Good morning, everybody.
Welcome to the last session in Workstream one today.
Yesterday, we finished discussion Article 20, and now we're going to start the discussion for Article 21, which is relation with other agreements and instruments and domestic law.
So now I'm going to hand over the floor to the co lead to start the discussion for this article.
Good morning, colleagues and welcome to at least for this session, the last day of looking at work work stream one.
We have done a lot of work and I want to say thank you to everybody and congratulate us.
Today basically is the last day, so we will do our best to to cover the rest of the articles.
I believe that we don't have too many left.
Article 21, as it was previously Article 15 and it came to 23 or whatever, is now 21 where we are looking at the relationship between this convention and other agreements, instruments, and then domestic law, how we would start off.
This looks at some level of should I use the word implementation.
But then I believe that as we continue, we'll be able to come to some coms.
So I want to open the floor for any comments on this, we will encourage us to be succint in our presentations because I suspect that this is one article that we might have all 193 students want to make a comment on.
In doing that, it will help us to allow everybody to have some wording.
Just know that when 3 minutes is getting up the light on your microphone starts blinking.
It means that you have just about 30 seconds to round up.
So please let's do our best to keep to the time.
With that, we welcome the senior delegate from the United Arab Emis to commence C.
You are put in second place for this time.
Please.
Thank you, colleague, and my apologies to Chia.
If you want to go first, you can.
And also happy Friday.
Good morning, everyone.
The UAE appreciates the efforts reflected in this provision to clarify the relationship between the Framework Convention and existing international agreements.
We support an approach that promotes coherence across international tax instruments while respecting the diversity of existing treaty relationships.
We consider it important that this convention complements existing international legal frameworks.
In our view, any provisions concerning existing bilateral or multilateral agreements should preserve legal certainty, respect the principle of state consent, and recognize the practical realities of maintaining extensive treaty networks.
With respect to paragraph one B, the UAE supports preserving the ability of state parties to conclude future and bilateral and multilateral agreements.
We would, however, welcome further clarification regarding the reference to agreements being compatible with the state parties' commitments under the Framework Convention.
As currently drafted, this language could be interpreted as limiting the flexibility of states to negotiate future bilateral tax agreements tailored to their particular circumstances, including where those agreements pursue the objectives of this convention through different legal approaches.
We would therefore favor language that preserves treaty flexibility while avoiding unintended constraints on future treaty practice.
With regard to paragraph three, we have some significant concerns regarding this paragraph.
As currently drafted, the provisions appear to establish an affirmative obligation for state parties to review and potentially renegotiate existing international tax agreements.
This represents a significant departure from established treaty practice.
International agreements are negotiated individually and reflect carefully balanced outcomes between sovereign states.
Any amendment or modification of these agreements should remain subject to mutual consent of the parties consent.
For many states, including those with extensive treaty networks, the obligation to progressively align existing agreements could create considerable legal uncertainty as substantial administrative burdens.
In addition, the reference to existing international tax agreement and related instruments seems very broad and could potentially encompass a wide range of bilateral and multilateral instruments that were negotiated in different legal and policy contexts.
We would therefore favor replacing the mandatory obligation with language that encourages states to promote consistency where appropriate and by mutual agreement.
We also have concerns regarding the obligation requiring other state parties to enter into negotiations in good faith and without undue delay wherever renegotiation is requested.
While the UAE fully supports dialogue and cooperation between treaty partners, international law has traditionally recognized that the decision to amend an existing treaty remains a matter of the mutual agreements of the parties.
We also have a concern that the reading of this text now implies that one request from a state party could also be made on multilateral treaties, for example, the MAC.
We wonder what state parties would be expected to do if this request is made with respect to a particular reservation and if this goes against the states parties constitutional constraints.
We therefore believe this sentence should be deleted or significantly qualified as to not create a legal obligation to reopen all existing treaty relationships.
Regarding paragraph four, we understand the objective of monitoring implementation.
However, requiring detailed reporting on requests to renegotiate existing treaties and the disposition of those requests may impose unnecessary administrative burdens on state parties.
Treaty negotiations are often confidential, may extend over several years and involves sensitive diplomatic considerations.
We therefore suggest limiting reporting to general implementation efforts.
Finally, we would also like clarity on whether this article applies to the Framework Convention only or also its protocols.
While we discussed yesterday that we have agreed protocols are non binding, we would want to understand what would be the expected outcome if a state party makes a request to renegotiate a treaty based on a new protocol.
For example, if the Protocol if Protocol one includes a gross withholding tax, but the requested party is only a signatory to the FC and not Protocol one, how are state parties meant to meet the obligations set out in this article? Thank you for that.
Chia, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Coy for giving me the floor and good morning, everyone.
This article is obviously crucial for the functioning of the Framework Convention.
In general, we still believe that the Framework Convention should enhance and complement the current system of existing instruments of international tax cooperation rather than rewrite it.
This system of cooperation, although not without issues, has proven vital in combating tax evasion, limiting tax avoidance, ensuring legal certainty, and boosting revenue collection.
Therefore, we would like to echo the intervention of the distinguished delegate of United Arab Emit.
In particular regarding the need for clarification of various issues mentioned by the distinguished delegate.
Regarding paragraph one, subparagraph A, we would like to suggest adding a wording containing supranational law to reflect our duties as an EU member state by, for instance, adding words supranational law afterwards with its domestic law.
Concerning paragraph two, we acknowledge the principle of respecting the existing instruments, is absolutely essential for successful cooperation under the Framework Convention in order to avoid fragmentation of the current system, which again, we understand might have gaps and issues, but for a significant group of member states works well.
In relation to paragraph three, we would suggest deleting the paragraph in its entirety for several reasons.
First, the wording establishes undefined concepts such as progressive and meaningful steps.
The instruments in system are hardly ever linear and their change is binary, so it might even be impossible to objectively identify which steps are progressive and meaningful.
Second, a provision that would create an obligation now or in the future to override pre existing agreements would create a degree of legal uncertainty that is not workable.
Moreover, it ought to be emphasized that EU member states are strictly bound by EU law and must take any appropriate measures to ensure the fulfillment of their obligations under EU law.
We would also suggest deleting paragraph four because it is related to paragraph three which you want to delete, and it would introduce another reporting duty on top of many reporting duties we are facing.
This could certainly be more streamlined and be incorporated in a general review.
Thank you very much.
Thank you, Switzerland, please.
Good morning, distinguished colleagues.
Thank you, Mr.
Collett, for giving us the floor.
This provision has undergone major redrafting that goes broadly into the right direction.
We welcome that and we would like to express our gratitude to you and the other persons involved.
We have two remarks regarding this provision.
The first one concerns the effects of the Framework Convention on the possibility to enter into treaties that are not compatible with the Framework Convention with countries that are not parties to the Framework Convention.
Um, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that non parties to the treaty can invoke the state treaty if this is the intention of the parties to that respective treaty.
And the present wording in paragraph one, letter B, is in our view not clear in that respect.
A literal interpretation implies that all future treaties, whether concluded with another state party to the Framework Convention or not, must reward the commitments of the Framework Convention.
We therefore request clarification in that respect.
Our preferred option would be to state that the commitments under the Framework Convention would only affect future treaties between state parties to the Framework Convention.
This would, in our view be in line with the basic principle of public international law that treaties should only create effects.
For the parties to the treaty.
Our second remark relates to paragraph three.
We welcome the approach to leave the fate of treaties concluded prior to the Framework Convention to the parties of the respective treaties so that parties of a treaty can continue with it if they are in agreement in that respect.
Um, however, the provision could be redrafted a bit into the direction as was proposed by our distinguished colleagues from the United Arab Emirates.
The basic approach seems, however, fine for us, and also it works in a bilateral relationship.
Regarding multilateral agreements, the present wording does, however, in our view not produce the appropriate result since a single country's request to renegotiate would require all the other countries to do so.
The practical example, we have in mind, is the multilateral Convention on mutual administrative assistance and in particular, the reservations made according to that convention that are, as it reads now in certain cases not in line with the Framework Convention.
Consistent with the approach to leave it to the parties of the concerned agreement, if they want to continue with it, we would suggest that in case of a multilateral agreement, all other state parties must require a state party to proceed to a renegotiation.
Thank you for your time and for taking this into account.
Thank you.
Demk, please.
Thank you for giving me the floor, Mr.
Cole.
Denmark wishes to align itself with the comments made by the colleagues from UAE and Cechia and also Switzerland.
I will not repeat the comments as they are general of nature and we share the sentiment expressed by those delegations.
For the concrete drafting proposed by other delegations, we are not taking a position on that, but we are aligning ourselves with the general remarks made.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Austria, please.
Thank you, Cole.
Austria appreciates the work that has been done and is reflected in the drafting of Article 21.
However, we wish to note that we do not consider that the explicit obligation to renegotiate existing bilateral tax treaties as proposed in the current draft to be in line with what we believe is the nature or should be the nature of a framework convention as a high level instrument.
Along those lines, we do not think that additional sentence as proposed in paragraph three reflects that and reflects that states parties should be able to base their treaty negotiations taking into account in the domestic policy objectives, legal frameworks, and administrative and research capacities.
We therefore propose the deletion of the sentence and echo the distinguished delegate from the UAE, C in Switzerland in this regard as well.
We would also like to reiterate that our view that the Framework Convention should not prescribe or limit the manner in which states parties implement the commitments under the Framework Convention.
Rather, states parties should retain the flexibility to determine how to best fulfill their commitments, including where appropriate through existing international instruments.
In addition, the Framework Convention, in our opinion, should provide sufficient flexibility for regional integration organizations and their member states to comply with the regional legal obligations, including those arising under supranational law.
In light of the proposed deletion pertaining to paragraph three, we also should consider the corresponding addition proposed in paragraph four to be deleted as well.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Lazenburg please.
Thank you, Chair, and good morning to you all.
Luxemburg, we'd like to echo the comments made by the distinguished delegates from the UAE and from Cech out, especially as they address our main concerns about Article 21 are preserving legal certainty and then mutual concern.
As currently drafted, we fear that paragraph one B does not clearly identify which agreements must be considered compatible.
And who would assess this compatibility or what legal consequences would follow.
Paragraph three and four go even further by creating an open ended process for the renegotiation and review of existing agreements and we fear that this could make the Framework Convention harder to implement and to be accepted by a wide by a large number of member states.
For that, we proposed the deletion of the final compatibility clause in the paragraph one B, as well as paragraphs 3 and 4.
We just really strongly believe that existing tax treaties and future tax treaties must rely on mutually agreed negotiations in order to reflect also the bilateral relations between countries.
Thank you.
Thank you.
China, please.
Thank you, Colleague for giving me the floor.
Regarding this article, we have two comments.
First, we think the agreements or conventions should not be mutually restrictive.
Accordingly, we are fine with the first half of subparagraph B of paragraph one.
Nevertheless, the latter part of this subparagraph, which is provided that such agreements are compatible with the state parties commitments and the framework convention appears to be at odds with the first half of subparagraph B.
In light of this inconsistency, we recommend its deletion.
Moreover, the application of agreements shall adhere to the principles of effectiveness and relevance.
For instance, in cases where two state parties are contracting parties to both framework convention and the multilateral convention on mutual administrative assistance in tax matters, the competent study of the requesting state party shall provided that all requisite conditions are satisfied, select the most relevant and effective convention for submitting a request for assistance.
The second comment refers to the relationship between the convention and the existing agreements, especially the bilateral tax treaties.
Many states like China have a huge trading network currently.
China now with over 100 bilateral tax treaties in force.
We have strongly argued that these existing bilateral tax treaties reflect the overall balance of interests between the contracting parties.
They represent a balanced package of all articles regarding different types of income, not only the articles concerning cross border services, the existing bilateral tax treaties should be duly respected and the renegotiation of existing bilateral treaties should not be mandatory.
In this context, we recommend the deletion of paragraph three and four.
Thank you, Mr.
Cody again.
Later, we will submit our written comments on this article.
Thank you, Azerbaijan, please.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Colit.
We support consistent between this convention and existing international tax agreements.
However, existing agreements should be changed only by mutual consent of the parties.
We therefore suggest revising paragraph three to clarify that a request for renegotiation doesn't create automatic obligation to amend existing agreement or accept a particle outcome.
The other states should consider such request in good faith and taking into account its domestic law and constitutional procedures.
We also suggest that reporting requirement under paragraph four should be simple and should not cover confidential information or ongoing treaty negotiations.
Thank you very much.
Thank you, Italy, please.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Collid good morning, everyone.
Italy believes that the Framework Convention should be complimentary to the existing instruments of international tax cooperation and not merely aimed at replacing them.
Paragraph two states that the Convention does not affect pre existing rights and obligations of the party.
But then paragraph three requires the state parties to take progressive and meaningful steps to aligning the existing agreements with the convention.
Imposing an obligation to enter into negotiation and change the existing treaties.
These provisions in our view, create uncertainty and lack of clarity about the relation between the existing agreements and the convention.
This uncertainty is also exacerbated by the fact that Article 13 assigns to the conference of the party the role to assess the progress on the alignment of the convention whereas the decision making modalities in the conference of the party are not clarified.
Our reading is that as a result of this provision, there is an obligation now or in the future to override existing agreements and clearly this goes against the principle of sovereignty.
From our perspective, existing agreement should not be impacted by the convention unless there is consent of the relevant parties and equally constitutional requirements should be respected also in perspective and the subscription of an agreement or protocol should remain a sovereign decision and subject to the legality principle.
Thanks.
Thank you.
Indonesia, please.
Thank you, colleague.
Indonesia generally support the objective of this article, while maintaining the goal of this convention, which is to establish an inclusive, fair, transparent, efficient, equitable, and effective international tax system, we also need to be mindful of the existing tax agreement.
We believe Para one A is better placed under Article 26 on the entry into force since it's concerned domestic implementation procedure rather than the relation between this convention and other international agreement.
We also seek clarification on paragraph three.
As drafted, it's unclear whether state party will be required to renegotiate existing agreement, which instrument will prevail in case of inconsistency and how compatibility with this convention will be assessed.
In our view, this article should instead emphasize the consultation where a potential incompatibility is identified, allowing parties concerned to assess whether any amendment is necessary by mutual agreement without prejudging that renegotiation is always required.
Thank you, colleague.
Thank you.
Gevity, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Collett.
Good morning, colleagues.
We very much welcome the opportunity to discuss Article 21.
At times, the impression is given that our work here is taking place in a regulatory vacuum.
In reality, we are operating within a dense and well established ecosystem of intergovernmental legal instruments.
Article 21 is hence of paramount importance and has implications for the negotiations on all other elements of the convention and the protocols.
Although the latest draft clarifies that pre existing agreements are not automatically affected, significant concerns remaining regarding the relationship between the Framework Convention and existing as well as future bilateral and multilateral tax agreements.
Particular, the obligation for state parties to take progressive and meaningful steps towards aligning existing agreements with the convention, including renegotiating where necessary, raises significant legal concerns.
The convention should not restrict the state sovereignty in bilateral negotiations for existing as well as for future treaties.
Germany considers it essential that the convention explicitly recognizes that its objectives may partially be fulfilled through existing bilateral and multilateral agreements and internationally agreed instruments.
Existing cooperation frameworks should be acknowledged as capable of satisfying the convention's objectives where appropriate.
The reporting obligations regarding treaty renegotiations and implementation measures should also be reconsidered, particularly given the remaining uncertainty regarding the substantive obligations contained in the convention.
The entire article should not establish any legal binding obligations regarding future changes of any national or supranational legislation or administrative practices.
Rather, the article should reflect the guiding principles of non interference, mutual supportiveness, and compatibility.
I thank you.
Thank you.
Lori, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Colad.
We appreciate the efforts put into drafting this proposal, and we also underline the importance of continuing the discussions on this important article.
We believe that the Framework Convention should take a cooperative approach in a complementary manner to the existing international framework for tax cooperation.
In both bilateral and multilateral context and not prescribe specific results in its cooperative provisions in the convention as a whole, including in relation to bilateral and multilateral treaties in the tax area.
It's important that this article builds on and reflects the broader principles and practice of international law.
From our point of view, it's important to drop not only this article, but all the articles in the Framework Convention in accordance with established principles of international law.
Well, as we probably all agree on, there are definitely proposals in the current draft where we do not agree in substance and that also challenge established procedures and established rules and methodology in the international law.
We believe the suggested obligation of renegotiation of existing bilateral treaties might belong in this category.
An important perspective in this context is that obligations of international law do not exist in a vacuum.
There are rules of interpretation already in place and made to solve a lot of the concerns that we are dealing with here in these negotiations.
When determining our approach here, relevant background law needs to be taken into consideration.
The conflict rules in treaty law in particular in the Vienna Convention Article 30 do not necessarily solve the issue at hand by itself, but it provides guidance on what should be regulated in the Framework Convention.
Whether it is a conflict between special provision and different treaties is a matter of interpretation and the principles of harmonious interpretation and systematic integration suggest that the already established system and corpuses of bilateral treaties are highly relevant for the interpretation of the Framework Convention and its relationship to existing international law.
Best way to ensure harmonization and compatibility between the Framework Convention and the existing rules and regulations for tax cooperation is to not create conflict whilst negotiating the Framework Convention articles.
That is, as we have suggested, to design the commitments at the level appropriate for framework convention and as guiding principles rather than prescribing specific outcomes.
Have particular concerns with paragraph three.
While we support the spirit of the last sentence in paragraph three as an expression of the general principle of negotiating in good faith, we have not been able to identify other UN conventions that explicitly require the renegotiation of existing treaties.
As provided in the first sentence in paragraph three.
Instead, the approach used is that of interpretation, and we believe that we should take care not to create new precedents in this convention.
We note that the suggested approach is particularly concerning as there seems to be very diverging views of what the commitments in the draft actually mean.
This draft creates significant uncertainty with respect to its effect.
In the area of tax treaties, one size does not fit all.
Member states have different economies and different tax systems.
The needs and priorities will vary according to which jurisdiction is their treaty partner.
For example, and I hope that my colleague from Sweden will agree with me on this.
In relation to Article 5 in the convention and in the case, for example, between Norway and Sweden, both countries rely primarily on the principle of physical presence to tax income from business activities.
We would like clarity on whether paragraph two and three in this article would require us to amend the tax treaty between our two countries to allow for taxation of business income without physical presence.
This is a practical example.
We believe that the specific context of a bilateral tax treaty should be for the parties to mutually agree on without restriction in line with the principles of tax sovereignty.
We also note the points made by Switzerland and the UE in relation to the application of this article to existing multilateral agreements such as the MAC and situations where a treaty covers both parties to the Framework Convention and non parties.
We also think this is an area where a discussion notes on the relevant principles under international law and how Article 21 is intended to apply in practice would be useful and it would also be useful to have the OLA present when we discuss this further.
We will provide further comments in writing.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Estonia, please.
Thank you and good morning to everyone.
I would like to support the comments of Cechia, Austria, Luxemburg, China, and Germany.
I'm not going to repeat them in the interest of saving time.
But what I think merits repeating is that we would also suggest deleting paragraphs 3 and 4 for the reasons that have been already outlined.
What I would specifically like to bring out is that, like Norway has just mentioned, we have very diverging views on what the commitments in the Framework Convention actually mean, and I By stipulating based on such broadly defined and high level commitments that the bilateral tax treaties that are very specific in nature would need to be renegotiated, would create a lot of confusion.
For example, I can't really picture how we would change an existing bilateral tax treaty based on what we have in Articles four, five, and six of the convention right now because we are operating at very different levels here.
Like I already mentioned framework convention with high level and general commitments and apilteral tax treaty with specific and operational provisions that just would not work.
Also, in relation to paragraph four, Article 16 already provides for the review of the commitments of the convention, so we don't really need paragraph four here.
Thank you.
Thank you, India, please.
Thank you, Colue.
We have carefully listened to the statements of all the distinguished delegates spoken so far.
And we have also looked at the text of this article.
Now, we can understand that there can be a desire for adjusting the language of this article.
But what this article seeks to do is something that we cannot compromise upon or should not be compromised.
Basically, the way we understand is that this article sets out to give effect to everything that we are going to agree to within this framework convention and maybe even under the protocols that we eventually sign up.
Now, I know there are concerns that there are existing multilateral agreements, there are bilateral treaties, of course, and there are several other organizations where work is being carried out.
While that is understood, but at the same time, we must also admit to ourselves that here at this forum we hope to agree to certain principles of taxation where we all of us have not agreed to in any other forum.
If we do that, then there will be some new principles that we will all have agreed to.
It is not always that the work that we do here as part of the UN Framework Convention on international tax cooperation should follow in the wake of all the work that has been done elsewhere.
So I think we have to be open to accepting that there will be situations where the work that we have done here will take precedence over what we have done so far.
Now, eventually, what is it that this article is asking us to do? It is asking us to make changes to our domestic law, to be aligned with the commitments that we have made under the Framework Convention and the provisions of the protocol that we sign up.
It is asking us to align our treaties to those commitments.
If I sign up to a commitment that I am willing to effectively exchange information with a treaty partner, then my domestic law should contain my ability to do that.
My treaties should be aligned with that commitment.
If I make a commitment without reservation, that I will provide assistance in collection of taxes, then I don't think it is unfair that my treaty partner should expect that my domestic law should contain a batching provision once I have made that commitment.
And I also can expect the same from him once he has made that commitment.
So I don't expect that it should be perceived as unfair.
Now, as regards as changes to our treaties, if I and another country, we both sign up to the same convention, we both sign up to the same protocol, It should not be a problem for us to align our treaty to the principles that we have signed up to.
Yes, I can understand that there is a desire that language should be such so amended that it does not become a burden or it does not become impossible or it does not create too much difficulty.
But at the same time, the principle cannot be an exception cannot be created.
There may be a concern that eventually what will happen is that our treaties will get amended from different sources.
Some of our treaties have been amended by the MLA, our treaties may get amended by the Framework Convention or by the protocol, but that is a sovereign choice that we make.
If we choose to do so, then so be it.
So therefore, I don't think the language, yes, that we are open to looking at drafting proposals, but neither should the language be so adjusted that going forward, the review that will be done within this framework convention should be made a dead letter.
If we were to delete paragraphs completely, we were to delete paragraph three completely or paragraph four completely for it, for example, we would make all review to be done under this framework convention a dead letter.
I don't think that anyone of the 193 of us wants to do that.
For the first time, 193 countries have got together and each one speaking with a voice as equal as the other, no matter what the GDP, what the population, what be per capita income, but we're all together in this as equals.
I think that is something that we should be open to.
The review of this framework convention will be done under this framework convention itself by a methodology that we will all agree to.
That cannot be made ineffective by any language change or any adjustment to the text of Article 21.
That is our comment as of now.
We will look at this text.
We will give our text suggestions.
We are open to looking at text suggestions that come from other distinguished delegates.
But I think the principles that this article is trying to lay down is something that we must preserve.
Thank you.
Thank you.
United Kingdom, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Cole.
I'll probably echo the majority of the views of delegates today.
As many have said, we've consistently noted the criticality of having clarity on the interaction of the Framework Convention with existing agreements and have called for this article to be drafted a number of times, so it's very positive that we are now turning to this discussion.
We would expect an article 0F this kind to provide legal certainty about how the convention sits alongside existing bilateral and multilateral agreements with a clearly established hierarchy and a clear sense of what is expected of state parties in the case of inconsistencies.
At the moment, the article seems to imply the convention is subordinate to existing treaties, while at the same time containing obligations that could require reinterpretation or renegotiation.
We would like to understand what is the intention of this provision and see this is another example where commentary and explanatory note further detail is really important, particularly given how pivotal this article is in hearing the views of delegates today.
We've previously noted this in other parts of our discussions this week on the Framework Convention.
But if the convention is to impose legal obligations on parties, it is essential both that the states have a clear understanding of what those obligations mean in practice and that there is clarity about the intended relationship between those obligations and existing legal instruments, both treaties and domestic law.
At the moment, we do not feel that Article 21 meets these conditions and the UK would welcome clarity on the intended relationship between the Convention and existing DTAs, multilateral instruments and domestic law.
Finally, and this is perhaps in addition to what other delegates have already said, we had also assumed that Article 21 would outline existing domestic action, bilateral and multilateral agreements could positively meet the principles of the Framework Convention where they deliver its aims.
For example, the UK would expect existing mechanisms such as the MAC and the FHTP to be relied upon where they deliver the relevant aims and principles of the Framework Convention.
With the inclusion of such a provision, this positive statement, the Framework Convention could be read as intention with existing cooperation rather than as augmenting it, which is what we would like to see.
Thank you very much.
Excuse me.
Thank you, France, please.
Mercy President.
Thank you, Chair.
Good morning, colleagues.
We're very happy to at least to at last be able to discuss this key article 0F the Framework Convention.
This is a discussion that we called for at the previous session.
Now, in order to be concise and to save time, we'd like to align ourselves with the multiple statements made previously, in particular by the United Arab Emirates, Checka, China, Germany, Estonia, or just now by the United Kingdom.
We would simply like to underscore that the existing treaties between states is an essential tool by which the majority of states in this room already put into practice the principles and commitments that will be contained ultimately in the Framework Convention.
These treaties, by their design are strike a balance between states that should not be put in question by the Framework Convention and the Framework Convention should not harm the capacity of states to reach a just and balanced agreement.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mercy, Cambodia, please.
Thank you, Cole Lee for giving us the stage, and good morning, all delegates.
As a whole Cambodians support this important article.
However, Cambodia also would like to echo concern raised by the distinguished delegates from Australia, China, Estonia, Indonesia, Switzerland, Norway, and other in terms of clarity, flexibility, sovereignty, citing numerous domestic and international constraint.
Therefore, as a whole, Cambodia is aligned with the point raised by the majority.
In terms of amending paragraph three and four or should they be deleted? Thank you.
Thank you.
Brazil, please.
Okay.
Thank you, Cole and good morning everyone.
I think this is the most intricate and complex article in the whole convention, and I think it should be read in its context and take into consideration other parts of the convention.
We should never forget that.
Probably a whole PhD could be written on that, few hundreds of pages and how it should be connected to the principles, how it should be connected to other parts of the convention.
Having that in mind, I do concede that it's possible to make it more conditional, to have it more explicit references to adopt and to improve the wording that we have there.
But I also agree with the Indian delegate that we should not forget the direction of what we want to achieve here.
And reshaping or excluding entire paragraphs there, we would not support.
It seems to undermine our own work.
If we do not set a general best efforts obligation, for instance, to renegotiate treaties or to try to move in that direction, to try to improve treaties that were unbalanced when one of the treaty partners is a country that suffers from human rights issues because this is, again, in this context, a convention that deals with human rights and taxation.
Removing that general obligation would clearly undermine the message that we have here.
I'll make brief comments on each paragraph.
Paragraph one, I agree with the Indian delegated, that's just a general message that countries have to move to adopt whatever necessary in the domestic law.
Is the wording too binding? We are open to consider it, but I think it sends the right message and it's a first step.
In paragraph one B, I don't see much of the problems that have been raised, but again, we would be open to find to accommodate the concerns, if any.
In paragraph two, Again, we don't see much of the concerns, but I think it's possible to improve the wording.
In paragraph three is what I call the attention most to.
The idea is to take a best efforts obligation, not not not an obligation to provide to find results to achieve results immediately.
Progressive and meaningful steps.
Let's move progressively deepening more and more where necessary also conditions the whole idea because if there are no necessity to update the treaty, there is no obligation to update the treaty.
For instance, a treaty between Norway and Sweden would be not necessary to be changed.
Again, this whole provision should be read in the context of the whole convention, that it's something the overlap between human rights and taxation.
Um, and it's also condition ensue in paragraph three where a party where a state party requests.
So I don't think that the treaty between Norway and Sweden, each of them or any of them will ask for a renegotiation of the treaty to include taxation of services.
They might change their idea in a few years.
But again, that's not a situation that we are concerned, in this treaty.
This treaty is concerned with the overlap between, again, human rights and taxation.
And it is also conditioned as a best efforts obligation, saying to enter into negotiations in good faith and without undue delay.
Well, even undue delay, it depends because the administrations might have to prioritize which treaties that we renegotiate.
And finally, the last paragraph, I don't think that we should also remove it.
I agree that to some extent, it's covered in other articles with the review.
But paragraph four wants to hold us accountable for what we do and to give transparency to which measures we are taking to meet the obligations of the convention.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Israel, please.
Thank you, Chairman.
I will be quite short because the other delegates already said what I was going to say.
We echo Checha, the United Arab Em, Germany, and other delegates.
From our perspective, the current wording, especially paragraphs 3 and 4, could undermine principles of sovereignty.
Therefore, we move to delete those paragraphs.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Distinguished delegate Belgium, followed by Mexico.
Well, thank you, Chair.
We want to align ourselves with what the distinguished delegates from the UAE, the Czech Republic, Switzerland, Austria, China, Italy, Germany, Norway, Estonia, UK, and France have sat before us.
It is also for us an issue that we think that paragraph three, the way it stated is also not in line with the overarching principle of sovereignty that should be also a guiding principle for this convention.
Um, and on paragraph one, we want to emphasize again, but the distinguished delegate of the Czech Republic and Austria also mentioned that is for us, it is very important to add next to domestic law, supranational law as EU member state.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Distinguished Delegate of Mexico, followed by Lingstein.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chair.
Good morning, everyone.
We're coming into this article, very grateful that the work has been done to provide some direction in what this convention should do when it comes to relation with other agreements, instruments, and domestic law.
I think that as my colleague from Brazil mentioned correctly, this is to examine the links between human rights and tax.
In that regard, I'll take advantage to issue reiterated request to have an article 0N human rights, but that's a conversation maybe for Nairobi.
Um, at this point, we have been asking also what the relations between this article and others in the convention.
And while I'm not equipped to give PhD thesis on what this should be all connected, I do think that we cannot just see this independently.
We know that there's a discussion on the principles on whether or not to have an overarching principle that the convention directly takes into consideration, Work in relations with other agreements in multilateral for as well.
We also know that we have to look at this decision based on the recent comments made in Article 13 on the COP, where decision making has now been weighed, whether to be consensus or simple majority.
We also have to see this in relation to Article 25 for the convention would, in essence, not accept any reservations.
If we don't get this right, that means that when we go to the COP, or we have to agree in this, there's going to be a discussion on whether or not the majority of countries will want to push forward and then the others will feel excluded.
If I'm not mistaken, The whole purpose of this convention is to avoid replicating existing practices that have been taken in other multilateral forum where the majority leads and the others follow because they don't have the right to choose or to make reservations.
So let's not forget why we're here.
As the delegate of India said, we need to take into consideration and take full advantage that we're all here, but for that to happen, we also cannot overate that we all have a question of what this is going to do to our domestic tax systems and the relationship this article will have with the assessment that we need to conduct because the focus here could be very well on our international tax treaties.
What about if Mexico has to go into a renegotiation of the Free Trade Agreement with the European Union because we do have tax provisions there.
What happens if paragraph three, well, every country will have the prerogative to go and take progressive and meaningful steps to align the principles of the convention, but let's not kill ourselves.
The problem in this paragraph is that this directly relates to opening the door for requests on renegotiating, linking this to if you're not making the necessary steps to align to the principles of the convention, then another state party could easily come and ask you to do so.
Then what happens then? For us, this could also result in an assessment of some international tax treaties or free trade agreements in which if we incur in renegotiating some of those provisions, we might see an economic loss.
We also think that in this article, we should have the flexibility as member states to also understand that our obligations should also be read in what it makes sense for our domestic tax systems.
And so far in this convention, and this is what I'm repeating myself again, we see this as a paragraph that speaks more to an International Tax Convention on enforcement and not incorporation.
If we wanted to have a very honest assessment of how this article is going to impact the rest of the conversation moving forward, then we would ask kindly to at least give flexibility in this article so that member states can make the decision on how they want to achieve aligning the principles of the Convention to their domestic tax systems and to ensure that there's legal certainty not only for member states but other actors that sit within our tax architecture.
You know, there's other players there.
There's other actors that make decisions there, so we also need to make that evaluation.
Of course, if the COP is a place where we're going to come and do the review on the assessment, then paragraph four could easily be transplanted to another article and modified.
But I think here on paragraph three, the suggestion would be to do full stop after the renegotiation of existing agreements.
We all know that we are trying to be here in good faith.
But to open the door with language that directly states that not fulfilling or aligning provisions to the principles of the conference could lead to another state party requesting renegotiation of an agreement.
Is a bit delicate.
I know that the example put forward from Sweden and Norway might not seem as one that's likely to happen just because the dynamics in that region.
But let's not kid ourselves.
This is opening the door for non OECD agreements to be reopened with OECD countries.
This is also an agreement that could put developing countries in a hard position where developed countries could go and ask for a renegotiation of a treaty.
And then make provisions that will harm developing countries as well because this is a practice that has happened.
It's a leverage language.
In our suggestion, while we agree with some of our colleagues that this should be modified, We completely understand that we're not going to do away with the whole drafting of this article.
We would welcome more clarity on how this is going to be complimentary and beneficial for all parties because this could lead to another attempt to leverage one part of the world against the other.
So for us, we would welcome doing some drafting of paragraph three.
If you want to assign homework to someone and do a workforce task force to come up with an idea, Mexico willingly puts themselves forward.
But we would welcome this article to be looked deeper into because the relation to other articles in this framework cannot be ignored.
Thank you.
Thank you, miss Lichtenstein, please.
Thank you very much, co leader, and good morning to everybody.
As much has been said already, I will be brief.
I would like to express our appreciation for the work done on the wording of this article.
However, I would like to echo the statements of UE, Czech Republic, Switzerland, Austria, and others that the Framework Convention should not put the obligation on jurisdiction to change existing bilateral treaties, which take into consideration very specific bilateral relations.
We believe that such provision would be against the state sovereignty of the treaty partners concerned and should therefore be deleted or the wording should be changed accordingly.
Thank you very much.
Thank you, Zambia, please.
Good morning, Chair.
Good morning, colleagues and good morning, colleagues.
Zambia is the honor to speak on behalf of the 54 member states of the African group.
We appreciate the work done in drafting the text of Article 21.
Let me also start by echoing the remarks that have been made by the distinguished delegates of India and Brazil.
The African group supports Article 21 as it is a pivotal provision determining the legal relationship between the Framework Convention and existing including future international tax agreements.
We regard it as one of the load bearing provisions of this convention because this article governs how the commitments we make here reach into the vast existing network of tax treaties that shape the daily reality of revenue mobilization.
We rise not to weaken it, but to hold it to its own purpose.
As the Africa group, it is our understanding that states that signed the Framework Convention will take the necessary steps to comply with its provisions and commitments.
Otherwise, if that is not the case, this negotiation may result in academic exercise.
We offer preliminary amendments and one framing principle, but we shall later on provide detailed written comments to strengthen this text so that it's effectively implemented.
Our comments as regards the paragraph three, Colleagues, fellow colleagues and delegates, the first sentence of paragraph three already establishes a standing obligations, and that is that the parties take progressive and meaningful steps to align their existing agreements with this convention.
That duty is freestanding.
It requires no invitation, yet the second sentence makes good faith renegotiation contingent on a party requesting it.
The AFCA group is concerned that this converts an unconditional obligation into a request triggered one.
That is, it hands to each party the power to defer simply by declining to ask, and this may delay the implementation.
An obligation that awaits the trigger is an obligation deferred.
We therefore propose that the last sentence of paragraph three be deleted so that the alignment duty stands on its own strength as the drafters plainly intended that to be.
Our comments as regards paragraph four, As drafted, paragraph four requires parties only to report on the steps they have taken.
Yes, reporting is necessary, but it is not sufficient.
Without a timeline, alignment becomes the horizon that precedes one as one approaches it.
The African group proposes that paragraph four should empower the conference of the parties to determine the time frame when the existing treaties are to be brought into conformity with this article and the object and purpose of this convention.
Obviously, conference of parties will look at the realities on the ground and determine the deadline in which the parties can ensure that they bring all their treaties in conformity and therefore, it's our proposal that this obligation or mandate be given to the conference of parties.
We believe that this places the pace of alignment in the hands of the collective and not the reluctant.
Now that the principle governs both, Chair, let no one make a mistake that these proposals are for an incursion on sovereignty.
They are the opposite.
This article respects sovereignty precisely because it offers options.
In any case, I think whatever we do we need to be aligned to the principles of the objection of the Framework Convention.
Parties may discharge their obligations through existing instruments or through future ones, bilaterally, regionally, or multilaterally.
We prescribe no single path, but we do insist on the destination and that's very key because we are here as all member states trying to negotiate a reform for international tax cooperation.
For anything less would render nugatory the very commitments we make in this convention.
It will deny the parties the fruit of their labor, and it is like asking us to build a house and then forbidding us to live in it.
Therefore, it's very important that as we draft the text to strengthen Article 21, which is very key in guiding the relationship of the tax treaties.
We the text face reality, but we also make the text to ensure that the Framework Convention that we're negotiating comes to effective implementation without undue delay.
I submit.
Thank you, Japan, please.
Thank you, colleague.
Good morning, everyone.
Japan very much welcome the opportunity to discuss this crucial article.
We believe Framework Convention should be complimentary and should not override existing treaties and agreements.
In our view, it is unclear what it means by the progressive and meaningful steps and how to assess the alignment between the high level provisions of Framework Convention and existing treaties.
Renegotiation should not be an obligation under the Framework Convention.
This article could pose a significant obstacle to broad participation in the Framework Convention.
In particular, paragraphs 3 and 4 raise concerns about increasing uncertainty and thus should be deleted.
Thank you.
Thank you, Singapore, please.
Thank you, colleague.
We will keep this short.
We echo the comments made by the UAE, Chusgia, Switzer, China, Azerbijan, the UK, many others have spoken before us.
Bilateral and multilateral tax treaties reflect carefully negotiated outcomes between treaty partners.
They are also an expression of each state's tax sovereignty.
We're concerned that Article 21 could be understood as creating a self executing obligation to renegotiate existing treaties or require treaty partners to reopen settled bargains whenever requested.
There's also some ambiguity as to scope of the treaties that will be affected and the Framework Convention should not constrain states abilities to enter into those agreements.
In the same vein, the scope of the reporting in paragraph four is also unclear.
These uncertainties will make it hard for states to assess obligations, so we echo calls to remove Articles three and four or redrafting to provide more certainty in this regard.
To maximize participation, we reiterate our earlier suggestions to provide for appropriate reservations to be made to the frame of convention.
Thank you.
Thank you, the K of the Netherlands, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Colets.
We very much appreciate the discussion of Article 21 that we are finally having.
A well functioning Article 21 is fundamental to the effectiveness of the Framework Convention and to secure broad support on substance.
Also, I will probably echo what much of my colleagues have stated before me.
Framework Convention should acknowledge the landscape in which we are having these discussions and can therefore not ignore the many successful existing instruments of international tax cooperation, a large network of agreements that significantly improved good cooperation and that has been built on for decades.
This extensive network consists of bilateral and multilateral agreements ratified by parliaments and have democratic legitimization in the states in which the parliaments have ratified those agreements.
Any party of those instruments has a sovereign right to withdraw from those agreements if that state is of the opinion the agreement does no longer provide the right balance as does no longer serve its needs.
These principles and forms of cooperation have proven vital in the strengthening of economic cooperation and combating tax evasion and avoidance, ensuring legal certainty and boosting revenue collection, thereby contributing to the public good.
These instruments are built on important principles that cannot simply be ignored.
A framework convention that includes concrete obligations covering the same subject as those longstanding agreements and that overrides such agreements without the option for member states to take into consideration specific longstanding bilateral relationships is unacceptable.
We are all here and in other fora, committed to coordinate to combat illicit financial flows, tax evasion, and tax avoidance and tackle specific tax related issues such as those related to the digital economy in a coordinated manner.
But there is no one size fits all when it comes to the allocation of taxing rights on income from individuals and businesses.
Moreover, it must be emphasized that the EU member states are strictly bound by EU law and must take any appropriate measure to ensure the fulfillment of their obligations under EU law, also with respect to instruments developed after the entry into force of this convention.
This text of this article states it will not affect pre existing rights and obligations of parties.
At the same time, the text requires progressive and meaningful steps to be taken towards aligning all existing agreements with the convention.
The text is ambiguous.
Paragraph three should therefore be deleted.
We do not accept the COP deciding about the fulfillment of member states commitments to renegotiate agreements to which the majority of the conference of the parties is not a party.
It cannot be that the COP dedicates how parties can provide for compatibility with commitments of this Framework Convention, while these commitments this week have shown to be unclear and to which many differing interpretations apply.
We reiterate that the convention should focus on adding value to the international tax structure.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Republic of Korea, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Cold, for giving me the floor.
Korea appreciate the efforts of the Secretariat and the Cole for preparing the draft of Article 21 and welcome that the discussion is going on on this article.
We consider Article 21 to be one of the most important provisions of the Framework Convention, given its implications for the relationship between the convention and existing international tax agreements.
Before turning to our specific comments on each paragraph, Korea would like to recall the importance of respecting the tax sovereignty of each state and would like to stress the importance of respecting existing international tax agreements and ensuring legal certainty and stability in existing treaty relationships.
In general, Korea aligns with the views expressed by previous speakers, including Turkea, UAE, Austria, Germany, France, Japan, and Netherlands.
First, regarding paragraph one B, Korea has concerned with the requirement that future bilateral or multilateral agreements to be compatible with the state parties commitments under the Framework Convention.
We believe that such a requirement could unduly restrict the ability of state parties to negotiate and conclude tax agreements, taking into account their respective circumstances and policy considerations.
In this regard, we believe that the tax certainty of each state party should be fully respected.
Second, regarding paragraph three, Korea would like to share the concerns raised by many distinguished delegations before.
One specific thing about paragraph three is that Korea would appreciate further clarification regarding certain expressions, including progressive and meaningful steps and without undue delay.
On paragraph four, regarding the reporting obligation, Korea believes that the current provision appears overly prescriptive for a framework convention which should remain focused on high level principles.
In particular, requiring states parties to report to conference parties on the number of requests made or received for the renegotiation of existing tax treaties, as well as the disposition of such requests could impose an unnecessary administrative burden on state parties.
In this regard, we support to delete paragraph three and four.
In light of those concerns raised above, Korea believes that Article 21 should be redrafted to better reflect the tax sovety of state parties and ensure greater legal certainty.
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
Philippines, please.
We concur with the aims of Article 21.
Aligning existing bilateral tax agreements with this framework enhances international coherence, provided that all treaty modifications undergo standard domestic legal procedures.
We echo the position of India and Brazil on what the article does for the Framework Convention.
The wording of the article, especially paragraphs 3 and 4, may be improved in recognition of tax sovereignty in the prerogative of states as regards their priorities, diplomatic and economic relations, and for clarity sake.
The provisions under Article 21 is very important in how we will translate our commitments in the Framework Convention to reality.
The article should highlight that international tax cooperation shall moving forward, be guided by the Framework Convention.
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
Spain, please.
Thank you very much, Chair, very good morning to everyone.
Like many other colleagues, many other colleagues have already made the points that I wanted to make, including Cechia, the UAE, China, Germany, France, Luxembourg, UK, the Netherlands, and others.
Many points have already been covered.
I just wanted to say that this framework should be complimentary in nature and not replace anything else.
And just not wishing to repeat what others have already said, nevertheless, I would just say on one B, the last sentence after the comma after protocols where it says, provided that such agreements are compatible, That is a sentence that is of concern to us like the Republic of Korea.
We're not entirely unsure about the meaning there and who will determine whether or not the agreement is compatible or not? That is what we have some concerns about at the moment and it leads to some legal uncertainty in our eyes.
As some other speakers have already said, what is stated in paragraphs 3 and 4 could infringe on national sovereignty, and that is why we think they should be deleted.
Thank you.
Thank you, as, please.
Thank you very much, co chair.
Honduras is grateful for the efforts that have been made to draft this article and we've recognized the importance of having coherence between this framework and the existing international architecture in the tax domain.
In terms specifically of paragraph three, we think that the goal of promoting greater consistency between international tax agreements and the principles of the convention is a positive development.
Nevertheless, we think that this should be achieved through a flexible, gradual legally viable approach.
In practice, renegotiating bilateral tax agreements or multilateral agreements is a complex process which depends on the mutual consent between the parties and depends on national priorities as well.
In many cases, these processes take many years and it's not always possible to reopen agreements even when there is a determination or will to do so.
That is why we think that paragraph three should reflect clearly that states parties will try to achieve coherence and consistency between their agreements and the principles of the convention.
Where that is possible, ensuring the necessary flexibility for each state to determine the best way to implement their international commitments in line with our domestic legal framework.
We think therefore that a more flexible wording here would strengthen legal security, would respect the principle of national sovereignty, and facilitate a more effective realistic implementation of the convention.
We will submit some further comments in writing on this paragraph.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Portugal, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Cold.
I'm happy for finally having the opportunity to discuss this article.
I had lots of questions, but my colleagues already made them.
I'm going to echo much that was said by UAA, Cechia, Switzerland, Denmark, Germany, Austria, Luxeburg at certain time I lost count, but we are also had written the view that we have regarding this in a our written comments already and it was very good to listen all the state parties.
I think we're going to back to the basics.
We are discussing, is this just a matter of changing domestic legislation? Because if we accept the article in the term, it is redacted, We are removing a constitutional power vested in our case in Portuguese sovereign institutions because we are bound first and foremost by our constitution.
It's just not a matter of changing our ordinary domestic legization.
Go to the basics and to the Secretary-General report and the decision that was made and we talked to you over and over about the Framework Convention and we agreed that this would be a framework convention.
So a framework convention in this field should mainly establish broad eye level principles of international tax cooperation, leaving detailed implementation to binding protocols.
So are we discussing the Framework Convention that lies in eye level principles with a cooperative and progressive aspiration or the way I interpret the Article 21, are we discussing an enforceable obligation to renegotiate specific treaty provisions on demand? Just to conclude and It's just a small suggestion.
Maybe we can think about this because we are going to enter on the drafting.
I suppose later on on next session we're going to have the drafting and discussing and changing at the same time.
I don't know, but there was something that I saw on Workstream three and we also have year on Protocol two.
That is an option.
It even to a very similar article.
There are two different views and in this case, it is very clear There are two different views, and there was an option A and B, and then we discussed this.
This could also be something interesting to introduce here as a way of work instead of saying, I don't like this word, because the truth is, we have very two different views.
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
Najera, please.
Thank.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair, and good day, everyone.
For Nigeria, we support the statements that position that have been read out by the distinguished delegate of Zambia on behalf of the 54 African countries.
And Nigeria, we fully support that statement.
And also, we echo the statements or the position that have been provided by India, Brazil, and Philippines.
Also, we like to make these following observations.
The first one is to call our attention to the fact that when we enter, A treaty.
Trey provides obligation, and members of that treaty are expected to make necessary efforts or do all things possible to ensure that they comply with those obligations.
And this is not the first time it is happening.
Many of us we are a member of the other forum, and we do all things necessary to comply with our obligations that we have entered into under those forum.
For instance, under the global forum, we know that when those exchange information instruments are released, we do all things possible, including amending our domestic law to be able to comply with the necessary provisions that are contained in the MCAs that were signed under the global forum.
Similarly, under the inclusive framework, we have obligations, especially as concerned minimum standard, and we ensure that we carry out all obligations, including changing existing treaties to ensure that we are able to comply with those standards.
When we also enter new agreements, for instance, when we enter into subsequent DTs, we understand the EUI standard we assigned to under the global forum, and we ensure that in those agreements, we comply with that standard in our newly negotiated agreements.
So all things that are here, there's nothing new is There are things we many of us know already and we comply with in our order forum that we are members.
And finally, because of finally paragraph three and four, under paragraph three, we know that the Vienna Convention, Article 30 talks about hierarchy of agreements, and we know under that Article 30, that if you enter into a new agreements and two of you are member of um or the another agreement, we know that the new agreement automatically updates your existing agreements.
So there's nothing new in paragraph I mean, paragraph three is not new, and that is why we even support the African Group on the deletion of the second sentence.
And if you are going to retain it, then we should clearly indicate that this agreement will supersede previous agreements.
Thank you, Chair.
Thank you.
Dw, please.
Mercy.
Thank you, Mr.
Cochir.
Code Dvore would like to thank the Secretariat for having made available Article 21.
Which is a key article for the implementation of this Framework Convention.
Code devoir wholeheartedly supports the position of the African group, which was outlined by Zambia on behalf of 54 African countries.
We also support the position of India, Brazil, and more recently Nigeria.
In the proposal to delete the second sentence of paragraph three of Article 21, as well as changed the amendment to paragraph four to give the COP the possibility of establishing a time frame, a deadline by which alignment with existing treaties should be completed.
Generally speaking, We have a hard time understanding the position outlined by some previous speakers consists of saying that states parties to the convention should not feel bound by the cons the commitments they have taken under this Framework Convention and especially with regard to the agreements future agreements that they will negotiate in the future.
Perhaps we missed some aspects in terms of understanding what was said, but I think the very principle of the convention that we're working on is to adopt new obligations that will govern, at least with regard to the future, the relationships and international tax cooperation.
Côte D'ivoire will make written comments in line with the African group on this provision.
Thank you.
Thank you, Morocco, please.
Good morning.
Thank you, Mr.
Colt, for giving me the floor.
Morocco aligns with the statement made by Zambia on behalf of the African group and also echoes the submission by the distinguished delegates from India, Brazil, Philippines, Nigeria, and Court divir.
So we underline the importance of this article to implement and put in practice our commitments because when we join an international instrument, we have commitments and we need to implement them and put them in practice, while of course, avoiding conflicts and inconsistencies between the tax rules governing relations between state parties.
So we think that each paragraph serves a specific purpose, and we don't support deleting any of them.
But we stand ready to discuss and to accommodate some of the concerns expressed by some distinguished delegates that we see valid.
That said, we think and we understand that um The same rules should apply to the Framework Convention and to future protocols.
I think this is the understanding what the submissions I heard.
Same rules should apply to the Framework Convention and to the protocols.
I can see that in paragraph subparagraph B.
The, the provisions of the framework conventions and its protocol shall in no way affect the right.
We have it here in this subparagraph.
So just for the sake of consistency and just to avoid any confusion, we think that we need to add the phrase and protocols to the other across the article to the other paragraphs to make sure that the provisions apply at the same time to the convention and to the protocols to the future protocols.
Thank you.
Thank you, Saudi Arabia, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Colit.
On paragraph one and two, we appreciate the parts that appropriately preserves domestic implementation flexibility and protects the continuity of existing agreements upon entry into force of this convention.
We believe it or it could benefit from further redrafting for clarity and we will be sharing our written comments to support with that.
And on paragraph three, we see the intention of this paragraph, but we still believe that it needs further reflection.
As currently drafted, we're just concerned that this may in effect place agreements that are functioning effectively under renegotiation pressure, which could affect the stability and predictability that paragraph two seeks to preserve.
We suggest that any alignment obligation be limited to material inconsistency and that the renegotiation duty in paragraph three remain by mutual consent.
One suggestion could be that renegotiation should be reconsidered on a case by case basis, taking into account the effectiveness of existing agreements and the extent for any inconsistency with the convention.
And for paragraph four, we suggest this be revisited in light of paragraph three and that any reporting requirements avoid creating new administrative burdens.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Ireland, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Coley, for giving me the floor and thanks to you and to the Secretariat for the efforts made to redraft this article.
I'll try to be quick as I don't want to delay the coffee break.
But I wanted to echo the sentiments expressed by the UAE, Cechia, China, Switzerland, Germany, Estonia, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands and the many others who've also echoed those delegates.
More specifically, we agree with the suggestions of the distinguished delegates of Luxembourg and China and many others that to delete the latter half of paragraph one B as well as paragraphs 3 and 4.
As noted by the delegates of Belgium, Austria, and Cechia, we support the addition of supranational law to paragraph one A.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Mauritius, please.
Thank you, Colleague.
Let me start by saying that we support the position of the Africa group as relayed by Zambia.
Colleague, I would like to come back on a point that was made by Indonesia as regards the paragraph 18.
Indeed, this paragraph appears to be one that doesn't has its place here, but maybe it is more a provision that goes into the entry into force article.
Then as regards the question of renegotiation of existing agreements, I observed that this is a qualified position which is where necessary on the one hand.
And then the underlying is that it seeks to align existing treaties with provisions of this convention.
So it's not some sort of complete renegotiation of tax treaties, because as we all know, tax treaties cover much more than what we have in this framework convention.
And then minor things, Chair colleague, as we go forward, I find that sometimes we use the word convention in Ioldiion, sometimes framework convention, so there has to be consistency in the drafting.
Thank you.
Thank you, Poland, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Coit, for giving me the floor.
I would like to thank you very much for the efforts of redrafting this article.
I believe that there is a big scope to discuss this in order to reach a compromise here.
Nevertheless, I would like to support comments of my colleagues from UAE, the Netherlands, Belgium, UK, Czech Republic, Germany, Portugal, Ireland, and other members of this committee.
I believe paragraph three and four goes too far.
I think this is the question, of course, of the sovereignty.
Of the state and I believe we should at least redraft it in a different way, but probably delete it.
I would like also to say that here we are talking about totally different let's say basis for the cooperation than we have in the inclusive framework or global forum where we do not have any internationally legally binding commitment to cooperate within the specific standards.
We of course have some instruments, mostly MCAs, which are competent authority agreements.
They are not international treaties.
Also administrative cooperation, peer reviews, reports, et cetera.
But here we are talking about legally binding law.
The question is, what is the effect of this provision from the legal point of view? What would happen if any country did not meet this standard described in paragraph three? What would happen on the basis of, let's say, conference of the party, for example, reaction, or what would happen for the specific taxpayer? Who would like to apply the treaty which is not consistent with the convention, let's say, and what would be the effect of this provision for such a treaty? This is also the question.
This is a totally different issue than only setting up the soft law cooperation or the administrative cooperation between the states as we have within the inclusive framework and global forum.
What's more, I believe that when we have had the discussions during discussion on terms of reference, I had an impression that our goal is to create new platform for the international tax cooperation.
And we would like to create a convention which would be a framework for this cooperation, would impose any direct obligations on the contracting states and not to bind them.
What it is, of course, one of this reflection is also in the terms of reference because all the protocols are optional.
Now if we say, okay, protocol is optional, But you have to change your treaty if you do not accept, for example, protocol.
Let's say the contracting state is not going for the protocol, but has to change the treaty in light of the commitment in the convention.
In fact, in light of this protocol.
I protocol still optional in this context? I don't think so because we have to believe that the convention give us only a frank more framework for the cooperation where on the voluntary basis, all contracting states can create some complementary solutions for the specific issues which we committed to in the text of the convention.
This would be very clear and non controversial situation for the future for the contracting states, not to create legally binding obligations which which we do not know in fact, and this is also a problem.
What would be the effect of these provisions in the future, legal effect.
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
Finland, please.
Thank you, Colleague, for giving me the floor.
I will keep my intervention short by aligning with the general views expressed by previous speakers, such as Cechia, Denmark, Germany, and Estonia.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Or D, please.
Thank you, Chair.
We align ourselves with the statements made by Zambia on behalf of the African group, but also by India, Brazil, Philippines, Côte D'ivoire, as well as in Morocco.
We applaud the inclusion of this article in the convention.
It's an article It makes it possible to have new principles to be included in a way that they can be adapted to the current reality.
However, we do have some observations to add in addition to what has already been said by by the delegates.
In paragraph one of the Article 21, is the elimination compared to the previous draft of the mention at least as strict, which has been replaced by compatible.
The elimination of this mention, I think, frees future multilateral and bilateral agreements from strict adherence to requirements and limits them to simple compatibility and how the degree of compatibility will be evaluated, uh, As for paragraph three, we also welcome the inclusion as far as existing agreements for the states to implement the convention as protocols.
For this paragraph refers to a renegotiation of existing conventions, refers to a bilateral mechanism that consumes resources.
While we welcome the insertion of this paragraph and the progress that it provides, we think that Yeah.
Without referring to specific implementation mechanisms, bilateral ones, this could weaken the impact of the convention, it could leave the current network, current agreements closed to new standards.
I As far as some of the comments made this morning, I have a question to raise.
Most of the states parties in the framework of this effort already are amending their legislation, sign treaties, comply with norms.
Why does the accession to this Framework Convention today, which in addition is the most inclusive one of all, why should not affect existing or future agreements in having them amended based on the principles of the Framework Convention? Thank you.
Cameron, please.
Thank you.
Thank you, Chair for giving me the floor.
Cameron.
Would like to, first of all, support the position of the Africa group expressed by the Delegative Zambia on behalf of the 54 African countries and we'd like to reiterate once again our support and wholehearted commitment to these efforts aimed at strengthening international tax cooperation.
Cameroon supports the proposed reformulation of this Article 21, which in substance commits the states parties to take all necessary measures domestically whether legislative or administrative measures, making it possible to give full effect to the obligations that they have signed up during the framework of the Framework Convention.
Cameron also understands taking into account in paragraph three and four, the obligations undertaken by states previous to the entry into force of the Framework Convention and its protocols, the obligation of aligning these prior conventions with the terms of the Framework Convention, including through renegotiations of those previous agreements, I believe is justified approach and even mandatory in order to make sure that the coherence.
However, Cameron would like to propose the redrafting of paragraph one B.
I better specifying the rights recognized to states parties to sign agreements outside of the Framework Convention.
This provision also seeks to limit the possibility of disputes that could derive from the different interpretations of the compatibility of any new treaties signed by states parties with vis-à-vis the obligations under the Framework Convention.
On this point, the proposal formulated by Algeria, we believe is very relevant.
Along the same lines, Paragraph three of this Article 21 could usefully incorporate an accelerated alignment mechanism of existing agreements with the Framework Convention to accelerate the implementation Liking such an instrument, we think that it would be a good idea to have the possibility of states to free themselves of the obligation of previous agreements.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Listo, please.
Thank you, Chair and good morning.
I think I can be excused into thinking that there are two groups in this very same forum.
Those that are totally convinced that the status quo is to remain, and those that firmly believe that the change is long overdue.
Nonetheless, chair, we do align ourselves with the statements made on behalf of the African group laid out by Zambia and supported by many other African countries, Nigeria, Kodivo, Morocco, Mauritia, Algeria, Cameroon, and also want to thank our counterparts from India and Brazil because they made us appreciate the importance of the article that without the article, we are not going to recognize the benefits that are expected from this very same process.
If you don't have the article 0R some of the paragraphs in the article, then it will not be good for us to actually have come and started the process.
For that, we thank them.
I would like to make general comments with regards to the different paragraphs that are before us.
Paragraph one, for us, it states the obvious.
That is, once you enter into an international agreement, it becomes part of your law and all your laws have to be in alignment and must be complementary so that you avoid conflict of laws.
Paragraph one has to be there for us.
Paragraph two, the way we see it is that it prevents automatic cancellation of existing agreements because you would have entered into a new agreement.
For us who are non lawyers, we are always told that a new law replaces an existing law.
I think that is the risk or the safeguard that is provided under paragraph two.
Again, with regards to paragraph three, I guess we don't need to have done international tax law one oh one to understand the hierarchy of laws in that once we go into an international agreement, then we have to make sure that your domestic laws are aligned to that particular agreement.
So one other thing we know is that this framework and its protocols are not going to be imposed like it happens with some other instruments elsewhere.
So once this becomes your law, then the issue of sovereignty for us falls off.
We cannot be part of an agreement and say it infringes on your sovereign rights to actually do something.
You go into that because you want to change something.
And one other aspect that we have already seen in this regard is that There are a lot of examples, at least a number of examples that we have seen practically put in place to actually deal with improving or amending a vast majority of treaty networks at a go.
Even at the UN level, there's an agreement or arrangement to actually make sure that the existing treaties are changed because there are updates in the tax treaty provisions.
For us, it should not be such a big issue to start to contemplate as to how we are going to go about it.
With regards to paragraph four, I think without it, we will not recognize the effectiveness of the agreement, the framework itself, and we need to be accountable and report to the conference of the parties as to how we are doing in terms of making sure that in the final analysis we achieve the benefits of this.
That will be our general remarks, Chair.
Thank you.
Thank you, Botswana, please.
Good morning.
Thank you, Mr.
Cold, for affording us the floor and greetings to distinguished delegates.
Mr.
Cold, we find ourselves encouraged and troubled this morning.
We are encouraged and we fully support the views and submissions made on behalf of the African group.
We recognize that this is an important article to the Framework Convention, and we support.
We support views that call for strengthening the text of this provision.
Mr.
Cold, we are troubled by Call for deletion of paragraph three and four in their entirety.
Our view being that an entire deletion of paragraph three and four will render the article as is moot and the efforts taken to create obligations which give rise to the article as important as it is, a futile exercise.
Therefore, we support interventions from India, Brazil, Cor de Vo that this is an important article to the Framework Convention and therefore, it has to be strengthened.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Senator, please.
Thank you, facilitator.
A very good afternoon to everyone.
Senegal aligns itself with the statement delivered by the African group, which was then supported by India, Brazil, Cotvoa, Nigeria, and Algeria inter Aliia.
We think that this provision is important as it will allow the convention to have a real impact.
First of all, it invites states to align themselves with the agreement and to take all necessary measures in that regard, while also at the same time respecting state sovereignty.
Given that the convention is not supposed to replace existing conventions.
At the same time, however, if there is a shortcoming in this regard, Perhaps, if measures need to be taken, then one of the contracting parties has the right to ask for an agreement to be renegotiated and then to ask for a follow up process to be started.
I do think this is a consistent approach in these provisions, which will also make it possible for the convention to become fully operational.
As Nigeria quite correctly said, We're not creating anything particularly new here.
There are lots of instruments that already exist in this regard.
States within a particular agreement commit to abide by minimum standards and states are quite within their rights to ask for agreements to be renegotiated when circumstances change and states have made use of conventions in the past to do so.
So I think that this convention will just make it possible for states to decide in total freedom and in line with their commitments to decide for measures to be taken if necessary to align themselves with the existing or minimum standards if the convention does not respect the principles that we've all committed to.
I've heard a lot about sovereignty, but I don't think we're eroding state sovereignty here.
This isn't anything particularly new.
I think we're talking really about a common approach here.
States are fully able to take measures as they see fit even within the context of this convention.
I don't think there's anything particularly concerning here.
I think these are matters that we should all be in a position to support provided that the provisions as they're drafted are in line with the goals that we have set ourselves.
Within the overarching principles of this convention to ensure that these matters are appropriately reflected.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Can you please? Thank you, Cole.
We appreciate your efforts as well as those of the Secretariat in presenting this draft text.
We fully aligned with the submission made by the distinguished delegate from Zambia on behalf of the 54 African countries as supported by many African countries, as well as the submissions made by the distinguished delegates from India and Brazil.
This committee is well guided by the terms of reference, as we keep saying on its mandate and on what the Framework Convention is being developed to achieve.
This includes the objective of establishing fully inclusive and effective international tax cooperation, as well as establishing a fair, equitable, and effective international tax system with a view to enhancing the fairness of international tax rules.
If this committee or the Framework Convention allows or does not address the perpetuation of international tax rules, which don't reflect inclusivity, fairness, or equity, it will have failed to fulfill its mandate.
We don't believe that the majority of countries in the world should continue to suffer inequality and weaken domestic resource mobilization because of the procedural or administrative aspects of aligning with the Framework Convention.
We fully support the inclusion of this article and its contents and its objective of ensuring that other agreements, instruments, and domestic law are consistent with and promote the objectives, commitments and principles of the Framework Convention.
Signatories to this Roma convention will have exercised their sovereign right in ratifying the convention itself along with the objectives, principles, and commitments.
We therefore don't understand how that same sovereignty can then be used to defeat the implementation of those objectives or principles.
Tax treaties, especially those negotiated by developing countries on an unequal footing and which are based on outdated and non inclusive principles represent the very international tax rules which this Framework Convention seeks to address.
Many of these treaties also represent a major barrier to the domestic resource mobilization efforts of many countries.
The Framework Convention and this article in particular should ensure that these treaties are addressed.
This would be fully in line with the third objective of this Framework Convention, which is to address challenges to strengthening domestic resource mobilization.
We support the wording under paragraph one, although we are not opposed to the enhancement of some of its drafting, especially the calls to strengthen the proviso on ensuring consistency with the Framework Convention, where we would look at stronger language since the word compatible seems to be unclear or vague to some.
We also fully support the provisions under paragraph three and four, and we would also support the inclusion on provisions of a multilateral mechanism to renegotiate or review the existing tax treaties to ensure that they conform with the Framework Convention.
We fully support, again, the content of paragraph four, as well as the proposal from the Africa Group to enhance it in relation to the Conference of Parties facilitation of the implementation of the Framework Convention, especially in relation to ensure that the existing tax treaties will be brought into alignment with the Framework Convention.
Thank you, Colleague.
Thank you, Distinguished Delegate of South Africa, followed by Russian Federation.
Thank you, Chair.
We would like to align ourselves with the submission that was made by Zambia on behalf of the Africa group.
We actually want to raise a couple of issues, just one issue per se as well, is just in relation to the deletion of um subsection three and four.
I think we actually opposed to that and we're just saying, look, maybe to the extent that some suggested reading can come in, so we are fine with it, but we just completely opposing the fact that it should be deleted.
Then just one on the technical issues that we saw that on the Article 13, it makes specific references to Article 1516 and I think 20, but it doesn't include this one.
We just wanted to know maybe it might be an oversight or not given the importance of this article.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Distinguish of the Russian Federation, followed by Thailand.
Sure as possible.
Thank you.
Thank you, Chairman, for giving me the floor.
We have thought a great deal about these issues.
We think there are some quite radical positions here, notably on whether or not we should keep the provision on reviewing treaties to avoid double taxation.
For countries who signed this convention, we believe that Well, of course, this idea should appear within the convention because let's imagine that two parties signed the convention and then they enter into an agreement to avoid double taxation, the parties could conclude that the bilateral agreement they've entered into is not in line with the goal and the spirit of the convention, which has also been signed by the two parties.
What's the result? If we delete this provision from the text, if we delete this article, Well, then it will be impossible for the agreement to be reviewed or not.
We believe therefore that this possibility for agreements to be reviewed needs to be conserved, needs to be kept in so that we can bear in mind the desires that parties may have to reopen agreements.
In this regard, we believe That radical approaches that aim to see the deletion of this provision, which can allow that to happen or to create an ironclad obligation for that to be the case are not acceptable.
There has to be a compromise here in particular given that we're looking at this for the first time in the plenary session.
It's a great thing that we're having this open dialogue and that we're discussing these issues.
We think we need to continue working on this article, try and find a compromise and try and improve the wording so that we can have a flexible wording that will allow for a compromise to be struck between countries different positions.
Because we know that a compromise means that both countries are not entirely satisfied, but they nevertheless agree.
Thank you.
Thank you, Silent, please.
Thank you, cos.
I will keep my remarks brief.
Thailand would like to echo the view expressed by the Philippines, India, and Brazil concerning Article 21.
We believe that the draft need to be reconsidered.
Thailand will submit a writing comment paper setting out our view on this provision for consideration.
Thank you, cos.
Thank you.
Estonia, please.
Thank you.
Now, listening to these discussions, I would like to make a request to the Secretariat.
I I would like to know what would be the hierarchy between the Framework Convention and bilateral tax treaties, and also our common existing multilateral instruments, namely the Mutual Administrative Assistance Convention in the light of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
I'm specifically referring here to Article 30.
What would happen and to our existing international obligations if we didn't have Article 21 in this convention at all.
For example, if there is a bilateral tax treaty by two states that have also signed up to the Framework Convention and the protocol, how should this conflict or any potential conflict be resolved just based on the Vienna Convention? I think If this was clear and we all had the same understanding of the situation, it would also be easier to draft this provision.
Also, it would be interesting to know the UN Secretariat's opinion whether the Framework Convention would be considered as is in relation to the tax treaties, and what would be the status of the protocol? Would it be considered as a posterior in relation to tax treaties or does it have any other status? I know I'm not very perfectly clear on this at the moment, but that's the idea I had when listening to the conversations in the room at the moment.
And I do think that such analysis would benefit the negotiations.
Thank you.
Thank you.
United Republic Opsven please.
Thank you, colleagues.
The New Republic of Tanzania supports this article, and we align with the statement made by Zambia on behalf of four African group.
As well as views expressed by several delegations from Nigeria, Cordiva, Morocco, Ageria, Kenya, Senegal, Malias, Cameroon, the Botswana, South Africa, Brazil, India, and many other support team.
Colleagues, this convention should deliver practical change for many countries.
This is the first inclusive multilateral process to shape the international tax cooperation.
Therefore, the convention should guide both existing and future tax instruments as we committed to the terms of reference.
Colleague, we should not be concerned that all existing agreements will be affected.
It is our understanding that only the provisions that are inconsistent with the obligations under this convention would need to be brought in to confirm it.
Parties may continue to implement their obligations through existing or future instruments provided they are consistent with this convention.
Therefore, colleague, we support the deletion of the last sentence of paragraph three and the amendments to paragraph four to empower the COP to determine an appropriate time frame for bringing inconsistent existing instruments into conformity.
Otherwise, colleague, if we simply preserve the existing system, we may not achieve the ambition of this process.
Thank you, colleague.
Thank you.
Jamaica, please.
Thank you very much.
Thank you very much Chair.
Jamaica supports the fair allocation of taxing rights, and we do believe that the system as it stands now, is an inequitable one.
Nevertheless, Chair, we do have concerns about Article 21, which is also linked to Article 5.
Chair, we believe that the point here is not whether countries signed or ratified the MLA of the OECD.
And I think Poland was making the same point.
We believe that the real issue is whether benefits have been derived from that process and what were the flaws in the process.
It is well considered by a number of countries that the MLI process was a very complicated process and and we are not sure whether or not having signed the MLA, we have not been able to measure whether or not we have in fact benefited.
But the question we think should be discussed here is what were the flaws in that process and is there a better way for countries to adopt whole scale changes as proposed by the Framework Convention and whether countries will benefit economically from those changes.
Our concerns are twofold.
Um, as I reflect on Jamaica's own treaty network, which is not an extensive one, but many of our treaties are signed with developed countries, and some of those treaties were motivated by the investors themselves approaching Jamaica to enter into a double taxation agreement with their jurisdictions.
One of the things that we have to consider in relation to the Framework Convention is, well, how do we assure our investors in the event that one of our treaty partners will not sign the Framework Convention and may even decide to discontinue the agreements that they have with Jamaica.
So that is one of the concerns that we have.
The other concern we have Chair is that this is a resource intensive proposal, and I'm speaking here now, particularly about paragraph three will be resource intensive and for small countries, I think that it places an onerous responsibility in terms of trying to renegotiate agreements.
Our region also has a regional double taxation agreement.
And if you look around this room, you will see that there are very few countries from the Caribbean and particularly the Anglo Caribbean, who are members of the Cracom Treaty, you will see that they have not been very engaged in this process.
And so that being an existing agreement, we wonder how we will, uh, navigate that process.
And so Chair, we are aligned with the views of countries that the article does need some work, and particularly as it relates to how resources are going to be allocated in terms of implementing this article.
Thank you, Chair.
Thank you.
Top one N Guinea, please.
Thank you, colleague.
Papua Ne Guinea echoes the sentiment shared by India, Brazil, the African group, Philippines, Nigeria, Morocco, Algeria, Lesotho, Russia, and others.
We thank the Cole for the preparation of this draft article and support its objectives of ensuring coherence between the Framework Convention and existing international tax agreements while respecting domestic legal systems and sovereign treaty making powers.
Papua Nw Guinea strongly supports paragraph three and considers it a key provision of the article.
The effectiveness of the convention may be limited if existing tax treaties continue to contain provisions that are inconsistent with its principles and objectives.
We therefore welcome the call for states parties to take progressive and meaningful steps towards aligning existing international tax agreements with the Convention, including through renegotiation where necessary.
We further welcome the requirement that treaty partners enter into negotiations in good faith and without undue delay when a request for renegotiation is made.
This provision promotes fairness and ensures that countries like Papua New Guinea who seek to align existing agreements with the convention are able to engage meaningfully with the treaty partners.
Regarding paragraph four, Papua Nwuine supports transparency and accountability in the implementation of treaty alignment efforts.
In agreement with Saudi Arabia, the Conference of the States parties should seek to avoid creating unnecessary reporting burdens and should, where possible, streamline reporting processes with existing obligations.
We propose further refinement of the article to reach a compromise between the two differing views expressed today.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Burkina Fasu, please.
Thank you very much, co facilitator.
We fully align ourselves with the statement delivered by Zambia on behalf of the African group.
This has then been supported by several countries such as Nigeria, Cotivi, Morocco, Algeria, Brazil and India.
We'd in particular also like to commend the Secretariat for the drafting for all the hard work that's gone into Article 21.
As several states have already said, The content of Article 21 is nothing particularly new.
Countries already have signed up to conventions in which similar provisions are to be found, and that is why we're not in favor of the deletion of Articles three paragraphs 3 and 4 in Article 21.
We support these two paragraphs.
I think if we delete these paragraphs, that would weaken the article and the convention.
We do think that Article 21 could be worded perhaps better, and we're willing to work on that and that is why we support the African group's proposal that speaks about deletion of the second sentence in paragraph three and perhaps rewording paragraph four.
Thank you.
Thank you, Gunner, please.
Thank you, Cole.
Ghana aligns with the submission made by the distinguished delegate of Zambia on behalf of the 54 member Africa group, and this was also further supported by our colleagues from Nigeria, Cordivi, Morocco, Mauritius, Algeria, Cameroon, Lesotho, Botswana, Senegal, Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, and Burkina Fasu, as well as the submissions also made by the delegates from India, Brazil, Philippines, Russia, and Papua New Guinea.
I would like to point out that as the delegate from India mentioned, this is the first time that more than 190 member states have come together at one table to negotiate a framework convention that seeks to work for everyone.
Like other African group distinguished delegator pointed out, we wholly support the inclusion of this article in the Framework Convention as it seeks to establish the place of this framework convention in the midst of existing agreements, as well as those that may be concluded in the future.
The purpose of this article in this convention is to rightly give due recognition and consideration of the existing agreements by making sure that there's alignment with the Framework Convention and other instruments.
We would especially like to point out that, for instance, in the same way that bilateral treaties are amended by a multilateral agreement like the MLI for those countries that sign onto it, or domestic changes that are necessary to effectively implement multilateral agreements are done, it's in the same spirit that we must be open to the commitments under this Framework Convention to make conforming changes if necessary.
We note the concerns of other member states and are open to further discussions to determine the time frame within which other agreements and instruments should be brought into conformity with this Framework Convention.
Thank you, colleague.
Thank you.
United Kingdom, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Colead.
Apologies for coming in again, but the discussion I think has prompted me to give a few further reflections.
Thinking about the discussion that's happened this morning, the discussions that have happened across the course of the week, I'm struck by the fact that it seems that there is no common understanding on the interaction between a number of the different provisions that are on the table, namely Article 5, Article 20, Article 21, and the relationship with Protocol one.
I would like to call For an explanatory note, for some understanding of the Secretariat to ensure that as we are talking about this, particularly in relation to this article, that we all have a shared understanding of what the text means that is on the table, which I don't believe and distinguished delegates can correct me, but I do not believe that we currently have.
Now, we are talking about undertaking binding legal commitments.
At the moment, I do not think the room has a shared understanding of what those binding legal commitments are and particularly the commitments that run to the very heart of this Framework Convention.
It seems to me difficult to imagine how we can move forward in this discussion when we don't have that understanding.
As I said, I would like to call for the Secretariat to give an explanation of how we can read these commitments together so that state parties can truly understand, based on the text that is on the table, what we are actually being asked and bound to do.
Otherwise, it seems difficult to progress.
I would also like to note that colleagues called for a closed informal earlier this week.
It would seem to us that this is exactly the matter that would suit that discussion.
Again, I think we should consider that based on that understanding.
Thank you and apologies again for coming in a second time.
Thank you.
Now we'll move over to A.
Okay.
Thank you.
We are now moving to stakeholders.
And please, we have a very long list.
So let's.
Okay.
Sweden, please.
They're almost left out.
Thank you very much.
Interesting topic is Article 21.
Thank you, colleagues for giving me the floor.
Sweden would like to make a brief comment on Article 21.
We have, as many previous speakers already mentioned, some concerns regarding those parts of Article 21 that could be interpreted as requiring state parties to align existing international agreements and related instruments with the provisions or principles of this convention.
Now, it's important to preserve coherence within the international legal system and to respect existing international commitments.
The convention should not establish a hierarchy among international instruments, nor should it create obligations to interpret, amend, modify, renegotiate other international agreements or instruments in order to bring them into line with this convention.
That said, we will probably come back with some text proposals later on in our written comments.
Thank you.
Thank you.
I started, please, we have a lot to do before the break time and there's a lot to do after break, so we will enurge everybody to be sussin in their presentations and we'll start with the Afghan Union, please.
As we mentioned earlier, let's be straight to the point.
Thank you very much.
Thank you, chair, and good morning.
Dear Colleague.
I want to take us back a few years back when we first, as the African Union were included as members of the G 20.
When we brought the issue of international tax cooperation at the table and that we spoke about the negotiations that were going to start at the UN, we recalled the difficulty that we had in the room trying to pursue all the members of the G 20 that we can start that conversation and you can see that we are still in the same environment.
But nevertheless, what we want to say is that the African Union fully aligns with the statement made by Zambia on behalf of the 55 African Union member states, and also we would like to align with the statement that were delivered by Nigeria Côte D'ivoire, Morocco, Mauritius, Algeria, Cameroon, Loto, Botswana, Senegal, Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, and Ghana.
We also take note of the interventions by India, Brazil, Philippines, Russia, Papua, New Guinea.
We wish to underscore the importance of Article 21.
Much of our attention in this negotiation has rightfully been drawn to the substance to the substantive commitment of this convention, namely on allocation of taxing rights, on illicit financial flows, on mutual assistance, et cetera But the commitment is only as good as the mechanism that carries it into effect.
Article 21 is that mechanism.
It is therefore the bridge between what we promise one another in this room and what our citizens will one day receive The African Union rises to strengthen that bridge.
We would like therefore to make two points and leave you with a reflection.
Our first point concerned paragraph three.
The African Union reads the first sentence of this paragraph as establishing a standing and unconditional duty that parties take progressive and meaningful steps to align their existing agreements with this convention.
We are grateful for that sentence.
It is, in our sense, the heart of the article.
Our concern is only that the sentence which follows it by making renegotiation depend upon a party request may unintentionally cast the shadow over that duty, suggesting that without a request, the obligation may rest.
We do not believe that was the drafters intention, and we propose that the final sentence of paragraph three be removed so that the obligation stands clear and un died as stated by Zambia on behalf of the Africa Group.
On our second point, colleague, we would like to emphasize.
I'm sorry to interrupt.
You have a maximum 10 seconds because you already exceed the time.
We need to give equal opportunities to all the multi stakeholders and we need to close by lunchtime.
The afternoon, we're going to move to the following articles to allow equal opportunities.
Maximum 10 seconds, please.
Thank you, Chair.
I 10 seconds, we would like to echo the fact that we stand solid in support of the position that was expressed by Zambia and supported by all the African countries who spoke since this morning.
So thank you and back to you.
Again, please, everyone commit to the 3 minutes or we will start to cut the microphone after this.
Once the micro start flashing, you have 30 seconds to wrap up, please.
E, please.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Cole, the African Tax Administration Forum aligns itself with the statement delivered by the Republic of Zambia on behalf of the Africa Group and all African countries that have expressed their support.
Mr.
Cole, we believe that Article 21 is vital for the work that we do supporting our members, but also it is vital for the convention to move forward.
In the interest of time, I will point out that paragraph three, we believe that the second sentence of paragraph three should be deleted and removed.
Furthermore, we believe that paragraph four should be strengthened by giving the conference of parties the opportunity to set deadlines and not impose it within the article.
Finally, I think the African Tax Administration Forum stands ready to supply additional text to improve the article where necessary.
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
ICC, please.
Not ICC Mexico, ICC.
I have it right now.
Thank you, colleague.
I'll try to be brief.
ICC appreciates the efforts made to have a current draft of the article.
It's something that we requested also in the previous session, so we appreciate the opportunity to have a text.
Article 21 may indeed become one of the most consequential provisions of the convention from an implementation perspective.
We welcome recognition in paragraph two that existing bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements continue to apply.
This is an important safeguard for legal certainty, business confidence, and the stability of cross border economic activity.
However, as of now, it remains unclear how the Framework Convention will interact with existing international commitments, bilateral tax convention, trade and investment agreements.
In relation to this one, we would like to know that these are also matters that are not within the competence of this mandate.
While paragraph two preserve existing rights and obligations, paragraph three qualifies that protection by requiring state parties to take progressive and meaningful steps towards aligning existing agreements with the convention and where necessary, it calls for the renegotiation of existing agreements.
As a result, uncertainty remains regarding the extent to which existing treaty protections are preserved.
To provide certainty to both taxpayers and tax administration, existing treaty commitments should remain fully effective unless and until both treaty partners expressly agree to amend them.
Further clarification is regarding the meaning of alignment in paragraph three.
For us, it is currently unclear whether alignment refers only to obligations that state have expressly accepted under the convention, the protocols were its to them, whether it extends to the broadly convention objectives and principles.
This question is particularly important where a state has ratified the convention but not a specific protocol where optional provisions have not been accepted by both treaty partners.
ICC therefore believe that any alignment obligation should apply only to obligations that have been expressly accepted by both parties.
A broader interpretation could create significant practical challenges.
It could generate uncertainty regarding the status of existing treaty commitments, lead to consistent approaches across jurisdictions and reduce predictability for both taxpayers and tax administration.
We support efforts to promote cooperation and coherence within the international tax system.
At the same time, preserving treaty certainty and ensuring that existing agreements remain effective unless expressly abandoned by the relevant treaty partners will be indeed critical to support cross border trade, investment, and ultimately sustainable economic growth.
Thank you, colleague.
Thank you.
Stakeholder one, please.
Good morning, Chairman.
I have the honor of addressing.
This session.
It is the first time we're taking the floor, and we're grateful for coordinating this work.
I want to state that we fully support the efforts of the United Nations to strengthen international tax cooperation, improve tax cooperation for the benefit of sustainable development.
I'd like to offer some comments on Article 21.
We believe that this debate should not be focused on replacing what already works.
It should be focused on recognizing and preserving instruments that over time have demonstrated to be effective, mature, and useful for the cooperation among states, regional and multilateral agreements that are currently in force have been developed over decades of dialogue and mutual trust among states.
In numerous sectors, including international air transport, these instruments have made it possible to facilitate commerce, strengthen interconnectivity and provide legal certainty to states.
These principles have been historically supported by international frameworks that are consolidated and broadly applicable.
This is why we consider it fundamental that Article 21 clearly state that current agreements continue to be valid and applicable when states consider that updating is necessary.
This should be done through a progressive sovereign process based on consensus among parties.
This is why we request that paragraph two of Article 21 be preserved without change and paragraph three is to be understood as a cooperative process led by states rather than some kind of automatic requirement for renegotiation.
Alignment with the principles of the Convention should be understood as a process of cooperation and continued improvement, not as an automatic obligation to renegotiate.
States should preserve the necessary margin to, protect their priorities in any process of renegotiation.
In our opinion, preserving legal stability, respecting existing commitments, and promoting gradual changes when necessary would be the best way to strengthen international cooperation and ensure effective implementation of this convention to conclude.
International agreements in force must continue to be effective.
Any change or updating of these instruments should be done progressively based on consensus and respecting the sovereignty of states.
Thank you very much.
Thank you, CFS, please.
Thank you so much, colleague.
As drafted, Article 21 approbates and reprobates.
It affirms the convention's allocation principles with one hand and then goes on to subordinate them with the other.
Article 21 paragraph two, it provides that the rights and obligations of state parties under agreements concluded before this convention enters into force are not affected.
Now place that against Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Article 30 paragraph three of the Vienna Convention provides that where the parties to an earlier treaty are also parties to a later treaty, the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that it is compatible with the later one.
That is the default rule.
In other words, the later treaty prevails.
But Article 30 Paragraph two provides that where the later treaty specifies that it is subject to an earlier treaty, then the earlier treaty prevails instead.
Going back to paragraph two of Article 21 of the Framework Convention, the legal effect is now quite precisely clear.
Paragraph two is a conflict clause within the meaning of Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.
Under the general laws of treaties, this convention would have arrived then holding priority over every pre existing tax treaty to the extent of incompatibility.
Paragraph two surrenders that priority.
The old treaty network then prevails not because international law requires it, but because the convention chooses it and the convention chooses to subordinate its text to the existing double tax treaties, for example.
However, there's also the condition that paragraph two is subject to paragraph three of the Framework Convention.
Paragraph three requires that state parties to take progressive and meaningful steps to align their existing agreements with the convention, including through renegotiation in good faith and without undue delay.
So it can be argued that the subordination under paragraph two is only temporary and that the paragraph three redeems it, but it does not for two reasons.
First, paragraph three is a duty to negotiate, not a duty to agree.
In every renegotiation, there is a party that benefits from the existing allocation, and for that party, deadlock is always a victory.
It can negotiate in perfect good faith, concede nothing and paragraph two guarantees that its treaty governs throughout indefinitely.
The provision makes the status quo the sanction free outcome and awards it to the party that wants no change.
Secondly, the alignment target is also indeterminate.
Paragraph three directs alignment with the provisions and principles of this convention.
But the operative allocation rules will sit in the protocols in Article 20 Thank you, CFS BCAS please.
Thank you, Chair.
It is certainly desirable to preserve the principles contained in Article 21.
That's the core of the entire negotiation.
However, several commitments in the convention are at high level and how they will interact with the existing tax cities is unclear.
For example, it may be difficult to determine whether the existing tax treaties result in a fair allocation of taxing dis as contemplated in Article 5, even it is assumed that protocol one is signed.
If thinking further, is there a fair allocation of taxing rates as regards capital gains? Is it fairly allocated? What is a fair allocation will always be a question mark and that gives the question whether existing tax cities are in alignment with the price commitments of principle Convention.
To ensure maximum countries are able to sign the Framer convention and the entire initiative does not fail or become futile, the following approach may be considered.
This is one aligns with what I had suggested.
A couple of days back, this should reduce the deadlock, which I see currently happening.
One, to the extent possible, make a separate protocol for each commitment contained in the Framework Convention.
Two, whether the commitment is very general in nature, but must have, if possible, diluted text of the relevant article 0F the convention so that it is acceptable to all.
Three, allow the state parties to make reservations on certain specific articles of the convention, but in a manner that the entire initiative does not become futile.
A state cannot make a reservation on all the substantive articles of a convention.
Four, a separate protocol on specific commitments reduces the scope of the treaty renegotiations.
Dilute the requirement of renegotiation, which is paragraph three of the existing tax treaties contained in paragraph three by adopting a specific list of commitments on which the countries may request renegotiation.
Renegotiation can be requested only on the commitments for which there are no separate protocols.
Thus the countries will know what exactly they are signing up to as regards the future negotiation.
While we adopt this approach, certain commitments under the convention must be non negotiable.
Each country from this approach will gain certain things.
It will be package deal.
Certain things they want, they like, certain things they will not like, but they will accept the entire package.
Just going quickly, the approach of one on one bilateral negotiation of a tax treaty probably is going to take too long and we certainly should have something like an ML or fast track instrument so that we have very quick results.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Ayata please.
Thank you, Mr.
Colito Dear Colleague, the International Transport Association appreciates, again, the opportunity to comment on Article 21 this time.
As was explained during the discussion on Article 5, ATA fully supports the objectives of the Framework Convention, including the objective of achieving a fair allocation of taxing rights among jurisdictions.
We also support the views expressed by many delegations today that Article 21 should preserve sufficient flexibility for states to maintain existing agreements where those arrangements continue to operate effectively, including through appropriate safeguards, reservations, or other mechanisms determined by member states.
IATA submission is not that international aviation should be treated differently simply because it is aviation.
Rather, this sector already operates under a longstanding multilateral framework that was specifically developed by member states to achieve many of the objectives that this convention seeks to promote while addressing the complexities of a sector that it is inherently cross border.
The International Aviation Taxation framework did not emerge by chance.
It was developed through decades of multilateral work within the International Civil Aviation Organization, ICO, the United Nations Specialized Agency for International Aviation, by its 193 member states as the technical solution to the challenges of allocating taxing rights in an industry that it is inherently international and cross border.
Indeed, many of the principles and objectives that have been at the forefront of discussions during these negotiations, including fairness, legal certainty, international cooperation, and the balanced allocation of rights have long guided the development of the international aviation Taxation framework within IKO.
Equally important, these arrangements should not be understood as resulting in under taxation.
International aviation remains subject worldwide to a broad range of taxes, charges, and other fiscal obligations.
The purpose of the framework is to allocate taxing rights in a manner that reflects the unique operational characteristics of international transport while avoiding multiple taxation and providing legal certainty.
That brings me to the Article 21.
We recognize that international law already provides established principles governing the relationship between successive treaties.
However, the inclusion of Article 21 reflects a recognition by member states that the relationship between this convention and existing agreements warrants particular consideration.
The issue before negotiators is therefore not whether such principles exist, but whether additional clarity or safeguards may be appropriate where long standing international frameworks already operate effectively and continue to command broad support among states.
When read together, Article 5 and 21 could have significant implications for the very limited number of sectors that already operate under international agreed allocation frameworks.
If Article 5 establishes principles governing the allocation of taxing rights, well Article 21 encourages the alignment of existing agreements.
Through negotiation where necessary.
Questions may arise regarding the continued operation of well established aviation arrangements.
Our concern is simply to ensure that pursuing the objectives, the Convention does not unintentionally undermine international Thank you, TGNE, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Cold, for the opportunity to speak.
I speak on behalf of Tax Justice Network Africa, the African Civil Society Working Group on the UN Tax Convention, and the Global Alliance for Tax Justice.
We really must ensure the effectiveness of the Framework Convention and this lies particularly within Article 21.
For this reason, we believe that there should be several safeguarding elements, particularly in paragraph three of Article 21.
We must remember that historically, bilateral renegotiations for developing countries have not been very successful or favorable because they face significant buyers.
For instance, on things such as threats of removal of investment.
Having this in mind, we really do echo what has been stated by several members of the African group that the renegotiation of treaties should not be peed on a state requesting.
It's important that we use this multilateral space to negotiate the best outcomes, particularly for member states that have suffered historically.
We'd also like to add that this isn't just about developing countries.
We are here to reinvent the international tax system, and for that reason, also developed countries will need to review and renegotiate the existing frameworks.
Lastly, We have several suggestions on how to strengthen the role of the conference of parties in this particular paragraph.
We believe that renegotiations should not be pegged on any subjective or vague standards, so we therefore believe that the COP should be mandated to define what constitutes incompatibility with existing agreements.
In short, they should be allowed to define the scope of where necessary.
We also believe that the COP should provide strict timelines for review of existing double taxation agreements, and this is so we will and this is to prevent situations where we will have member states perpetually renegotiating double taxation agreements.
We will be happy to provide further written submissions on this.
And lastly, we really do recommend that the Conference of Parties should also be strengthened with the powers to deal with non cooperative jurisdictions who will not abide to what is outlined within paragraph three of Article 21.
Thank you, Mr.
Colley.
Thank you.
CCFD please.
Oh, does it work.
Thank you, Mr.
Colt.
I'll deliver my statement in French.
We'd like to recall here that this article will determine if we can at last break with a profoundly unjust international tax law order and recall why we're actually here.
We're here because for too long, countries of the South have been forced to cede their right of taxation.
Through double tax treaties that are unjust and imbalanced, often treaties that are negotiated in conditions of asymmetric expertise, unequal administrative capacity, treaties that are the most obvious reflection of economic, political, and historical imbalance that we have a chance to correct.
Just take an example of my own country, France, which has one of the most extended system of treaties.
Research has shown how imbalanced these treaties are.
Treaties concluded by France are those that limit the right of taxation of source countries, particularly those negotiated with African countries that import capital.
France is only one example amongst others.
Since the start of these negotiations, we have heard obstinate insistence by some countries on complementarity with other conventions.
In fact, these treaties, especially within the framework of the OECD that are not fair.
When we speak of complementarity, the real question is why should a framework convention that is designed to be equitable, inclusive and effective should be subordinated to instruments that have never been that.
When we uh I hear the word duplication and we say the only duplication that we should fear is the duplication of imbalance and failures of existing instruments.
Also, civil society calls on making Article 21 the key for making states, especially developing states to reconquer their right of taxation, which is so unjustly hampered by existing treaties and existing instruments.
Article 21 must guarantee that existing treaties and instruments do not respect the requirement of justice and equity of this convention do not hinder its ambitions or its implementation.
Thank you.
Thank you.
APM DD, please.
Coleed and France, I bring you greetings of peace and solidarity from the Asian People's Movement for debt and Development.
At this time, I co chair the Asean Parliamentarians for Human Rights.
My name is Charles Santiago.
Here are my three concerns.
First, the obligation that parties have to implement the convention, including by abolishing or negotiating treaties that conflict with the convention must be strengthened.
Without this, Article 21 risk preserving status quo.
Second, there is no deadline for treaty alignment.
The obligation is simply to take steps towards alignment and conduct an assessment leaving implementation open ended and allowing delay to become a substitute for reform.
Third, Article 21 lacks an effective compliance mechanism which states refuse to negotiate, where states refused to negotiate or prolong the process indefinitely.
We therefore need a mechanism that ensures implementation, accountability, and compliance.
To stress the point, do we prolong negotiations for another 15 years when parties stonewall the process in the first three years? Cole and friends, when do we say enough is enough? I leave this scenario as a question to this assembly.
Article 21 must require parties to align their domestic legislation with the convention so that the convention's obligations are fully reflected in the legal frameworks governing multinational corporations or enterprises.
The terms of reference call for a fully inclusive, equitable, and effective international tax system.
That objective cannot be realized if Article 21 merely encourages future negotiations while allowing inconsistent treaty obligations to remain indefinitely.
Cole and friends, this convention is a historic opportunity to rebalance global tax governance in favor of fairness and justice.
Article 21 must be strengthened so that it delivers implementation and not just aspiration.
I thank you.
So thank you.
We don't have enough time to continue.
We have three more stakeholders who will take immediately when we come back from the break.
ICC stakeholder two and NTRL.
So those are the three where they will take those three when we come back, then we will continue the next sessions.
Meanwhile, there was a question that was raised.
The Secretariat will answer it before we go.
Thank you, Mr.
Colet.
And this is in response to the distinguished delegate of Estonia, who had asked the Secretariat to give meaning to this article.
In the view of the Secretariat, this is an intergovernmental process.
It is for member states to give meaning to this article as it is for member states to give meaning to all articles of the convention, and not for the Secretariat.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Colet.
Thank you, and have a nice lunch, everybody.
GA
General Assembly
(9th meeting) - Fifth Session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on the UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation (INC Tax) - 3 to 13 August 2026
The Fifth Session will take place at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 3 to 13 August 2026.
Description
The United Nations General Assembly has established an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) to draft a United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation and two early protocols.
The United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation is a proposed international legal instrument aimed at improving global tax cooperation. This Member State-led process will run from 2025 to 2027, with the aim of developing a framework convention that leads to fully inclusive and more effective international tax cooperation.
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