(Main Committee I) Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Excellency, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, the seventh meeting of main Committee one of the 2026 Review conference of the parties to the Trey on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is called to order.
Excellency, distinguished delegates, this afternoon, we will continue to hear delegations reactions to the revised draft outcome document, particularly on the paragraphs assigned to this main committee.
As this is the last meeting of main Committee one, the committee will also need to adopt its draft procedural report.
To enable the most efficient use of our time, I suggest that we first proceed to adopt the draft procedural report before moving to delegation's views on the revised draft outcome document, beginning with those speakers that were remaining on my list from yesterday.
I thrust that this approach is acceptable.
Thank you for your cooperation.
This morning, the Secretariat circulated the draft report of main Committee one, bearing the symbol NPT slash NF 2026 slash c dot or slash Rp dot, which contains these procedural elements of the committee's work.
As delegations are aware, the Secretariat continues to receive working papers and national reports from delegations.
The list of documents contained in paragraph four are current as of the time of circulation this morning and will be factually updated at the latter stage by the Secretariat to reflect all documents submitted prior to the end of the review conference.
If there are no objections, the draft report of Main Committee one outlining the procedural work of the committee will be circulated as an official document of the review conference.
I see no objection.
It is so decided.
Thank you very much.
The Secretariat will now issue this procedural report as document PT slash NF dot 2026 slash c dot slash one.
Distinguished delegates, we will now continue with our discussions of the revised draft outcome document of this review conference bearing the symbol, PT slash CNF dot 2026 slash r.org slash rev.
Please allow me first to thank you for the comments we provided in our meeting of yesterday and for the written inputs that have been sent already.
We will now continue our discussion on the following elements of the revised draft outcome document allocated to this committee.
Preamble paragraphs Roman numeral one to 12, paragraphs 1 and 2, paragraphs 45 to 73, and paragraph 81.
I would again recall the president's request for delegations to do their best to focus on those areas to which there have been amendments or when new elements have been added.
Let me also remind you of the strict time limit for interventions, 5 minutes for national statements and 8 minutes for group statements.
After which there will be a microphone cutoff.
Delegation who speak on behalf of a group of states, state parties should clearly indicate that they are doing so when they take the floor.
Delegations are also requested to please inform the Secretariat as soon as possible if they wish to exercise their right of reply.
Right of reply will be heard at the end of this meeting.
Distinguished delegates, as you'll be aware, this morning the president of the conference announced that he will convene a plenary meeting today from 5:30 P.M.
In the trusteeship council chamber.
We therefore need to close this meeting and the work of main Committee one around 20 minutes past 5:00.
As I indicated earlier, I'll first give the floor to those delegations who had requested to speak yesterday, but were not able to do so before the end of the meeting.
Those are Egypt on behalf of the Arab Group, Belgium, Norway, the United States, France, and Finland.
With that, I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Egypt on behalf of the other Arab group.
Egypt, you have the floor.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairperson.
We've spoken two times yesterday, so we promise to be brief in the third and hopefully the last intervention during this section.
Just a couple of remaining outstanding comments from our side that the Arab Group strongly supports the retention of paragraph 81 on the universalization of the treaty.
We have submitted to your consideration and the states parties as a whole language to further strengthen this section, to replace promptly with urgently and to add or further delay after conditions, it would be without conditions or further delay.
We also would be interested to see an 82 B where the conference further reaffirms the integrity of Article 9, paragraph three of the treaty.
The obligation of all states parties not to accord any status or recognition in any form contrary to the provisions of the treaty to any state not party to the NPT.
I think that this is one of the core legal obligations under the treaty and it would be useful to have it featured in the text.
Paragraph 46, where we reiterate the urgent implementation of Article 6, we think that it would be very pertinent to also include and related commitments, especially since we have reaffirmed the commitments under previous review conferences in the preamble.
So it would be the urgent implementation of Article 6 obligations and related commitments.
The last comment, Chairperson from our side is the last part of paragraph 62 about the proposal for establishment of a subsidiary body.
We don't have a difficulty with the proposal itself, but we think that we need to revisit this language to take into consideration that the conference on disarmament is a negotiating platform.
Not a consultative body and the delineation of responsibilities is very clear under the outcome document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.
So I don't think that it would be accurate that we use the word recommendations.
Here, this part of the paragraph would need streamlining.
So as we give the mandate for a consideration of an internationally legally binding agreement without all the qualifiers in the middle, we have also submitted a language to this effect.
Thank you, Chairperson.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Egypt on behalf of the Arab group for his intervention.
I invite the distinguished representative of Belgium.
Belgium, you have the floor.
Mr.
Chairperson, my delegation thanks you for your tireless efforts in bridging divides and for your work on Rev one.
We continue to believe that the draft contains many good elements, but we regret some weakening of the text in Rev one, especially regarding nonproliferation issues.
We are gathered in the framework of the nonproliferation treaty.
Belgium is concerned that the present revised text focuses insufficiently on the very real nonproliferation challenges the world is facing.
Instead, attention is devoted to perfectly legal incompatible security arrangements.
The reference in paragraph two on longstanding and evolving nuclear weapons sharing and extended deterrence arrangements is problematic on several levels.
The used terminology is incorrect and misleading.
There is no sharing of nuclear weapons as previously explained by Denmark, at least within our alliance.
Neither is there an evolution in arrangements.
In fact, their existence is longstanding and predates the negotiation of the NPT.
In our view, extended nuclear deterrence has made a significant contribution to the prevention of horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons on multiple continents, including our own.
This is a view shared by numerous delegations.
We have made textual suggestions to that end that were unfortunately not withheld.
For Belgium, therefore, this section either needs to be rebalanced in such a way or be removed altogether.
On paragraph 48, this is a generic statement and it remains unclear what it refers to.
The second sentence needs to be clarified further if it is to be maintained in the text.
We would therefore suggest specifying the concern in case regarding irresponsible rhetoric and the threat to use nuclear force, a concern that is widely shared by the conference.
Paragraph 57, we do recognize that the non nuclear weapon states have a role to play in implementing the treaty, but assigning them a role in preventing any use of nuclear weapons is a bridge too far and honestly unrealistic.
We would therefore request the deletion of this section.
We understand that paragraph 63 contains a mistake and that a reference is missing regarding the reporting on disarmament by nuclear weapon states.
We would request this to be corrected accordingly.
I thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Belgium for his intervention, and I invite the distinguished representative of Norway to take the floor.
Thank you, chair.
We welcome the revised draft and the efforts to find a compromise.
Much is good, but some key concerns remain for us.
We've sent our comments in writing, of course, and I'll highlight some issues here.
In the preamble, we welcome the considerations in paragraphs 2 to four are maintained in the text and the notion reflected in the new PP two is also a welcome addition.
OP two, we appreciate the efforts to find a solution here and the new formulation could perhaps be read to point to the fact that these longstanding extended deterrence arrangements both predate the NPT and have played a positive role for non proliferation.
But the text remains, however, ambiguous on this point and the overall framing remains problematic.
It unduly singles out only one of many discussions that have taken place in this review cycle and we still read the formulation to imply that nuclear sharing and extended deterrence arrangements are problematic for the treaties effectiveness and credibility and a nonproliferation concern.
Apart from the fact that nuclear sharing is not a clear term, we reiterate that there is no convergence on such an assessment and ask for the deletion of OP two.
If it were to be retained, it would have to be relocated in the text and reworked quite a lot.
We've submitted some proposals to this effect, but we expect that this will be hard to achieve in the time that remains, so we propose deletion.
On OP 47, as regards to transparency, verification, irreversibility, more broadly, we welcome the maintained emphasis on these three core principles in the body of our text in OP 47, 71, and 72.
We've made some suggestions to slightly improve the text on verification that we've sent in writing.
OP 250 to 52, we welcome the strengthened language on the CTBT including the new OP 52 IMS and further on the testing moratorium, we welcome the shift to any yield in OP 54 which strengthens the provision.
As regards OP 55, we welcome the spirit in which these changes seem to have been made.
And we appreciate the new emphasis on multilateral arms control frameworks.
However, one problem that we pointed out earlier still remains, which is that this explicit and repetitive mention of Russia and the US in the paragraph fails to take account of and sort of directs the focus away from the nuclear weapon state with the third largest arsenal, which is currently expanding very rapidly and without any kind of transparency.
So the text in this paragraph should call on Russia, the US and China to engage in multilateral strategic stability dialogue and to lead in taking meaningful initiatives towards multilateral arms control.
We ask for the deletion of OP 59, which refers to the nuclear doctrine of one nuclear weapon state and is not prone to consensus.
As mentioned by others, a purely non declarative, non verifiable, no first use doctrine that is not backed by the very highest levels of transparency, not meaningfully boost confidence, stability, or reduce risks.
If it were to be retained, it would have to adequately reflect these aspects.
On OP 60, we welcome the second sentence and the retained emphasis there with regard to the need for human control and involvement of the decision to employ nuclear weapons, as well as the new reference to the statements made by some nuclear weapon states in this regard.
On OP 63 and 64, those paragraphs are an important foundation for the latest section on transparency, accountability, and reporting in the SRP part of the text, which we expect will be further strengthened with detail on the interactive dialogue on the national reports of the nuclear weapon states.
As many others have mentioned OP 63 now inadvertently, we think, suggests that it is non nuclear weapon states that should report on the implementation of disarmament obligations and a This is about highlighting an imbalance in reporting requirements.
It must be clarified that this last part of OP 63 is, of course, a call on the nuclear weapon states, or we could delete that part of the paragraph.
The same goes for OP 64, where we simply don't understand why the reference to nuclear weapon states have been removed from the first sentence, which then completely changes the focus of that paragraph.
The reference to nuclear weapon states must be reinstated because the raison that of this paragraph is to call for both greater and equal transparency among the nuclear weapon states.
And like others, welcome the emphasis on FMCT negotiations in OP 68 and the important call for moratorium in 2070.
Like others, we believe there is no need to limit the call for negotiations to the CD only.
Thank you.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Norway for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of the United States to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Following on my colleagues comments yesterday, I will start with a few additional areas where we see progress in the text and reiterate a few areas where we still have concerns.
On the paragraphs related to risk reduction, we echo the remarks of Thailand and Australia.
The president and his team have done a commendable job consolidating and bolstering the text with concrete examples of risk reduction measures, reflective of the rich exchanges on this topic throughout the past three weeks and capturing helpful specificity.
These are many of the same measures that the United States has been advocating for bilaterally and within the P five.
The United States remains committed to preventing nuclear war, and we hope all nuclear weapon states will commit to this risk reduction language in the final text and undertake good faith efforts to put these words into action.
Chair, another area where we saw positive movement was Paris 60 on the role of artificial intelligence in decisions on nuclear employment.
The United States reaffirms that the ultimate decision to employ nuclear weapons should never be delegated to artificial intelligence.
We hope all nuclear weapon states can agree to this position.
We do, however, maintain concerns over several paragraphs in this Rev one text regarding paragraph 55 on arms control.
As discussed in Geneva and throughout the last few weeks here in New York, new start was not fit for purpose, and it did not account for China's rapid and opaque nuclear weapons buildup or Russia's sizable arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons and novel systems.
We want to remind the room that while the United States was abiding by this treaty, China more than tripled its nuclear arsenal.
We will provide textual edits to this paragraph to this effect.
The United States echoes the concerns of many yesterday on OP two.
This is the only place in the text that references discussion among the conference.
Yet there are a wider range of important and more relevant issues that have been raised, such as one country's rapid and opaque nuclear buildup and are not referenced in this paragraph.
We echoed the many others who have called for the deletion of this paragraph.
Chair, on paragraph 59, the United States reiterates our policy of only employing nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances.
An unverifiable no first use policy does not contribute to risk reduction or improving the security environment.
It is inaccurate to imply in the outcome document that there was a conference consensus to call on all nuclear weapon states to adopt an NFU policy.
The United States already engages seriously in discussions of doctrines in the P five format and would be happy to discuss doctrines as part of the proposed multilateral strategic stability talks.
On the paragraphs on negative security assurances, we echo Japan and the Republic of Korea, among others, who have called for the clarification that these apply to states who are in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations.
This should be an easy clarification for the conference to take on board.
We reiterate our concern regarding language on humanitarian consequences.
We acknowledge the consequences of nuclear war, and this is why we are working so hard to pursue risk reduction, multilateral strategic stability, and arms control.
The treaties preamble has useful language that might help us move the text forward, specifically, considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples.
This conference must seize the opportunity to add focus and resolve to this text that identifies and addresses the most important threats to the treaty's authority and effectiveness.
The United States will provide written comments and continue to engage constructively toward that aim.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished Representative of the United States for her intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of France to take the floor.
President.
Mr.
Chair, I would like to make a few preliminary remarks on the latest version of the text.
At this stage in the negotiations, we believe that it is still far removed from a consensus, but we are ready to work upon that.
Allow me to underscore a few problems that continue to exist in the text in its current balance.
First, the reference to the Trey on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the TPNW is not acceptable for my delegation.
The same goes for the references to the humanitarian or environmental consequences of the use of nuclear weapons or nuclear tests, which are not in line with the text of the NPT preamble.
Two, France has always promoted a progressive approach to disarmament rooted in the strategic context.
It cannot accept the wording of paragraph 48, which ignores the fact that some nuclear weapon states have made far more efforts than others and which attributes the non implementation of Article 6 to all nuclear weapon states without differentiation.
France can also not accept the many references to the urgent nature of disarmament, which disconnect disarmament efforts from the strategic context and which are incompatible with the objective of non diminished security for all.
Three, and for the same reasons, the proposed wording in paragraph 55 does not sufficiently, in our view, reflect the responsibility incumbent upon the largest arsenals in the area of arms control.
Having said that, France would like to send a positive signal and better highlight the efforts that have already been made under Article 6.
For that reason, we propose in this paragraph, supporting the establishment of multilateral strategic stability negotiations as a measure that would contribute to the implementation of Article 6.
Four, France rejects the inclusion of a paragraph on non first use policy.
We believe that it is not appropriate to promote one doctrine over another, and that this policy in no way guarantees restraint in terms of capacity.
Five, my delegation does not accept paragraph two, which does not fully reflect the fact that nuclear sharing arrangements are fully compatible with the NPT and that they contribute to the objective of non proliferation.
Mr.
Chair, allow me to underscore several points that my delegation would like to see kept in the next version of the text in order to find a consensus on the outcome document.
My delegation very much appreciates the president's efforts to maintain concrete proposals and to develop them in the area of risk reduction.
We also welcome the inclusion of an ambitious paragraph on the comprehensive test ban treaty and the associated monitoring system.
For the same reasons, we support the addition of confidence building measures aiming to ensure that the moratorium is respected by all.
Lastly, in particular, we support the call for the adoption and maintenance by all nuclear weapon states of a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, which is something that has long been awaited by the international community, as well as the reference to the negotiations of a fissile material cutoff treaty at the conference on disarmament and also the dismantling of fissile material production facilities for nuclear weapons.
These elements must be maintained in the next version.
Mr.
Chair, we will send these comments in writing, and you can count on the support of my delegation to continue to work with determination towards a text that is acceptable for all.
Thank you, Chair.
Mercy I thank the distinguished representative of France for her statement.
I now invite the distinguished representative of Finland to make an invention.
Mr.
Chair, I would like to thank the president for the draft outcome document.
We highly appreciate the efforts made to identify compromise solutions and stand ready to contribute constructively to this work.
We consider the revised outcome document to be a solid basis for compromise.
We particularly welcome the strong language on the CTBT, the nuclear testing moratorium and risk reduction, and we encourage retaining these elements.
However, like many others, we have concerns regarding paragraph two and request its deletion.
Extended deterrence has played a critical role in preventing proliferation and promoting collective security, yet this is not reflected in the text.
In paragraph 55, we would like to see the inclusion of the idea of multilateral strategic stability talks which has received support.
Furthermore, we would like to support the deletion of paragraph 59, which calls on all nuclear weapon states to adopt a no first use policy, which is a declaratory policy.
In paragraph 60, we would like to reflect also the opportunities that emerging technologies can provide like improve and further develop verification.
There could be many other positive aspects as well.
For instance, the Stockholm Initiative presented a working paper on this subject.
With regard to paragraphs 63 to 65 on reporting and transparency, we support these measures as they help build trust and confidence.
However, like many others, we find the final part of paragraph 63 problematic as it introduces reporting requirements on the implementation of disarmament commitments vis-à-vis non nuclear weapon states and this should be deleted.
In addition, we would like the text to explicitly condemn threats of use of nuclear force and dangerous nuclear rhetoric.
Mr.
Chair, finally, on a positive note, we welcome the addition of preambular paragraph Roman numeral two highlighting the value of the treaty in the past.
Let us ensure that the treaty remains equally valuable in the future.
I hope that we can continue to work towards an outcome document that reflects a clear commitment to the balanced implementation of the treaty in all its aspects.
I thank you Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Finland for her intervention.
That concludes the list of speakers from yesterday who now proceed with a list of speakers who have inscribed to take the floor today.
I invite them in this order, Italy, South Africa, Iran, Poland, and New Zealand.
I invite the distinguished representative of Italy to make his intervention.
Thank you, Chair.
At the outset, I would like to thank you and through you, the president and the Secretariat for this revised draft.
We can see the effort to produce a balanced text and consider that several parts have improved as far as we are concerned, but others remain unsatisfactory.
The preambula section, we welcome the introduction of the reference to the historic achievements of the NPT over the past five decades of its existence, as we believe this treaty provides the norm and the foundation for international regime to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons around the world, greatly contributing to international peace and security.
We also appreciate the addition in the preamble of the language on nuclear testing.
Concerning paragraph two, while we consider this revised text an improvement on the previous version, It still does not go far enough in our view to recognize the positive contribution these arrangements have brought to the treaty in helping ensure non proliferation in Europe.
We see that the reference to the credibility to the treaty has been removed and that we no longer mention concerns on new arrangements.
However, the text now refers to nuclear weapons sharing, which is factually incorrect.
In light of all the above, either this text is redrafted accordingly or it is simply removed.
In line with our previous comments, we strongly support the elements on the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, including the call on the nuclear weapon states to maintain the existing moratoriums on nuclear weapons tests pending the entry into force of the CTBT.
We welcome the introduction in paragraph 52 of the reference to the international monitoring system being at the core of the verification regime provided by the treaty and the reference to the explosion of any yields in paragraph 54, as the absence of any testing is an essential contribution to reversible disarmament and non proliferation of nuclear weapons.
We still have reservations on paragraph 63, formerly paragraph 64.
We still do not consider it appropriate to refer to reporting requirements on the implementation of disarmament commitments for non nuclear weapon states.
We also do not understand why the reference to nuclear weapon states with regard to the implementation of Article 6 has been removed from paragraph 64.
We believe it should be reinstated.
Reinserted.
We welcome in paragraph 68, the reference to immediately commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and pending its negotiation, the call on nuclear weapon states to maintain or declare moratoriums on its production in paragraph 70.
This moratorium in particular is a very important point.
Concerning paragraph 55, we would prefer language on multilateral strategic stability talks along the lines of that contained in the P three joint statement delivered by the United Kingdom in Main Committee 12 weeks ago.
Finally, we have problems with paragraph 59 as it seems to reflect only one particular view expressed in this debate, and this is a declaratory policy that cannot be verified.
As this is drafted now, we cannot accept it.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Italy for his intervention, and I invite the distinguished representative of South Africa to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
South Africa takes the floor in its capacity as the president of the First Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, encompassing 99 states parties and signatories, which constitute a majority of the United Nations membership.
All TPNW states parties and signatories are also parties to the NPT and actively work towards the NPT's full implementation.
The TPNW is fully consistent with the NPT and endeavors to contribute towards advancing and fulfilling its provisions, including the obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures towards nuclear disarmament.
The TPNW represents the highest nonproliferation commitment any state can make.
It allows the opportunity for those states that are not located in nuclear weapon free zones to join an instrument that expresses their total opposition to nuclear weapons.
The 99 states parties and signatories of the TPNW viewed the treaty as an essential and effective measure to implement the NPT's disarmament obligation contained in Article 6.
TPNW states parties have taken on additional obligations regarding nuclear weapons compared to the NPT, so as to further ensure that these inhumane weapons will never be used again or proliferated further.
The TPNW is also consistent with action one of the 2010 NPT action plan, which calls on all states parties of the NPT to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the treaty and objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.
Therefore, the TPNW is not only fully compatible with the NPT, but represents a concrete step to further its implementation on both nuclear disarmament and non proliferation and should be reflected as such in the outcome document of this review conference.
We strongly advance that the conference acknowledges the TPNW, its entry into force, and the holding of its relevant meetings.
Additionally, the complementarity between the NPT and TPNW for the TPNW states parties in the furtherance of our NPT Article 6 obligations needs to be reflected.
Chair, we deem it necessary to reaffirm our unwavering determination to address the existential threat that nuclear weapons pose to humanity.
The awareness and prevention of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and a conviction to prevent them.
We reiterate our grave concern about the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons, which transcend national borders, pose grave implications for human survival and well being and would be incompatible with the right to life.
These consequences are substantiated by growing body of scientific evidence which confirms that the effects are more severe, cascading, long lasting, and complex than previously understood.
Involving long term damage to the environment, socio economic and sustainable development, the global economy, food security, and the health of current and future generations, including the disproportionate impact that nuclear weapons have on women and girls, including as a result of ionizing radiation, as well as on infants and children, given their particular vulnerability to the effects of nuclear weapons.
We strongly request that the outcome document of the conference reflects this grave concern and that the awareness of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons must underpin our approaches and efforts towards nuclear disarmament.
The conference should also retain the reaffirmation of the obligation for all states at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law and the Charter of the United Nations.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished Representative of South Africa on behalf of TP&W states parties for his intervention.
I now invite the distinguished representative of Iran to take the floor.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chair.
In addition to our previous comments, there's only a couple of points that I have the honor to share with you.
With regard to paragraph 63, we believe that it should be added at the end of the paragraph that the nuclear disarmament obligations should or must be implemented by all nuclear weapon states.
On paragraph 65, we believe that the language from the 2010 action plan should be retained and it should be the basis for national reporting.
With regard to fesile materials, Mr.
Chair, I had the honor to attend a very fascinating side event meeting during today's lunch break time where there was a full and thorough review of all developments with regard to fesile material and it was mentioned that the principles agreed upon in the previous review conferences and during 1990s unfortunately are not honored anymore by all member states.
Especially in this regard, it was referred to two main principles of FMCT which refers to a non discriminatory and comprehensive approach of the treaty that should be elaborated.
By non discriminatory, it especially refers to the obligation that needs to be taken and met by the nuclear weapon states to allow safeguarding their fissile materials.
By comprehensive, it means that not only non proliferation aspect, but also disarmament aspect of the notion the idea should be taken into account.
Therefore, in addition to forward looking aspect of the story, it should be highlighted that the past and existing production of physical materials should be cut off and those stockpiles should be destroyed in an irreversible and verifiable manner.
And Iran as a non nuclear weapon party believes that the inalable right of enjoying peaceful use of nuclear materials and participation fully in the international cooperation programs should be respected and we have proper languages in these effects to be added in the paragraph.
On paragraph 71, we believe that the compliance with the obligations should be extended to object and purpose of the treaty and the implementation of the obligations on nuclear disarmament should be highlighted.
With regard to paragraph 74 on TP&W, We believe that the neutral language with regard to the timeline of the meetings of the treaty can be dropped and instead, at the end of the paragraph, it should be mentioned that the TP&W is a valuable instrument to complementing and furthering objective of the NPT.
Finally, on paragraph 81, we believe that the entity named Israel should be called the Israeli regime, and it can be just a party to the NPT.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Iran for his intervention.
I now invite the distinguished Representative of New Zealand to take the floor.
Okay.
You Chair.
We commend your continued efforts and that of the president in honing this draft outcome document with a review to achieving consensus.
We support this Rev one draft outcome as the basis for our work, although there are aspects we would still like to see improved.
Moving to our preliminary comments on preambular paragraphs 1 to 12, paragraphs 1 and 2, paragraphs 45 to 73 in paragraph 81, we note many elements that we strongly support, including but not limited to PP three's affirmation that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
PP four's reference to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons.
It's reaffirmation of previous commitments including the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of the nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all states parties are committed under Article 6.
The importance the preambular section places on implementation of Article 6 as essential to the credibility and strengthening of the treaty.
It's inclusion of the need to uphold and strengthen the norm against nuclear testing in the preambula section, although we would suggest adding the descriptor global to the sentence given its near universal adherence.
The emphasis in preambula paragraph 11, that the treaty's indefinite extension does not translate to indefinite possession of nuclear weapons.
In paragraph 45, we welcome the amendments which provide a precise restatement of Article 6, and we support your new paragraph 52 on the International monitoring System, as well as the edits to paragraph 54 clarifying that any nuclear tests of any yield would be contrary to nuclear testing moratorium.
We support the mention of nuclear risk reduction efforts, noting that these do not substitute for nuclear disarmament efforts.
The expanded paragraph on nuclear legacy issues is one we strongly support.
We continue to strongly support a factual reference to the TPNW and fail to understand the arguments of those calling for its deletion.
We also have a few additional suggestions to make.
In preambula paragraph five, while we support referencing the UN charter alongside IHL, we suggest the charter reference be generalized and not reference specific articles.
In preambula paragraph seven in the final sentence, we would prefer this language to more closely align with language from the 2010 MPT outcome in which states resolved to commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the treaty.
In paragraph 48, we should refer to the obligations of Article 6 over the objectives of Article 6 while supporting the broader edits to this paragraph.
In paragraph 50, we suggest adding a reference to pending the entry into force as it relates to the CTBT.
In general, we continue to support paragraph 55 on arms control, including its updates, although intermediary stabilizing steps such as dialogues are missing from this text.
We suggest at the end of paragraph 58 to delete without prejudice to national security.
To reflect the point that risk reduction methods should be pursued precisely because they improve security by reducing the risk of accident, misinterpretation or miscalculation.
At the end of paragraph 63, as many others have noted on reporting, it should be clarified that it is nuclear weapon states that must comply with reporting requirements on the implementation of the disarmament commitments.
For instance, by adding bi nuclear weapon states to the end.
We welcome new paragraph 67 on disarmament education, but believe it could be further strengthened by referencing the work of scientists and other experts.
We also suggest the final sentence be amended to read, to better understand the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences.
Thank you, Chair.
We will submit our suggestions in writing.
I thank the Distinguished Representative of New Zealand for her intervention, and I invite the distinguished Representative of Switzerland to take the floor.
Monsieur President.
Mr.
Chair, Switzerland thanks you and your team for the revised version of the draft report, and we welcome the fact that this attempts to integrate the various comments.
Switzerland welcomes the preamble of paragraphs.
First, the addition in the preambular paragraph 11 usefully says that the extension of the treaty can be indefinite.
This consideration is welcome and should continue to guide our work.
Secondly, the addition to PP 12 underscores the importance of maintaining safeguards and bans on nuclear testing at a time when this is subject to severe testing.
Switzerland welcomes this addition.
Paragraph one on the role of the treaty is more concise.
It places disarmament and on on the side of nonproliferation in accepted languages.
As for paragraphs 3, four and five, PPEs 34 and five, we welcome the language about avoiding a nuclear war and the catastrophic repercussions of the use of nuclear weapons and the importance of respecting international law, especially IHL.
The revised text is progress on several fronts, in particular in being more frank about the gaps in implementation and the efforts needed to close those gaps.
In particular, paragraph 47, the addition of the verb applied.
To the principles of irreversibility and the other principles.
This is welcome.
Paragraph 55, Switzerland strongly supports the call upon all nuclear weapon states to multilateralize future arms control frameworks.
We call upon the US and Russia in particular to adhere to the New Start treaty while respecting the bilateral agreements.
Paragraph 49 to 54 on the CTBT.
We welcome the stronger wording in paragraph 50 without preconditions or delay.
The recognition of the international monitoring system calls upon nuclear weapon states to adopt confidence building measures.
This paragraph sends a strong signal at a sensitive moment.
Mr.
Chair, risk reduction is of high importance for the Swiss Declaration.
Rev one makes significant strides in this regard.
A couple of remarks about paragraph 58.
We regret that the wording is a simple call upon nuclear weapon states.
We support operative language that is stronger, committing nuclear weapon states to continue and implement concrete nuclear risk reduction measures.
This is essential in particular because stronger language was submitted by an inter regional group during this cycle.
We welcome the we welcome the amendment that was made, which is a logical and welcome improvement.
Switzerland also supports the addition of the word strategic risk.
However, we would like to clarify it by saying strategic and nuclear risk.
As of miscalculations and misunderstandings.
These are all strategic risks and accidents are not the only risk.
We hope that this framework will be more complete and Switzerland attaches great importance to this issue and we want to see this reflected in the text.
Finally, in paragraph 58, without prejudice to national security was added.
We think that this is a necessary consideration to facilitate support.
We will not oppose, however, any attempts to add a general reservation with regard to curbing nuclear risks.
We also welcome the language about artificial intelligence in Article 60.
Adding artificial intelligence on the list of technologies is an important step to ensure greater emphasis is placed by the conference on the risk of this technology.
We would like to underscore the importance of humans in command and control and decisions to use nuclear weapons.
This is it.
I will provide the various comments that I still have yet to make this afternoon.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Mercy.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Switzerland for his statement.
And I invite the distinguished representative of Ireland on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
I take the floor on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and my own country, Ireland.
First, let me express our collective gratitude to you and your team and that of the president and Secretariat for the efforts to date.
We appreciate the inclusive and transparent approach.
Chair, a key priority for the NAC at this review conference has been a clear reaffirmation of the validity of existing treaty decisions and commitments, as well as recognition of the urgent need to accelerate the implementation of nuclear disarmament under Article 6.
This regard, we welcome several updates in the newest revision, including the appropriate reflection of disarmaments role in the amptee in preambular paragraph one and the strengthening of language in preamular paragraph ten.
We also welcome the amendment to paragraph 48 to accurately reflect the language of Article 6 and the inclusion of language on the threat of use of force in preambular paragraph five.
However, paragraph 48 should be strengthened to make clear that any threat of use of force is unacceptable.
We also welcome the inclusion of the new preambular paragraph 12, underscoring the need to uphold and strengthen the norm against nuclear testing.
Chair, while we welcome the inclusion of language in the preamble reaffirming existing obligations and decisions and commitments, we note that the 1995 outcomes are not consistently referenced throughout.
This should be referred to in paragraph 49.
Similarly, action five of the 2010 action plan should be reinserted here.
The retention of language on the humanitarian consequences in parameter of paragraph four is welcome, but remains insufficient.
We wish to see inclusion of a reference here to the deep concern at these consequences as previously affirmed by states parties.
Chair, the NAC has been clear that nuclear weapon states must redouble their efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament and we welcome the language around expanded multilateral arms control frameworks, as well as the call for previous limits under Net to be respected pending a new agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation.
The phrasing, however, requires additional clarity.
We propose amendment of limitations to stockpile limits.
Chair, we welcome the inclusion of language regarding risks related to the integration of emerging technologies and artificial intelligence into command control and communication systems of nuclear weapons and the need to ensure human control and oversight over these systems.
However, this should be amended to make clear that full and effective human control should apply to the entire chain of command and not just decisions related to use.
Furthermore, such risks should be addressed rather than being simply being mitigated.
Chair, we are disappointed at the dilution of language the creation of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
Likewise, the insertion of language in paragraph 77 caveatating the creation of new nuclear weapon free zones.
We also wish to see a reinstatement of the previous language on the inherent right of non nuclear weapon states to receive negative security assurances from the nuclear weapon states.
Chair, progress in enhancing transparency and accountability is a priority for a majority of states parties and a longstanding priority for the NAC.
We note that the modalities for a new structured interactive dialogue process on the reports of nuclear weapon states are still missing in this current text.
We hope the process facilitated by South Africa and Switzerland can help achieve a cross regional consensus on a credible methodology for interactive reporting by the nuclear weapon state during the next review cycle.
Enhanced national reporting and associated interactive dialogue should allow for vertical and horizontal comparability.
Baselines and mutually understood criteria or benchmarks to measure progress are required in order to understand the direction of travel within and among the nuclear weapon states.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Ireland on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition for his intervention.
I now invite the distinguished representative of Costa Rica to take the floor to be followed by Ukraine.
Senor President Mr.
Chair Costa Rico welcomes the efforts made by the presidency to reflect in this new version of the outcome document the various proposals made by delegations throughout the conference.
We would like, in addition, Mr.
Chairman, to take this opportunity to congratulate you for your efficient and constructive conduct of the work of Main Committee one.
Costa Rica welcomes some of the improvements that have been introduced.
Nevertheless, we believe that other provisions need to be strengthened in order to preserve the authority effectiveness of the treaty and to clearly and accurately respond to current challenges.
First of all, we reiterate our concern over the absence in the text of any robust reference to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.
The current wording in PP four is insufficient.
We suggest returning to the language from previous articles and processes that establish the devastating cross border and cascading effects of nuclear weapons on health, environment, biodiversity, infrastructure, food security, climate, development, social cohesion, and the global economy, as well as the risk that their very existence constitutes for the survival of humanity.
On OP 45, Costa Rica believes that in this paragraph or in an additional paragraph, we should incorporate an express reference to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or the use of nuclear weapons of the 8th of July 1996.
In particular, we should recall the obligation to in good faith engage and conclude negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.
Third, and relating to OPs 58 and 64, we recommend removing the phrase without prejudice to national security because that weakens the scope of commitments and opens the way to restrictive interpretations that are contrary to the spirit of the treaty.
On OP 67, we believe that the conference should at the very least include a reference to the establishment of an independent scientific panel on the effect of nuclear war in accordance with Resolution 70 9238 of the General Assembly.
Its mandate would provide a scientific basis for considering the physical effects and social consequences of nuclear war, including its climate environment impacts, its radiological impacts, its public health, agricultural, environmental, and socioeconomic impacts as well.
Fifth, on OP 71, we propose returning to the expression welcomes instead of takes note or notes on the scientific and technical group of experts on nuclear disarmament.
Verification is essential for moving towards concrete, credible, and irreversible measures of nuclear disarmament.
On OP 73, we believe it is essential to strengthen the reference to the Trey on the prohibition of nuclear weapons.
The TPNW has significant and growing membership with 99 states parties and signatories, all of them are also parties to the NPT.
The TPNW is entirely compatible with the NPT and it represents a concrete step towards advancing its implementation in the area of nuclear disarmament and also in the area of nonproliferation.
It should be reflected as such in the outcome document of this review conference.
Lastly, as a cross cutting subject throughout the text, Costa Rica reiterates the need to strengthen the equitable participation of women in all aspects of nonproliferation and disarmament, including language on the full equitable and meaningful participation and leadership of women in implementation and in the review of the treaty.
Moreover, we need to recognize the growing scientific evidence on the disproportionate impact of nuclear explosions on women and girls.
Mr.
Chair Costa Rica is making these proposals in order to strengthen the credibility, the scope, and the effectiveness of the treaty.
These are essential elements for the continued legitimacy of the treaty as the cornste in the international nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime.
Thank you very much.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Costa Rica for his remarks and I now invite the distinguished representative of Ukraine to take the floor.
Mr.
Chair, Ukraine is grateful to the president of the conference for the revised draft outcome document.
We would like to make a few points.
While there are certain elements that we appreciate, particularly in the preamble or section as well as the provisions on risk reduction fissile material, some parts of the text remain unsatisfactory.
Throughout the deliberations, many delegations referred to the responsible nuclear rhetoric and threats to use nuclear weapons.
Ukraine would like to once again add its voice to these concerns.
We believe this issue should be duly reflected in the draft outcome document.
Regrettably, the draft outcome document does not contain any reference to the unprecedented decision by a nuclear weapon state to revoke its ratification of the CTBT.
Furthermore, the draft does not contain the reference to the importance of security assurances provided to Ukraine in connection with its accession to the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, commonly known as Budapest memorandum.
It is worth recalling that Ukraine voluntarily abandoned the world's third largest nuclear arsenal and thereby made a historic contribution to global nuclear disarmament on the basis of the security assurances provided in the Budapest memorandum.
The failure of the Russian Federation to comply with its commitments has direct implications for the credibility of security assurances and undermines confidence in the global nonproliferation regime as a whole.
Our delegation has already submitted its written proposals to the revised draft outcome document.
Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Ukraine for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of Poland to take the floor and that will be followed by Canada.
Yeah.
Thank you, Chair.
We are extremely grateful for the efforts to accommodate as many divergent views as possible.
However, we still see quite a few concerns that remain unaddressed.
To be more specific, Poland maintains the request to delete paragraph two.
We consider it of utmost importance to avoid the stalemate at the conference over an issue that has never been a central element of the NPT discussions.
We continue to believe the paragraph is neither balanced nor anchored in the regional security context, particularly nuclear threats made by Russia, militarization of Kalyrad Oblast and Belarus, as well as the Russia's ongoing aggression against our neighbor, Ukraine.
Our position and argumentation remain unchanged since the submission of our previous comments.
Chair, the current wording suggests that extended deterrence, nuclear sharing, and NATO's nuclear policy in general may impact credibility and effectiveness of the NPT.
It does not recognize, however, the fact that nuclear sharing arrangements have had a stabilizing role in Europe, preventing proliferation and contributing to a more stable security environment.
In an increasingly complex security environment, NATO's nuclear policy remains critical for deterring aggression, promoting collective security, and preventing war.
It is a vital component of our security policy given the regional threat.
Finally, the paragraph does not recognize that extended deterrence provides a powerful disincentive to nuclear weapons proliferation by protecting non nuclear weapon states from nuclear armed aggressors.
We believe that until such time that NPT Article 6 can be fully implemented, extended deterrence will continue to be a cornerstone of ensuring global security.
Chair, there are also other parts of the text that we would like to comment further.
In the preamble, we remain worried about the potential negative and unjust conclusions stemming from the current wording of the paragraph concerning catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons.
Any use may be understood as undermining the concept of deterrence, which has played, as I stated, a stabilizing role in the absence of full, complete, verifiable, and irreversible nuclear disarmament.
In paragraph 48, we ask for a more balanced approach.
This paragraph in its current shape, does not provide enough context in relation to the sources of regional and global instabilities, such as Russia's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, China's opaque nuclear policy, the DPRKsepanding nuclear and ballistic missiles programs, and Iran's nuclear program coupled with this country's non cooperation with the IAEA.
In paragraph 55, as much as we support the inclusion of non strategic weapons, we note with concern that all P five states seem to be given the same status, vis-à-vis the issue of future arms control framework.
We cannot support this approach.
The arsenals of the UK and France are nowhere near close to the ones maintained by the other P five states.
Therefore, we request more objective language specifying that Russia, China and the US should be in the first instance covered by future arms control regulations.
In paragraph 59, we cannot accept the inclusion of no first use language as it is not pertinent to the NPT.
For the same reason in paragraph 73, we are still not in a position to support any reference to the DPNW.
Finally, in paragraph 79, we note with dissatisfaction that the language in the DPRK has been watered down since the issuance of the zero draft.
We therefore ask for reinstating this language and we deem the previous wording a bare minimum, particularly in the context of the growing cooperation between the DPRK, China and Russia, which constitutes a clear violation of international law, including multiple UNSC resolution.
Thank you, sir.
I thank the distinguished representative of Poland for his intervention, and I I invite the distinguished Representative of Canada to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Our delegation is grateful to the president, his team, and you and OODA for producing rev one of the outcome document.
Finding compromises is a difficult exercise in the current political context, and we appreciate the president's efforts.
We see improvements in the text, even if some concerns remain.
We will not comment on the merits of each paragraph in this intervention and refer instead to our previous statements and written submissions on the zero draft and Rev one.
Canada also supports the statements made by other delegations in particular Germany and the Netherlands in main Committee one yesterday and Norway today.
As for today, our delegation would like to focus on a few core issues that are fundamental to the NPT, in our view.
First and foremost, we have heard an offer by the P three nuclear weapon states to engage in multilateral strategic stability talks.
We believe that all nuclear weapon states, in particular those holding the three largest nuclear arsenals, should participate in these talks and advance strategic stability, nuclear arms control, and disarmment.
This offer represents a historic opportunity to advance the disarmment pillar of the NPT and reverse the real risk of a post Cold War nuclear arms race.
Global nuclear arsenals are already increasing again and one of them particularly rapidly.
The conference should call on nuclear weapon states, in particular, those three holding the largest arsenals, to participate in multilateral strategic stability, arms control, and disarmament negotiations.
We also believe that nuclear weapon states have a responsibility to pursue concrete risk reduction measures to minimize the possibility of an inadvertent or accidental use of nuclear weapons pending the elimination of all nuclear weapons.
We support language to that effect in the outcome document.
This conference should support the CTBT, the international monitoring systems, nuclear testing moratoriums, and other practical measures that reinforce the norm against nuclear testing, including against explosive nuclear testing of any yield.
It is critical that we reinforce the monitoring and verification regime surrounding nuclear testing through entry into force of the CTBT, strengthening of the detection, capacity of the international monitoring system, and other verification measures.
We do not want to go back to a world where states conduct once again nuclear explosive tests.
The roughly 2000 nuclear explosive weapons tests conducted to date and their consequences should be more than enough to teach us that lesson.
Canada supports calling out and addressing violations of treaty obligations, including the DPRK's nuclear program, Iran's non compliance with its nonproliferation obligations, and Russia's unlawful and destabilizing behavior in Ukraine, including its dangerous nuclear rhetoric and attacks against civilian and peaceful Ukrainian nuclear facilities in the context of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.
These actions undermine our collective security and our goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.
We would like to see a robust response by this conference and the international community more broadly against these violations and threats to the NPT regime.
Finally, we note that another core issue for Canada is the inclusion of gender language in the outcome document along the lines of specifying that the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in the implementation of the NPT and its review process is vital.
We need everyone to support the NPT.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Canada for his intervention.
I invite the distinguished representative of Turkey to take the floor and to be followed by Zimbabwe.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Turkey commends the president's ongoing efforts to guide the conference towards a consensus outcome.
Even though su progress has been reflected in Rev one, there remains room for further improvement in order to achieve a balanced text with greater clarity and broader convergence with a view to reaching consensus.
In this regard, we would like to share our views on certain paragraphs of the Rev one draft as follows.
Mr.
Chair, regarding operative paragraph two, our concerns remain.
We believe that the current reference to extended deterrence is not conducive to achieving a balanced and consensus based outcome, as is introduced language that many states parties, including Turkey have identified as a source of concern.
Not only is the substance of this paragraph is problematic, but its prominent placement at the outset of the document also creates an inaccurate impression regarding priorities of the conference, diverting attention from the substantive issues under consideration.
We therefore support its complete decision.
Deletion.
In this regard, we reiterate that NATO extended deterrence and nuclear sharing arrangements have always been and continue to be fully consistent with the NPT.
These arrangements predate the NPT, were well known at the time of the treaty negotiation and ratification and remains recognized at the time of its indefinite extension in 1995.
Furthermore, as we have noted previously, NATO's nuclear arrangements have contributed and continue to contribute to preventing proliferation risks in a manner consistent with the objectives of the treaty.
We are concerned that the statements by said parties underscoring the compatibility of deterrence arrangements with the NPT and broader non proliferation objectives have not been reflected in the text.
Given the immense challenges facing nuclear disarmament and non proliferation, we consider paragraph two to be a distraction from the core issues before the conference and retreate our expectation that it be deleted in its entirety.
We trust that this concern will be duly considered in the next revision with a view to achieving a more balanced and broadly acceptable outcome.
Mr.
Chair, with regard to transparency and accountability concerning paragraph 64, we consider it essential that the reference to nuclear weapon states be retained as it underscores the need for enhanced and equitable transparency by those states in line with the action five of the 2010 action plan.
The priority should remain the reporting obligations of nuclear weapon states, particularly in the context of Article 6 commitments.
We appreciate strong language on the CTBT as well as the inclusion of a paragraph commending the work of the international monitoring system and recognizing the importance of nuclear testing moratorium.
Finally, Turkey believes that the importance of achieving the universality of the treaty should also be reflected in the preamber paragraph of the outcome document.
Turkey remains committed to engaging constructively throughout the negotiations with the aim of adopting a meaningful consensus based outcome document.
I thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Turkey for his intervention, and I I invite the distinguished representative of Zimbabwe to take the floor to be followed by Singapore and Latvia.
Zimbabwe, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Zimbabwe extends its appreciation to President Viet and the Bureau for the leadership and efficient manner you are handling our work during this review conference.
We appreciate the timely circulation of the draft outcome document Rev one, which we view as a good basis for a consensual outcome.
My delegation wishes to reiterate that the treaty cannot afford a third consecutive review conference without a substantive outcome.
The global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime rests on the success of the negotiations in the coming seven days.
We have comments on five paragraphs undermined Committee one as follows.
On paragraph 45, we welcome the insertion at an early date in relation to the need to pursue regulations for the cessation of the nuclear arms race.
This means such negotiations should commence without delay.
On paragraph 48, we concur with the recognition of lack of progress on good faith negotiations as this should be a regret and this should be a regret.
We call on all states parties to lend the necessary political will to these processes.
On paragraph 50, we welcome the call for all states to refrain from any actions that are contrary to the object and purposes of the CTBT.
This is necessary for the maintenance of the global norm against nuclear testing.
We further welcome paragraph 54 and its urging for the development and implementation of new measures to restore confidence in explosive nuclear testing moratoriums.
On paragraph 62, we support the calls for the conference on disarmament to establish a subsidiary body to formulate recommendations on the provisions of legally binding security assurances to non nuclear weapon states.
And finally, Mr.
Chair, on paragraph 67, we welcome calls for raising public awareness on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.
We also recommend that such education awareness programs should also showcase the peaceful power of the atom to encourage communities to see nuclear energy as having the potential as a force for good rather than distraction.
Mr.
Chair Zimbabwe assures you of its constructive engagement towards a positive and progressive outcome at this review conference.
I thank you.
I thank the distinguished Representative of Zimbabwe for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished Representative of Singapore to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Singapore thanks the president for the revised draft and his efforts to refine the text based on the views received.
My point will be brief.
My delegation welcomes the addition of new language that strengthens this section of the draft outcome document, in particular, the inclusion of the new OP 52 on the International Monitoring System.
We would strongly support the retention of this paragraph going forward.
Although having heard comments in the room yesterday, we are open to refining this paragraph if required, so that the final formulation is acceptable to all delegations.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Singapore for her much and I now invite the distinguished representative of Latvia to take the floor.
Latvia will be followed by Mexico and Lithuania.
Chair, we thank you and through you, the president and his team for Revision one.
We recognize effort by the president to seek ways to accommodate different perspectives among states.
On some elements, we see progress while on others, there's still work to do.
Let me briefly go through some of the points that we will also submit in writing.
On OP two, we noticed some improvement.
However, we are not there yet.
We believe that the text still does not accurately capture positions among states, particularly on the positive contribution of extended deterrence to preventing proliferation.
Therefore, at this late stage of negotiation, we would request to delete this para.
Here we do agree with the comment by Belgium and that instead of extensive focus on these well known arrangements that predate the NPT, we should devote attention to urgent challenges to NPT linked to actions by Iran, Russia, and DPRK on which the text, unfortunately, has been weakened in Revision one.
We also share opposition expressed by many states on Para 59 and would request its deletion.
On paragraph 60, we support calls to include language that reflects not only risks, but also potential opportunities provided by new technology to advancing NPT goals.
We regret that despite calls by many delegations, the text does not include references to risk related to reckless nuclear rhetoric.
We see that this language could be added to paragraph 58.
On para 63 and 64, we agree with many comments on the need to reinstate the focus on responsibilities of nuclear weapon states in this section.
On para 73, hearing calls to expand and strengthen this para, we would like to state for the record that Latvia does not support reference to the treaty on the prohibition on nuclear weapons in the outcome document.
However, to conclude on a positive note, we welcome strengthened language on CTBT including references to International Monitoring System and the International Data Center.
We also welcome refining language on risk reduction.
Furthermore, we welcome the deletion of references to root causes in paragraph 58.
We look forward to continuing working with you on the text.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Latvia for his intervention, and I invite the distinguished representative of Mexico to deliver his remarks.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chair.
I'd like to reiterate Mexico's support for the statement by Ireland on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, and also the statement by South Africa on behalf of the parties to the TPNW to strengthen the language on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, particularly to express our concern over that threat and also to strengthen the language on the CTBT and keeping the reference to the TP&W.
That notwithstanding, this time, I am going to refer to a question that may seem cosmetic, but which has not been mentioned, and that is an inconsistency in the section on disarmament, particularly in the Rev one.
That is that in some cases, there are specific references to resolutions of the General Assembly and in other cases that isn't done.
In some cases, Those references have been deleted or they're referred to but without the nomencture of the code of the General Assembly.
My delegation doesn't have a preference in one direction or the other, but I wanted to draw attention to that inconsistency.
Perhaps it would be preferable when there is a further revision of the document that a consistent approach be adopted where decisions or resolutions of the General Assembly that are relevant to this text be referred to in the correct way.
Of particular importance as well, is being fair and equitable in the references to the way that they are taken note of because some of these references are to decisions that were adopted without a vote.
In that regard, my delegation would be flexible about only recalling them or noting them, but to do so in a consistent way throughout the text.
Lastly, I wanted to, in general terms, refer to the references to the 2010 plan of action.
We've noted that in many occasions, those references to action five in this section have been deleted.
The NAC asked for that to be restored and for us, that it's very strange to not refer to the latest, the most recent consensus that we had on that.
We understand that it's not necessary to reiterate word for word all of the language that was contained in that action, but that brings me to my final request.
Yes.
That is that if there is some disagreement over the language on one subject or another, it's very important that we do go back to agreed language, particularly when it comes to the language in the corresponding action in the plan of action because that could serve as a basis for finding a solution.
This isn't an invitation to engage in the selective application of the plan of action.
It's simply a call for the consistent application of the language that was agreed upon in the most recent document that was agreed to by the parties to the NPT.
Thank you very much.
I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for her intervention.
I now invite the distinguished representative of Lithuania to take the flow.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
We thank you, chair, and the entire leadership team for this revised draft, which demonstrates the efforts of finding common ground.
We would like to offer the following specific comments under main Committee one.
We will also share written contributions in due course.
First, we welcome the language in the preambular section and operative part on nuclear explosion testing and CTBTO.
We also reaffirm the fundamental value of the treaty and its historic achievements as reflected in PP two.
There remain several elements in the current text that we either see a necessity for revision or do not support maintaining the current language.
On OP two, we note the suggestions to change the language and appreciate the effort.
However, as noted by distinguished delegations of Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, the United States, and many other delegations yesterday and today, We do not see justification in singling out one specific discussion among many, especially since as emphasized by numerous delegations, no such substantive discussion actually took place, nor should the policies fully compliant with the EPT be discussed further.
Furthermore, as clearly stated on previous occasions, NATO's defensive arrangements do not involve nuclear weapons sharing as indicated in the mentioned paragraph.
In our view, this reference does not add value to the outcome document.
We therefore request complete deletion of the paragraph.
We would, of course, consider revision of the text as mentioned by the delegations of the Netherlands if it was about noting the NATO's defensive arrangements implications towards positive outcomes of nonproliferation.
With respect to OP 48, we believe this paragraph should also reflect on the impact of dangerous and destabilizing nuclear rhetoric and threats which are incompatible with Article 6 obligations and undermine the credibility of the treaty.
This could and should also be reflected in the preambular paragraph.
This issue has been mentioned numerous times in the room.
Also, in this paragraph, we would like to see mentioning rapid and opaque in the context of the growth of some arsenals.
We reiterate that we do not support the inclusion of no first use language as currently reflected in OP 59.
This concept is proposed and pushed forward by a single state party whose actual actions stand in dissociation from the stated policy.
Furthermore, this concept remains highly contested as an inherently unverifiable.
We therefore request the complete deletion of the paragraph.
Mr.
Chair, the Lithuanian delegation does not support OP 63 or the modifications made to OP 64, when read in conjunction with OP 91 and OP 93, which we note fall outside this committee's mandate.
These paragraphs lead to ambiguous interpretations.
My delegation firmly believes that all paragraphs concerning reporting must remain clear, precise, and strictly anchored in the treaty and its core obligations.
We do not find neither original text nor current revision of OP 63 clear.
In OP 64, we do not understand the rationale of the deletion of nuclear weapon states and other proposed changes.
With the proposed changes evaluated in conjunction with each other, we see the risk of imposing greater reporting burdens on non nuclear weapon states that the then the apetee established and potentially even more than those placed for the nuclear weapon states.
Finally, we do not see added value in the reference to the Treaty on the prohibition on nuclear weapons in paragraph 73 and reiterate our suggestion to delete this reference in order to preserve focus on the NPT as the cornerstone of the regime and single and most credible path to nuclear disarmament.
We would also support Australia and Canada on the inclusion of language on the participation of women.
I thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Thanks.
I thank the distinguished representative of Lithuania for her intervention.
The next set of speakers I have on my list are China, the Holy See, Mozambique, Indonesia, Ireland, and Estonia.
I invite the distinguished representative of China to take the floor.
Mr.
Chair, in the earlier statements, a certain nuclear superpower and its allies, driven by various motives, have groundlessly distorted and smeared China's nuclear policy and nuclear force development, China firmly opposes this and urges the country concerned to earnestly fulfill its special and primary responsibilities for nuclear disarmament and to engage in more self reflection rather than shifting blame onto others.
China has no interest in engaging in politicized debate on this matter and will continue to participate constructively in the consultations on the texts.
Building on the remarks made yesterday on PP one, China knows that all parties have emphasized the balanced advancement of the three pillars, the importance of the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the need to ensure that treaty serves peace and development.
We therefore propose adding the words and development at the end of this paragraph.
On PP three, China suggests citing the consensus language from the 2010 final document and adding a new paragraph to reaffirm the need to further diminish the role of nuclear weapons in national security policies.
On PP six, China suggests citing the consensus language from the 2010 final document and adding a new paragraph following it to reaffirm international consensus on disarmament.
Relevant proposals have been submitted to the chair.
Regarding paragraph two, China notes that the majority of countries have called for expressing serious concern regarding existing nuclear sharing arrangements and the potential establishment of new ones.
China supports the outcome document fully reflecting these positions.
Individuals justification for their friendly proliferation is really shocking.
China also proposes adding a new paragraph after paragraph two, further calling on the relevant nuclear weapon states to withdraw their nuclear weapon deployed overseas to their own territories and to refrain from making new deployments on foreign territories.
Regarding paragraph 52, China notes that many delegations have expressed concerns about this paragraph and have even called for its decision.
China has no objection to deleting this paragraph.
However, in the spirit of constructiveness and to facilitate consensus, we suggest adjusting the specific language of this paragraph by referencing the consensus language of Action 14 in the 2010 64 point action plan, we will provide the specific language proposal to the chair.
Regarding paragraph 57, China supports in principle, the amendment proposed yesterday by Egypt on behalf of Arab states.
At the same time, China emphasizes the special role of non nuclear weapon states participating in nuclear sharing arrangements in this regard and suggests adding after non nuclear weapon states in the second sentence the phrase, in particular, non nuclear weapon states participating in nuclear sharing arrangements.
Regarding paragraph 61 and 62 on SAs, China supports in principle, strengthening the relevant language, including emphasizing in paragraph 61 that receiving active security assurances is a legitimate right of non nuclear weapon states and in paragraph 62, calling for the conference on disarnment to start negotiations on the relevant international legal instruments.
On paragraph 67 to simplify the paragraph, China suggests deleting the part from including at the first line to the end of the paragraph.
Regarding paragraph 68, China suggests referencing the consensus language from action 15 of the 2010 action plan and adding language on comprehensive and balanced program work.
In conclusion, China wishes to emphasize that China support retaining paragraph 59 and strengthened language as appropriate and China is open towards the specific language in this paragraph.
Any attempt to question this paragraph is a disguised encouragement or condoning of the use of the first use of nuclear weapons, which will send a wrong signal to the outside world.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of China for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of the Holy See to take the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
My delegation wishes to thank you and the Secretariat for the considerable work undertaken in preparing this Rev one.
Bearing in mind the divergent views heard in the past weeks, we recognize and appreciate the efforts to find a text which is acceptable to all states parties.
At the same time, from the perspective of the Holy See, while this text is an improvement on the draft, there remain several key elements that require further development.
In the interest of time, my delegation will limit itself to a few paragraphs which we consider particularly significant, not only in themselves, but also as indicators of the broader direction in which this process is moving.
We will share our further comments in writing.
With regard to preambular paragraph four, my delegation welcomes the inclusion of a reference to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, particularly at the outset of the preambular section.
At the same time, we believe the paragraph could be further strengthened, including through a more comprehensive reference to the environmental consequences of nuclear weapons and language more closely aligned with previously agreed formulations.
My delegation is convinced that this is not the moment to weaken references to the humanitarian and environmental consequences.
We are living through a period of heightened nuclear risk marked by the modernization and expansion of nuclear arsenals, increasingly dangerous rhetoric, and the rapid development of emerging technologies.
In this context, preserving strong language on these consequences remains essential, particularly in light of the growing body of scientific and technical research that continues to underscore their gravity.
Regarding the paragraphs related to the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, my delegation welcomes the fact that the references to the CTBT have been retained in the text, including the mention of the international monitoring system and the commemoration of the treaty's 30th anniversary.
In particular, we welcome operative paragraph 53.
Turning to operative paragraph 60, my delegation welcomes the fact that this paragraph has been retained in Revo one and improved, particularly through the reference to artificial intelligence.
At the same time, given the gravity of the matter, we believe that the paragraph could and should be developed further.
In this regard, we agree with other delegations on the importance of ensuring full and effective human control, not only over decisions to employ nuclear weapons, but over nuclear weapons at large.
Human responsibility and meaningful human judgment must remain fully preserved in all matters concerning nuclear weapons and related systems, particularly in contexts involving emerging technologies and opaque algorithmic processes.
Finally, regarding operative paragraph 73, my delegation welcomes the retention of the reference to the Trey on the prohibition of nuclear weapons in the text.
At the same time, we would attach particular importance to ensuring that the paragraph reflects in a clearer and more substantive manner the complementary relationship between the TPNW and the Trey on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, especially in relation to the implementation of Article 6 and the shared objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Holy See for his intervention, and I invite the distinguished representative of Mozambique to take the floor.
Mozambique will be followed by Indonesia.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Mozambique thanks the Chair and facilitators for their effort in advancing a balanced draft outcome document and assures you of our constructive engagement throughout this process.
Mozambique generally supports the language contained in the sections relating to nuclear disarmament and non proliferation and considers the current draft to provide a useful basis to further negotiations.
With regards to OP one, Mozambique supports the emphasis placed on the effective implementation of Article 1 and two and their contribution to international peace and security.
Concerning OP two, Mozamique appreciates the balanced approach reflected in the language on continued dialogue regarding nuclear sharing and extended deterrence arrangements.
We believe the current formulation appropriately avoids prejudging positions while encouraging continued discussion among state parties.
Mozamiique supports OP three, emphasizing the concerns regarding compliance with the treaty obligation should be addressed exclusively through political and diplomatic means in accordance with the charter of the United Nations and the provision of the treaty.
We attach particular importance to the language reaffirming the authority and the central role of the IA in safeguard verification and compliance matters.
In our view, the independence, technical credibility, and impartiality of the agency must continue to be preserved and strengthened.
Mozambique further welcomes the reference throughout the draft to transparency, verification, safeguards, and confidence building measures, which remains essential component of the nonproliferation regime.
Regarding the disarmment section, Mozambique supports the reaffirmation of the obligation under Article 6 to pursue negotiation in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.
Mozambique considers the language contained in OP 48 and 49 to reflect legitimate concerns regarding the lack of progress in the implementation of Article 6 obligations, the continued existence of nuclear weapons, and ongoing modernization programs.
We also welcome reference to nuclear weapon free zones as practical and credible regional measures that strengthen international peace, security, confidence building, and nonproliferation objectives.
In this regard, while discussions often focus on the Middle East, Mozambique emphasized that nuclear weapon free zone remain equally important for Africa.
Particularly at a time when major energy mining, maritime, and strategic infrastructure projects are expanding across the continent.
The preservation of Africa as a nuclear weapon free zone under the Treaty of Pina remain essential for ensuring that the continent's development and natural resources continue to contribute exclusively to peaceful purposes, sustainable development and regional stability.
Mozambique particularly welcomes operative Paragraph 67, encouraging greater public awareness, education, and engagement of younger generations on issues relating to nuclear government and nonproliferation.
For many nuclear weapon states, especially developing countries, investing in youth awareness and education is essential to sustaining long term international commitment to multilateralism, peace, responsible scientific development, and prevention of future nuclear risks.
Mr.
Chair, Mozambique remains committed to engaging constructively and flexibly in order to achieve a balanced, credible, and consensus based outcome that strengthen the treaty and advances its objective.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Mozambique for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of Indonesia to take the floor.
Mr.
Chair, Indonesia wishes to highlight additional priority issues where in our view, the revised draft could benefit from more refined language.
First, on paragraphs 46 and 47, Inditia reaffirms that Article 6 requires states parties to pursue negotiations in good faith and bring them to a conclusion under transparent, strict, and effective international control.
We further underscore that the multilateral, regional, bilateral and unilateral measures undertaken in fulfillment of Article 6 must contribute to cannot substitute for the full implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
Second on paragraph 55, while the Indonesia notes that call for engagement on a successor to new start, we must underscore that arms control measures do not substitute nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments under Article 6.
Bilateral arrangements between nuclear weapon states, while welcome, cannot replace the multilateral obligation owed to all states parties.
Third, on paragraph 58, Indonesia proposes that nuclear risk reduction must address the full breadth of risk associated with nuclear weapons, including those arising from doctrines, operational postures, high level alerts, modernization, emerging technologies, weakening transparency and arms controls, and the erosion of confidence building arrangements.
The text should specifically include de alerting and the separation of nuclear warheads from the delivery of vehicles and diminishing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines, and policies.
Fourth, on paragraph 59, Isia calls on all nuclear weapon states to declare that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons and to undertake corresponding doctrinal enforce posture measures as an inter measure and not as a substitute for nuclear disarmament.
Mr.
Chair, Indonesia would also like to align itself with the previous statement delivered by South Africa in its capacity as president of the first Review Conference of the Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, reaffirming our unwavering determination to address the existential threat that nuclear weapons pose to humanity, our awareness of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, and our conviction to prevent them.
Indonesia trust that the outcome document of this conference will give due reflection to this grave concern and to the awareness of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.
These elements, together with those raised in our earlier intervention, reflecting Alicia's consistent commitment to the full and faithful implementation of Article 6.
Our written recommendation will further be submitted for the consideration of this conference.
Thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Indonesia for his intervention.
I have three more speakers on my list, Ireland, Estonia, and Nepal.
The United Kingdom must join.
I invite the distinguished representative of Ireland to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair.
Through you, let me pass our thanks to the president and his team for their work on the first revision of the draft outcome document.
We look forward to continuing to work constructively towards consensus.
We have submitted our concrete suggestions in writing.
Let me take this opportunity to set out our initial views.
At the outset, let me make two overarching points.
First, we welcome the strengthening of some of the language and disarmament.
In particular, we welcome the reference to the urgency of the need to implement Article 6 and the full implementation of nuclear weapons state obligations and related commitments.
We see this including in preambular paragraphs 2 and 10 and paragraphs 45 and 46.
Welcome that this draft recognizes that the credibility of the treaty depends on the good faith implementation of those disarmament obligations and commitments of the nuclear weapon states.
We need to ensure clear and unequivocal focus on the special responsibilities of all the nuclear weapon states and the core promise of the treaty, the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
Second, we welcome the retention of language in preambular paragraph seven, reaffirming the validity of all existing commitments, including those agreed in 1995, 2000 and 2010.
It should be the baseline of our ambition throughout the text.
Our wish to achieve an outcome document should not be at the price of diluting previous commitments.
Turning now to specific issues, we welcome the retention of language recognizing the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons in preamble to paragraph three.
These consequences must both inform and give urgency to our work.
However, we need to go further and express concern about these consequences.
This conference has done so in the past.
There's no reason why we can't do so again.
We welcome recognition in preambular paragraph six that there's no endorsement for the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons and we strongly welcome the preamble of paragraph seven on the norm against testing, which should be a central focus of this conference.
Noting the new language in preambular paragraph five, we think that the text should be clearer on the unacceptability of nuclear threats.
With that in mind, we suggest adding to paragraph 48 that all nuclear threats implicit and explicit are unacceptable, end quote.
Also in paragraph 48, it is welcomed that the deeply concerning rapid and opaque expansion of some nuclear arsenals, which are inconsistent with NPT commitments is recognized.
On nuclear risk reduction, we welcome the specificity of measures set out in paragraph 58, and we call for progress on their implementation.
On paragraph 60 concerning emerging technologies, we welcome the explicit reference to artificial intelligence.
However, we would like this language to be strengthened further given the specific and urgent concerns it raises.
First, we would delete the words human involvement.
Rather, it is human control that must be maintained at all times.
Furthermore, human control should apply throughout communications command and control systems so that the human dimension is retained throughout any process to launch a catastrophic strike.
Paragraphs 63 and 64 reflect the calls heard throughout this review cycle and at this conference for improvements on transparency and accountability in the implementation of Article 6.
In paragraph 63, we suggest that the reporting on the implementation of disarmament commitments be appropriate and adequate.
That's a quote in light of the existing extensive legal reporting requirements on non nuclear weapon states.
I paragraph 64 to echo the contributions of many, nuclear weapon states should be specifically referenced as short action five of the 2010 action plan.
Finally, we welcome the simple factual language on the TP&W in paragraph 73, which should be retained without dilution.
Thank you very much.
I thank the distinguished representative of Ireland for his intervention.
I have an additional delegation that is requesting the floor that's Thailand.
We have Estonia, Nepal, United Kingdom, and we might be able to fit in Thailand.
But as I had indicated from the beginning, we need to close by 520 to our last time to move to the plenary.
So I would encourage delegations to be brief and straight to the point.
It's now my pleasure to invite the distinguished representative of Estonia to take the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Estonia thanks the President for circulating rev one of the draft outcome document.
We recognize that preparing a balanced and consensus oriented revision has not been an easy task.
Nevertheless, we consider Rev one to be an important step in the right direction.
Estonia has already submitted its detailed comments and drafting suggestions on Rev one in writing.
Allow me briefly to highlight a few key priorities relevant to the current main committee's discussions.
Regarding paragraph two, While we appreciate efforts to improve the language compared to the zero draft, the current formulation still creates unnecessary ambiguity with regard to longstanding extended deterrence arrangements, therefore consistent with the treaty.
Estonia would therefore favor its deletion as references to evolving nuclear weapon sharing arrangements or ongoing discussions may unintentionally suggest that such arrangements are inconsistent with the treaty.
In Estonia's view, deletion of paragraph two would better support clarity and the long term credibility of the outcome document.
In paragraph 58, Estonian would favor stronger language condemning threats to nuclear weapons.
An irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, which undermines strategic stability and increase nuclear risks.
In para paragraph 62, Estonia supports language expressing grave concern that the Russian Federation's actions against Ukraine are inconsistent with the security assurances provided under the Budapest memorandum.
In our view, this undermines confidence in existing security assurances for non nuclear weapon states and has a broader implications for the credibility of the nonproliferation regime.
Already noted, Estonia has submitted its more detailed comments and drafting suggestions in writing.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Estonia for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative of Nepal to take the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
My delegation commends the president and you Chair, for the Rav one of the draft outcome document.
Allow me to share some of our preliminary observations.
My delegation appreciates the constructive amendments reflected in the Rav one draft, as well as ample space given to nuclear disarmament pillar and retention of languages from draft, which our delegation welcomes as valid and necessary.
We also welcome the inclusion of the language that underscores the importance of upholding the GM against nuclear testing in preambularii.
Preambar paragraph I, in our opinion, could be slightly revised as cornerstone of global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime, and so on.
We note the deletion in paragraph two of the concerns expressed upon the new nuclear sharing arrangement, and we hold that notions such as nuclear sharing perpetuate a dangerous and unjust nuclear status quo, which is against the spirit of the treaty.
We also welcome the introduction of paragraph 52 that recognizes the verification regime of the CTO underpinned by IMS and IDC, although the language allows some room for refinement.
On paragraph 58, we support delegations suggesting inclusion of the phrase pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons before the second sentence.
We welcome the addition of Artificial intelligence in paragraph 60 on the risks of integration of emerging technology nuclear weapons and the effective maintenance of human control at all times.
On negative security assurances in paragraph 61, we regret the replacement of the word right with interest.
We particularly welcome paragraph 62 on CD establishing a subsidiary body to recommend on a legally binding negative security assurance agreement for NMWS.
We also welcome paragraph 66 and 67 as separate paras on environmental remediation and disarmament education.
Our delegation reiterates recognizing the PNW is complementarity with NPT for the latter's effective implementation in the paragraph 73 of the draft.
Chair, Nepal remains committed to working constructively with all to achieve a balanced, forward looking, and consensus based outcome that strengthens the treaty.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Nepal for his intervention, and I now invite the distinguished representative for the United Kingdom to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair and good afternoon, colleagues.
I'm focusing my comments on Article 2.
The rationale, Mr.
Chair, for Article 2, is to note ongoing discussions on the question of extended deterrence.
As several delegations, including Germany and the Republic of Korea noted yesterday, the fact that an issue on which there is divergent views has been discussed at this conference does not necessarily qualify it for inclusion in this draft outcome document.
When I reflect on this review conference, there have been many such issues, the rapid and opaque buildup of nuclear arsenals, the use of novel dual use destabilizing capabilities, the Budapest memorandum, suspicions around the possible violation of existing moratoriums on testing.
None of these issues are mentioned in the draft text.
I suspect many delegations in this room would prefer not to go down that path.
As I noted yesterday, while my delegation had initially called for genuinely balanced language on this question, our view now is that the paragraph should be deleted.
Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom for his intervention.
I now invite the distinguished representative of Thailand to take the floor.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
In addition to the comments made yesterday, I would like to express our support to the statement delivered earlier by South Africa in a capacity of the president of the First Levi Conference of the TP NW.
We wish also to join other previous speakers in highlighting the contribution of the TP NW to the disarmament and nonproliferation regime.
The complementality between the NPT and TP NW in the furtherance of Article 6 obligations needs to be reflected.
Furthermore, I also concur with the views that the draft outcome can be strengthened by defining the language on humanitarian and environmental consequences.
Ta remains firmly committed to working constructively with all state bodies to arrive at a consensus based outcome.
Thank you.
That was the last speaker on my list.
Distinguished delegates.
Before we move to the trusteeship council for the plenary, let me convey my thanks to all of you for the positive spirit, the constructive engagement and cooperation over the course of our meeting and in the meeting of subsidiary B one.
I do understand that there is a great deal of work to be done as many delegations have pointed out, but I believe that a successful outcome is possible.
Thank you very much.
With that, the final meeting of Main Committee one is adjourned.