraphs on IA safeguards, I would like to say that the NPTT provides in its Article 3 that all member states have to implement a program in line with the safeguards agreements with IAA, and the report has to underscore positively those countries which have recently ratified such agreements, Guinea and Somalia, for example.
The conference has to also underscore the importance for states to fully uphold the safeguards agreement with the IA and urge all member states who do not have nuclear weapons to fully implement their safeguards agreements under all circumstances.
IA safeguards need to be reviewed regularly as we have in paragraph 16, but the decisions adopted by the governing bodies of the IA are there to increase the effectiveness and to improve the efficiency of the agency safeguards, it needs to be supported and implemented in line with the action 32 of the 2010 action plan.
The supplies agreements in paragraph 22 are there to prevent proliferation and restore trust, and promote transparency and facilitate the development of peaceful nuclear energy.
My delegation will forward detailed written submissions on all the points that I've just mentioned.
Thank you.
I thank the distinct representative from France for the statement.
Next on my list is representative of Australia, followed by Costa Rica, Australia, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
The Australian delegation would like to express its appreciation for the outcome document released yesterday.
We appreciate the efforts to reflect a wide range of views in the draft and we welcome many of the elements reflected.
Please allow me to share just a few preliminary views relevant to subsidiary B two.
Regarding paragraph five, we welcome this language on the IAEAs role.
We suggest it could be strengthened by the addition of one sentence, namely, that it is the conviction of the conference that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the IAEA in that regard, full stop.
This reference was also included in the 2022 draft outcome text.
We support an earlier statement by Belgium regarding paragraph 22, which inaccurately implies that effective export controls may hamper peaceful uses.
In fact, effective export controls support peaceful uses by preventing proliferation.
We therefore suggest using text from the 2010 action plan, which states in action 35, that supplier arrangements should continue to promote transparency and ensure that nuclear related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the treaty, full stop.
Responding to an earlier comment by China, Australia reiterates its position that our acquisition of conventionally armed nuclear powered submarines is fully consistent with our international nonproliferation obligations.
We reject claims to the contrary.
The transfer of nuclear material of any level of enrichment is permitted under the NPT.
There is no loophole.
Transfers of HEU based reactor systems and fuel components can and do take place between nuclear weapon states and non nuclear weapon states.
Specifically, regarding paragraph 19 on naval nuclear propulsion, we are concerned that paragraph 19 does not sufficiently reflect the IAEAs independence, mandate, and technical authority in relation to naval nuclear propulsion and safeguards arrangements.
We propose to submit alternative texts that reflects this important element.
Australia will share our comments in writing, and we look forward to working with you to achieve a successful outcome this review conference.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Australia for the statement and kind words regarding the final zero draft of the final report.
Next, my list is Costa Rica, followed by Brazil and Costa Rica, you have the floor.
President.
Thank you, Chair.
We would like to thank the chairmanship, the Bureau, and the Secretariat for the work they've done to give member states a timely document that will work as a basis for the negotiations in this conference.
We think the document appropriately summarizes everything and seeks to reflect the concerns and suggestions of states.
We would like to make some preliminary comments until we get further feedback from Capital.
First, we appreciate the language and the fact that the IAA is recognized as well as its various initiatives in relation to paragraph 20 and the following paragraphs of the zero draft, we consider that the section on nuclear security could be further developed.
The initial draft recalls each state their responsibilities when it comes to nuclear security and the importance of physical protection, but the final draft in 2022 addressed a set of concerns that was broader and more operative in nature.
It included issues such as cybersecurity, protection against unauthorized access, theft and sabotage, the illegal trafficking of nuclear materials and other radiactive materials, sensitive information, nuclear terrorism, and the risk that non state actors would acquire nuclear weapons or their delivery systems.
The outcome document should also recognize the continued relevance of resolution 15 42,004 of the Security Council, which continues to be a key component of the international framework to stop non state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction as well as their delivery systems.
Re establishing this language would contribute to ensuring that nuclear security is considered both a national responsibility as well as an area that demands international cooperation, capacity building, and effective controls.
These are our preliminary comments and in due course, we will submit in written format comments from our capital.
I thank you.
I thank the distingu representative of Costa Rica for the statement.
Next speaker is Brazil, followed by Japan.
Brazil, you have the floor.
Thank you very much, Chair.
As we have said this morning, my delegation in coordination with Capital is still analyzing the text, and we might come back with other commentaries.
But in the meantime, we have some preliminary observations.
The first is in paragraph three.
It seems to us that in the second sentence, we would be talking about concerns regarding noncompliance and not concerns regarding compliance.
So we would suggest to change the word compliance for noncompliance.
In paragraph six, again, the second sentence is somehow a little bit convoluted for us, so we will need clarification on that one.
It looks like it is trying to expand on the IA statute mandate, and we will have difficulty with anything that goes beyond Article 12C of the statute.
In paragraph nine, we have to see what is the added value of that paragraph because it's concern is somehow subsumed in the first sentence of paragraph six.
And again, if it doesn't mention the IA statute, especially Article 12C, we need to really carefully consider what does this entail and what it proposes for the conference to do.
On paragraph ten, I think we could do away with the last part about the limited level of assurance.
This is a paragraph about comprehensive safeguards agreements and there are many focuses assurance on declared nuclear material.
So I think that part we could just delete it.
Again, I don't think we need paragraph 13.
Um as I think one paragraph and that would be paragraph 12, I think is enough to address the additional protocol.
Paragraph 16, it's a bit too loose in our review.
I know that one delegation mentioned that this has to do with action 32 of 2010, the 2010 final document.
But action 32 makes reference to IAA policy bodies, that is the BOD and the general conference.
There's no mention of this whatsoever.
So we don't know who would do this assessment, what that would entail, and if that would include states parties concerned.
So again, we would need a bit more clarification on this one.
And for now, I think those are the comments.
Thank you.
I thank Dt President from Brazil for the statement.
Next speaker is Japan, followed by United States of America, Japan, you have.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Japan commend the effort led by the president and his team in preparing this zero draft document, in particular, its early circulation.
Japan would like to align ourselves to the statement made by the representative of France on North Korea.
Regarding North Korea, Japan attaches great importance to retaining the wordings of paragraph 78, and I appreciate the Chair's effort.
Its nuclear issue is a matter of the integrity and credibility of the NPT.
We also welcome paragraph 79.
These paragraphs should be maintained or even reinforced.
We may come back with concrete proposal in a later stage.
Also, Japan welcomes paragraph 13 on the additional protocol.
Although we would prefer the use of urge rather than encourage.
We understand that the current formulation reflect a balanced approach and this should be maintained.
By contrast, Paragraph 11 raised concerns.
The conclusion of the CSA is a legal obligation under the NPT.
In this right, merely encouraging its conclusion would be insufficient.
At a minimum, the conference should use urge rather than encourage.
Also, Japanese observes that effective export control of nuclear related items and the use of multilateral guidelines and understandings are essential in fulfilling NPD obligations and proposed to add relevant paragraph after paragraph 22 in line with 2022 final document.
On paragraph 77, it is necessary to place this paragraph after paragraph 79 in line with the 2022 final draft.
We would also like to suggest using the language, certain regions in South Asia rather than other regions in Asia, in line with the difference in the same paragraph to the importance of achieving universalization of the treaty.
That is the context this paragraph is placed.
That concludes Japan's comment for today.
Further comment will be submitted in writing.
Thank you, miss Sachi.
I thank the United Representative of Japan for the statement.
Next speaker is United States of America, followed by United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
United States of America, you have the floor.
Chair, thank you for giving me the floor.
While the US delegation is awaiting fully developed guidance from Washington, I have some initial reactions that I would like to share.
First of all, we want to thank the president and his team for their efforts.
We are grateful to have a well developed text sufficiently early in the conference to afford states parties ample opportunity to fully review and discuss.
We are also very pleased by the president's streamlining of the process, and we are glad that we have just one fairly concise document to review.
As for the text itself, there are a number of elements that we can praise.
The draft document recognizes the obligation of all states parties to comply with all nonproliferation obligations, and it highlights the importance of addressing non compliance matters.
The very first paragraph reaffirms that the full and effective implementation of Articles one and two of the treaty remains essential to its operation.
Those articles are the heart of nonproliferation and we are pleased to see them emphasized up front.
The text underscores compliance with nonproliferation obligations and that addressing any instance of noncompliance is necessary to uphold the treaty's integrity.
We fully concur.
I will return to this point momentarily when I review the language in Iran.
We certainly welcome that the draft reaffirms the centrality of the IAEA and the invaluable role of the IAEA safeguards.
We could not agree more.
Nevertheless, we were surprised to note that there is no language welcoming or drawing near to universality of states parties entering CSAs into force.
As IAEA Director General Grossi noted in his remarks to the conference, we are tantalizingly close to achieving universality and that should be noted in the text, and our delegation, subject to guidance from Washington may propose appropriate language.
I'd like to take a moment to associate myself to support the remarks by Australia responding to China.
Transfer of materials is permitted under the treaty very clearly.
We will agree with and support the alternative text that Australia intends to propose.
There's much more to support in the text, and we will be highlighting it and working toward consensus and adopting the language over the next weeks.
At the same time, there are elements of the draft text that we regret to see.
We hope to work with the other members of the committee and states parties to improve such elements as we go forward.
While we welcome that the text reaffirms that nuclear weapon free zones should be formed on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned.
In paragraph 74, we remain concerned that the text elevates the negotiation of a Middle East zone above other issues relating to zones in other paragraphs.
We believe that this slights the importance of the already existing zones.
The United States will share edits to this section of the text pending guidance from Washington.
While we welcome the inclusion of language on the IAEA Board of Governors finding that Iran is in noncompliance with its comprehensive safeguards agreement, we find this text inadequate and it misses the mark.
Iran is in violation of the treaty that is the subject of this review conference.
That is the central fact of this exercise.
Recognition of this violation would be factual and no one can say that it is not germane to the conference.
All states parties are duty bound to defend this treaty and the international safeguard system, and that means being honest when a violation of the treaty has occurred.
At the same time, paragraph eight is unacceptable.
It is clearly a reference to the United States and the United States is not the party that has violated the treaty.
In sum, the United States finds much to agree with in the draft but recognizes that there is a considerable amount of work to be done before we have a satisfactory final document.
We call on all states parties to work toward reaching consensus on a forward looking and final product.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished Representative of the United States of America for the statement and kind words addressed to the presidency.
Next on my list is United Kingdom, followed by New Zealand.
United Kingdom, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Allow me to join others in thanking the president, you and your teams for the provision of this text at such an early stage in the review conference.
As I said this morning in subsidiary B one, the manner in which you have captured the breadth of views across our debate reinforces the manner and the way in which you've engaged with all states parties to the MPT both at the conference and before you arrived in New York.
As others have said also, as with any text, there are elements that we will support and that we view positively, and there are others where we have concerns and see challenges.
We are examining the draft carefully and will continue to engage constructively and intend to submit written comments to you and the president and Secretariat in the coming days.
Allow me to offer some initial reflections.
We very much welcome recognition of the importance of the IAEA and the safeguard system and of the need for compliance with non proliferation obligations under the treaty.
We can strengthen this language further with language on the need to do nothing, nothing that undermines the authority of the IAEA.
I fully agree with the US delegation that we should celebrate universalization or near universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreements, and I very much welcome the recent accession by Somalia and Guinea in this regard.
We ought to recognize this in the text.
Conclusion of the final comprehensive safeguards agreement will be an important milestone.
Language in this document on the additional Protocol is a good base basis for developing and continuing this conversation.
And should be strengthened to recognize the fact that a majority of states have now concluded an additional protocol.
We think the references to nuclear weapons free zones reflects the discussions in this debate and serves as a basis for our deliberations.
We have some specific proposals on this topic, including regarding the suggestion to review interpretive statements.
I want to reinforce here, Mr.
Chair, that the UK provides clear, credible assurances and has given legally binding NSAs to more than 100 countries.
Mr.
Chair, we believe references to export controls could better reflect their contribution to preventing proliferation and to be clear, we don't accept that export controls impose undue restraints or hamper the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
Mr.
Chair, we agree with the delegations of Belgium, Canada, Poland, the Republic of Korea, US, and others that the language on Iran and DPRK should be strengthened significantly to properly reflect the significant threat these challenges represent to the nonproliferation goals of the NPT.
As Belgium stated, this should include reference to United Nations Security Council resolutions.
Regarding naval nuclear propulsion, I associate myself with the comments made by Australia and the United States.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom and for your statement and kind words addressed to the presidency.
Next on my list is the speaker is the representative of New Zealand, followed by Germany, New Zealand, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
We join others in commending the efforts of the President and his Bureau of Main committee chairs to produce the zero draft outcome and for its early circulation.
Like others, we're still closely analyzing the text so what follows our initial and likely incomplete impressions.
However, it is already clear that the president and his team have listened to a wide range of delegations, both at this review conference but also through extensive consultations beforehand to produce this thoughtful and streamlined text.
It is a good basis for our negotiations.
New Zealand sees many areas in this text we could support, and there are also elements that we would wish to see strengthened.
It is encouraging to see language underscoring the core role of the IAEA safeguards to effective implementation of the NPT's nonproliferation obligations and the need for compliance with these obligations.
Like my Canadian colleague, we too would see additional value in language highlighting the need to respect the mandate, technical authority, and independence of the agency.
We agree with previous speakers of the need to strengthen the language in the document related to the IAEAs comprehensive safeguard agreement, the additional protocol, and crucially on the full and effective implementation of these commitments, including making it clear that the CSA remains a legal obligation once entered into.
Further language on universalization in this context would also be a positive addition.
We join other delegations, like my colleagues from the United Kingdom, Australia, Belgium, and others who have reflected views on export guidelines.
The current framing is inaccurate and creates an imbalance in the outcome text.
It is encouraging to see language in the draft outcome on the DPRK.
We agree with other colleagues, however, that this conference should send a stronger message than is currently reflected in the text.
Like others, we support the inclusion of language in the text on Iran's non compliance with its safeguard obligations and call for the inclusion of further referencing urging Iran to resume full cooperation with the IAEA across all outstanding issues.
In this regard, we should also make reference to relevant resolutions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors.
And finally, we note the absence of any reference to the international nuclear testing moratorium in the preamble of this draft that should be remedied.
I provide these comments as initial response on behalf of New Zealand, and we remain open and committed to working on this text as a strong basis for our work going forward.
Thank you for giving me the floor.
I thank the distinct Representative of New Zealand for his statement and thank you for your kind words to the presidency.
Next on my list is the Representative of Germany, followed by Russian Federation.
Germany, you have the floor.
Chair, thank you for this opportunity to comment on the zero draft issued only yesterday.
First, we would like to thank the president for the early circulation of the CEO draft, which will give us sufficient time for negotiations.
We also appreciate the brevity of the text which focuses on the main points, but still includes the most important elements.
In our view, the CEO draft in most parts reflects the general debates and exchanges in the main committees and subsidiary bodies.
As these debates have shown different perspectives and controversial approaches, it is not surprising that the CEO draft at this stage cannot reflect consensus.
This is the work ahead of us and our decation is ready to contribute to it.
We may point out the fact that the real consensus document reflects the equal suffering of all parties.
In order to achieve consensus, Germany would like to appeal to all allegations to show the necessary level of flexibilities to achieve our common goal.
Our delegation aligns with the statements by UK and others on the recognition of the importance of the IAA for the safeguard system and by France and others on behalf of a group of states on DPRK and welcome that the CRO draft addresses this issue, representing one of the major challenges our treaty is confronted with.
Please find below very few preliminary general and specific comments by Germany on the CEO draft, only on Pillar two issues, whilst we have already delivered other issues in the MC one session this morning.
On Para seven, and Iran, we appreciate the clear language on Iran's noncompliance with its obligations under its safeguards agreement with the IAA.
Nevertheless, it is of utmost importance that we include a reference to relevant UNSC resolutions as underlying international law in that respect.
We would also like to add that we have grave concerns regarding the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program.
On paragraph eight, we have doubts that this paragraph reflects the complexity of the situation in an adequate and balanced manner and will not comment further on it at this stage.
In this respect, we also highlight the fact that paragraph 43 already generally reflects on NPPs under conditions of armed attacks.
Regarding paragraphs 10 to 14, Germany would like to echo Japan's comments on strengthening language in paragraph 11 with regard to the conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements.
Against the background of current proliferation crisis in DBIK and Iran, these would strongly encourage all straight parties to move forward towards recognizing CSA and AP as the current standard of safeguards verification and therefore reinforce language in respective paragraphs.
On St NPP, we want to remind state parties that the Sposia nuclear power plant is a Ukrainian power plant.
To further shorten the text, paragraph 44 and 45 could be merged.
No para.
Finally, Germany wants to put your attention to the fact that outstanding nonproliferation issues of the former Syrian nuclear program have not yet been addressed in the draft.
We will forward detailed written comments.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the Representative of Germany for the statement.
I Speaker.
The next speaker on my list is the representative of the Russian Federation.
To be followed by Islamic Republic of Iran.
The Russian Federation.
You have the floor.
We President Mr.
Chair, first of all, I would like to thank the president of the Peer Review Conference and his entire team for the huge work they have conducted so as to prepare this document under the conditions of a very complicated situation and a wide divergence of views.
We expect that it will be possible to take this document to acceptable wording.
At the same time, I'd like to share with you my preliminary comments while we continue studying it.
So on paragraph seven, the references here to the IA Board of Governors decisions on Iran, which were not consensual decisions, which were not supported by the Russian Federation.
These decisions do not reflect the entirety of the situation around the Iranian nuclear program.
And are too politicized.
We cannot support references to these decisions here.
Paragraph eight now contains equivocal appeals to exercise restraint and to refrain from strikes against Iran.
Here, I would like to note that it is important to state that's completely unacceptable to have such strikes and they need to be appropriately assessed as actions which undermine the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.
Next, on paragraphs 10 and 12, we think they bring into question whether the IAA safeguards are sufficient to verify the nuclear activity of states and and contain in fact, factual demands, they compel states to do something and to introduce a protocol as an additional standard.
What is a standard is a safeguards agreement.
The protocol is an additional measure.
We also think it's important to reflect the IAA safeguards need to continue to be depoliticized in nature, technical in nature and be in line with the agreements between states and IAA on safeguards.
We're not certain that it's justified to include here paragraphs which have to do with the seven pillars and five principles voiced by Director General Grossi.
The five specific principles, first, This is not something that is to be discussed here at the review conference.
The issues of the protection of a Russian nuclear facility, Zaproz NPP is an issue between us and the IAA and discussing it here in a multilateral format is not something that I think is needed.
As regards the seven pillar as well, they have been largely compromised by the fact that they were being used when it came to strikes against Iran and the feasibility of the use in the document is something that we're still considering.
The last point, we do not see the prospect here for including language in the outcome document or language which relates to DPRK.
This issue for us is closed.
The situation there is very complicated.
The pressure exerted on the DPRK, there are also military exercises, naval vessels entering the ports of the Republic of Korea.
And the right of states to self defense come into play.
We don't see a way of coming to an agreement on this language at this current review conference.
Therefore, we do not see for that reason, the possibility of having them included in the outcome document.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation for his statement and for the kind words towards the chair.
My list is Islamic Republic of Iran, followed by Ukraine, Iran, you have the floor.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chair.
With regard to preambular paragraph 11, we think that when we highlight the need for the state parties to comply with their obligations, first of all, we have to address all the states parties, and then to be fair, it's correct to address both nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament obligations.
And going back to the main body of the text, before paragraph three, we think that it's really important to address the issue of qualitative proliferation committed by specific nuclear weapon states, including the US, the UK and France, and then we need to have a standalone paragraph on demanding them to stop such activities.
In the same effect, we believe that we should have another stand alone paragraph addressing and in fact, deploring any request by different European officials to seek nuclear weapons or to host them.
Among them, I can refer to Belgium, Canada, Poland, Germany, and also their interlocutors in other regions including South Korea.
And with regard to paragraph three, as I mentioned, we need to add nuclear disarmament obligations here, and also we support the Chinese suggestion to reflect on the nuclear deterrence and nuclear sharing as cases of nuclear proliferation.
We need to have specific paragraph on addressing the implementation of the safeguards in a way that would not restrict the inaluable right of enjoying peaceful uses of nuclear technology or to impede the international cooperation programs in this regard.
So Looking at paragraph seven, we utterly are disappointed with this paragraph and we reject it, we reject any claim with regard to the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program, as we heard from a couple of delegations.
We believe that in principle, Iran's nuclear peaceful program is nothing to do with the NPT.
Our nuclear program is as ordinary as other nuclear program of other states parties.
And the referred decision by the IAA Board of Governors, as Russia correctly mentioned, it is a voted decision by the IAA and manipulated by the E three, and we regret that such a thing has been reflected in the draft and we strongly insist on reference to Iran.
We will have no flexibility on reference to Iran and we believe that even with the controversy about Iran's nuclear program during 2010 nuclear review conference, even with those Security Council resolutions that now have been all expired, there was no reference to Iran.
It should be the case again in this review conference.
On paragraph eight, we clearly believe that the US and the Israeli regime committed a war crime, violated international law, and violated international humanitarian law by attacking illegally to our nuclear facilities.
Therefore, instead of expressing grave concern, they have to be condemned.
On paragraph 21, we believe that ARCUS should be mentioned as a case of non compliance of transferring fissionable material and especially in the weapon grade uranium to a non nuclear party.
It should be highlighted in that paragraph.
As I mentioned today in the morning, export control I thank distinguished representative of Islamic Republic of Iran for the statement.
The next speaker is the representative of Ukraine, followed by Denmark, Ukraine, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
At the outset, our delegation would like to express its appreciation to the president of the conference, the Bureau, and the Secretariat for circulating the zero draft outcome document.
We are pleased to start working with this document at this stage.
Currently, our capital is still reviewing the zero draft outcome document.
Therefore, we wish to share our initial remarks and reflections.
Uh, first of all, we also would like to know that we align ourselves with the statement delivered by France on behalf of the Group of states on the DPRK.
We welcome some references in the paragraphs on DPRK and Iran.
However, we still believe that those references and the language could be reinforced.
Also a comment on another important issue for Ukraine.
Regrettably, the draft outcome document does not contain any reference regarding the implementation of IAA safeguards in Ukraine, in particular on the impediments created by the Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and its illegal seizure of the Zaporiz nuclear power plant and the obstacles created by this occupation of the NPP for the conduct of IAA verification activities due to the ongoing presence of Russian military and other unauthorized personnel at the site resulting in Ukraine's loss of regulatory control over nuclear material.
We firmly believe that this should be reflected in the text, and we will submit in writing our proposal in this regard and on other elements that we have already mentioned.
Thank you for your attention.
I thank the distinguished representative of Ukraine for the statement and kind words addressed to the presidency.
Next is the representative of Denmark, followed by Indonesia.
Denmark, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair, and our thanks go to the president, to you and all involved for the preparation and release of the early S draft.
We've sent it to Capitol for closer dissemination.
Of course, we look forward to our negotiations and hope for consensus.
Let me just for now deliver a couple of initial brief remarks.
First on the text and supplier agreements and export control in Paragraph 22, allow me to follow up on Belgium's Canada and other state remarks.
As we also find the text is out of balance, the text should absolutely reflect that the legal and legitimate export control contribute to nonproliferation.
Second, let me also express our full support to the president in placing the text on extended deterrence in Power two under MC one.
It is not a matter of nuclear proliferation.
It's a matter of nuclear disarmament and as a key tenant in extended deterrence is that the US retains full control and custody over the nuclear weapons.
I just wanted to put that on the record.
We have other remarks on other issues, including Iran and DPRK on which strong and strengthened language should of course stay in the document, but we will return to that.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank distinguished Representative of Denmark for his statement and kind words addressed to the presidency.
Next on my list is the representative of Indonesia, followed by Argentina, Indonesia.
You have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
At this stage, Indonesia wishes to provide preliminary comments on the section of the draft outcome documents under the purview of the main Committee two and subsidiary B two.
Overall, we once again extend our appreciation to the president and his team, also to the chair of the main committee for the draft outcome documents which provide solid foundations for our negotiation.
We reiterate again our views that the document has taken into consideration our interests, and at the same time, we believe that there are critical areas that must be recalibrated to reflect truly balanced implementations of the treaty, avoiding the imposition of undue constraints on the nuclear weapon states and ensuring that our commitment are matched with concrete actions.
On premar paragraph on Safegu and compliance, especially, we emphasize that while IAEA Safegt are indeed a fundamental component of the non proliferation regimes, they must be implemented for the exclusive purposes of verifications without affecting the inalible rights of states party under Article 4.
It is vital that discussions on compliance do not become politicized or hamper the economic and technological development of developing countries.
We note the reaffirmations also in paragraph one and three that full implementation of Article 1 and Article 2 is essentials and that matters regarding compliance or noncompliance in this regard should be resolved exclusively through political and diplomatic means.
We welcome also the affirmation in paragraph five that the AA is the sole competent authority responsible for verifying compliance with Safeguard agreements.
Consequently, regarding paragraph nine on the role of the IAA with relations to the UN Security Councils, we urge cautions in this regard as they will also have negative implications, including political pressure or interference that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility in the long term.
On paragraph 12 and 13 regarding the additional protocol, while we note the draft recognizes it remains a sovereign decisions, the text must make a clear distinctions between legal obligations and voluntary confidence building measures.
We maintain that the conclusions of an additional protocol must remain strictly voluntary and should not be used as preconditions for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy or for the export of nuclear material and equipment.
Paragraph 19 on the NVO nuclear proprisins, we note the additions of the NNP to the outcome as an acknowledgment to the growing concern and broad discussions during this review conference.
In general, we believe that it is important to strengthen the paragraph, including on the view aspect, including credibility on safeguard systems due to the difference in risks, addition of open and inclusive, aside from on transparent discussions in the text, as well as consideration on safety, security, and environments, implications that could arise from accident, incident or exposure.
On nuclear weapon free zones, we support the establishment and institutional actions of nuclear weapon free zone as vital contributions to nuclear disarmament and non proliferation and welcome definitely this acknowledgment in paragraph 75.
I will stop here, Chair, and we will provide further comments and written input as we continue to assess the draft upcoming documents.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Indonesia for the statement and kind words to the presidency.
Next on my list is the representative for Argentina, followed by Saudi Arabia.
Argentina, you have the floor.
I Thank you, Chair.
First, I would like to thank Ambassador Viet for the zero draft distributed yesterday.
This draft does not just reflect our debates in the last couple of days, it also reflects the regional consultation process that was held in months prior to this.
We would also like to thank you, Ambassador, for your efforts at the head of this committee and for the way in which you have reflected our exchanges.
We are aware that this is a highly sensitive issue and that it requires flexibility on behalf of all delegations.
Chair.
Our delegation can say that our capital is analyzing the text and logically, it can be improved in terms of technical and substantive issues, but we believe that it is a good basis to work on issues addressed in this committee and subsidiary organs.
This is why I will limit myself to general and preliminary comments in terms of some of these points.
Among the elements that we would like to highlight are the following first.
Mentions to the IAEAs safeguards regime are relevant and consistent with the magnitude of their tasks.
Of course, the language can be improved with regards to the impartiality of its work and the non erosion of its authority in all circumstances as other delegations have pointed out.
Second element that I would like to highlight is the reference to Iran's nuclear program.
My country welcomes these references, and we believe that it is relevant because it is one of the major challenges of the nonproliferation agenda, especially due to the instances of noncompliance with the Safeguards agreement.
This language could be improved by an additional reference to the importance of ensuring access for IAA inspectors.
Third point, we think that the language on export controls could be redrafted to be more balanced so that there is no linear negative interpretation with regards to these.
I am specifically referring to paragraph 22, which includes a narrative in its second part, which my country cannot support.
Although we do not believe it is necessary to mention any specific group, we do think that in terms of balance between nonproliferation and legitimate access to peaceful nuclear energy is something that should be rescued in the text.
Fourth, With regards to the DPRK, my countries support the references in the text.
We understand that it's another major challenge when it comes to nonproliferation on a global level.
Nevertheless, we would like to point out the lack of references to the six nuclear tests carried out by this country and the risks for nuclear security that they carry with them.
I would also like to point out that Argentina supports the joint statement made by the ambassador of France on the topic.
Fifth, We take note of and we support the reference in paragraph 74 to nuclear weapons free zones and its creation by regions through freely arrived at agreements based on the work of the Disarment Commission in the United Nations, we would also like to highlight the drafting in paragraph 75 with regards to the positive contribution of these nuclear weapons free zones.
My sixth and last point is that we take note of the lack of reference to the application of safeguards on a regional and bilateral level and the role that these can carry out when it comes to confidence building and transparency.
A language proposal shall be sent to the Secretary for your reference.
Mr.
Chair, our delegation will continue to analyze this draft and we just provide this as an initial contribution, and we will make additional contributions as our debates move forward.
Thank you.
I thank the recent Representative of Argentina for the statement.
Next on my list is the representative of Saudi Arabia, followed by Saudi Arabia.
The floor is yours.
Saran.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Allow us to thank President Viet for circulating this document early.
This allows countries enough time to review the document.
We believe that this draft is a good starting point to start discussions.
We are still awaiting guidance from the Capitol.
I would like to make some preliminary remarks.
Regarding paragraphs 10, 12, 13, and the reference to the additional protocol, we would like to stress the importance of clarifying the voluntary nature of this protocol.
We hope that the document reflects that the safeguard expe is sufficient.
This is the only legal requirement to verify the compliance of non nuclear weapon states with the peaceful nature of their nuclear programs and their compliance with commitments regarding nonproliferation.
According to Article 3 of the ampT and we stress the following.
Text concerning the importance of implementing safeguards should clarify this matter and stress that matter without any confusion.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the representative of Saudi Arabia for the statement.
Next on my list is Iran, followed by Kazakhstan, Iran, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair, for giving me the floor and following my previous comments, I'd like to complete my intervention with addressing some few points as following.
First, we support the Russian position on DPRK and Ukraine and we believe that those paragraphs have no added value to the document and to the conference.
Specifically on DPRK, it's interesting to note that the Western countries are requesting DPRK to avoid something that they themselves are committing every day.
This is a real case of hypocrisy.
And lastly, Mr.
Chair, on paragraph 85 about the Middle East, we think that we need to reflect the realities and have a realistic point of view with regard to implementation of resolution 1995 and establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
The reality is that it's only the Israeli regime in our region that has not joined the NPT.
The reality is that it is Israeli regime that has refused to participate in the conference on establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
And it is that the US has supported Israeli regime in any wrongdoing in our region and also blocking the conference.
In order to redress the situation, we think that we should have a proper language in our final document, first expressing grave concern of non implementation of the resolution 1995 after 31 years.
Second, expressing grave concern because of the impediments and obstacles created by the US in implementation of this resolution.
Thirdly, expressing grave concern of non attendance of the conference on Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, both by the US and the Israeli regime.
And finally, we need to build up the language that we have crafted in 2010.
In 2010 review conference, there is extensive paragraphs requesting the Israeli regime to join to the NPT as a non nuclear weapon party and putting all its nuclear facilities under the full scope of safeguard of the IAEA.
Having said them all, we would be very glad to share our written input with you, Mr.
Chair later on.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguish representative of Iran for the statement.
Next on my list is the representative of Kazakhstan, followed by Egypt.
Kazakhstan, you have the floor.
Miss Bashir, in addition to the group statement delivered on behalf of the Central Asian states, we would like to make several observations in our national capacity.
In general, we think that the main elements on the current nuclear related trends have been included to a zero draft document.
However, some other important elements are still missing.
We wish to emphasize the importance of including references to the key export control regimes, such as the Nuclear supplies Group and the Tanger Committee.
In our view, the conference should highlight that the primary objective of export control is to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
At the same time, it is essential to reaffirm the legitimate right of all state parties, particularly developing countries to full access to nuclear materials, equipment, and technological information for peaceful purposes in accordance with the objectives of the treaty.
Moreo would like to underline the importance of the comprehensive nuclear Test Ban Treaty organization and the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty in this document.
As we mark the 30th anniversary of the signing of the CBTO this year, we remain concerned that despite three decades having passed since its adoption, the treaty has still not entered into force.
And we think that the relevant paragraphs with reference to the CTBTO should be reinforced accordingly.
Finally, distinguished chair would encourage the Secretariat to avoid duplication of some paragraphs of the main committees, in particular, the main committees two and three.
I thank you.
I thank the representative of Kazakhstan for the statement.
The next speaker I have on my list is the representative of Egypt, who will be the last speaker for today.
Egypt, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
There's always a certain pressure in being the last speaker of the day, but I'll try to handle myself well.
On our part, we're still reviewing the draft zero draft by Capital, but we would certainly like to thank you and your team for the great effort and the fact that you have taken the time to craft this draft early on in order for us to be able to study it and review it carefully.
So along with many others in the room, we believe that the draft contains positive elements that warrant further discussion.
Of course, we will submit our full detailed remarks at a later point, pending a response from Capital and of course, consulting with our regional groups.
So from this point on, I would like to join my colleague from Brazil and my colleague also from Saudi Arabia regarding the amendments needed on paragraphs 10, 12 and 13.
I also voice our support to the remarks made by our colleague from Indonesia on paragraphs 12 and 13 regarding the need to emphasize the voluntary nature of the additional protocol.
While highlighting, of course, that the CSA is the legal requirement for non nuclear weapon states under Article 3.
We believe that also the language on export control, as iterated by a colleague from Argentina, needs redrafting in order not to be construed as impeding the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
And we also support the references in paragraph 74 and 75 regarding the importance of nuclear weapons free zone and in this context.
We would also like to refer to the section or paragraphs on the Middle East nuclear weapons free zone.
Um, we note that they include important points, and we do, however, regret that a number of fundamental elements and core principles are missing concurrently.
In addition to the absence of a forward looking dimension, we understand that this is, of course, the first draft and will be further developed.
Accordingly, Egypt and a group we'll engage with the relevant partners with a view to ensure the requisite balance and of course, safeguarding the agreed commitments and highlighting the work that's being done in this regard.
So on this issue specifically, we'll speak in further detail S in subsidiary body two, and we thank you once again, Chair, for being so responsive and for doing this great work in due time.
Thank you, sir.
I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt for the statement and the kind words addressed to the presidency.
You said that last speaker, but we have another delegation who joined the list.
Next speaker is Sweden.
Thank you, Chair.
Thank you for allowing us to take the floor, even though we got the impression that the list of speakers might have been closed.
Much appreciated, and we of course, appreciate the work by you and your team and we welcome once again, this early circulation of the zero draft.
We just wanted to add our voice in support of some remarks made by other delegations.
As many others, there are elements in the text that we fully support and welcome and others that we think needs to be adjusted or strengthened.
We will, of course, contribute with written comments, but let me share some preliminary remarks on these particular paragraphs.
Sweden aligns itself with the statement delivered by France earlier on DPRK and welcome the inclusions of paragraphs on DPRK.
DPRK's nuclear program is the most flagrant breach of the NPT and including the issue on the outcome document is absolutely necessary.
However, the text should be strengthened further, calling on DPRKK to abandon its nuclear weapons and delivery systems and re establish its pre existing commitments to a moratorium on all nuclear testing and missile launches.
A reference to UN Security Council resolutions 23 97 should also be included.
Another major concern is Iran's noncompliance with its safeguards obligations.
We welcome paragraph seven in this regard.
But like many others, we propose an inclusion of references to relevant UN Security Council resolutions.
We also support inclusions of the text on attacks on nuclear peaceful facilities in paragraph 42 and 43, and we want to remind colleagues that Ukraine's Zaporis nuclear power plant is still illegally seized.
Effective export controls are supporting nonproliferation and contributes to the fulfillment of the NPT.
The text as it stands, is not sufficient in this regard and it's not sufficiently balanced in our review.
We support the proposal from Belgium to alter the order of the sentences in paragraph 22.
Thank you again for giving me the floor.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Sweden for the statement and kind words addressed to the presidency.
Apparently, we have another delegation who would like to take the floor.
It's delegation of Cameon.
Cameeron, the floor is yes.
Okay.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
We would like to make the very brief comments on the paragraphs.
As far as the preamble is concerned and diplomatically settlement of disputes, the role of IA and affirmation that the violations are unacceptable.
We would like to recall a paragraph here, which is asking for proportional means and transparent means here.
The paragraph 14 would like to say that there needs to be a coherence between that and paragraph 18.
Paragraph 15, Roman 15, is just a statement without a follow up.
Paragraphs 1 23, On this, we welcome the affirmation of Articles one and two of the treaty and the peaceful settlement of disputes and calls for the improvement of paragraph three, which does not prohibit the asymmetry of treatment.
We think that predictable non discriminatory procedures are needed here.
Paragraph four to 22, we welcome the statements about IA and encouragement for the additional protocol and the peaceful resolutions.
Paragraph seven and eight, which seem to be targeting a country.
The review conference, according to us, cannot substitute IAA or the Security Council.
This language goes beyond its mandate.
On paragraph 19, it's talking about dialogues.
Dialogue without any obligations.
We would like a technical multilateral review.
Then Paragraph 22 is talking about suppliers, we do not have much authority here.
This is more detailed here, but paragraph seven and eight, the wording there is regrettable.
74 and 75 here.
We welcome the request for ratification of the protocol.
Here, we We welcome and support the demilitarization of the Korean Peninsula.
We would like to have a link Here, if there are states which announced their withdrawal in 2003, while the review conference cannot address the obligations for a non parties wording here is questionable.
We would need to find a more appropriate wording.
There is no outcome proposed here.
This problem of competency remains here.
The initial draft have three major lacunae.
First of all, there are certain aspects which go outside of our countries.
Certain countries are targeted supplier arrangement, qualifications of countries, and This conference is not a security council or a court or an expert body.
Next, the lack of operational measures, for example, the withdrawal issues, the support to non nuclear status of African states.
We also note that artificial intelligence is not at all mentioned, whereas It can be invoked when we're, for example, talking about the confliction protocols.
This would make this document more relevant to current realities.
Thank you.
I thank Distinguished Representative Cameron for the statement.
Apparently, it was the last speaker for today.
I don't see any other requests for the floor.
Excellence distinguished delegates.
Now we proceed to the requests of reply.
I note that there is one request from a delegation to exercise its right of reply.
Pursuant to Rule 19 of the rules of procedure, we will hear We will hear it now.
May I remind delegations that in accordance with Rule 19, that the statement should be as brief as possible.
Delegation should limit its intervention to 5 minutes.
May also remind that in accordance with established practice, the number of interventions for any delegation is limited to two.
The second intervention should be limited to 3 minutes.
Consistent with the advice provided by the president of the conference speaking limits will be strictly enforced for right of reply.
A timer will show on the screen indicating when there is 1 minute remaining.
After the time limit has been reached, the microphone will automatically be cut off.
Canada has requested to exercise its right of reply.
Canada, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
I'd like to briefly exercise Canada's right of reply in response to the statement by one delegation calling for a standalone paragraph in the outcome document deploring any requests by EU states to seek or host nuclear weapons, which also referenced Canada.
First, while Canada has been called the most European of non European states, we are not a member of the European Union.
Second and most critically, Canada does not seek nuclear weapons, nor do we seek to host nuclear weapons.
We reject any request for such a paragraph in the outcome document and urge the committee to focus on the actual nonproliferation challenges facing the treaty.
Thank you.
I thank the distuedreenative of Canada for the statement.
That was the last speaker I have on my list for this meeting.
Excellency, Distinguished delegates.
There will be a meeting of subsidiary B two on Monday, 11th of May at 10:00 A.M.
In the trusteeship council chamber.
The next scheduled meeting of main committee two is on Tuesday, 12th May at 3:00 in the afternoon, also in this trusteeship council chamber, where we will continue discussion of the draft outcome document with priority given to states which have already, we don't have any states today.
Remaining, so So we will continue our meeting on 12th of May here.
Do you have any announcement? No, the secretary does not have any announcement to make.
The meeting is adjourned.