Good afternoon.
Can we settle, please? We're finished with member states.
We now have one, two, three, four.
We have five stakeholders.
We'll deal with those five stakeholders, then we'll move to the next article.
Basically after the five, we'll close and then we'll move to the next article.
With that, I would like to welcome stakeholder one to take the floor, please.
Thank you, Coley, for giving me the floor.
I'm here with Norwegian church aid making a statement on behalf of Tax Justice Norway and the broader civil society group led by the Global Alliance for Tax Justice.
We are happy to see the inclusion of this article in the convention and experiences from other UN processes such as the UN Framework Convention on climate change and the Convention on Biological Diversity, to name some, show that subsidiary bodies can be very helpful to support the COP with implementation and review.
This includes by allowing for in depth technical work ahead of the CPs.
So both the reference to the creation of subsidiary body of implementation in paragraph one and the mandate for the conference of the parties to establish additional bodies or mechanisms in paragraph two are in our eyes, important components which strengthen the Framework Convention as a whole and will allow it to be agile for the future.
However, we struggle to understand this one sentence in paragraph one, which reads, no later than 2035 and then every five years thereafter.
It is our understanding that the review of the convention does not necessarily follow a five year cycle, it will be ongoing, as we can also see in the Article 16 of the draft on review and verification, which we'll move on to later.
Furthermore, we are worried that it will create substantial delay if the SBI can postpone its first review until 2035 or later.
In other processes, the subsidiary body of implementation usually meets in advance of each conference of the parties and contributes by putting substance onto the agenda and developing draft decisions for the COP.
We therefore call for the deletion of the reference to a five year cycle and a starting date for the review.
We believe that this should be left open for the COP to decide.
That will also allow for the COP to design the review process in line with what is suggested in Article 16 of the draft, including the frequency of meetings and the rhythms of the review cycle.
Thank you, colleague.
Thank you.
DM Yen Foundation.
Thank you, Cole.
I have the honor to deliver this intervention on behalf of the financing for Development, Children Youth constituency of the major Group of Children and Youth.
Children Youth welcome the provisions on the establishment of the subsidiary body dedicated to implementation.
We believe that a permanent technical body can help translate the convention and its protocols into administratively workable measures, identify implementation gaps, and provide evidence based recommendations to the conference of the state's parties.
Regarding paragraph one, The body's mandate should distinguish clearly between technical assessment implementation support, and decision making authority.
Its work could include developing implementation guidance, review common administrative challenges, identifying capacity needs, evaluating the effectiveness of technical assistance, and recommending improvements to reporting and cooperation mechanisms.
Participation by all states parties is important, but the body should also reflect a diversity of expertise, legal systems, economic structures, and levels of administrative capacity.
States should be encouraged to nominate experts from tax administrations, relevant public institutions, and include non governmental stakeholder experts in their national delegations.
Adequate support should be available to enable experts from countries in special situations to participate constantly.
We encourage regular reporting rather than waiting until 2035 for the first comprehensive recommendation.
The subsidiary body could submit annual or biennial progress reports while undertaking a more extensive implementation assessment by an agreed date and every five years thereafter.
The initial review date should be linked to the conventions entry to force so that the body has sufficient implementation evidence while avoiding an unnecessarily delayed assessment.
Regarding paragraph three, We believe that substantive modalities must be provided pertaining to the participation of observers in the subsidiary bodies.
We also encourage structured mechanisms for the participation of stakeholders and right holders, especially through the participation of the major groups and other stakeholders.
In the work of subsidiary bodies, providing rights to provide technical input and contribute substantially to their work both in person and in hybrid modalities.
We also call in the text to strongly encourage state parties and observers to organize their respective delegations to the subsidiary bodies in the context of gender balance intergenerational solidarity and multidisciplinary expertise, echoing our previous statement on the importance of multi stakeholder participation.
Children and youth believe that this principle of openness and inclusivity must also be reflected in the subsidiary bodies of the Framework Convention.
We thank you.
Thank you.
Latin, please.
Gracias.
Thank you very much, Colleague.
As emphasized by my colleague briefly when we were discussing Article 13, we want to underscore the importance of guaranteeing robust and effective participation from civil society, trade unions.
Indigenous peoples and all other non governmental stakeholders that are so committed to this process, as has been the practice of the GA and in this mandate, this participation should be guaranteed and it should be specifically enshrined in the relevant articles of the convention.
This point is also vital on Article 14 on subsidiary bodies.
At present, The INC is a subsidiary body under the framework of the GA of the UN.
As you know, we recently arrived.
We are committed to tax justice even before the negotiations began.
We have contributed technical contributions and having come this long way together, we trust that delegations now recognize the work of civil society and how we enrich the process.
This is why we have been left with a bitter taste and some red flags are going up because there is an omission or no real recognition that already within the United Nations, there is an agreement that the majority of the countries present here have been actively defending in other bodies and that in this process is written out in paragraph 21 of the terms of reference.
Article 14 includes a mandate for the COP to establish subsidiary bodies and mechanisms.
Our request is a concrete one to incorporate immediately after paragraph three of Article 14, explicit wording on the participation of observers in all bodies to the convention.
We are not asking for anything new or disruptive, as we have noted, the work on wording has been a little too focused on wording some from others.
And we would look here to other conventions such as the Framework Convention on climate change.
There are provisions, and this is a precedent, for instance, in the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Framework Convention of the WHO for Tobacco Control, the UN Convention on Corruption, and the Agreement on sustainable mean biodiversity.
As we have highlighted, civil society and all of its diversity represents citizens from all continents.
These people are taxpayers and they hope that together we will raise the veil of opaqueness that is over this and open up a new pathway to fiscal transparency for new generations.
These are the people that the government that you represent must be accountable for and we have every right to know exactly what our governments are negotiating.
This is a fundamental question of democracy.
I thank you.
Thank you.
BCS, please.
Thank you, Cold.
Para provides for reporting by the subsidiary body by 2035 and every five years thereafter.
The reporting should be much quicker and faster.
2035 is eight or nine years away.
Several people in this room may have retired by that time and even five year cycle thereafter is too long.
My comments on Para two, external technical experts, non state participants should be allowed to participate in the technical working groups.
The role of external experts will be purely technical in nature without having any voting or other rights, and this may work like subcommittees of the UN Tax Committee, which allows individual experts to participate.
To give an example, currently, the UN subcommittee on digitalized and globalized economy has 29 participants with few individual experts as well.
This participation in the technical working group will be in addition to the participation by the backbench stakeholders.
Thank you.
Thank you.
CFS, please.
Thank you, Colleague.
My intervention concerns principally paragraph two.
Paragraph two empowers the conference of state parties to establish mechanisms and bodies, including technical working groups, temporary or standing, reporting to the conference or to the subsidiary body as directed.
Now, this is an unlimited delegation clause.
Because it does not enumerate the functions that may be delegated.
It reserves no matter to the conference itself and it says nothing about the legal status of what these bodies are going to produce.
It also permits a working group to report to the implementation body rather than to the conference, which means a technical output can sit two steps removed from the plenary organ and nothing in this article requires that output ever to come before the state parties for decision.
Now this matters and it matters a lot because technical output can end up becoming law.
Now, under Article 31, paragraph three of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the subsequent practice of the parties is a mandatory element of treaty interpretation.
Any guidance that they produce or is produced by a working group that is applied by tax administrations or is cited in court rulings or tribunal rulings and is repeated over years, it becomes exactly that binding norm, binding law.
I think Article 14 requires a legal safeguard.
This being that recommendations and outputs of the subsidiary bodies contemplated in paragraph two to have no normative effect unless and until it is adopted by the Conference of state parties.
The recommendation that I make can be added into paragraph two and it does not in any way weaken the envisaged working groups.
Thank you.
Thank you and thank you everybody for your contribution on this article.
We want to now move on to the next article.
What we're going to do is we're going to combine two articles here.
Since basically they are related.
Article 15 data collection and analysis, and then Article 16, review and verification.
Now, these basically form some work bargain that we that the COP would be carrying out and they've been a bit broadened or a little more detail has been provided on them over here.
And so would like to open it up for discussion.
So basically let's comment on both at the same time and Yeah.
So floor is open, please.
Do I have the pleasure of going ahead to 17.
India.
Sorry, Jeff.
Sorry, Colleague denied you the pleasure, but as regards the point that you made that these two articles should be taken together, maybe that's actually a very valid way of going forward because probably they deal with the same thing.
I have a feeling that we are trying to what we will eventually do is we will set up a review mechanism for which we will require this data collection and analysis.
So I don't really see the need for a data collection and analysis article separate from the review and verification article.
Because right now, for example, this Article 15 begins by saying that each state shall collect and develop statistical research data.
Why would they do that? I imagine if all 193 of us started collecting data about chaos we would cause for each other.
I suppose the purpose of both these articles is to set up a review mechanism for for the functions that the conference of parties would do, the subsidiary bodies would do the working groups, if we ever set them up, they would do.
I suppose what the two articles put together should do is to first set up a review mechanism.
And the data collection and analysis would feed into that review mechanism.
So I suppose that is where that is how we look at the process that these two articles put together seem to indicate.
Thank you.
Thank you, India.
Okay.
Singapore, please.
Thank you, Colleague.
We appreciate the intent behind Article 15 and agree that the collection and sharing of statistical and research data is valuable for effective implementation of the Framework Convention.
That said, we are concerned that the provisions as currently drafted remain too open ended.
Safeguards are needed even for aggregate or anonymous information, and state parties should not be required to disclose information that could compromise ongoing audits, investigations, or risk assessment methodologies, even where such information is non taxpayer specific.
To address this, we would suggest three amendments for Article 15.
First, qualifying paragraph one with the words to the extent possible before the word collect.
Second, amending paragraph two to read, State parties shall, as appropriate, share with each other generic information to the extent permitted by their domestic laws and in accordance with applicable safeguards and so on.
Third, adding a sentence to paragraph three, which reads, Before sharing such information under paragraph two, a state party shall also ensure that such information does not compromise ongoing audits, investigations, or risk assessment methodologies, even where such information is non taxpayer specific.
We believe that these amendments strike the right balance between promoting necessary data sharing and protecting the integrity of tax administration.
On Article 16, we note that the process for the COP to establish reviews is not clearly defined, particularly when read together with the COP article.
This further reinforces our view that decision making processes should be centralized under the COP article.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Tgen please.
Thank you, Mr.
Colead.
I speak on behalf of Tax Justice Network and the wider civil society group coordinated by the Global Alliance for Tax Justice.
Article 15 is a cornerstone of the Framework Convention, and it will ensure both that the framework body can act effectively to combat dynamic patterns of tax abuse and also that the effectiveness of the convention and the framework body themselves can be demonstrated.
For both these elements, the data and the analysis must be comprehensive.
It must cover every member state with equal rigor to meet the convention's commitment to inclusive and effective cooperation.
Now, one especially crucial element of the data that's required is the public country by country reporting of multinational companies.
This is data with real power.
The simple act of being required to provide that data privately to tax authorities has been shown to raise effective tax rates of multinationals by more than a percentage point.
Being required to publish the data more than doubles that effect and that would result if applied to all major multinationals in tens of billions of dollars of additional tax revenue worldwide without any further changes to tax systems.
The immediate value of public country by country reporting is that this is precisely the data which will reveal and track over time the extent to which a convention central aim is met, whether or not taxing rights are being distributed according to the location of real economic activity.
The present arrangements provide an egregious example of the exclusionary nature of the OECD's stewardship of this global public good.
First, the data not required to be published.
Indeed, the OECD has actively lobbied against governments that have sought to require publication.
Both Australia and the European Union now require publication of data relevant to their own problems of tax abuse, but of little or no help to other countries.
Now, second, the OECD's convoluted arrangements for the exchange of this information between tax authorities mean that some developing countries receive the data with significant delays, while many others are left entirely in the dark.
A global public database of country by country reporting, as indicated in the compromiso de cedia, is the guarantee of fully inclusive access, as well as delivering accountability for the convention.
Such an approach also maximizes the revenue benefits of transparency and meets the demands of both global labor and investors with trillions of dollars in assets under management who are now campaigning for just this transparency.
This is the lowest hanging fruit for delegates to agree upon now.
The data is already partially public, requiring full publication would lower compliance costs for companies compared to the current complex arrangements and requiring full publication is the only way to deliver the benefits of transparency to all countries equally and to ensure the framework body can deliver on central elements of its objectives.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Israel, please.
Thank you Chair.
Our comments are similar in mind with the comments of Singapore.
Regarding paragraph one, we ask at the end of it to add in accordance with its domestic law and available resources.
Regarding paragraph two, what's important to us is that it should be known and the treaty will say that this information should be anonymized information.
We see this article as it focus on the sharing of professional knowledge, statistics, trends, and typologies of tax evaders rather than specific information regarding individual taxpayers that we have other articles for that.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Stakeholder one, please.
Thank you, Chair.
Chair.
Sorry.
I hereby speak on behalf of open ownership and the civil society group coordinated by the Global Alliance for Tax Justice.
It has been widely recognized that the opacity in the ownership and control of legal vehicles and assets enables tax evasion tax avoidance, and other illicit financial flows.
Complex and transnational networks of companies, foundations, trusts, and other legal vehicles obscure the identity of those who ultimately control and benefit from taxable assets.
To raise their revenue that they are owed, governments need information of who ultimately owns what and where.
Furthermore, it is important that the public is able to access basic information to identify those controlling the companies and other legal vehicles operating in our societies.
Collecting, publishing, and sharing timely and up to date beneficial ownership information that allows tax administrations to widen its tax base by bringing hidden owners into view, enforce domestic revenue realization efforts, and tax the wealthiest according to what they truly own.
To date, almost 100 countries across the world have established central beneficial ownership registers, yet their effectiveness and the availability and accessibility of quality data remains very limited.
We urge member states to incorporate further transparency provisions, particularly under Article 15, including establishing high quality beneficial ownership registers of legal vehicles and assets with publicly available information about key elements and the necessary safeguards to protect sensitive information while not undermining the convention's objectives.
In addition, a global asset register is another transparency measure very much needed to enforce international tax cooperation.
This register shall support parties in knowing who ultimately owns high value assets, information often located in separate registries set up for diverse purposes.
It will ensure effective, fair, progressive, and efficient tax systems, including with respect to combating illicit financial flows and enable cross border data sharing to ensure everyone pays their fair share.
One year ago in Seville, the very same governments sitting here committed to strengthen their domestic beneficial ownership registers, to improve how they exchange the information between them, and to consider the feasibility and utility of a global beneficial ownership registry, one that could map the networks connecting companies, people, and assets.
Our ask is straightforward, deliver on the promise from Seville by concretely committing in this Framework Convention to bring beneficial ownership transparency and a global asset registry to life.
The question is no longer whether this can be done, but when we will do it.
Thank you.
Thank you, Austria, please.
Thank you, colleague.
We recognize that the collection and analysis of data constitutes an essential basis for evidence based policy making and informed decision making.
At the same time, we would welcome greater clarity regarding the nature and scope of the commitments envisioned under this provision.
The collection and management and analysis of data can entail significant administrative and resource implications, and Austria thinks it is important to clarify the process through which the categories of data to be collected will be determined and by whom such decisions will be taken.
Furthermore, for paragraph two, we think it should be redrafted to better express a high level principle rather than forming a separate legal basis.
We also echo the Singapore and think the suggestions raised by the distinguished delegate merit further discussions.
Thank you.
Thank you, China, please.
Thank you, colleague for giving me the floor regarding paragraph two.
We think the international cooperation on exchange of information or information sharing in tax matters is of great importance.
However, due consideration should be given to the action needs of state parties relevant legal constraints at both domestic and international levels.
The technological capacities and strict compliance with information protection requirements.
Thank you, Mr.
Colleag again.
Later, we will submit our written comments on this article.
All right.
Thank you.
I at least I think those of us who were in the intersectional meetings would remember that when we discussed this was agreed that we're not looking at taxpayer specific data or what we exchange information on, rather putting in systems that will help us to monitor and analyze what we had decided that if there's a need to provide any data for analysis or for reporting and other things, that data will be available.
So it's not looking in the sense of the traditional exchange of information, but more of on the work field.
So like reports with maybe might have to provide some SA scar reports on what has been done.
And those details are basically what is being looked at here.
Azerbijhan please.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Collett.
Azerbaijan supports database international tax cooperation.
In practice, our tax administrations frequently use international statistics for benchmarking purposes.
However, such data sometimes are often incomplete, outdated, or based on different methodologies and which limits their reliability and comparability.
We therefore suggest that article define the categories of data to be collected and establish common standards for their quality, completeness, regular updating, and comparability.
The term generic information should also be clarified and limited to aggregated and properly anonymized data.
Its collection and sharing should be subject to safeguards on confidentiality, data protection, secure transmission, and prevention of taxpayer identification.
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
Chia please.
Thank you, Mr.
Codes for giving me the floor.
Jack, I would like to state that for us as for Austria, evidence based and data driven policies are crucial.
However, we would also like to reiterate that the Framework Convention should not create unnecessary burden to states parties.
In relation to Article 15, we would like to note that we have to clarify how the article should work, who decides what data are necessary, and what is the scope of the article as the distinguished delegate of Austria mentioned.
You might also be open to discuss proposals made by the distinguished delegate of Singapore.
Thank you.
Thank you.
He that, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Cole.
I'm speaking on behalf of the Financial Tnparency Coalition, its member Eurodat and the civil society group coordinated by the Global Alliance for Tax Justice.
Article 15 outlines indeed the much needed data access of a successful Framework Convention to fulfill the ambition established by the terms of reference.
In this context, I'd like to highlight three reasons why it's important to provide public access to data as well.
First of all, investigative journalists, civil society and academia have conducted cross border investigations into beneficial owners in drawing on different registries and linked to numerous cases brought forward also by whistleblowers.
They have also examined the tax payments of large multinational corporations and uncovered the vast wealth of high net worth individuals.
Without access to public data, these debates would be conducted blindly and to a large extent they still are.
Secondly, public access also of data enables better policy making by everyone.
It informs public debate.
Aggregate revenue collection statistics are not sufficient to guide our policymaking.
This transparency also facilitates monitoring illicit financial flows, including tax avoidance and tax evasion, allowing estimates of illicit financial flows by sector, country, and trade partner.
Thirdly, publicly accessible data provides the most efficient pathway for governments and officials to access information.
They can first consult public data before initiating information exchanges that require official protocols and data access from other jurisdictions.
This approach also enables more targeted requests for non public data, which is typically more extensive and comprehensive.
Privacy arguments should not be used to prevent access and the right to protect private life doesn't apply to corporations.
In the case of beneficial owners of companies and assets, wide axes have proven to improve governance, the integrity of markets, prevent environmental crimes related to illicit financial flows and mobilize revenue.
Let's make this happen.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Lori, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Coleid.
We appreciate your explanation now of what kind of data this provision is intended to cover.
Nevertheless, like other delegates, we would appreciate even more details on what data and information this provision is envisioned to cover and under which terms and who and how it would be decided what information it would require.
Would also like some more information on which conventions or instruments, if any, has inspired this article so that we can better understand what it's intended to cover.
We note that even with your explanation that this is not intended to cover taxpayer specific information.
There is in the end of paragraph three, a clause that explains that it's not intended to disclose taxpayer specific information.
But Nevertheless, we think it's appropriate and necessary to implement the necessary safeguards protecting taxpayer information and respecting the confidentiality requirements of domestic law and international agreements.
I think here we would refer to the comments made by Singapore, China, and Austria and the amendments suggested by Singapore, but we will return with written comments also.
Thank you.
All right.
Thank you.
Okay.
Germany, you can come and then I'll come.
Germany, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Cole.
First, I would like to thank you for the draft provisions and the possibility to discuss them.
I would also to echo the latest intervention from Norway and the other interventions Norway was referring to.
We also have the impression that Article 15 and 16 overlap in terms of both the purpose and the measures they envisage.
Beyond that, we see some unclear overlaps also with other provisions.
For example, Article 16, Paragraph one addresses implementation issues that is also supposed to be covered our understanding by reviews pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3.
At the same time, implementation and its periodic assessment are already the subject matter of Article 14.
We believe that the respective scopes of these provisions could be defined more clearly.
As a general matter, we support evidence based international cooperation and the exchange of statistical and analytical information.
However, we consider it essential first and foremost, to provide legal certainty regarding the obligations arising under the Framework Convention and what state parties are expected to do in order to fulfill them before introducing reporting, monitoring, or peer review mechanisms.
In any event, review mechanism should focus on facilitating implementation rather than establishing compliance procedures.
Still less, should revenue activity serve to create normative standards.
Against this background, we are concerned by the statement in Article 15 paragraph two that the development of common definitions should be an objective of the analysis or revenues.
In all circumstances, the obligation under Article 15 and 16 should remain proportionate and should not create unnecessary or duplicative administrative burdens.
Any collection, maintenance, sharing and other forms of data processing of information must fully respect confidentiality requirements, taxpayer rights and applicable international data protection standards.
In this regards, the reference to confidentiality in paragraph three, Article 15 should be strengthened.
It should make clear that all confidentiality and data safeguard obligations contained in this instrument underlying the exchange of information continue to apply.
The mere anonymization alone is, in our view, not sufficient to replace those safeguards.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Okay.
Can you please.
Thank you, Colleague.
I'm speaking on behalf of the 54 member states of the African group and I will just make very general comments and observations with the written input to follow.
Combining the comments from Article 15 and 16, we mainly have questions and concerns and issues that we would want clarified across both the articles.
One of them being on more guidance and clarification on what is meant by international accepted professional standards.
What would this mean and what would be entailed by that phrase.
Um, again, when we say with a view to developing common definitions, standards, and methodologies, we have some questions there because.
Wow.
I think you can still hear me.
Kindergarten Okay.
Thank you.
With the phrase with a view to developing common definitions, standards, and methodologies, the question that comes up is, who is coming up with these common definitions? Should that be done by the conference of the parties or is it the subsidiary bodies or any two countries that are sharing information with each other because that would raise quite a few concerns.
Then there are also concerns around the scope of the information to be shared and whether this article, as well as the next one provides any clear safeguards in terms of the information that is being shared.
On Article 16, our view is that the article also needs to adopt clear language, especially since obligations are being placed on the state parties.
The issue around frequency and the format of the reports, I don't think that has been elaborated on and whether that frequency and format would be developed by the COP, or is it going to be developed by the state parties.
We would also want to see a provision that would allow the COP to consider arrangements that would assist developing countries to meet their obligations under both of these articles.
There should also be provisions around privacy and confidentiality of the information that is submitted by the state parties.
So there are quite a few concerns and issues that we clarify, but we are still reviewing these two and we'll be submitting written input on the same.
Thank you.
Okay.
Thank you.
I have a few members, but a quick one.
If we go to the terms of reference and look at, I think 13 other elements, we'll find out clearly that these two articles are listed there.
As I mentioned, this clarified a bit of what I mean, it came up in terms of reference and there was some rationale for it.
I don't remember all of it.
So once we have it there and we have comments on how we should structure it, it's good.
When the comments come on how we decide now, the structure is up to us all of us to decide how we structure it.
So these comments, we'll still continue to work together as the comments come and then we can structure it in a way that when we are doing the next review, it will help all of us.
Maia, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Nigeria supports fully the comments and statement that have been read out by the delegate of Kenya on behalf of the 54 African states.
Then in addition, we also want to make this few observations also.
Number one is in respect of clarity because Mr.
Chair, you have to intervene to explain what the article speaks to or what it's all about.
That give indication that the article 0N its own as expressly construuted is not clear.
So, we may need to provide more clarity so that any person implementing or that wish to implement this convention will clearly understand what Article 15 is about, the scope and the expectation.
So, we may need to look at putting some wordings that will show clearly what the objective of that article is so that it's clear the nature of information to be shared and how it will be shared.
Then in paragraph two, in addition to the comments on the developer of common definition as raised by the delegate of CAA on behalf of the African group, we also observed that the We also observe that some provisions there may also not declare, particularly reference to agreements.
It says in the second to last paragraph it says in the implementation of such agreements, what agreements are we referring to here? Do we mean the convention and its protocol? If that is what is meant, then we have to take out such agreement and make reference to the convention and its protocol.
Then in paragraph three, in addition to the comments by the Kan delegate with respect to the professional standard, we also think the the last line where it talks about anonymized information.
The way it is drafted I think is the intention is that information will be anonymized.
But the way it is drafted is actually saying information will not be anonymized.
Because if you read, it says, H shall ensure that it will not disclose or it will not anonymize because when we put the null before verb, it goes before the first verb and it goes before the second verb, which is anonymized.
I know that's not the intention, but the way it is placed now is saying it will not be anonymized, so we need to have to correct that.
Thank you.
Saudi Arabia, please.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr.
Cold.
Saudi Arabia notes the data collection and review provisions in Article 15 and 16.
On Article 15, we support the confidentiality safeguard in paragraph three, but we know that it is currently anchored only to information protected for Article 11.
And we wanted to reiterate the similar comment we made on the exchange of information article that confidentiality and data protection safeguards should not be siloed to a specific provision, but it should apply as a standing principle to the whole and across the convention.
Um, and we would also ask for clarification for the scope of paragraph two, to ensure that sharing of standards and methodologies does not extend beyond cooperative and non prescriptive nature.
And on Article 16, we support the principle of equal footing, in paragraph three.
But we agree with the comments made by the Kenya delegate that this needs further clarity, specifically the reporting requirement in paragraph one, as it reads as shall be required by the conference of the state parties, and it can be read as an open ended, um, wording.
We ask that the reporting requirements be clearly scoped so that the review process do not create complex standards or undue administrative burden, particularly for developing countries.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Colombia, please.
When I started it.
Good afternoon to everyone.
Thank you to the co facilitator and the Bureau.
We in Columbia would like to echo some of the comments we heard on Article 15.
We believe that there's still elements that need to be defined to define the scope of the obligations envisioned.
We consider that it's still not possible to determine specifically their eventual operational, technical, and financial implications, and we consider it necessary to obtain greater clarification on the objectives and the results that we're seeking to obtain in this provision as well as maintain a the instruments that will be included to ensure a constant monitoring and understand their impact of these requirements and the characteristics that will involve their implementation for states.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Afghanion please.
Thank you, colleague, for giving us the floor.
The African Union aligns itself with a statement made by Kenya on behalf of the Africa group and the statements made by Nigeria and the earlier intervention by India.
We agree with the Africa group that Articles 15 and 16 need further interrogation and are happy to look at it and provide written comments to enable the rewriting of both articles.
I submit.
Thank you, Chair.
Thank you.
Dia Yen Foundation.
Thank you, co lead.
I have the honor to deliver this intervention on behalf of the financing for Development Children and Youth constituency for the major group for Children and Youth.
Children and Youth welcome the recognition that reliable statistical and research data are necessary for the effective formulation, implementation, and evaluation of international tax policies.
Data collected on this article should help states assess tax base erosion, revenue mobilization, compliance costs, distribution effects, and the practical implementation of convention and its protocols.
Regarding paragraph one, we encourage the development of national data strategies to identify priority indicators, responsible institutions, reporting intervals, data quality standards, and resource requirements.
These strategies should promote coordination among tax administrations, customs authorities, fairness ministries, statistical offices, and other relevant bodies.
Data should be sufficiently detailed to support meaningful analysis while remaining proportionate to administrative capacity.
Where feasible and legally permissible aggregate data could be dis aggregated by jurisdiction, sector, enterprise size, income category, age, gender, and other relevant factors.
This could help states assess how international tax policies affect small and medium sized enterprises, young entrepreneurs, employment, public revenues, and different population groups.
Regarding paragraph two, the development of common definitions, standards, and methodologies is essential for comparability.
State parties should agree on standardized metadata, reporting periods, valuation methods, classification systems, and procedures for addressing incomplete or inconsistent data.
Shared information should include explanations of methodology and limitations so that statistics are not interpreted outside their proper context.
Data sharing arrangements should also support interperability, This may require common technical formats, secure transmission standards, reliable identifiers, data validation procedures and protocols for correcting inaccurate information.
Regional organizations can play an important role in adapting common standards to regional needs and supporting countries with limited statistical capacity.
Regarding paragraph three, we support compliance with internationally accepted professional standards, including relevance, accuracy, timeliness, impartiality, and statistical confidentiality.
We encourage clarification of the final sentence so that taxpayer specific information is not disclosed unless it has been effectively anonymized or aggregated in accordance with an agreed standard.
Anonymozation should include an assessment of rent re identification risks, particularly where datasets contain rear attributes or may combine with other information.
Measures could include data minimization, aggregation thresholds, suppression of small cells, access controls, secure research environments, retention limits, and procedures for responding to data breaches.
The convention should also distinguish clearly between generic statistical data statistical information shared under Article 5 and taxpayer specific information exchange under Article 11.
This distinction would strengthen legal certainty and ensure that each category is subject to appropriate authorization and confidentiality safeguards.
Some countries may require assistance with statistical infrastructure, secure data systems, analytical software, methodological training, and the retention of qualified personnel.
Reporting obligations should be phased and proportionate so that they do not divert limited resources from core tax administration functions.
Children and youth support data governance that is standardized, interoperable, secure, and capable of measuring the conventions, long term development and intergenerational effects.
Thank you.
Brazil, please.
Thank you, colleague.
We supported drafting.
I think there are some maybe minor tweaks to be made, but all in all, I think it reflects basically the practice that we already have.
Brazil very often responds to it, several of those requests and inquiries, the OECD as well.
Uh, so it's quite common.
It's common practice.
Maybe in the second paragraph, instead of saying shall share with each other.
I'm not sure that it's the correct drafting.
It should be shall share or will share.
In the third paragraph about the ambiguity or anonymized information.
We could change the orders.
We could put anonymized information and uh, we will not disclose any taxpayer information, any specific taxpayer information that would be protected by Article 11, that can also solve the issue of the ambiguity.
But, in essence, we support, we think that it's adaptable and, uh, good enough, how to proceed.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Are, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Colet.
Just a short intervention to say that we echo the comments made by the delegates from Austria, Cechia, Norway, and Germany, and on Article 15, we are open to exploring the suggestions made by the distinguished delegate of Singapore.
Thank you.
TJ, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Khalid.
I speak on behalf of the Global Alliance for Tax Justice and the wider civil society group here with us.
We know that the terms of reference specify that the convention should establish an inclusive, fair, transparent, efficient, equitable and effective international tax system for sustainable development.
We believe that Article 16 is very important, especially in relation to the point of ensuring that the international tax system is effective.
In that context, we would like to flag two issues that we believe can undermine the effectiveness of the system.
The first relate to what you might call non cooperative jurisdiction, meaning countries that do not sign on the future Convention on international tax cooperation.
While we call for all countries to engage and cooperate, we are aware of the risk that some countries will not.
We know that the current draft lacks provisions that would allow the parter to the convention to take action to protect their tax system and the convention itself from being undermined by non cooperative jurisdiction.
The second issue concerns the case where a party to the convention fails to comply with its obligation.
We note that the current draft doesn't include any provisions to promote and ensure compliance.
With that in mind, we would like to invite the INC to consider including this issue in Article 16.
There are long standing precedents in several UN treaties that established implementation and compliance procedure or mechanisms.
These are non adverse DO with the primary objective of ensuring effective implementation in good faith of the treaty concerned.
For example, the Montreal Protocol of substance that deplete the ozone layer established a compliance mechanism.
The Kyoto Protocols Compliance Committee ensures party meet their greenhouse gas reduction and reporting targets with two specialized operational branches, the facilitative branch, enforcement branch.
The Paris Agreement constitutes an implementation and compliance committee to facilitate the implementation of and compliance with the agreement's provisions.
The BB&G Agreement that entered into force in January 2026 is the latest UN treaty to have established an implementation and compliance committee.
I thank you.
Thank you.
UAE, please.
Thank you, colleague.
We support the objectives of Article 15 and 16.
However, like other speakers, we would welcome greater clarity on the specific data contemplated under Article 15 to ensure a common understanding among state parties.
We also believe that any data collection, reporting, review, or verification requirements should not create additional administrative burdens for tax administrations and should make use of existing processes where possible.
We align ourselves with Singapore's intervention and agree that these provisions should not compromise taxpayer audit, compliance activities, or risk based methodologies employed by tax administrations.
We therefore support the proposal put forward by Singapore.
Thank you, colleague.
Thank you.
Okay.
That's good.
We are making progress.
Thank you all for your comments on these two articles.
We will await the written comments also to enable us to continue the work.
With that, I believe we can move on to Article 17, that's the Secretariat.
Again, we have expressed views on this three in the sessions as to the importance of the Secretariat and the work of the Secretariat.
So welcome comments on this article, please.
All right.
Thank you.
I think we can move on since we don't have any comments on the Secretariat, we can move to financial resources.
Article 18.
That's fine.
Article 19, please.
Uh huh.
No, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Cold.
And as we have now moved on to Part five, I would like to take the opportunity to make a more broader comment on Part four and the institutional arrangements.
We think it's important for us to understand from which conventions or instruments, if any, the language of these provisions in Part four and five are drawn upon.
This is important not only to ensure consistency with UM practice and also to consider whether those provisions, if any, are taken from other instruments that are designed for conventions with different subject matters are also suitable for the provisions in this convention.
So Um, I think going forward, we would like you to specifically indicate where you have drawn these different provisions from, if any, that would help us in assessing the content of these provisions further.
Thank you.
One on that.
I've made this statement several times and it seems I still have to make it.
Everything we have here is drawn from the discussions we've had in the intersectional sessions or earlier sessions.
The wording ism from any particular convention.
There might have been references on the floor to, this is in this convention, we are bringing it from here.
It all member states have said and we've looked at in the intersectional sessions and the earlier sessions that is here.
Is an amalgamation or cooperation or integration or whatever you call it consolidation of all our comments that were being given.
Thank you.
Brazil, please.
Thank you again.
Colleague, we have a general feeling, not so much of the proposals and how to solve the problem that issue.
We have the impression in our discussions in Brazil that the wording of the paragraph of Article 18 in the financial resources, I think it was still not clear enough how, whether we will guarantee there will be sufficient resources and whether the costs will be properly shared and that it is the responsibility of the countries to meet the budget to fund the activities of the convention.
We had prepared one additional paragraph.
I'm not fully sure that it's necessary or that it cannot be redrafted, but it's an orientation.
I think that we need to put more details into that article to guarantee that an obligation that states will directly have access to, uh, to the funds necessary and to receive a specific and separate, uh, view to fund the activities of the convention.
We don't want it to go to be mixed with the whole budget of the UN.
We think that it will not guarantee the predictability of the whole, uh, functioning of the convention and of the staff and the subsidiary bodies that will be designed.
We had thought preliminary, something along these lines.
In paragraph four, we would say that the administrative budget of the conference of the parties or of the convention, whatever, Its subsidiary bodies and its permanent Secretariat adopted by consensus by the conference will be funded from regular contributions by the states parties based on the United United Nations scales of assessment, as well as from voluntary contributions and additional resources.
We understood that it would guarantee that there will be more transparency and accountability of the states to fund directly the activities of the convention.
Thank you.
Thank you, United Kingdom, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Colad.
As we've gone through quite quickly, I would say that I actually shared my colleague from Brazil's question about the nature of the funding.
We couldn't quite tell whether this was intended to become from the UN regular budget or from the parties, clarification there would be helpful anyway.
But Article 19, an amendment.
We, of course, recognize that amendment procedures have an established basis in framework convention.
Since we were on on 18, let's finish 18 first.
Let's be sure nobody has anything else on 18.
Sorry, I thought you moved to 1919, but I will stop from going to 19 because people started commenting on 18.
I just want to be sure that there's nothing else on 18 before we go to 19.
We'll come back to you later, but let's just be sure.
All right.
Then Nigeria and Kenya.
Thank you, Chair.
I will go to 17 first.
If you if you will indulge me, Mr.
Chair, So quickly, paragraph 33c says, Pre reports on its activity and present them to the conference and compile and transmit.
I want to believe the conference we are referring to here is a conference of the parties, the COP, and if so, I think I would need to clarify that.
Same thing in three D, which talks about providing information.
I think we need clarity on the information we are referring to here.
Then if I can now go to Article 18, On Article 18, Nigeria will also support the statement released by our colleagues from Brazil in respect of funding because looking at the whole Article 18, there's no provision on how members are going to fund the activities of the convention.
So I think we need clarity on this, and if the expectation is that members are going to fund it, then we need a paragraph to be included to clearly specify how members are going to provide funding for the convention.
Then lastly, in paragraph three, He said the conference of the state parties in its first session shall review existing and potential sources and mechanism of assistance based on the study conducted by the sectariat.
So looking at it, it seems the Secretariat will have been in existence and be able to conduct a study before we have the COP.
Is this the expectation? I think I just seeking clarity in that aspect.
Thank you.
Generally, the Secretariat would sort of, as it suggests, will be there before the COP will have its first meeting.
They'll be required to do some work in the background.
So as soon as the enough people who have deposited in the things are supposed to start, the Secretariat comes in, set up by the Secretary-General has been mentioned in that and then they start working on because they will have to do somewhere.
So basically, that's the general idea.
Can you please? Thank you, colleague.
I'll also take us back to Article 17 on the Secretariat and make comments on behalf of the Africa group.
The Africa Group's position is that this article requires elaboration to make the mandate of the Secretariat clear to ensure that the implementation of the Framework Convention is going to go in accordance with what is intended.
Under paragraph one, this article simply refers to the COP making arrangements for the functioning of the Secretariat.
There is no clear language on when the Secretariat will actually commence its work.
Given the technical nature of international taxation, the Secretariat needs to be designated or inaugurated at the first meeting of the COP to enhance the implementation of the Framework Convention and its protocols.
We see this clear language in quite a number of many similar instruments and framework conventions.
Under paragraph two, which provides for the functions of the Secretariat, we also believe that these functions need to be enhanced to include functions like facilitating communication, documentation, and implementation measures.
The Secretariat also needs to provide secretarial services not only to itself, but also to other organs like the COP, the subsidiary bodies, and technical working groups, and also providing research support.
The Secretariat should also serve as the institutional mechanism for capacity building and technical assistance in line with the relevant articles under the Framework Convention until such a time as the COP may establish other organs to undertake these functions.
The Secretariat would also need to provide assistance to the parties, especially developing countries in compiling and submitting the information that is required of them under the Framework Convention.
We would also call for a provision under this article to ensure that there's going to be equal and balanced representation from the regions of the UN to enhance inclusivity, which is a key pillar of this Framework Convention.
Colleague, without taking us back to the article 0N subsidiary bodies, the Africa group just wanted to say that it is important to know that we submitted written input on an additional article that would provide for a technical advisory committee, and we raised that because from the floor, we've heard quite a number of comments that it would be important to make reference to the UN Tax Committee and how this work would be relate to that committee.
The Africa group drafted a proposed article 0N a technical advisory committee, which would answer quite a number of these questions and concerns.
Um, this committee would be comprised of 25 tax experts, five from each of the UN regions.
Among the functions of this committee, it would provide technical advice, guidance, and strategic direction for the COP, the Secretariat, and the subsidiary bodies, and any other technical working groups.
The committee would also assist the COP in assessment and review of the effective implementation of the Framework Convention and its protocols.
It would also finalize or approve technical reports from the subsidiary bodies, ensure that the technical work under the Framework Convention is evidence based, inclusive, coordinated, and consistent with each other and any other such functions as the COP may direct.
The Africa group will resubmit its proposal and its written input.
Thank you.
I'm sorry, but I have to intervene here, Kurd.
But this way we are working in an organized way and once we move forward from any article, it's difficult.
We moved from 17 and 18 and we are in 19.
Then now we're receiving comments on 17 and 18.
Now we're going to open 17 and 18 for any comments because we need to move in an organized way because of our colleagues here and also our colleagues who are following us from the website, so they will get confused in which article we are commending.
So now we're going to open again the floor for comments on 17 and 18 before we move.
So we give another chance for it.
But please, I'm going to ask everyone to concentrate and once we open any article, if you would like to comment, take the chance once we move forward, then you have the opportunity to provide written comments later on.
So again, excuse me, Mr.
Koury for the interruption, but now we are opening 17 and 18 for any comments.
Thank you, I stated that Ken after graduated on 18, then continue before you round.
So microphone to Kenya, please to finish on Okay.
You are done with 17 and 18.
No, that was on 17.
And then you are 18.
Just continue.
So go ahead.
I'll allow other members.
I'll come back on 18.
So we are on 17 and 18 Corda.
Thank you very much, co lead.
I had indeed requested the floor to comment on Article 17 and 18.
We would like to unreservedly support the remarks made by Kenya on Article 17.
As regards Article 18 on the financial resources.
This article is particularly important for our country.
Like other delegations, we think that this article is deserving of a great deal more precision in fact.
Reading a close reading of Article 18 as proposed here is almost identical to Article 26 of the anti tobacco legislation.
There it establishes obligations to the states parties as adopted in the Framework Convention of the WHO.
Our general observation Before we send in any written comments that will be more detailed, our general remarks relate to Article 18 here and on this, it is the lack of predictability of the financing of the activities of the COP that is at issue.
It would seem that this article is going to provide funding on a voluntary basis without an independent source of funding from states according to their capabilities.
No further precision is given on that and we believe that this type of Financing represents a risk in terms of the effectiveness and functioning of the bodies that are going to be set up.
Co lead, as I said earlier, we will be submitting more detailed written remarks on this article later on.
Thank you.
Thank you, Germany, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Colet.
In the same vein as the UK and Brazil, we would appreciate more clarity whether Article 18 and I start my intervention on Article 18 is about funding from the regular budget or rather other funding mechanisms.
Concerning the financial resources, according to this article, we support voluntary capacity building efforts with voluntary financial and material assistance subject to national priorities and policies.
In our view, the convention should not establish mandatory financial commitments or create expectations regarding new international funding mechanisms.
See Article 18 closely related to Article 17, which is why I would continue with committing on Article 17.
Concerning the Secretariat, it is in our important first to emphasize that the Secretariat is a prerequisite for any future success of the Framework Convention and the work that is being conducted under the Framework Convention.
In our review We support a lean Secretariat with exclusively technical and administrative functions, and in case assessed contributions should be requested, Rule 153 of the UN rules of procedure has to be strictly respected.
Thank you, Mr.
Colit.
Singapore, please.
Thank you, Colley.
Hearing the concerns of other member states, we have two suggestions on Article 17.
First, we think it will be useful to clarify the scope of reports and activities in paragraph three C by adding an upon request qualifier at the start of paragraph three C, similar to the language already used in paragraph three D.
This will ensure that the COP retains appropriate oversight and direction over these reports.
Second, we will suggest replacing paragraph four D with language drawn from Article 54 paragraph four C of the BBNG Agreement, which reads, Circulate information relating to the implementation of this convention in a timely manner, including making decisions of the conference of the states parties publicly available and transmitting them to all parties.
We think this formulation better ensures timely and transparent information flow and provides sufficient lead time for state parties to act on decisions made.
Thank you.
Thank you, the Kom of the Netherlands.
Thank you, colleagues.
Listening to some of the colleagues and some of the points that have been raised, I just wanted to share an observation that I had.
I find personally the clarifying questions by many of our colleagues extremely helpful, such as the clarifying questions from our Norwegian colleagues as well.
Um, there seems to be text in this framework convention that is not clear where this text is coming from, and we keep hearing that the text is a compilation of the comments that have been made during the intercessal work.
However, it seems to me that there is a discrepancy of the interpretation or how some delegates have perceived these intercessional meetings because we have participated in all the intersessional meetings and, um, the majority of the delegates that are raising questions here on the floor that's the majority that participated in the intersectional sessions.
Therefore, I think that I just wanted to make the point that the clarifying questions are, in our view valid and need answering and we need to get a common understanding of what it is that we're actually meaning here.
For example, for us, some language in Article 17 and 18 is also not clear.
Um, I will just give one example, what means all potential and existing resources should be mobilized.
What does this mean in practice? I would really want to ask some clarifications on the questions that are being raised.
Thank you.
France, please.
Thank you, Cole.
As regards Article 17 and the functions of the secretary I wish to align with the words of the German delegate as regards to the lean approach and the technical role that should be at the heart of the Secretariat support functions.
This is something that we highlighted in previous days with other delegations and I think it is important for this to be reflected for the future.
As regards Article 18, we also believe that the budget is a crucial part of this and we share the views broadly, it's best that we need more clarity here as indicated by other delegations as well.
Our position is that it is appropriate to provide funding on a voluntary basis.
Thank you.
Church please.
Thank you, Mr.
Coley for giving me the floor.
I just very quickly wanted to say that we are supportive of the intervention of the distinguished delegate of Germany in its entirety and also for the EU member states and especially if you would like to point out the relevant comments made by the distinguished delegate of the Kingdom of Netherlands.
Thank you.
Indonesia, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Coley.
On Article 17, Indonesia support Kenya regarding the transition from the interim raniman to a permanent or dedicated Secretariat.
And with respect to paragraph three A, initial also suggests broadening the Secretariat function since this convention envisage the establishment of subsidiary bodies, the Secretariat should not only assist the conference of the state parties, but also support the subsidiary bodies in the carrying out their respective functions.
We therefore propose that Spar A be revised to refer to assisting the conference of the state parties and any subsidiary bodies established under this convention.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Estonia, please.
Thank you.
I would also like to support the comments made by Germany and the Kingdom of Netherlands.
Thank you.
Thank you, Lutingbd.
Thank you, Mr.
Colit.
Article 18 currently speaks about financial resources and includes the option of establishing a financial mechanism in the future.
However, we wanted to flag the option of establishing a financial mechanism directly under the convention, which can then be further developed by the Cp.
We believe that it is quite clear that the convention will need a financial mechanism, not least to fund the Secretariat and the subsidiary bodies of the convention.
Having a mechanism as opposed to relying on uncoordinated contributions would give the COP a direct role in relation to deciding how resources should be spent and would, for example, prevent contributions get earmarked to specific and limited purposes or projects.
We would like to highlight that there are many examples of UN conventions that include financial mechanisms, including, for example, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Biodiversity Convention, and the BBNGJ.
We also want to flag that in some cases, such as the UN Framework Convention on climate change, the financial mechanism also includes the issue of technology transfer, which seems highly relevant for the UN Tax Convention.
Thank you, sir.
Thank you.
Can you please? Thank you, colleague.
I make this submission on behalf of the 54 member states of the African group.
Under Article 18, we appreciate the inclusion of this article, but we believe that it lacks clarity on how the article will actually enhance and support the effective implementation of the Framework Convention and its protocols in the current drafting.
We support the comments calling for the establishment of a mechanism on financial resources other than what the current draft language is providing for.
Under paragraph two, we believe that this language is also very vague around the sourcing of funds by simply requiring member states to promote utilization of various channels to provide funding.
We believe that this will not support the implementation of this Framework Convention.
Africa group will submit draft language creating an obligation on the conference of the parties to source financial resources from various channels.
This will include free donation from member states, contribution from parties following a scheme of contribution that will be drawn up by the conference of the parties, grants or concessional financing, and other sources as the COP may from time to time determine.
We also believe that countries should be at liberty to contribute anything that's going to be higher than what the previous paragraph is going to provide for, and the mechanism should also ensure that there is regional balanced representation from the UN regions.
As stated, we will provide written input on this article.
Thank you.
Thank you.
DMUN Foundation, please.
Thank you, co lead.
I have the honor to deliver this intervention on behalf of the financing Development constituency for Children and Youth of the major group for Children and Youth on Article 17.
We take note of the proposed establishment of a Secretariat to support the conference of the states parties and the implementation of the convention and its protocols.
Regarding paragraph one, the arrangements adopted at the first meeting of the conference could clarify the Secretariat mandate.
Organizational structure, staffing, budget, reporting responsibilities, and relationship with subsidiary bodies.
These arrangements could also identify the technical, legal, statistical, and administrative expertise required to perform its functions.
The interim arrangements under paragraph two could include a transition plan covering the management and transferred documents, records, financial responsibilities, information systems, and pending requests once the permanent Secretariat begins its work.
Regarding paragraphs 3 A and three B, the Secretariat could support effective participation by circulating agendas and documentation sufficiently in advance, providing services in the official languages of the United Nations and maintaining clear procedures for meetings of the conference and its subsidiary bodies.
Under paragraph three C, reports could use consistent formats and clearly identify their sources, methodologies, and any limitations in the information presented.
The Secretariat could maintain an accessible respiratory of official documents subject to applicable confidentiality, data protection, and information security requirements.
Regarding paragraph three D, assistance provided in states parties upon request could include reporting templates, technical guidance, and support for compiling relevant information.
Such assistance could remain procedural and should respect the responsibility of each state party for the content of its submissions.
Coordination under paragraph three E could help identify relevant work undertaken by international and regional organizations, reduce unnecessary duplication and improve the exchange of technical knowledge.
The scope and purpose of coordination arrangements should be reported to the conference of the states parties.
Regarding paragraph three F, administrative and contractual agreements should be governed by applicable financial procurement, audit, and conflict of interest procedures.
Regular reporting on the Secretariats activities and expenditures would support oversight by states parties.
Finally, any additional functions assigned under paragraph three G could be accomplished by a clear mandate, reporting line, time frame, and assessment of the resources required.
This would help ensure that additional responsibilities remain consistent with decisions of the conference.
The major group for Children and Youth encourages arrangements that allow the Secretariat to perform its functions consistently, transparently, and effectively while remaining accountable to the conference of the states parties.
Thank you, Cole.
Thank you.
Republic of Korea, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Collet for giving me the floor.
I will be brief.
In general, we align with the views expressed by distinguished delegate from Germany, France, and other previous speakers.
Regarding Article 17, we believe that the role of the Secretariat should remain primarily focused on providing technical and administrative support to the implementation of this convention.
Regarding Article 18, financial resources, we share the view expressed by previous speakers as well that greater clarity is needed on the current draft.
We also wish to underline the importance of maintaining voluntary funding arrangements.
Thank you very much.
Ireland, please.
Thank you, Korea.
Thank you, Mr.
Colad.
Just to flag that we support comments made and the clarifying questions posed by Norway and the Netherlands.
We echo the comments of Germany and France on the role of the Secretariat in Article 17.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Sig, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Kf Silt.
I would echo the comments of the African group made by Kenya.
Just a few comments in national capacity.
First of all, in paragraph one, which mentions both public and private financing.
I would like to have some information on the contribution of private financing.
Are we talking about multinational corporations that will have to pay part of the tax? This is important to avoid any conflict of interest as far as paragraph three, which describes the missions of the conference of the states parties which will need to review existing financing based on a study conducted by the Secretary.
I think this part regarding the functions of the Secretary should be moved to Article 13 regarding what is expected of the COP.
Its presence here is superfluous to my mind.
Thank you.
Thank you.
A quick one on Sweden, please.
I would just want to align with the comments made by Norway, Netherlands, Germany and France on Article 17 and 18.
Thank you.
Thank you.
There have been some questions relating to the budget and financial resources and once again, and I Michael Germany also referred to Rule 153.
We have the African Union afterwards with the Secretariat will give us some update on that.
Afghan Union, please.
Thank you, colleague.
Very quickly, we would just like to align ourselves with the comments made by Kenya on behalf of the African group and the comments made by Côte D'ivoire and Senegal.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr.
Cooley.
Good afternoon, Excellencies, distinguished delegates.
In response to questions by Brazil, UK, Germany, France, Sweden, and others on use of the regular budget, just to confirm, as was the case this morning, that the matters that you're discussing this afternoon are for you for member states to determine, not for the Secretariat.
As you've pointed out, it's important that your intention in this regard is stated clearly in the convention and that there is no ambiguity.
Indeed, as the representative of Germany points out, in accordance with the rules of procedure of the General Assembly by which this committee is bound, Rule 153 provides that no resolution involving expenditure shall be recommended by a committee for approval by the General Assembly unless it is accompanied by an estimate of expenditures prepared by the Secretary-General.
Also provides that no resolution in respect of which expenditures are anticipated by the Secretary-General shall be voted by the General Assembly until such time that the Fifth committee has had an opportunity of stating the effect of the proposal upon the budget estimates of the United Nations.
I concrete terms, when the committee will formally consider the proposals before it, that is, at the end of this process, once the committee concludes its substantive work, the Secretariat will advise on any program budget implications entailed by any of the committee's proposals, that is, implications for the regular budget of the United Nations.
Such an assessment is made on the basis of the text on the basis of the proposals before the committee and on the basis of the intent of member states in this regard.
This applies to any of the articles in Part four entitled Institutional arrangements that you've been discussing this afternoon, but it applies also to the convention protocols and any of the articles contained therein as a whole.
Thank you, Mr.
Cold.
Thank you, Secretariat.
Before we go to the next article, I think we can take a ten minute break and then come back.
Thank you.
I Thank you.
I back up.
Thank Wednesday.
Thank you.
Please set it down so we can continue.
Okay, sir.
Thank you.
Welcome back from the break.
We want to move to Part five, which is the final provisions.
I want to start with Article 19, which is amendments to the convention, sorry.
Any comments? Any comments over here? Changes.
Ch Ch, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Corley for giving me the floor.
We didn't want to risk the confusion again, so we decided to break the ice.
Checky I would like to flag that we consider this provision to be crucial to the proper functioning of the Framework Convention.
While saying that, we would like to know that we should look at the other framework conventions for our inspiration on how to approach this article, such as Article 0F the VBNJ, so we stick as much possible to the agreed language as recorded earlier today by the distinguished delegate of Sweden.
As regards paragraph two, it is a minor point, but we want to flag that the provision uses the term ordinary session of the Conference of Parties.
This language would acknowledge that there might be extraordinary sessions of the Conference of Parties, as you mentioned earlier, vis-à-vis to Article 13.
In relation to paragraph three, we would suggest that in line of our general position, any amendment should be adopted by consensus.
However, subject to this caveat if the text keeps the current wording, we believe that the framework convention has to clarify when all efforts to reach consensus have been exhausted.
In addition, we find the current drafting of paragraphs 3 and 4 clunky in relation to how the agreements and acceptance are done, and we believe that we should streamline the wording by looking at other framework conventions such as the BBNJ.
Thank you.
Thank you, United Kingdom, please.
Thanks, Mr.
Colead.
I guess we'll finally get back to the intervention which started us going back to 2017 and 2018, so I'll try and make that now.
Thanks very much for the drafting around the article 0N amendment procedures.
We of course, recognize that they have an established basis in framework conventions, and so it's helpful to get the drafting now on this.
We did want to highlight that given the sensitivity of tax, tax obligations are central to sovereign governance and interact directly with domestic law and an extensive network of bilateral treaties, we do have concerns about the scope of amendment proposed, particularly as our colleague from S has just mentioned, the fallback around majority voting.
We don't think that instruments such as the UNFCCDC or UCAC provide an appropriate precedent in this context, particularly because amendments to a tax convention have direct implications for domestic taxing rights and existing bilateral or multilateral arrangements.
Tax sovereignty is an issue of broad importance to all states.
This direction of travel is concerning for the UK and could ultimately constrain wide participation in any framework convention, and we continue to consider consensus as the right model for decisions on tax.
Thank you.
Austria, please.
Thank you, colleague, for the opportunity to come in.
First of all, we would like to echo Norway on their comment on clarity on which bases are used, where drafts are coming from.
A convention in case they were inspired by other conventions.
We think that could provide more clarity for discussions moving forward.
Furthermore, we'd like to echo what our distinguished delegates from Checha and the UK have just mentioned regarding Article 19.
Thank you.
Thank you, Singapore, please.
Thank you, Cole.
We appreciate the inclusion of a decision making rule for amendments, and we think this is a useful addition.
That said, we were wondering why such a rule is proposed specifically for this article, but not for other matters that may also require decision making, such as the rules of procedure or the financial rules of the COP.
We raised this in the spirit of ensuring consistency across the framework convention.
In a similar vein, we would like to reiterate our earlier suggestion for the COP article to incorporate Article Article 47, Paragraph four and five of BBNG.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Any more interventions on 20? Let's know that if we move to the next article, we are not coming back.
Can you please? Thank you, colleague.
The Africa Group will submit written input elaborating its position on this article.
However, we would want to retain our support for adoption of simple majority vote in this article and also specify that only parties to a protocol should be able to participate in the adoption of amendments to those protocols.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Berin, please.
Thank you.
We would like to echo what the distinguished delegate of Norway said before regarding choices that are made for the text and then also echo what the distinguished delegate of the Czech Republic and Austria said before us.
We have a specific question also on Article 19 where it says that instruments of acceptance entered into force for those parties that having accepted the amendment on the 90th day after the date of receipt, It's like in paragraph four.
So the fact there it's only referring to accept it.
But if you also look at other conventions and it always says parties ratifying, approving, or accepting them.
I just wonder what is the difference between what do we have to do to accept them and why is it in other instances referred to as ratified, approved, or accepted.
Thank you.
For the clarification, and sorry, if it is something that is clear to everyone else, but it's not clear to me.
We'll come to it in a minute.
Israel, please.
Thank you, Chair.
We want to echo what No said regarding the origin of the text and regarding Article 19, we want to echo Austria, UK, and Czech and we are asking for consensus if something on a treaty that we are already signed to to change something in such a convention, we ask for consensus.
Thank you.
Thank you, Nigeria, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
For us in Nigeria, we wish to support the comments by a Kayan delegate on behalf of the 54 African countries.
Number one is to say that as earlier indicated, when we're discussing Article 13, we support a simple majority.
So in that instance, when there is amendment, that amendment should see through by simple majority.
Then secondly, for protocol, when the protocol is being amended, then the parties that should be able to vote in respect of that amendment or that should be able to participate in decision making in respect of that amendment should be limited to parties that are a member of that protocol.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Okay.
I don't see any further requests for the floor, so Brazil, please.
Okay.
Could be the last moment.
Reacting to the question of consensus here.
If the approval of the convention will not be by consensus, I don't see the reason why it should be by consensus to amend it.
I am not sure how the situation actually do for the approval of the convention in the quorum.
But I don't see the reason to be by consensus, any amendment and to be sure and it's clarified here as well, if I recall it, it's also in the Vienna Convention, I An amendment, it's only valid for those that approved it.
So I don't see so much concern in relation to the consensus.
If the parties that have not approved the amendment, then they will not be bound by it.
It's just that it weakens the concern in my point of view for the consensus for the amendment.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Alan, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Coley.
Just a short one to say that we echo our colleagues from the UK and C out.
Thank you.
Thank you, Azbijan.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Collet.
We consider that consensus should remain the preferred method for adopting amendments, particularly where amendment may create new substantive tax obligation for state parties.
If consensus cannot be reached, we suggest requiring at least a two thirds majority of states parties present and voting subject to existence of appropriate minimum participation requirement.
Article should also clearly provide that amendments will bind only those states party have formally accepted it in accordance with their domestic procedures.
It should not affect the rights and obligations of state parties that have not accepted it.
Thank you.
African Union, please.
Thank you, colleague.
We support the intervention by Kenya on behalf of the Africa group and the intervention also made by Nigeria and we wish to emphasize that voting mechanism should be by simple majority and amendments to this particular article should be limited to the parties to the protocol.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Come on, please.
May I please.
Thank you very much, Coley for g me the floor.
I support the position presented by Kenya on behalf of the African group.
I would like perhaps additionally pose a question, sorry, as regards L two of this Article 19, Paragraph two, states that the adoption and review of amendments to the convention would be done at an ordinary session of the Conference of States parties.
This would be as regards a change to the foundational text Because the framework is one of the most important documents.
This sets the general framework, commits parties and perhaps this should be done at a special session rather than an ordinary session.
The mention here, the reference to an ordinary session would suggest that there are potentially also special sessions.
If That would be the logic if there are ordinary sessions and there could potentially be special sessions, and so it would be worth specifying what the remit of each particular type of session is, and then the matter of the amendments to the convention should fall under the special session so that we do not make changes to a framework convention too complex.
Thank you.
Thank you.
I Okay.
I think now we can move to Article 20 relation with protocols.
Again, it's open for comments.
Sorry.
Are you ready? Yeah.
Secretary will come in before I go.
Thank you so much, Mr.
Coley, and then to the question of the distinguished representative of Belgium, just to confirm that in order for a state to become a party to a multilateral treaty, the state must demonstrate through a concrete act its willingness to undertake the legal rights and obligations contained in the treaty.
It must express its consent to be bound by the treaty.
And in common practice, a state can do so in order in accordance with the final clauses of the relevant treaty.
And so what you see here are the most common ways that in practice, such consent to be bound is expressed.
And you see that here in terms of ratification, acceptance or approval, and accession.
These are the most common ways for states to consent to be bound to a treaty.
Thank you, Mr.
Coby.
Thank you.
And we can about you.
But my point is also then the same wording should be used in Article 19.
For the amendments, if you put the approval ratification for the whole document.
So that's the Article 24 says ratification, acceptance approval.
And then in Article 19, it only says acceptance.
That that's my question.
Why is there a difference for the amendment? Okay.
So basically, what is that we should redraft it in line with that one.
Okay.
Maybe those are suggestions that can come back.
Yeah.
Yeah.
So we'll come back to it later.
Okay.
Church here, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Colt, for giving the floor.
I just wanted to echo very quickly with the distinguished target of Belgium set.
That's what we mentioned that's what we meant by mentioning the reference to WBA and because I think it's in Article 72, paragraph three that used a bit different wording.
That's basically what we would like to see in the next draft.
So we avoid any confusion about the process.
Thank you very much.
Che in your written comments, suggest that way so that it helps all of us in that sense.
Thank you.
All right.
Is the chance for 19.
Anybody else on 19, move on.
Nothing.
Okay.
So Article 20, please.
I'm just looking for comments now.
Singapore, please.
Thank you, Colleague.
Happy to break the ice this time.
Just a quick comment, and we thought that because the protocols are meant to be optional, that the language in Article 20 should also reflect this for avoidance of doubt.
Singapore, is it we looked at paragraph four, I looking at something different from what is in paragraph four.
Paragraph four is the state party to the convention is not bound by a protocol unless it becomes a party to the protocol according with the provisions thereof.
Are you referring to something different from that? Yeah.
Perhaps it should be something like a state party to this convention is not bound by protocol unless it becomes, something like that will work as well.
Yeah.
So that's Okay.
Thank you.
Check here, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Corley for giving me the floor.
Jackie, I would like to say that Article 20 needs a more detailed description of the process of submitting a proposal for a protocol.
We will submit a written comment on this, but we would like now to suggest at least for consideration to add wording similar to Article 17 paragraph two of the UNF TOC, stating that the text of any proposed protocol shall be communicated to the parties by the Secretariat at least six months before such a session, in this case, meaning an ordinary session.
Thank you.
Thank you, France, please.
Thank you, Chair.
We would like to support the intervention by Singapore.
We have the same reading.
It seems to us that for the first it seems to us that Article 20, the party not bound by the protocol unless they have signed it, but I think it is useful clarifying that the protocols are optional and the states can subscribe them if they wish.
United Kingdom, please.
Thank you.
We would concur with the comments from C and from France.
I think it's really important that we're clear that the protocol is optional, which of course was was always the intention, but I think it's important to draw this out in the text.
I think we would also welcome clarity more generally on the legal status of the protocols.
When I think back to the intersessional meetings, for example, on Protocol one, I We asked for clarification about the legal status of that instrument and received none.
I think it would be helpful for us to understand that.
I think also particularly to understand whether protocols were intended to operationalize existing Framework Convention obligations or create new obligations.
For example, it would be helpful for us to understand the extent to which legally and operationally, Article 5, to give an example, is supposed to be defined by Protocol one.
I think we still have questions around that too.
I think a few things about the practical operations of the protocols which I think are important to draw out and as I said, we certainly echo the comments by France.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Austria, please.
Cote, we would like to echo the distinguished delegates before us.
We do recognize the progress made in relation to Article 20.
However, especially relating to the newly formulated paragraph one, we're not sure that it sufficiently reflects the optional nature of protocols and that the commitments under the Framework Convention can be met outside of those protocols.
So we would welcome some work and discussions in that regard.
Thank you.
Okay.
Thank you.
Germany, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Scot.
Like Austria, the UK, Singapore, France, we also would welcome clarification that protocols are optional in the sense that parties cannot be expected either legally or in practice to sign them.
The mere fact that they are only bound following a signature as a matter, of course, and does not sufficiently ensure that the signature of those protocols are meant to be optional.
Thank you.
Thank you.
No, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Cold.
We would also support the request for clarifying the optionality of protocols.
It has an impact on the later assessment of whether state parties have fulfilled their obligations to underline that the protocols are optional and should thereby not necessarily be part of a review of implementation of obligations if a state party has not signed up to a protocol.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Can you please? Thank you, colleague.
I make this submission on behalf of the 54 member states of the African group.
The African group will be submitting more detailed written input on this article.
However, we wanted to elaborate on a few issues under paragraph two, which provides for entry into force of the protocol.
In our view, this should be enhanced to say that the procedure for amendment of this convention shall also apply to the protocols of the Framework Convention.
We also see room for language that would state that the protocols shall be administered and implemented in accordance with the convention, and the structural and governance structure available to the Framework Convention should also facilitate implementation of the protocol.
Thank you, Colleague.
Thank you.
He, please.
Thank you, colleague.
We echo Singapore, Austria, and others regarding the optionality of the protocols.
We think language could be added to make it clear that all protocols are optional given that paragraph one says protocols are there to implement the convention.
Thank you.
Thank you, Botswana, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Colled for affording us the opportunity to speak and greetings to all distinguished members and delegates.
Mr.
Cold, instead of ours is a comment.
Instead of members seeking clarity, may we have written input from them that may substantively improve the drafting of paragraph four because as you stated earlier, maybe we need to see it from members who wish to see it drafted differently.
Thank you.
Thank you, Israel, please.
Hi, I just want to echo the UK, Austria, Germany about the importance of the optionality of the protocol.
Thank you.
Thank you, Brazil, please.
For me, the wording is clear that the protocols are optional, but Well, honestly, if they wanted to countries want to feel more comfortable or more agreeable to include the word optional, it's that was what was intended since the beginning and we would support that if it brings more countries to an agreeable position.
In relation to whether not signing a protocol will serve as an element of assessment, evaluation, recommendation.
Uh, in the review of the discharge of the obligations of the convention, we will have to decide in the future.
It might be the case that some countries don't have any need for protocols because the treaties are in line or because they have sufficient instruments to deal with the exchange of information, for instance, or um I don't think that we can state here that not signing a protocol cannot be used as one way of assessing the discharge of the fulfillment of the obligations of the convention.
I think that we will have to be read in a specific context in each individual case, honestly.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Benjamin, please.
Thank you, colleague.
Just wanted to echo what the distinguished delegates from Singapore, Austria, Czech Republic, and France have said before regarding the relation with the protocol, we believe it could be made it could be elaborated more upon the fact that it's optional.
And in paragraph one where it says, and also the distinguished delegate of the UAE touched upon it where it says to implement or elaborate this convention.
I believe in other conventions, it's stated also to supplement.
Is that not a better wording? So to change may adopt protocols to supplement so that it makes it clear that it's a supplement, but not part or a way to implement the convention.
Thank you.
Poland, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Colt.
I would like also to echo comments of Austria Czech Republic, France, Singapore, and other distinguished colleagues as far as the protocol optionality of the protocols is concerned.
I believe that we need here the expressly stated sentence which could say that nothing in this convention creates any obligation for the contracting state to sign a protocol, and then we can say that the contracting party may adapt protocols to implement and elaborate this convention.
But I think that this first part that nothing in this convention creates an obligation to the party to sign a protocol to adopt protocol would be needed.
Thank you.
Thank you, Zambia, please.
Thank you, Chair.
Just quickly, I'd like to echo the comments made by the distinguished delegate of Kenya on behalf of the Africa group.
I think also just to show, I was a bit confused just like a colleague from Brazil, that this article was not providing for optionality.
Because when I look at paragraph four, I know it doesn't have the word optionality, but when I interpret it, it means it's optional.
But anyway, I was just taken aback.
I started thinking maybe there's something I'm missing, but at least it's comforting to note that even Brazil noticed that is optionality, I submit.
Sweden, please.
Thank you for letting me speak.
We would also like to wish to see as Poland and many other speakers mentioned that clarification on that protocols are optional.
Thank you.
Eco, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Cory for giving me the floor again.
Hearing the discussion of the distinguished colleagues, including the comment of the distinguished colleague of Botswana, we would like to suggest to switch to line by line drafting and try to edit the text of the fourth paragraph together now while compiling the comments.
It might be easier for you, Mr.
Cord and the Secretariat than submitting written comments in several weeks.
Thank you.
I still believe that it might be better to give the comments and that drafting with so many people, the lawyers will tell you is one of the most I don't know if they have a word for it, I've forgotten the word for it, it's going to be a terrible activity because everybody will want to put a comma here and you have everybody doing it.
It's going to take forever.
I think it might be better for us to give if we have wording, we can read out the way we want the wording to be, but it's not a draft issue that we are going to draft line by line.
I think that's the way we look at it.
Ba please.
Thank you once again, Mr.
Cold.
I think as we proceed on this issue or on our discussions regarding the Framework Convention, we should always go back to the terms of reference.
Paragraph 14 under protocols.
I say this because I keep hearing the issue of option, state members having an option coming up.
But if you read paragraph 14 under protocols and the terms of reference, it says, protocols are a separate legally binding instrument, a separate legally binding instrument under the Framework Convention.
To implement or elaborate the Framework Convention.
Then it says, each party to the Framework Convention should have the option whether or not to become party to a protocol or any substantive tax issues either at the time they become party to the Framework Convention or later.
I believe as we keep making interventions, we should also refer to the terms of reference.
Thank you, colleagues.
Thank you, India, please.
Thank you, Cole.
In fact, I think it was the distinguished delegate of Nigeria who was surprised, so was I.
In fact, we have to strike a balance between the language of optionality.
That we build into this article.
Now paragraph four right now says that a state party to this convention is not bound by a protocol unless it becomes a party to the protocol in accordance with the provisions thereof.
I think this language is fair in terms of setting out that these protocols are optional because what paragraph one says is also absolutely true that the conference of parties may adopt protocols to implement or elaborate this convention.
Now, after having said that in paragraph one, put in a very strong language about optionality more than what paragraph four is doing, then it will amount to amount to saying that while protocols actually implement or elaborate this convention, we are prepared to step away from that by allowing optionality in a protocol.
While optionality is understood, I believe that paragraph four serves that purpose.
Now, that brings me another point that was brought up by the distinguished delegate of Brazil, that We have to also then create saving language that if someone does not sign up to a protocol, he will not be held on account or any sort of review or verification that we do under the other article dealing with that in this convention.
So that's the point I think that we need to draw this balance in language, which I think is already there.
So rather than stressing too much on optionality and then running into paragraph one, which is important, I think I believe that the language that is there right now is fair.
Thank you.
N e, please.
Thank you, Chair.
Nigeria also would like to fully support the comments that have been made by Kenyan delegates on behalf of the 54 African group members.
In addition, Nigeria also wish to make the following specific comments.
Number one, in terms of we understand that treaty or protocol provides both rights and obligation.
So while there is emphasis that we should from some delegates that we should include the disclaimer of obligation.
That is, I mean, the protocol is optional, and also that if you are not a signatory, you are not bound by review and other obligations.
I think we should also emphasize in that same breath that you will also not be entitled to benefits of that protocol.
Because if you are disclaiming obligation, we should also disclaim benefits at the same time.
Then We should also clarify the adoption process of protocol.
That the adoption of protocol should also be by simple majority.
When that protocol is developed, the adoption should be by a simple majority.
Thank you.
Germany, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Coley, for giving me the floor again.
I thank the distinguished delegate of Botswana to remind us of Paragraph 14 of the terms of reference, I raised my flag initially to draw our attention to the very same part of the terms of reference following the request to provide a concrete example for how the language could look like to clarify things further.
While in our view, the passage in paragraph 14 of the TRR is not ideal.
It does provide a degree of clarity that is missing here.
I'm referring to the sentence that reads, Each party to the Framework Convention should have the option whether or not to become party to a protocol on any substantive tax issues either at the time they become party to the Framework Convention or later.
It was then said by the distinguished delegate from Botswana that there is no need to reproduce it because it is already in the TRR.
I have to say, I find this argument rather surprising.
Following that logic, there would be no need for us to restate in the Framework Convention many of the other points that are already contained in the TRR, that can't be it.
I stop here.
Thank you.
Thank you, South Africa, please.
Thank you, colleague.
We just want to support the statement that has been made by Kenya on behalf of the Africa Group, as well as other comments that have been made that seeks to support this language, that it's quite clear.
I think even from our side, we think that it's fine.
It might be the issue of a style, and then we try to look into some of the languages that has been used in the past by the UN.
I think then maybe if the other colleagues can also look into this United Nations Convention Against Organized Crime, then we find that Article 37 0.72 and three.
Actually has the similar language as this one.
On our side, we just want to highlight that we don't have any issue with the current ring.
Thanks.
Thank you.
Can you go length, please.
Thank you, colleagues.
I wanted to draw your attention back to a comment that our distinguished delegate from Belgium made.
The written submission that we can maybe implement to supplement.
I think that it differs.
It depends on what we are trying to achieve here.
In our view, the conference of the parties may adopt protocols in order to supplement the convention.
In the future, we might want to discuss different issues that have been mentioned in the Framework Convention, but that there is no protocol Yet that is addressing that issue.
That will be to supplement the convention.
I'm not sure what elaborate means, whether with elaborate, we are actually trying to say that we may supplement the convention.
Um, and the exchange of information commitments in the Framework Convention may be fulfilled, for example, by signing up to the MAC, but there may also be a separate protocol that if you sign up to that protocol that you are then fulfilling the commitments and parties may, of course, always choose whatever means that they wish to adopt in order to fulfill their commitments.
But if a state party would decide to sign up to a protocol which fulfills the commitment on exchange of information, for example, then that would be a protocol that would implement the convention.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Russian Federation, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Co Chair for giving me the floor.
It's a joke that if you have two lawyers, you always have three opinions on the same topic of discussion.
And when our delegation was preparing for this session, we considered how various provisions, various texts of the articles could be interpreted.
We had probably four such lawyers, but that doesn't mean that we had ten opinions on this.
All four came to the conclusion that this article offers optionality, which everyone is mentioning.
So on the other hand, we need to respect the views of colleagues who request clarification of certain language.
In the future discussion, we'd like to know whether this optionality flows from paragraph four of Article 20 or whether there's some other reason for proposing other language.
That is the question that I'm asking myself.
In one of your responses, Mr.
Co Chair, you said that probably a good idea to receive written comments from those colleagues.
Then with specific text or concrete text, we could examine.
There are 193 lawyers here.
We probably have at least I'm sure we'll have 193 identical opinions on this thing.
Thank you.
Unfortunately, you talked about liars.
The other joke is that if you have ten economists and give them the same question, you get 20 different answers.
Let's go to M Bergin, please.
Well, thank you, colleague.
I can certainly agree with you and the distinguished delegates of Russia that we will have very different opinions if you put two lawyers together.
Yeah.
That is also my point where I wanted to come back on the fact.
Article 20 now says in paragraph one, the conference of the parties may adopt protocols to implement or elaborate this convention.
Okay, if That is, and if we can add the language also to give more comfort as the distinguished delegate of Germany proposed coming from the TOR also, because if we now read Article 20 paragraph one, and then we have the review Article 16 paragraph one, then it says that we have to provide information on legislative and administrative measures to implement this convention as required by the Conference of the Parties.
Then if the Conference of the Parties the way the decision making will be made by the conference of the states parties is not clear yet and we don't know what the impact of the reviews might be or the consequences, then it would give more comfort.
If we really have this as a standalone that the Framework Convention can be signed separately and it's possible that you don't sign a protocol, then it has to be legally possible also and there has to be uh, not a possibility through the conference of the states parties that there is an enforcement in a way in that way to that if we have to that we have only implemented it in the correct way if we have signed up for the protocol in every instance, also referring to what the distinguished delegate of the Netherlands said before me.
If it is truly optional, the protocols, then it should be made clear, and then it should also be made clear.
And then Um, maybe in Article 16, Belgium would feel more comfortable if the last part would be deleted as required by the conference of the states parties.
Thank you.
Ireland, please.
Okay.
To every concerned jurisdiction, including Ireland.
We support adding text to clarify that the adoption or signing of protocols is optional for parties to the convention.
Thank you.
Thank you, Portugal, please.
Thank you, Mr.
Colleague.
Two quick interventions.
One, just to say that we also support what many have said here to reinforce the optionality of the protocol, having something like saying nothing in this convention bounds the state parties to sign the protocols or something else.
What was perfectly clear for me from this discussion, it is the importance of having not explanatory statements because now I understand perfectly what it is.
It is a text that is done after the convention, but the clarifying note It's not have to be something very elaborate, but just think this article was inspired on this article 0F the UN Convention.
When we start analyzing it, we have a clear starting point.
This notes will help towards efficiency of the discussion here on the sessions.
It will be helpful also towards transparency to know what we are always talking about.
That way we will have a clear starting point.
Thank you, Mr.
Colit.
Thank you.
Li Soto, please.
Thank you, Chair.
The Soto aligns itself to the position canvassed by I Kenya on behalf of the African states.
Perhaps just turn into the issue of paragraph four.
The concern that other member states have, I think personally, I understand where that comes from.
When you look at what happens in other fora, we have jurisdictions and states that have been forced directly or otherwise into joining such jurisdictions or arrangements or platforms and in the process have been a assessed.
That's where the issues of being assessed and being reviewed comes from as far as I'm concerned.
I think parties seeking to have optionality stated there under paragraph four, which is actually available, don't want to fall into that trap, whereby in some other fora, a lot of developing countries and jurisdictions have been forced to join those fora by assessment or otherwise.
And when you look at that, the instruments thereof, we're not indicating as to whether those were optional or not.
I think it makes perfect sense to me with that background.
If you look at many jurisdictions and countries that are part and parcel of the global forum, some of them were not ready to join because they did not see any immediate benefits to them, but somehow they were able to attract into the process.
And so I think this is what the concern that people who are raising the issue of optionality are coming from.
Otherwise, as we indicated, we fully subscribe to the position conversed by Kenya on behalf of the African states.
Thank you, Chair.
Thank you, Kenya, please.
Thank you, colleague.
Speaking in our national capacity, we share the view that paragraph four is clear on the concept of optionality and we also agree with the distinguished delegate from Nigeria that this paragraph should also make it clear that both the obligations and the benefits of a protocol will not be extended to states who are not parties to a protocol.
We also align with a statement made on behalf of the Africa group.
Especially the provision saying that the protocols should be administered in line with the Framework Convention.
There's a provision which would probably be more relevant under Article 21, but I think in relation to protocols, we just wanted to mention it here as well.
To have a provision that will make it clear that the objectives, principles, and commitments of the Framework Convention shall governorship and be applicable to the protocols as well.
And also be clear that where there is a conflict between the convention and that of the protocols, then the provisions of the convention shall prevail.
I think that will be a very important provision to have, whether we have it in Article 21, but we'll also discuss it when we get in Article 20, but we will discuss it also when we get to Article 21.
Thank you, Colleague.
Thank you.
Denmark, please.
Thank you, Coley, for the floor and giving me the chance to speak.
From our point of view, we have been following the discussion and at this moment, I'm not sure I understand what exactly we are discussing, as in this room seems to be an agreement that all protocols are optional.
There is an ask for having language which makes this point clear to everyone and gives comfort and there has been made reference to specific language from the term of reference.
As there is agreement between us on protocols being optional, we are finding it rather hard to understand the argument against using language from the TRRs also in this article, but we are very keen in understanding the concerns from other states of using this language again.
And we would invite them to explain this to us because as we hear the room, there is actually no disagreement between us on the fact that protocols are optional.
So with that, I will close.
Thank you.
Okay.
Speed, please.
Thank you for giving me the floor.
I was going to make the same comments as Denmark.
I'm following the debate.
I think there's an agreement on the optionality.
I don't really understand why this clarification cannot be included, given that it is requested by a large number of states and these are options.
Everyone agrees on that.
I think this is a good way of resolving this problem in the article by including this clarification.
Thank you.
Thank you, Real.
Thank you for allowing me to intervene again.
I see some merits in the word of supplementing, but I also see merits in using the word implement, because it does both.
Protocols will somehow implement, maybe it will derive and complement somehow the convention.
Both words, if it's a reasonable way to approach, we can add one more word there.
We can say supplement, implement or elaborate the convention.
Or we can simply remove all of those two verbs, may adopt protocols.
Yeah.
To this convention.
I mean, I'm involved with transfer pricing legislation, the drafting I'm an obsession sometimes, but there are different ways to approach me.
One way to accommodate is to say that it's both actually because it is, in fact, both.
It's a way to supplement and to implement as well.
There are other ways to implement the convention with administrative practices internally with so many ways.
It's just the fulfillment of the obligations of the convention will occur in different manners, not only protocols.
Thank you.
Thank you.
The glass is half empty or half full.
Anyway, African Union, please.
Thank you, colleague.
We align ourselves with a submission made by Kenya on behalf of the Africa group, specifically the redrafting of paragraph two and the comments made by Botswana, Nigeria, Lestu and Kenya in its national capacity and agree with Zambia, South Africa, Brazil, India, and the Russian lawyers that the language on optionality is already implied in paragraph four, I submit, thank you.
All right.
Thank you.
All right.
Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, I believe that we've exhausted this particular article.
The 6 minutes we have left doesn't allow us to start the next article.
I wish we could have started, but we can't.
And we'll give everybody a 6 minutes early rising and say thank you and good night for everybody.
(8th meeting) - Fifth Session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on the UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation (INC Tax) - 3 to 13 August 2026
The Fifth Session will take place at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 3 to 13 August 2026.
Description
The United Nations General Assembly has established an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) to draft a United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation and two early protocols.
The United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation is a proposed international legal instrument aimed at improving global tax cooperation. This Member State-led process will run from 2025 to 2027, with the aim of developing a framework convention that leads to fully inclusive and more effective international tax cooperation.
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